The Regime’s Struggle against Internal Opposition

Author(s):  
Pesach Malovany ◽  
Amatzia Baram ◽  
Kevin M. Woods ◽  
Ronna Englesberg

This chapter deals with the regime’s struggle against internal opposition and the internal security problem after 1991, and how it responded to it. These included open resistance by different factions of the population (mainly Shiites), which continued even after the brutal suppression of the Intifada (March 1991), as well as growing attempts in the 1990s by various elements in the armed forces to stage a military coup. These developments caused Saddam to place defending the regime against internal threats at the top of his agenda, whereas the struggle against external threats was considered to be of secondary importance. The regime’s chief response was to strengthen Iraq’s intelligence and security organizations and enlarge the forces that defend the regime, and employing harsh measures against any opposition.

Author(s):  
Y. S. Kudryashova

During the government of AK Party army leaders underprivileged to act as an exclusive guarantor preserving a secular regime in the country. The political balance between Secular and Islamite elites was essentially removed after Erdogan was elected Turkish President. Consistently toughening authoritarian regime of a ruling party deeply accounts for a military coup attempt and earlier periodically occurred disturbance especially among the young. The methods of a coup showed the profundity of a split and the lack of cohesion in Turkish armed forces. Erdogan made the best use of a coup attempt’s opportunities to concentrate all power in his hands and to consolidate a present regime. The mass support of the population during a coup attempt ensured opportunities for a fundamental reorganization of a political system. Revamped Constitution at most increases political powers of the President.


2020 ◽  
pp. 123-153
Author(s):  
Muhammad Maigari Abdullahi ◽  
Usman Ahmad Karofi ◽  
Uthman Abdullahi Abdul-Quadir ◽  
Ibrahim Arafat

This article identifies different operational codenames adopted by the Nigerian military in special domestic operations from 1966-2019 and examined whether the operations were executed in line with the codenames. In Nigeria, the military has an established tradition of codenaming special operations, in both internal and foreign missions. Since 1966, the Nigerian military has been involved in internal security management and codenamed all the operations using both English and local language names. The aftermath of the first military coup d'état on 15th January 1966, was the beginning of military involvement in domestic security operations in addition to their constitutional responsibility of defending the territorial integrity of the country. The Effect Perspective (TEP) is adopted as the theoretical framework which gives proper nuance to the study. Methodologically, data were elicited through in-depth interviews. The findings explain why several military operations have failed to achieve the objectives of their codenames. It concludes that there is no correlation between the operational codenames and their outcomes of special military operations in Nigeria because the desired results of restoring peace have not been achieved within the specific time frame given when they were launched. The paper concludes that the majority of special military operations launched in Nigeria failed below expectations and unable to restore peace in their country in line with the operational codenames as a result of factors identified in the study.


Author(s):  
Marco Bünte

Myanmar has had one of the longest ruling military regimes in the world. Ruling directly or indirectly for more than five decades, Myanmar’s armed forces have been able to permeate the country’s main political institutions, its economy, and its society. Myanmar is a highly revealing case study for examining the trajectory of civil–military relations over the past seven decades. Myanmar ended direct military rule only in 2011 after the military had become the most powerful institution in society, weakened the political party opposition severely, coopted several ethnic armed groups, and built up a business empire that allowed it to remain financially independent. The new tutelary regime—established in 2011 after proclaiming a roadmap to “discipline flourishing democracy” in 2003, promulgating a new constitution in 2008, and holding (heavily scripted) elections in 2010—allowed a degree of power-sharing between elected civilian politicians and the military for a decade. Although policymaking in economic, financial, and social arenas was transferred to the elected government, the military remained in firm control of external and internal security and continued to be completely autonomous in the management of its own affairs. As a veto power, the military was also able to protect its prerogatives from a position of strength. Despite this dominant position in the government, civil–military relations were hostile and led to a coup in February 2021. The military felt increasingly threatened and humiliated as civilians destroyed the guardrails it had put in place to protect its core interests within the tutelary regime. The military also felt increasingly alienated as the party the military had established repeatedly failed to perform in the elections.


Author(s):  
Derek Lutterbeck

Coup-proofing—that is, measures aimed at preventing military coups and ensuring military loyalty—has been a key feature of civil–military relations in Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) states. Just as the MENA region has been one of the most coup-prone regions in the world, coup-proofing has been an essential instrument of regime survival in Arab countries. The most commonly found coup-proofing strategies in the region include (a) so-called “communal coup-proofing,” involving the appointment of individuals to key positions within the military based on family, ethnic, or religious ties; (b) providing the military with corporate and/or private benefits in order to ensure its loyalty; (c) creating parallel military forces in addition to the regular military, so as to “counter-balance” the latter; (d) monitoring of the military through a vast internal security and intelligence apparatus; and (e) promoting professionalism, and thus political neutrality, within the military. The experiences of the “Arab Spring,” however, have shown that not all of these strategies are equally effective in ensuring military loyalty during times of popular upheavals and regime crises. A common finding in this context has been that communal coup-proofing (or militaries based on “patrimonialism”) creates the strongest bonds been the armed forces and their regimes, as evidenced by the forceful suppression of the popular uprising by the military in countries such as Syria, or by parts of the military in Libya and Yemen. By contrast, where coup-proofing has been based on the provision of material benefits to the military or on counterbalancing, as in Tunisia or Egypt, the armed forces have refrained from suppressing the popular uprising, ultimately leading to the downfall of these countries’ long-standing leaders. A further lesson that can be drawn from the Arab Spring in terms of coup-proofing is that students of both military coups and coup-proofing should dedicate (much) more attention to the increasingly important role played by the internal security apparatus in MENA countries.


Author(s):  
Daniel W. B. Lomas

Chapter Six focuses on the Government response to Communism at home. Shaped by their wartime experiences of intelligence and security, it argues that the popular perception that Ministers were suspicious of the intelligence services, particularly the Security Service, is unfounded, based largely upon Labour folklore. In fact, rather than viewing MI5 with distain, even alarm, Ministers in the new government were aware of the need for an internal security body; any changes in the security apparatus were the result of the recommendations made by Sir Findlater Stewart, whose report of November 1945 is examined here for the first time. The chapter also looks at the development of Whitehall security procedures using the minutes and memoranda of the Committee on Subversive Activities (GEN 183). It argues that, as in the field of British policy towards Russia, domestic countermeasures measures against Communists in the civil service were hidden until the spring of 1948 after attempts at Anglo-Soviet rapprochement finally broke down. Despite the introduction and later expansion of vetting, Ministers sought to balance anti-Communist measures alongside the need for freedom of speech and liberty. Nowhere is this clearer than in discussions for domestic anti-Communist propaganda. While the Labour Party and other organisations had participated in the distribution of such material, IRD had no specific mandate to conduct its activities at home. However, after the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, Ministers authorised a domestic campaign aimed at influential sections of the British public, with the study looking at the early development of this campaign, revealing IRD’s domestic activities in education, industry and the armed forces.


Author(s):  
Ekim Arbatli ◽  
Cemal Eren Arbatli

Why do coups d’état happen? Although many studies have investigated this question, they pay relatively little attention to the international causes and ramifications of coups. Especially, empirical studies on the external determinants of coup risk and outcomes still remain limited. There are two current lines of research in this direction. The first line studies international linkages and coup risk, looking at the external determinants of coups: regional spillover effects, foreign linkage, and foreign leverage. A promising angle on this front is focusing on the role of post-coup reactions from international actors to illuminate how coup plotters shape their incentives under outside pressure. The second line of research investigates interstate conflict and coup risk, considering diversionary behavior and external threats as potential coup-proofing strategies. In this effort, studying the relationship between external threat environment and coup risk can be fruitful, whereas empirical tests of the classical diversionary war theory will yield relatively marginal contributions. Currently, three issues stand out in the empirical coup literature that should be further addressed by scholars. First is the need for more extensive and systematic data collection efforts to obtain detailed information about the identities, targets, and motives of coup perpetrators. Second, the external sources of leader insecurity beyond interstate conflicts remain an underexplored area. Third, although many studies have tried to determine when coup attempts happen, scholarly knowledge of when and how they succeed remains very limited. More work is needed to uncover the determinants of coup success across different regimes and leader survival scenarios.


Author(s):  
Maiah Jaskoski

Under Ecuador’s “third wave” democracy that began in 1979, the armed forces have exhibited considerable autonomy vis-à-vis civilians in government, as measured by (a) military intervention in politics and (b) the armed forces’ spread into internal security. Perhaps most noteworthy, military participation in politics and internal security increased significantly during the second half of the 1990s, in a permissive environment: as a result of their rule in the 1970s, the armed forces enjoyed a positive reputation within society as an institution capable of getting things done, without committing human rights abuses. Within that context, a traumatic military role crisis prompted the armed forces to expand their political and internal security roles. The armed forces lost their traditional mission of defending Ecuador’s southern border against Peru in the late 1990s, due to the resolution of that border dispute. In its search for institutional justification, the military proactively intensified its participation in politics and internal security. That extensive internal security work not only served as an indicator of military autonomy vis-à-vis civilians but it also made the armed forces ineffective and unreliable in responding to the civilian government’s basic national defense requirements, as evinced by the military’s response to a new sovereignty threat. When Colombian guerrilla crossings into northern Ecuador became a salient border threat in the 2000s, the armed forces focused on internal security in the north and not border defense.


2020 ◽  
Vol Special Issue ◽  
pp. 49-59
Author(s):  
Krzysztof Justyński

At the moment in Poland, specialised dispositional groups such as the armed forces, the police, and various guards and other services are constituted. The fundamental tool that the state has at its disposal to counteract potential threats to internal security and public order, and to react appropriately to existing threats is a separate body — the police. The main objective of this paper is to define the practical benefits which can be gained as a result of organising cooperation between the police units mentioned above in an appropriate way. This paper is an attempt to present practical cooperation between a local police unit and the Police Academy in Szczytno. It also points out the distinct nature of functioning of the Regional Police Headquarters in Katowice and its dependent units; it describes the impact that cooperation with an educational institution has on the quality of preserving public security and order as well as the practical aspect of such cooperation on the example of the organisational units of the Polish National Police specified above.


Subject The political role of the armed forces. Significance The armed forces have recently assumed an unusually high political profile. The current government has appointed generals to high-level positions and ordered a large-scale intervention led by the army in Rio de Janeiro state security institutions. These measures, many of them unprecedented, are an attempt by President Michel Temer to boost his popularity as a ‘tough-on-crime’ leader. The armed forces are one of the few public institutions enjoying high levels of trust among Brazilians. Impacts Despite recent protest calls for a military coup, support for such a move is restricted to a radical minority. Resistance against further reliance on the military for domestic law enforcement will rise, including among senior officers. Bolsonaro will focus his message on crime, promising to bring more military members into his cabinet, including the Education Ministry.


2017 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 368-378 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ejaz Hussain

In 2014, Armed Forces & Society published Ali’s work, “Contradiction of Concordance Theory: Failure to Understand Military intervention in Pakistan.” Shortly thereafter in 2015, Schiff, the author of concordance theory, defended her theory with “Concordance Theory in Pakistan: Response to Zulfiqar Ali.” To this, Ali reiterated his position with, “Pakistan, Military Coup and Concordance: Four Objections to Schiff.” In response to Ali’s ideas, this article argues that Ali’s accounts not only lack theoretical and methodological rigor but also suffer from empirical fallacies and factual errors. Thus, he has failed to understand military intervention in Pakistan.


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