An Infinite Game

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (10) ◽  
pp. 76-82
Author(s):  
Dean Gessie ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Short Fiction ◽  
Simple Game ◽  
Value Theory ◽  
Infinite Game ◽  
Saw Blade

What aspects of game theory and value theory get tossed out the window for pragmatism when your life is actually on the line? In this work of philosophical short fiction, the narrator is held by a mad man interested in delighting his grotesque ideas with a simple game. He has lined up four prisoners, front to back, selected for position by lottery, and intends to see how far his bayonet saw blade will penetrate. The first man in lines knows he will die, so he turns, runs, and is shot dead. Now the second man in line knows he will die. Our narrator tries to encourage the new front man to die with honor, rather than run away. Of course, his real motivation is to save his own life. While the narrator is talking to the man at the front of the line, their captor stabs the person in the back of the line, killing him. He has changed the rules, and now the game is over. "Everything" the mad man argues, "is a game." The only real question is, "can I play?"

scholarly journals On the Analytics of Infinite Game Theory Problems

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zahra Gambarova ◽  
Dionysius Glycopantis
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Infinite Game

scholarly journals Bounds for Owen's Multilinear Extension

2007 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 852-864 ◽  
Author(s):  
Josep Freixas
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Simple Game ◽  
Practical Interest ◽  
Simple Games ◽  
Theoretical Interest ◽  
Complex Component ◽  
Multilinear Extension ◽  
Voting System ◽  
Minimal Winning Coalitions ◽  
Minimal Blocking

Owen's multilinear extension (MLE) of a game is a very important tool in game theory and particularly in the field of simple games. Among other applications it serves to efficiently compute several solution concepts. In this paper we provide bounds for the MLE. Apart from its self-contained theoretical interest, the bounds offer the means in voting system studies of approximating the probability that a proposal is approved in a particular simple game having a complex component arrangement. The practical interest of the bounds is that they can be useful for simple games having a tedious MLE to evaluate exactly, but whose minimal winning coalitions and minimal blocking coalitions can be determined by inspection. Such simple games are quite numerous.

scholarly journals Game theory application in marketing of innovation activity at industrial enterprises

2020 ◽  
Vol 311 ◽  
pp. 02013
Author(s):  
Alexander Samoldin
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Marketing Strategy ◽  
Service Sector ◽  
Simple Game ◽  
Optimal Choice ◽  
Innovation Activity ◽  
Industrial Enterprises ◽  
Innovative Products ◽  
Theory Application ◽  
External Conditions

The theoretical game approach to analyzing marketing objectives in innovation activity is a reasonable supplement to the traditional methods and models of managing enterprises>’ marketing. The optimal choice of innovative products is significantly more important for industrial enterprises as unlike the commerce and service sector there are more expenses on the development and production of innovative products. Relatively simple game models allow checking the choice of a marketing strategy for various external conditions.

scholarly journals Perfect or Bounded Rationality?

2004 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Werner Güth
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Simple Game ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Economic Behavior ◽  
Social Phenomena ◽  
Classical Economics ◽  
Experimental Game ◽  
New Synthesis ◽  
Experimental Game Theory ◽  
Reward Allocation

AbstractSimple game experiments of the reward allocation, dictator and ultimatum type are used to demonstrate that true explanations of social phenomena cannot conceivably be derived in terms of the perfect rationality concept underlying neo-classical economics. We explore in some depth, if speculatively, how experimental game theory might bring us closer to a new synthesis or at least the nucleus of a general theory of ‘games and boundedly rational economic behavior’ with enhanced explanatory power.

The Swing Ratio and Game Theory

1972 ◽  
Vol 66 (2) ◽  
pp. 551-554 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Sankoff ◽  
Koula Mellos
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Major Part ◽  
Simple Game ◽  
Hard Core ◽  
Theory Model ◽  
Mixed Strategies ◽  
Effect Factors ◽  
Asymptotically Optimal ◽  
Ratio Effect ◽  
Total Vote

We propose a simple game-theory model of single-member plurality electoral systems, two parties with unequal resources being the players. Strategies consist of allocations of resources among the n contests, and a party's payoff is the number of contests to which it has assigned more resources than the other party. Mixed strategies exist which are asymptotically optimal as n increases. Identifying a party's proportion of total resources with its total vote proportion, we predict that the swing ratio, or marginal seat proportion per vote proportion, is 2. This compares to empirical findings which range between 2 and 4, and to the hitherto unexplained cube law, which predicts 3. We suggest that the strategic problem modeled by this game accounts for the major part of the swing ratio effect. Factors which vary from system to system, such as proportion of hard-core support attached to parties, may amplify this effect.

scholarly journals Entry, Competition, and Regulation in Cognitive Radio Scenarios: A Simple Game Theory Model

2012 ◽  
Vol 2012 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luis Guijarro ◽  
Vicent Pla ◽  
Jose R. Vidal ◽  
Jorge Martinez-Bauset
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Cognitive Radio ◽  
Simple Game ◽  
Spectrum Management ◽  
Theory Model ◽  
Innovative Technology ◽  
Primary Operator ◽  
Radio Technology ◽  
Cognitive Radio Technology

Spectrum management based on private commons is argued to be a realistic scenario for cognitive radio deployment within the current mobile market structure. A scenario is proposed where a secondary entrant operator leases spectrum from a primary incumbent operator. The secondary operator innovates incorporating cognitive radio technology, and it competes in quality of service and price against the primary operator in order to provide service to users. We aim to assess which benefit users get from the entry of secondary operators in the market. A game theory-based model for analyzing both the competition between operators and the subscription decision by users is proposed. We conclude that an entrant operator adopting an innovative technology is better off entering the market, and that a regulatory authority should intervene first allowing the entrant operator to enter the market and then setting a maximum amount of spectrum leased. This regulatory intervention is justified in terms of users utility and social welfare.

scholarly journals THE NEW BASEL ACCORD AND THE NATURE OF RISK: A GAME THEORETIC PERSPECTIVE

2008 ◽  
Vol 04 (01) ◽  
pp. 0850003 ◽  
Author(s):  
VOLKER BIETA ◽  
UDO BROLL ◽  
HELLMUTH MILDE ◽  
WILFRIED SIEBE
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Risk Management ◽  
Simple Game ◽  
Basel Ii ◽  
Behavioral Risk ◽  
Strategic Decisions ◽  
Basel Accord ◽  
Strategic Model ◽  
Model Setting ◽  
Basic Ideas

Basel II changes risk management in banks strongly. Internal rating procedures would lead one to expect that banks are changing over to active risk control. But, if risk management is no longer a simple "game against nature", if all agents involved are active players then a shift from a non-strategic model setting (measuring event risk stochastically) to a more general strategic model setting (measuring behavioral risk adequately) comes true. Knowing that a game is any situation in which the players make strategic decisions — i.e. decisions that take into account each other's actions and responses — game theory is a useful set of tools for better understanding different risk settings. Embedded in a short history of the Basel Accord in this article we introduce some basic ideas of game theory in the context of rating procedures in accordance with Basel II. As well, some insight is given how game theory works. Here, the primary value of game theory stems from its focus on behavioral risk: risk when all agents are presumed rational, each attempting to anticipate likely actions and reactions by its rivals.

Game Theory in Context

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Suk-Young Chwe
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Simple Game ◽  
Strategic Thinking ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Mansfield Park ◽  
Much Ado About Nothing ◽  
Game Theoretic

This chapter explains game theory from the ground up. It first considers the concepts of choice and preferences before discussing strategic thinking as a combination of several skills. Game theory is built upon rational choice theory, and the chapter uses an example from Jane Austen's Mansfield Park to illustrate first rational choice theory and then game theory. To demonstrate the usefulness of game theory, it uses a simple game-theoretic model to show how Beatrice and Benedick in William Shakespeare's Much Ado About Nothing, Richard and Harrison in Richard Wright's Black Boy, and people revolting against an oppressive regime all face the same situation. Finally, it reviews previous work trying to bring game theory, as well as related concepts such as “theory of mind,” together with the study of literature.

scholarly journals Bounds for Owen's Multilinear Extension

2007 ◽  
Vol 44 (04) ◽  
pp. 852-864 ◽  
Author(s):  
Josep Freixas
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Simple Game ◽  
Practical Interest ◽  
Simple Games ◽  
Theoretical Interest ◽  
Complex Component ◽  
Multilinear Extension ◽  
Voting System ◽  
Minimal Winning Coalitions ◽  
Minimal Blocking

Owen's multilinear extension (MLE) of a game is a very important tool in game theory and particularly in the field of simple games. Among other applications it serves to efficiently compute several solution concepts. In this paper we provide bounds for the MLE. Apart from its self-contained theoretical interest, the bounds offer the means in voting system studies of approximating the probability that a proposal is approved in a particular simple game having a complex component arrangement. The practical interest of the bounds is that they can be useful for simple games having a tedious MLE to evaluate exactly, but whose minimal winning coalitions and minimal blocking coalitions can be determined by inspection. Such simple games are quite numerous.

scholarly journals Optimization of chronic lymphocytic leukemia treatment using game theory

2021 ◽  
pp. 57-63
Author(s):  
A. S. Luchinin ◽  
V. V. Strugov
Keyword(s):  
Risk Factors ◽  
Game Theory ◽  
Chronic Lymphocytic Leukemia ◽  
Success Rate ◽  
Genetic Risk ◽  
Simple Game ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Genetic Risk Factors ◽  
Lymphocytic Leukemia ◽  
Simple Method

The current strategy of chronic lymphocytic leukemia (CLL) treatment is based on genetic risk factors such as del(17p), TP53 mutations and/or unmutated variant of IGHV genes. Guidelines recommend the usage of targeted drugs, e.g. ibrutinib, in the first line for patients with unfavorable risk factors due to dismal results of other treatment options. Unfortunately,  in real-life treatment decisions are often made without full knowledge of genetic risk factors in the treated patient. Our aim was to find the optimal therapeutic strategy for such patients, that is, those providing the best 5-year progression-free survival (PFS). Using a relatively simple game theory-based approach we here show, that currently, the used strategy is more advantageous (success rate 71%) compared to administration of immunochemotherapy to all patients (success rate with fludarabine + cyclophosphamide + rituximab — 45%, bendamustine + rituximab — 32%). However, the optimal strategy for CLL treatment in the conditions of unknown genetic risks is the administration of ibrutinib to all patients (success rate 73%). Our simple method can be used for optimization of treatment strategy of any oncologic disease and can be integrated into relevant clinical decision support systems.

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