Grand Days, Dark Palaces

Author(s):  
Heather Rae ◽  
Christian Reus-Smit

Exploring contradictions inherent in liberal orders, this chapter questions the treatment of liberalism in the International Relations academy as a relatively straightforward set of beliefs about the individual, the state, the market, and political justice. It asserts that the contradictions and tensions within liberal internationalism are in fact deep and troubling. Highlighting some of liberalism's obscured and sometimes denied contradictions — between liberal ‘statism’ and liberal ‘cosmopolitanism’; between liberal ‘proceduralism’ and liberal ‘consequentialism’; and between liberal ‘absolutism’ and liberal ‘toleration’ — the chapter explores their implications for liberal ordering practices internationally. It concludes that liberal political engagement necessitates a more reflective standpoint and more historical sensibility if we are to be aware of how contradictions have shaped liberal orders in the past and are likely to continue to do so in the future.

1961 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 170-171
Author(s):  
Bruno Doer

It is always agreeable to offer congratulations to someone who is celebrating a jubilee. It is a particular pleasure to do so when the ‘child’ whose birthday it is can look back over 150 years of existence, and all those who have a share in the jubilee may reflect that the thanks for the achievements of the past and wishes for the future serve the cause of publicity. For no one who sets out to discuss the state of classical studies in Germany can, or should, fail to mention the Leipzig publishing firm of B. G. Teubner. Here publishing and scholarship have in the past century and a half formed an indissoluble partnership which has made it its duty to provide the best texts for use in the study of classical antiquity.


2016 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 286-301 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sandrine Sorlin

This review article brings to the fore what the publication of three handbooks in major publishing houses in the past three years ( The Routledge Handbook of Stylistics, The Cambridge Handbook of Stylistics and The Bloomsbury Companion to Stylistics) can reveal about the state of stylistics in 2016. After depicting the specific character of each volume, the article highlights the way old theoretical models in stylistics are re-exploited in innovative ways and gives prominence to new theories and perspectives that have developed rigorous methodologies and proper purposes. It also makes apparent how the volumes both explicitly and implicitly perceive the field of stylistics as regards its scope and frontiers, the extent of its corpora and its relation with other close disciplines. If it inherently welcomes interdisciplinary collaborations, it yet seems to do so without adulterating its primary concern for language. The three handbooks show that stylistics has entered its prime as a discipline. Yet although it has become a self-assured field, it remains uncompromisingly open to criticism and debate as reflected in some chapters. The last sub-section is devoted to the future prospects of stylistics in terms of the promising research paths the discipline is currently taking.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 241-263 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janis Grzybowski

AbstractThe literature on de facto states challenges the conventional identification of states by legal recognition, proposing to identify states based on their effectiveness instead. Yet, as I argue in this paper, rather than turning the tables on recognition, the de facto state challenge ultimately reveals all state identification in International Relations and international law to be essentially indeterminate. This lacuna, I suggest, is not an accidental omission, but an expression of the foundational paradox of modern political order that is rooted in the intertwined ontology of the state system and the individual states constituting it, with each presupposing the other. As a result, the opposition between empirical facts, political decisions, and legal norms invoked in attempts to identify states cannot but remain irresolvable. This should not be regarded as a problem to be overcome, however, but as a source of social order. Although states cannot be substantively identified, any effort to do so in practice naturalizes the state as the very form through which we articulate and shape political claims, conflicts, and settlements. In performatively enacting states precisely at the contested margins, state identification thus both invokes and (re-)produces the statist international as the central imaginary of modern political order.


Author(s):  
VICTOR BURLACHUK

At the end of the twentieth century, questions of a secondary nature suddenly became topical: what do we remember and who owns the memory? Memory as one of the mental characteristics of an individual’s activity is complemented by the concept of collective memory, which requires a different method of analysis than the activity of a separate individual. In the 1970s, a situation arose that gave rise to the so-called "historical politics" or "memory politics." If philosophical studies of memory problems of the 30’s and 40’s of the twentieth century were focused mainly on the peculiarities of perception of the past in the individual and collective consciousness and did not go beyond scientific discussions, then half a century later the situation has changed dramatically. The problem of memory has found its political sound: historians and sociologists, politicians and representatives of the media have entered the discourse on memory. Modern society, including all social, ethnic and family groups, has undergone a profound change in the traditional attitude towards the past, which has been associated with changes in the structure of government. In connection with the discrediting of the Soviet Union, the rapid decline of the Communist Party and its ideology, there was a collapse of Marxism, which provided for a certain model of time and history. The end of the revolutionary idea, a powerful vector that indicated the direction of historical time into the future, inevitably led to a rapid change in perception of the past. Three models of the future, which, according to Pierre Nora, defined the face of the past (the future as a restoration of the past, the future as progress and the future as a revolution) that existed until recently, have now lost their relevance. Today, absolute uncertainty hangs over the future. The inability to predict the future poses certain challenges to the present. The end of any teleology of history imposes on the present a debt of memory. Features of the life of memory, the specifics of its state and functioning directly affect the state of identity, both personal and collective. Distortion of memory, its incorrect work, and its ideological manipulation can give rise to an identity crisis. The memorial phenomenon is a certain political resource in a situation of severe socio-political breaks and changes. In the conditions of the economic crisis and in the absence of a real and clear program for future development, the state often seeks to turn memory into the main element of national consolidation.


Author(s):  
David Boucher

The classic foundational status that Hobbes has been afforded by contemporary international relations theorists is largely the work of Hans Morgenthau, Martin Wight, and Hedley Bull. They were not unaware that they were to some extent creating a convenient fiction, an emblematic realist, a shorthand for all of the features encapsulated in the term. The detachment of international law from the law of nature by nineteenth-century positivists opened Hobbes up, even among international jurists, to be portrayed as almost exclusively a mechanistic theorist of absolute state sovereignty. If we are to endow him with a foundational place at all it is not because he was an uncompromising realist equating might with right, on the analogy of the state of nature, but instead to his complete identification of natural law with the law of nations. It was simply a matter of subject that distinguished them, the individual and the state.


Author(s):  
Abbie J. Shipp

Temporal focus is the individual tendency to characteristically think more or less about the past, present, and future. Although originally rooted in early work from psychology, research on temporal focus has been steadily growing in a number of research areas, particularly since Zimbardo and Boyd’s (1999) influential article on the topic. This chapter will review temporal focus research from the past to the present, including how temporal focus has been conceptualized and measured, and which correlates and outcomes have been tested in terms of well-being and behavior. Based on this review, an agenda for research is created to direct temporal focus research in the future.


2020 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 141-159
Author(s):  
Jan Adriaan Schlebusch

Abstract In his strategic political positioning and engagement in the nineteenth century, Groen van Prinsterer looked towards both the past and the future. Rhetorically, he appealed to the past as a vindication of the truth and practicality of his anti-revolutionary position. He also expressed optimism for the success of his convictions and political goals in the future. This optimism was reflected in the confidence with which he engaged politically, despite experiencing numerous setbacks in his career. Relying on the phenomenological-narrative approach of David Carr, I highlight the motives and strategies behind Groen’s political activity, and reveal that the past and the future in Groen’s narrative provide the strategic framework for his rhetoric, and the basis for his activism. I accentuate how the emphasis of his narrative shifts away from the status quo and thus enables a type of political engagement that proved historically significant for the early consolidation of the Dutch constitutional democracy.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-141
Author(s):  
Osama Sami AL-Nsour

The concept of citizenship is one of the pillars upon which the modern civil state was built. The concept of citizenship can be considered as the basic guarantee for both the government and individuals to clarify the relationship between them, since under this right individuals can acquire and apply their rights freely and also based on this right the state can regulate how society members perform the duties imposed on them, which will contributes to the development of the state and society .The term citizenship has been used in a wider perspective, itimplies the nationality of the State where the citizen obtains his civil, political, economic, social, cultural and religious rights and is free to exercise these rights in accordance with the Constitution of the State and the laws governing thereof and without prejudice to the interest. In return, he has an obligation to perform duties vis-à-vis the state so that the state can give him his rights that have been agreed and contracted.This paper seeks to explore firstly, the modern connotation of citizenship where it is based on the idea of rights and duties. Thus the modern ideal of citizenship is based on the relationship between the individual and the state. The Islamic civilization was spanned over fourteen centuries and there were certain laws and regulations governing the relationship between the citizens and the state, this research will try to discover the main differences between the classical concept of citizenship and the modern one, also this research will show us the results of this change in this concept . The research concludes that the new concept of citizenship is correct one and the one that can fit to our contemporary life and the past concept was appropriate for their time but the changes in the world force us to apply and to rethink again about this concept.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janina Dill

AbstractDoes International Humanitarian Law (IHL) impose a duty of care on the attacker? From a moral point of view, should it? This article argues that the legal situation is contestable, and the moral value of a legal duty of care in attack is ambivalent. This is because a duty of care is both a condition for and an obstacle to the ‘individualization of war’. The individualization of war denotes an observable multi-dimensional norm shift in international relations. Norms for the regulation of war that focus on the interests, rights, and duties of the individual have gained in importance compared to those that focus on the interests, rights, and duties of the state. As the individual, not the state, is the ultimate locus of moral value, this norm shift in international relations, and the corresponding developments in international law, are morally desirable. When it comes to IHL, the goal of protecting the interests of the individual creates strong reasons both for and against imposing a legal duty of care on the attacker. The enquiry into whether IHL does and should impose a legal duty of care therefore reveals that the extent to which war can be individualized is limited.


1990 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 211-269 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pnina Lahav

“Liberty of the individual is a thing of the past, or the future, in Palestine”, wrote Bernard Joseph, a distinguished member of Israel's “government in the making” in 1948, shortly before Israel was inaugurated as a sovereign state. Joseph's “present” was the dusk of British rule in Palestine. Draconian Defence (Emergency) Regulations suspended conventional liberties ordinary westerners were accustomed to expect and turned Palestine into a police state.Precisely what “liberty of the individual” the esteemed jurist, who held degrees from both McGill University and the University of London, had in mind when he invoked the past of Palestine is not entirely clear. He could not have possibly meant liberty under the Ottoman regime which prevailed until 1918. Ottoman rule in Palestine was authoritarian, feudal and corrupt.


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