scholarly journals Blockchain as a method of resolving hold-up problem

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 9-22
Author(s):  
Predrag Cvetković

The hold-up problem is a form of opportunistic behavior of contractual partners. It occurs when the optimal volume and structure of transactions cannot be defined with ex ante certainty. The consequence of the hold-up problem is that, once a contractual relationship has been established, one of the parties seeks to modify the distribution of benefits in such a way that it has a higher level of profit from the contract than is justified by the contractual investments it has made. The paper examines the potential of the Blockchain concept to, applied as a framework of "smart" contracts, contribute to the elimination or reduce opportunities for the emergence of a hold-up situation. The Blockchain concept with its characteristics (transparency, protection of data integrity, shareability) deploys the foregoing potential in three ways: by witnessing the transaction via the Blockchain; ensuring the execution of a (by Blockchain certified) transaction; by verifying transactions through a decentralized system that replaces verification by third parties (courts or arbitration). Consequently, the Blockchain concept for storing and managing information substitutes the role played by the institute of trust in the classical ("analog") legal relationship.

Author(s):  
Sheng-Lin JAN

This chapter discusses the position of third party beneficiaries in Taiwan law where the principle of privity of contract is well established. Article 269 of the Taiwan Civil Code confers a right on the third party to sue for performance as long as the parties have at least impliedly agreed. This should be distinguished from a ‘spurious contract’ for the benefit of third parties where there is no agreement to permit the third party to claim. Both the aggrieved party and the third party beneficiary can sue on the contract, but only for its own loss. The debtor can only set off on a counterclaim arising from its legal relationship with the third party. Where the third party coerces the debtor into the contract, the contract can be avoided, but where the third party induces the debtor to contract with the creditor by misrepresentation, the debtor can only avoid the contract if the creditor knows or ought to have known of the misrepresentation.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haya R. Hasan ◽  
Khaled Salah ◽  
Raja Jayaraman ◽  
Ibrar Yaqoob ◽  
Mohammed Omar ◽  
...  

Contact tracing has widely been adopted to control the spread of Coronavirus-2019 (COVID-19). It enables to identify, assess, and manage people who have been exposed to COVID-19, thereby preventing from its further transmission. Today's most of the contact tracing approaches, tools, and solutions fall short in providing decentralized, transparent, traceable, immutable, auditable, secure, and trustworthy features. In this paper, we propose a decentralized blockchain-based COVID-19 contact tracing solution. Contact tracing can greatly suffice the need for a speedy response to a pandemic. We leverage the immutable and tamper-proof features of blockchain to enforce trust, accountability, and transparency. Trusted and registered oracles are used to bridge the gap between on-chain and off-chain data. With no third parties involved or centralized servers, the users' medical information is not prone to invasion, hacking, or abuse. Each user is registered using their digital medical passports. To respect the privacy of the users, their locations are updated with a time delay of 20 minutes. Using Ethereum smart contracts, transactions are executed on-chain with emitted events and immutable logs. We present details of the implemented algorithms and their testing analysis. We evaluate the proposed approach using security, cost, and privacy parameters to show its effectiveness. The smart contracts code is publicly made available on GitHub.


2020 ◽  
pp. 154-171
Author(s):  
Kimberley Brownlee

Some intimate associations simply should not exist—that much is uncontroversial. But once they do exist, the moral ballgame changes. For instance, a person who has no right to form an association might gain a right to remain in it once it exists. This chapter considers intriguing puzzles that arise in the aftermath of morally problematic associative decisions. One is the parasite problem, in which one person illegitimately piggybacks on another person’s undisputed associational rights which require the first person’s participation. Parasites illegitimately occupy the associative roles to which their rights attach. Can they bootstrap themselves into associative legitimacy? Should we worry about the precedent this might set? When are third parties required or forbidden to interfere? As this chapter shows, there are no simple answer to these questions. All ex ante solutions—relying on arguments about defeasibility, conditionality, and group rights—flounder. Only a case-by-case analysis will do justice to these intricacies of sociability.


Entropy ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 203
Author(s):  
Antonio López Vivar ◽  
Alberto Turégano Castedo ◽  
Ana Lucila Sandoval Orozco ◽  
Luis Javier García Villalba

Smart contracts have gained a lot of popularity in recent times as they are a very powerful tool for the development of decentralised and automatic applications in many fields without the need for intermediaries or trusted third parties. However, due to the decentralised nature of the blockchain on which they are based, a series of challenges have emerged related to vulnerabilities in their programming that, given their particularities, could have (and have already had) a very high economic impact. This article provides a holistic view of security challenges associated with smart contracts, as well as the state of the art of available public domain tools.


Author(s):  
Kaufmann-Kohler Gabrielle ◽  
Rigozzi Antonio

This chapter discusses the notion, content, and effects of the arbitration agreement, defined as an agreement to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes that have arisen or may arise between the parties in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, which may be in the form of a clause in a contract or of a separate ‘submission agreement’ (compromis arbitral). The chapter examines the principle of separability and the requirements for the validity of the arbitration agreement, namely arbitrability, written form, and substantive validity, including the agreement’s formation, interpretation, extension to third parties, and termination. Finally, it discusses to what extent defects of the arbitration agreement can be remedied by conduct.


2021 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 5153-5162
Author(s):  
Frans Kurniawan, Abdul Gani Abdullah, Amad Sudiro

The legal relationship between application companies, drivers, and consumers often create confusion. The consumer's contractual relationship is with the application company. Furthermore, the application company has a partnership contract with the driver. Drivers are the ones who directly interact with consumers to fulfill the services to consumers. This research aims to find the responsibility of the online transportation provider and driver to consumers. This research is normative legal research. It uses secondary data. The study found thatthe application company should be responsible for consumer losses in the event of a loss because it has a contractual relationship with the consumers.


2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 23
Author(s):  
Zuzanna Służewska

Si tamen plures per se navem exerceant. Several Remarks on the Liability of ShipownersSummaryThe problem discussed in this paper regards the liability of several shipowners (exercitores) managing the same ship. In the title de exercitoria actione o f the Digest there are three texts that refer to this matter: D. 14,1,1,25; D. 14,1,4 pr. and D. 14,1,4,1. The first and the last one refer to a situation in which the shipowners appointed a captain (magister navis) as their agent and thus were held liable in solidum for contracts made by him with third parties. In these cases their joint and several liability had ground in the joint appointm ent of an agent (praepositio). The second text D. 14,1,4 pr. is not very clear and refers to shipowners that were managing the same ship per se, and in this case they could be sued pro portionibus exercitionis. Such a model of liability was justified by the reservation that they cannot be deemed as being each other’s captain (neque enim invicem sui magistri videbuntur). This text was widely discussed among romanists and gave ground to various interpretations. The main questions concerned were the following: whether shipowners dealt with the third parties personally or appointed an agent (magister navis), whether a contract was stipulated by all shipowners jointly or only one o f them, whether they were partners in a partnership or conducted their business independently. According to the most common interpretation the text refers to a situation in which the shipowners conducted their activity personally in the partnership. Having accepted the above view, to justify their liability pro portionibus exercitionis one must admit that they all acted as a party in a contract or, supposing a contract was stipulated by one of them, a partnership between shipowners was a particular kind of partnership in which a contract concluded by only one of the partners resulted in the liability of the others. N one of these interpretations seems to be convincing.First of all, one must take into consideration that the word exercitor was a technical term used to define someone conducting an economic activity through his agent (magister navis) so it was normally used in the context of the whole structure of exercitio navis that was based on the scheme exercitor — magister navis. Thus it seems more likely that exercere per se means not conducting an activity personally but rather „on one’s own account”, „independently”. Besides, the reservation neque enim invicem sui magistri videbuntur suggesting that plures exercitores conducted their activity personally is dubious since it refers to a concept of mutual praepositio, which was used by glossators and commentators to justify joint and several liability of partners and it may be possible that this reservation constituted a part of the gloss or was added to the original context later by some interpreter that did not understand Ulpian’s intention.A similar conclusion arises from the comparison of the text of D. 14,1,4 pr. with texts concerning the liability of several persons on the basis of actio institoria. From the text of D. 14,3,14 it appears that if no legal relationship that guaranteed the possibility of a recourse existed among several persons liable for the act of the agent, none o f them could be sued for the full am ount (in solidum) but they were held liable pro parte. In the case of actio institoria the fact of a joint appointm ent was probably treated as a manifestation of animus societatis that made it possible to treat the persons that had nom inated jointly the institor as partners and thus held them liable in solidum for contracts made by this agent. Hence the fact that in the text o f D. 14,1,4 pr. the shipowners did not appoint jointly their agent and were held liable pro portionibus exercitionis suggests that they were not partners but each of them managed a ship on his own account.If we adm it that plures exercitores that per se navem exerceant were the shipowners that did not conduct their business together we could indicate two situations in which they could be sued pro portionibus exercitionis. The first would be the case in which each o f the shipowners appointed his own agent on the ship and the contract with the third party was stipulated by all agents acting together. The second would be the case in which the shipowners appointed the same person as their agent but the praepositio was given by each o f them separately. in both cases each o f the shipowners could be sued with actio exercitoria only for his proper part since they could not be deemed to be partners and they could not sue each other with any action for a recourse.


Solusi ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 301-320
Author(s):  
Fitriah Fitriah

  A bank is a financial institution whose existence depends absolutely on the trust of its customers who entrust their savings funds. Banks are very concerned that the trust of the public, who have and who will save their funds, are well-maintained, considering that the bank is part of the financial system and payment system. Bank secrecy is very important because banks need the trust of the people who keep their money in the bank. The customer only entrusts his money to the bank or makes use of the bank's services if the bank provides a guarantee that the bank's knowledge of deposits and the state of their assets will not be misused. The legal relationship between the bank and the depository customer starts from the signing of a written agreement (contractual relationship) between the bank and the customer which contains the rights and obligations for each party. As for the form of agreement for depositing funds between the customer and the bank, it is called a deposit agreement (Article 1319 Civil Code). In a deposit agreement, the bank sets certain general requirements in a deposit account or savings account, among others, the recipient of the deposit (bank) can use the depositors' money and at a certain time the bank will provide interest. Other provisions that can be used as the basis of relations between banks and depositors are Proxy Giving. Depositors give their power to banks when signing deposit accounts or savings accounts or bank accounts. This agreement becomes a law or law for both parties (Article 1338 of the Civil Code). As a manifestation of the bank's responsibility for depositing customers, banks must pay attention to the 4 (four) pillars of the relationship between depositors and banks, namely: Prudence, Health, Bank Secrets and Trust


2021 ◽  
pp. 002085232110596
Author(s):  
Rui Mu ◽  
Peiyi Wu ◽  
Maidina Haershan

In the literature on relational governance, it is often assumed that relational governance emerges primarily after formal contracting and acts as a functional supplement to a formal contract. In this article, we show that especially facing deep uncertainties, relational governance can emerge before the start of formal partnerships, in the form of trust-building, exchanging resources, and fostering flexibility. Based on a case study of a smart city outsourcing project, this article introduces a forward-extended framework of relational governance that captures the pre-contractual dimensions of relationship cultivation and their role in facilitating formal contracting. The study finds that pre-contractual relational governance facilitates formal contracting by reducing substantive, evaluative, technological, and procedural uncertainties in the project and helps the partners to design an elaborative contract, undergo an easy negotiation, adopt short-term contracts, and use simple monitoring and evaluation methods. The article thus argues that only understanding post-contractual relational governance is insufficient for exploring the relation between formal contracting and relational governance; facing deep uncertainties, it is necessary to understand how public and private parties develop their pre-contractual relationship and reduce the uncertainties before a formal contract can be signed. Points for practitioners Practitioners should realize that there is much room for relational governance in the pre-contractual phase of PPP projects when the projects are rife with various uncertainties. Public and private parties can take measures to build trust, foster flexibility, and create interdependence before a formal contract is signed. These ex-ante relational governance measures can facilitate formal contracting by reducing the various uncertainties, making a formal contract designable, making negotiation smooth and easy, and reducing the need for contract supervision.


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