scholarly journals El sistema electoral gallego: reformar, o no reformar, esa es la cuestión // The Galician electoral system: to reform, or not to reform, that is the question

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (102) ◽  
pp. 275
Author(s):  
Carlos Fernández Esquer ◽  
José Rama Caamaño
Keyword(s):  
Slight Modification ◽  
Political Stability ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
Political Consequences ◽  
Political Autonomy ◽  
El Sistema ◽  
Political Subsystem ◽  
System 1 ◽  
Regional Elections

Resumen:Desde que Galicia alcanzase la autonomía política hasta los últimos comicios regionales de septiembre de 2016, se han celebrado un total de diez elecciones para elegir a los representantes del Parlamento de Galicia. Transcurrido este tiempo, es posible analizar los rendimientos del sistema electoral gallego (en términos de proporcionalidad, fragmentación partidista, desigualdad en el valor del voto y primas y penalizaciones a los partidos), así como indagar en los debates sobre su origen y modificaciones posteriores. Tras la aprobación del Estatuto de Autonomía en 1981, el sistema electoral gallego fue reformado en 1992 para aumentar la barrera electoral y, más recientemente, se han planteado otras dos propuestas de reforma en los años 2012 y 2014. Con todo, las reglas electorales se han mantenido estables desde aquella pequeña modificación de los años noventa, por lo que han continuado beneficiando a los partidos establecidos, al establecer barreras de entrada a otras formaciones políticas y generar desigualdades en el valor del voto. Por ello, en este artículo formulamos una propuesta de reforma electoral que, con pequeños retoques, podría corregir algunas de las deficiencias del sistema electoral gallego, sin por ello poner en riesgo la gobernabilidad y estabilidad política que han caracterizado al subsistema político gallego durante estos años de autonomía política.Summary:I. Introduction. II. The Galician electoral system. 1. The regional electoral context. 2. The origin of the Galician electoral system. 3. The Galician electoral system at present. III. Political consequences of the electoral system. IV. Reforms and reform proposals of the Gacilician electoral system: 1. The controversial reform of 1992. 2. Proposal reforms of 2012 and 2014. V. A humble electoral reform proposal. Vi. Conclusions.Abstract:Since Galicia reached its political autonomy until the last elections of September of 2016, ten regional elections of the representatives for the Galician Parliament have been held. In the course of this time, it is possible to analyze the Galician electoral system´s yields (in terms of proportionality, party fragmentation, malapportionment, and premiums, as well as penalties to the parties), and inquire in the debates about its origin and later modifications. After the approval of the Autonomous Statute in 1981, the Galician electoral system was changed in 1992 to increase the electoral threshold and, more recently, two proposals of reform have been suggested in 2012 and 2014. Yet, the electoral rules have remained stable since the slight modification in the nineties, so they have continued to benefit the established parties, by creating barriers preventing the entrance of other parties and generating inequality in the value of the vote. Thus, in this paper we propose an electoral reform that, with minor changes, could solve some problems of the Galician electoral system, without jeopardizing the governability and political stability that have characterized the Galician political subsystem during these years of political autonomy.

scholarly journals El sistema electoral de Bélgica y sus reformas electorales

2020 ◽  
pp. 503
Author(s):  
Carlos Fernández-Esquer
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Turn Of The Century ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
Political Agenda ◽  
The Political ◽  
Coalition Government ◽  
Institutional Reforms ◽  
Electoral Reforms ◽  
El Sistema

El presente artículo aborda el estudio del sistema electoral de la Cámara de Representantes belga y sus reformas electorales. Bélgica fue el primer país europeo en adoptar un sistema de representación proporcional y, desde entonces, sus elementos centrales han exhibido una extraordinaria estabilidad. Sin embargo, con el cambio de siglo, el gobierno de coalición liderado por el liberal Guy Verhofstadt situó el debate sobre las reformas institucionales en el centro de la agenda política. Ello condujo a una reforma electoral que supuso la «provincialización» del mapa electoral, el establecimiento de una barrera electoral del 5 por ciento y la reducción a la mitad del peso de voto de lista. En 2012, se produjo la última reforma electoral, que consistió en la división de la polémica circunscripción de Bruselas-Halle-Vilvoorde. Este último episodio evidencia la complejidad del modelo federal belga, de carácter consociacional, bipolar y con dinámicas centrífugas.This paper deals with the study of the electoral system of the Belgian House of Representatives and its electoral reforms. Belgium was the first European country to adopt an electoral system of proportional representation and, since then, its main elements have exhibited extraordinary stability. However, with the turn of the century, the coalition government headed by the liberal Guy Verhofstadt put the debate on institutional reforms at the center of the political agenda. This led to an electoral reform that involved several novelties: the «provincialization» of the electoral map, the establishment of a 5 percent threshold and the reduction of the list vote weight by half. In 2012, there was the last electoral reform, which consisted of the division of the controversial constituency of Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde. This last episode shows the complexity of the Belgian federal model, consociational, bipolar and with centrifugal dynamics. 

Wahlsystemreform in Deutschland

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peggy Matauschek
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Parallel Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
Suitable Alternative ◽  
Representation Systems ◽  
District Magnitude ◽  
Alternative Vote

Is plurality or majority electoral reform a sensible option in Germany’s muddled electoral system debate? Yes, it is. Since Germany’s mixed-member proportional system fails to concentrate the party system in a sufficient way, Peggy Matauschek searches for a suitable alternative to the principle of proportional representation. She discusses the following options according to their contextual conditions: single-member plurality and majority electoral systems—like the alternative vote system—, parallel systems, proportional representation systems with a low district magnitude and majority bonus systems. In light of its balanced performance, the study advocates the introduction of a system with a majority bonus for a coalition.

The 2016 Electoral Reform in Mongolia: From Mixed System and Multiparty Competition to FPTP and One-Party Dominance

2017 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 511-531 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pavel Maškarinec
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Competition ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
District Level ◽  
Mixed System ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Party Dominance ◽  
Duverger's Law

This article tests the effects of a new electoral system that was introduced in Mongolia for the June 2016 elections. The decision to implement a first-past-the-post (FPTP) system instead of a mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system, which was first and last used in the previous elections of 2012, was due to the April 2016 ruling of the Mongolian Constitutional Court on unconstitutionality of the list tier as one of the mechanisms for distributing seats within MMM. Through an analysis of national- and district-level results, this article addresses the question whether electoral competition at the district level was consistent with Duverger’s law and resulted in the restoration of bipartism, which had been disrupted in 2012 due to the use of MMM.

Electoral Reform and the Electronic Voting System

2020 ◽  
pp. 182-204
Author(s):  
Dashbalbar Gangabaatar
Keyword(s):  
Electoral System ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
Electronic Voting ◽  
Mixed System ◽  
Parliamentary Election ◽  
Election Process ◽  
Election System ◽  
Voting System ◽  
Election Results ◽  
Electronic Voting System

Mongolia introduced a new electronic voting system for the first time for the 2012 parliamentary election. E-voting empowers citizens by making voting simpler and providing better opportunities for certain groups of citizens to participate in the election process. The electoral reform was one of the major steps the parliament carried out in order to restore public trust lost in the violent protests against the 2008 parliamentary election results. A free, transparent, and fair electoral system was important to correct the fraud in the old election system. This chapter examines the effectiveness of the mixed system of election, the electronic voting system, the constitutionality of the electoral systems, and other changes to the electoral system in Mongolia.

scholarly journals Hacia el estudio de lo preocupante en nuestro régimen de partidos = The worrying state of our party system

2015 ◽  
pp. 123
Author(s):  
Óscar Alzaga Villaamil
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Party System ◽  
Political Representation ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Full Control ◽  
El Sistema ◽  
Siglo Xix ◽  
Party Funding ◽  
Sociological Studies ◽  
Spanish Legislation

Noting that in sociological studies at European level Spain is almost at the bottom of civic appraisal of its democracy and its political, the study explores the historical roots of poor political representation in the nineteenth century Spanish with management from the Crown Decrees of dissolution of parliament and full control by governments shift elections based on small districts and on a rooted cacique system. The 1977 Law for Political Reform conditioned the electoral system for the Parliament, distorting proportional representation in terms that have come down to us and who have devoted bipartisanship when none of the major parties has a majority depends on the Nationalist forces, they have made great revenues as unique representative map. The Spanish legislation regulating political parties with great precision how the upcoming ban terrorism forces, but hardly develops the constitutional requirements regarding the organization and internal functioning must be democratic, nor on party funding, for what you need to consider the reform of the parties Act 2002.Tras constatar que en los estudios sociológicos de ámbito europeo España se sitúa prácticamente a la cola de valoración ciudadana de su democracia y de sus políticos, el estudio profundiza en las raíces históricas de la mala representación política durante el Siglo XIX español con manejo desde la Corona de los Decretos de disolución de las Cortes y pleno control por los gobiernos del turno de unas elecciones basadas en distritos pequeños y en un arraigados sistema caciquil. La Ley de 1977 para la Reforma Política condicionó el sistema electoral para las Cortes, distorsionando la representación proporcional en términos que han llegado a nuestros días y que han consagrado un bipartidismo que cuando ninguno de los principales partidos tiene mayoría absoluta depende de las fuerzas nacionalistas, que han obtenido grandes réditos de tan singular mapa representativo. La legislación española de partidos políticos regula con gran precisión la forma de prohibir las fuerzas próximas al terrorismo, pero prácticamente no desarrolla los imperativos constitucionales en cuanto a que la organización y el funcionamiento interno deben ser democráticos, ni sobre la financiación de los partidos, por lo que procede abordar la reforma de la Ley de partidos de 2002.

The Electoral System, the Party System and Accountability in Parliamentary Government

2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (3) ◽  
pp. 744-760 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTOPHER KAM ◽  
ANTHONY M. BERTELLI ◽  
ALEXANDER HELD
Keyword(s):  
Policy Making ◽  
Party System ◽  
Necessary Conditions ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
Electoral Accountability ◽  
Parliamentary Elections ◽  
Parliamentary Government

Electoral accountability requires that voters have the ability to constrain the incumbent government’s policy-making power. We express the necessary conditions for this claim as an accountability identity in which the electoral system and the party system interact to shape the accountability of parliamentary governments. Data from 400 parliamentary elections between 1948 and 2012 show that electoral accountability is contingent on the party system’s bipolarity, for example, with parties arrayed in two distinct blocs. Proportional electoral systems achieve accountability as well as majoritarian ones when bipolarity is strong but not when it is weak. This is because bipolarity decreases the number of connected coalitions that incumbent parties can join to preserve their policy-making power. Our results underscore the limitations that party systems place on electoral reform and the benefits that bipolarity offers for clarifying voters’ choices and intensifying electoral competition.

Dimensions of Variation in Electoral Systems

2017 ◽  
pp. 22-40
Author(s):  
Michael Gallagher ◽  
Paul Mitchell
Keyword(s):  
Real World ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Political Consequences ◽  
Policy Choices ◽  
District Magnitude ◽  
Essential Components ◽  
Seat Allocation ◽  
Dimensions Of Variation

Electoral systems matter. They are a crucial link in the chain connecting the preferences of citizens to the policy choices made by governments. They are chosen by political actors and, once in existence, have political consequences for those actors. This chapter argues that electoral system choice is a highly consequential matter for democratic states and offers a comparative overview of the principal means by which electoral systems vary. What are the essential components of real-world electoral systems? The chapter emphasizes the importance of district magnitude, ballot structure (with three main types: categorical, dividual, and ordinal), “levels” of seat allocation, methods of selecting candidates within parties, and devices for limiting proportionality.

The Capacity of Decentralization to Promote Democracy and Development in Africa

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amy R. Poteete
Keyword(s):  
Central Government ◽  
Political Stability ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Central State ◽  
Post Conflict ◽  
Electoral Support ◽  
African Context ◽  
Traditional Authorities ◽  
Decentralization Reforms

The multifaceted nature of decentralization, democracy, and development renders relationships among them ambivalent and conditional. It is certainly possible to decentralize in ways that foster local democracy and improvements in socioeconomic well-being. The empirical record, however, is mixed, and not only because the phenomena of interest have multiple dimensions and are open to interpretation. Whatever its form, decentralization is inherently political. In the African context, the extent and form of decentralization has been influenced by international support, the challenges of extending state authority in relatively young multi-ethnic states, and, increasingly, electoral considerations. By the 1980s, the broad consensus in the constructive developmental role of a strong central state that had characterized the immediate postwar period gave way to a growing perception of statist approaches as impeding democracy and, especially, development. For some, decentralization implied an expansion of popular participation that promised greater sensitivity to local knowledge and more responsiveness to local concerns. Others saw decentralization as part of a broader agenda of scaling back the central state, reducing its role, its size, and its costs. Yet others saw decentralization as part of a strategy of achieving sustainable natural resource management or political stability in post-conflict societies. By the early 1990s, a wide variety of international organizations were promoting decentralization and providing both financial and technical support for decentralization reforms. In the African context, political decisions about whether and how to decentralize reflect the continued salience of ethno-regional identities and non-state authorities, especially traditional or customary leaders. Incumbents may decentralize because they hope to consolidate their political position by crowding out or co-opting rivals, depoliticizing conflicts, or deflecting blame to subnational actors. Indeed, reforms made in the name of decentralization often strengthen the political center, at least over the short to medium term. Whether it attempts to co-opt or sideline them, decentralization interacts with and may reinforce the salience of ethno-regional identities and traditional authorities. To the extent that democracy presumes the equality of all citizens, regardless of ascribed status or identity, the reinforcement of ethno-regional identities and unelected authorities threatens democracy. The international spread of decentralization reforms coincided with the increasing prevalence of multiparty elections. In countries that hold elections, electoral considerations inevitably influence political interests in decentralization. Central government incumbents may view decentralization as a way to keep voters happy by improving access to and the quality of public services, as a form of political insurance, or as strengthening rivals. Whether incumbents and challengers view decentralization as a threat or an opportunity depends on not only the form of decentralization under consideration, but also their estimations of their competitiveness in elections at various levels (national, regional, local) and the interaction between the spatial distribution of electoral support and the electoral system. Electoral dynamics and considerations also influence the implementation and consequences of decentralization, perhaps especially when political rivals control different levels of government. Whether decentralization promotes democracy and development hinges on not only the form of decentralization, but also how broader political dynamics condition decentralization in practice.

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