scholarly journals Grounding Aesthetic Preference in the Bodily Conditions of Meaning Constitution

2012 ◽  
Vol 23 (43) ◽  
Author(s):  
Alfonsina Scarinzi
Keyword(s):  
Lived Experience ◽  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Human Experience ◽  
The Body ◽  
Sense Making ◽  
Lived Body ◽  
Aesthetic Preference ◽  
Enactive Approach ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
The Mind

Mark Johnson’s work The Meaning of the Body presents John Dewey’s pragmatism and pragmatist aesthetics as the forerunners of the anti-Cartesian embodied enactive approach to human experience and meaning. He rejects the Kantian noncognitive character of aesthetics and emphasizes that aesthetics is the study of the human capacity to experience the bodily conditions of  meaning constitution that grows from our bodily conditions of life. Using Mark Johnson’s view as a starting-point, this paper offers the beginning of an enactive approach to aesthetic preference  contributing to bringing human aesthetic behavior research closer to the enactive approach to human experience. Following enactive studies on bodily sense-making and embodied emotions, I identify the bodily conditions of meaning constitution in which aesthetic preference is grounded with the subject’s self-regulatory visceral embodied constitution of viable degrees of value of the environmental factors according to her bodily structure. Unlike mainstream aesthetic preference research in empirical aesthetics, I claim that the subject’s aesthetic preference constitution requires the lived experience of the bodily conditions of meaning constitution through the conscious experience of the subjectively aroused lived body. The implausibility of the mind/body dichotomy of current aesthetic preference research is highlighted.

Revaluations through Dance: Friedrich Nietzsche's Thought in Isadora Duncan's Speech The Dance of the Future

2019 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 206-219
Author(s):  
Meindert E. Peters
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
The Body ◽  
Eternal Recurrence ◽  
Early Twentieth Century ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Mind

Friedrich Nietzsche's influence on Isadora Duncan's work, in particular his idea of the Dionysian, has been widely discussed, especially in regard to her later work. What has been left underdeveloped in critical examinations of her work, however, is his influence on her earlier choreographic work, which she defended in a famous speech held in 1903 called The Dance of the Future. While commentators often describe this speech as ‘Nietzschean’, Duncan's autobiography suggests that she only studied Nietzsche's work after this speech. I take this incongruity as a starting point to explore the connections between her speech and Nietzsche's work, in particular his Thus Spoke Zarathustra. I argue that in subject and language Duncan's speech resembles Nietzsche's in important ways. This article will draw attention to the ways in which Duncan takes her cues from Nietzsche in bringing together seemingly conflicting ideas of religion and an overturning of morality; Nietzsche's notion of eternal recurrence and the teleology present in his idea of the Übermensch; and a renegotiation of the body's relation to the mind. In doing so, this article contributes not only to scholarship on Duncan's early work but also to discussions of Nietzsche's reception in the early twentieth century. Moreover, the importance Duncan ascribes to the body in dance and expression also asks for a new understanding of Nietzsche's own way of expressing his philosophy.

scholarly journals El dolor de los marcianos. Un análisis fenomenológico contra Rorty

2014 ◽  
pp. 313
Author(s):  
Agustín Serrano de Haro
Keyword(s):  
Mental Representations ◽  
Physiological State ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
The Body ◽  
Lived Body ◽  
Objective State ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Phenomenological Point ◽  
Person Experience ◽  
Sobre Todo

Mi ensayo trata de mostrar que es insostenible la ficción de Rorty de una civilización avanzada científicamente cuyos habitantes no sintieran el dolor como una vivencia sufrida en primera persona y que únicamente lo captaran como una excitación objetiva de su sistema nervioso. Entre otras dudas relativas a que esa captación objetiva y exacta se hallaría en indefinida reconstrucción teórica y a que ella no puede ser la experiencia primera del dolor ni siquiera en esa otra galaxia, aduzco que tener un estado fisiológico no equivale por principio a captarlo y que captar determinados rasgos objetivos no puede equivaler por principio a sufrir, a padecer. Concluyo señalando que Rorty, en su empeño por impugnar las representaciones mentales, pierde de vista cómo la experiencia del dolor manifiesta sobre todo la condición originaria del cuerpo vivido.My paper tries to show that Rorty’s fiction of a scientifically developed civilization whose inhabitants should not feel pain as a first-person experience, but would grasp it rather as an objective state of their nervous system, is unsustainable from a phenomenological point of view. I point out several doubts concerning the facts that such an objective apprehension would be in an indefinite process of theoretical reconstruction, and that even in that other galaxy it could not be valid as the original pain situation (for example, among children). But then I focus on the principles that to have a physiological state cannot be equiva-lent to grasping it, and second that to grasp several objective features cannot be equivalent to suffering or to undergoing pain. I conclude by suggesting that Rorty’s eagerness to discard mental representations made him neglect the lived body as implied in everyday experience: the body, not the mind, comes to the fore in the experience of pain.

scholarly journals More Than Meets the Eye: Explicating the Essence of Gerontology Nursing

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Anne Therese Schumacher
Keyword(s):  
Lived Experience ◽  
Nursing Practice ◽  
Phenomenological Study ◽  
Final Analysis ◽  
The Body ◽  
Lived Body ◽  
Negative Image ◽  
Recruitment And Retention ◽  
Hermeneutic Phenomenological ◽  
Personal Knowing

<p><b>The purpose of this hermeneutic phenomenological study was to explore the essence of gerontology nursing. This project sought to look beyond the practical tasks and skills of gerontology nursing to reveal what is more than meets the eye and thereby explicate the essence of gerontological nursing practice.</b></p> <p>Gerontology nursing is troubled by its unpopular status and negative image that in turn has serious implications for the recruitment and retention of nurses who are both willing and able to work in this field of nursing. The purpose for doing this study was to unveil a deeper meaning and understanding of gerontology nursing, thus contributing to its value and worth as a speciality area of nursing.</p> <p>Conversations with four gerontology nurses were taped, transcribed and then analysed using van Manen’s (1990) approach to researching lived experience. From the analysis, four cardinal elements emerged: true acceptance, personal knowing, being present, and being alive. Those four cardinal elements were reworked and further analysed to reveal three central aspects or essences of gerontology nursing. These essences were the centrality of temporality, the interconnectedness of human relationships, and the significance of the lived body. Temporality is demonstrated by nursing application of objective, or clock time, as well as subjectively in regards to the lived time of the clients. Interconnectedness is the lived human relationship between nurse and client and is represented by commitment, presencing/giving of self, connecting, and knowing the client holistically. The third essence is corporeality, which is portrayed by the gerontology nurses’ distinguishing characteristics and their perception of the lived body of the nursed. The final analysis unveiled caring for the body, the act of seeing, and the joy of care as emergent essences of gerontology nursing. Language of nursing in relationship to ‘basic nursing care’ is critiqued for its potential to devalue gerontology nursing and, by association, old people.</p> <p>The significance of these findings is that there is more than meets the eye in gerontology nursing, however, it is not widely known. To balance the abundance of literature about the science of gerontology nursing practice more research needs to be focused on the art. Establishing and disseminating a clearer, complete picture of gerontology nursing would go toward not only changing its negative image, but may also address recruitment and retention issues. Furthermore, this study has highlighted the need to recruit nurses who possess the necessary personal attributes to ensure they ‘fit’ into gerontology nursing.</p>

scholarly journals The Thinking Body: a Study of the Architectural Ramifications of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Rendering of the Human Body's Capacities

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Karan August
Keyword(s):  
Human Body ◽  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Human Experience ◽  
The Body ◽  
Critical Approach ◽  
Spatial Practices ◽  
Sensory Experiences ◽  
Phenomenological Experience ◽  
The World ◽  
The Mind

<p>Phenomenology offers a conceptual framework that connects and strengthens the architect' s intuitive understanding of the human experience of space with the theorist's more critical approach. Phenomenology is an ideal vehicle for architectural theorists to avoid the friction between first-hand or subjective experience and generalised or abstracted accounts of experience. In this thesis I extract an account of the human experience of space that is implicit in the Philosopher Maurice Merleau-Pontys work. I consider how this understanding has been employed in architectural scholarship and practice. In particular, I argue that the human body renders the richness of space through deliberate engagement with the indeterminate and independent possibilities of the world. In other words, as the body intentionally engages with the world, it synthesises objects that create determinate spatial situations. I account for Merleau-Ponty's depiction of the body' s non-rule governed, non-reflective, normative directiveness towards spaces and elements, and label it the thinking body. Furthermore I examine how the philosophical theory of Merleau-Ponty is represented in the explicitly theoretical works of Juhani Pallasmaa. In turn I then consider how the thinking body is physically and conceptually realised in the buildings of Carlo Scarpa. Finally I find that Juhani Pallasmaa's description of the phenomenological experience of space is incompatible with Merleau-Ponty's. The strategic importance of these different accounts emerges when projecting their implications for designed space. Pallasmaa' s account points towards an architecture that prioritises sensory experiences synthesised by the mind. The design focus of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy leads to spatial practices in line with Carlo Scarpa, that are sympathetic to the causal qualities of an intentional bodily engagement with spatial situations. In accord with Merleau-Ponty I argue that human body is our medium for the world and as such creates the spatial situation we engage with from a formless manifold of possibilities.</p>

scholarly journals Investigating Emotions as Functional States Distinct From Feelings

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 191-201 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ralph Adolphs ◽  
Daniel Andler
Keyword(s):  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Cognitive States ◽  
Causal Connections ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Philosophy Of Emotion ◽  
Functional States ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Functionalist Approach ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Neuroscience Of Emotion

We defend a functionalist approach to emotion that begins by focusing on emotions as central states with causal connections to behavior and to other cognitive states. The approach brackets the conscious experience of emotion, lists plausible features that emotions exhibit, and argues that alternative schemes (e.g., focusing on feelings or on neurobiology as the starting point) are unpromising candidates. We conclude with the benefits of our approach: one can study emotions in animals; one can look in the brain for the implementation of specific features; and one ends up with an architecture of the mind in which emotions are fully accommodated through their relations to the rest of cognition. Our article focuses on arguing for this general approach; as such, it is an essay in the philosophy of emotion rather than in the psychology or neuroscience of emotion.

Edward W. Blyden, W. E. B. Du Bois, and the ‘Color Complex’

1992 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 669-684 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J. C. Echeruo
Keyword(s):  
Black People ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Body ◽  
African Experience ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Color Complex ◽  
Long Time ◽  
History Of ◽  
To Come ◽  
The Mind

This article is an attempt to present (and thereby to come to terms with) an important aspect of the meaning of race as it relates to the experience of black people, especially in America. It commences with Edward W. Blyden because his ‘color complex’ is of a kind that brings us back, not without much embarrassment, to the realisation that while colour may be a state of the mind, it is also and even primarily a matter of the body. Blyden is particularly appropriate as a starting point, for he is an epitome, in many ways, of the African experience in the later nineteenth century, linking (as he does) the multiple experiences of the Caribbean, the United States, and mainland Africa. He wrote at a time when the intellectual and other currents in ‘Negro’ America flowed easily to the new centres of influence in Liberia and colonial West Africa. He was thus the product of the history of Africanity in his period, and for a long time after.

scholarly journals The Thinking Body: a Study of the Architectural Ramifications of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Rendering of the Human Body's Capacities

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Karan August
Keyword(s):  
Human Body ◽  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Human Experience ◽  
The Body ◽  
Critical Approach ◽  
Spatial Practices ◽  
Sensory Experiences ◽  
Phenomenological Experience ◽  
The World ◽  
The Mind

<p>Phenomenology offers a conceptual framework that connects and strengthens the architect' s intuitive understanding of the human experience of space with the theorist's more critical approach. Phenomenology is an ideal vehicle for architectural theorists to avoid the friction between first-hand or subjective experience and generalised or abstracted accounts of experience. In this thesis I extract an account of the human experience of space that is implicit in the Philosopher Maurice Merleau-Pontys work. I consider how this understanding has been employed in architectural scholarship and practice. In particular, I argue that the human body renders the richness of space through deliberate engagement with the indeterminate and independent possibilities of the world. In other words, as the body intentionally engages with the world, it synthesises objects that create determinate spatial situations. I account for Merleau-Ponty's depiction of the body' s non-rule governed, non-reflective, normative directiveness towards spaces and elements, and label it the thinking body. Furthermore I examine how the philosophical theory of Merleau-Ponty is represented in the explicitly theoretical works of Juhani Pallasmaa. In turn I then consider how the thinking body is physically and conceptually realised in the buildings of Carlo Scarpa. Finally I find that Juhani Pallasmaa's description of the phenomenological experience of space is incompatible with Merleau-Ponty's. The strategic importance of these different accounts emerges when projecting their implications for designed space. Pallasmaa' s account points towards an architecture that prioritises sensory experiences synthesised by the mind. The design focus of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy leads to spatial practices in line with Carlo Scarpa, that are sympathetic to the causal qualities of an intentional bodily engagement with spatial situations. In accord with Merleau-Ponty I argue that human body is our medium for the world and as such creates the spatial situation we engage with from a formless manifold of possibilities.</p>

scholarly journals Beyond Stasis: The Medium of Moving Bodies in the Work of Choreographer Ginette Laurin

eTopia ◽  
2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niomi Anna Cherney
Keyword(s):  
Lived Experience ◽  
Phenomenological Model ◽  
The Body ◽  
Lived Body ◽  
Contemporary Dance ◽  
Concrete Form ◽  
Collaborative Engagement ◽  
Moving Bodies ◽  
Insight Into

The following paper proposes a model for considering the nature of embodiment through the lensof contemporary dance. The primary aim of this study is to examine the methods through whichthe medium of performance can offer insight into the specificities of the lived body. I pose thematerial body as site of intercorporeal exchange and as a locus of dialogue. Rather thanaccounting for the body as always already being in motion, scholarship on the body has atendency to consider it as a static and concrete form. In order to develop a methodology fortheorizing the lived experience of corporeality, I consider the work of Montreal choreographerGinette Laurin’s evening length work, La Chambre Blanche, by way of example. It is the aim ofthis paper to suggest that a collaborative engagement of Brian Massumi’s post-Deleuzian body,alongside a reading of the traditional phenomenological model of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’snotion of “the flesh” (1968), may provide the tools necessary for a comprehensive reading of thebody in motion.

scholarly journals Knowing Groundlessness: An Enactive Approach to a Shift From Cognition to Non-Dual Awareness

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Meling
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Lived Experience ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Context Dependency ◽  
Sense Making ◽  
Enactive Approach ◽  
Science Discourse ◽  
Theoretical Statement ◽  
Underlying Principle ◽  
Reflexive Analysis

The enactive approach has become an influential paradigm in cognitive science. One of its most important claims is that cognition is sense-making: to cognize is to enact a world of meaning. Thus, a world is not pregiven but enacted through sense-making. Most importantly, sense-making is not a fixed process or thing. It does not have substantial existence. Instead, it is groundless: it springs from a dynamic of relations, without substantial ground. Thereby, as all cognition is groundless, this groundlessness is considered the central underlying principle of cognition. This article takes that key concept of the enactive approach and argues that it is not only a theoretical statement. Rather, groundlessness is directly accessible in lived experience. The two guiding questions of this article concern that lived experience of groundlessness: (1) What is it to know groundlessness? (2) How can one know groundlessness? Accordingly, it elaborates (1) how this knowing of groundlessness fits into the theoretical framework of the enactive approach. Also, it describes (2) how it can be directly experienced when certain requirements are met. In an additional reflexive analysis, the context-dependency and observer-relativity of those statements themselves is highlighted. Through those steps, this article exhibits the importance of knowing groundlessness for a cognitive science discourse: this underlying groundlessness is not only the “ground” of cognition, but it also can be investigated empirically through lived experience. However, it requires a methodology that is radically different from classical cognitive science. This article ends with envisioning a future praxis of cognitive science which enables researchers to investigate not only theoretically but empirically the “foundationless foundation” of cognition: groundlessness.

scholarly journals Consciousness and Perception: The Point of Experience and the Meaning of the World We Inhabit

1969 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sérgio Basbaum Roclaw
Keyword(s):  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Human Experience ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
The World ◽  
The Senses ◽  
Anthropology Of The Senses ◽  
As If

I suggest that consciousness may be culturally shaped, and thus it may be a romanticism of science to attempt explaining conscious experiences as if there could be one and only general abstraction of the whole human living conscious experience ? in spite of history, culture, language, etc. My starting point is perception ? its relation to conscious experience and, most of all, the meaning with which, through the mediation of perceptual processes, the world presents itself to each of us. I figure it out mainly by a combination of three different approaches to human experience: i) Maurice Merleau- Ponty´s works on perception; ii) Constance Classen and David Howes' Anthropology of the senses; iii) Vilém Flusser’s hermeneutical conception of language as reality.

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