scholarly journals Les dépenses militaires soviétiques ou le fardeau de la défense soviétique

2005 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 535-548
Author(s):  
Carl G. Jacobsen

Our understanding of the Soviet defence burden remains woefully inadaquate. The official Soviet defence expenditure figure is not helpful. It is not inclusive. There is no concensus on what or how much is covered by other budget accounts. Soviet statistics do not allow independent calculation. Official Western estimates, on the other hand, are equally dubious. They reflect more on Western political dynamics than on Soviet reality. The Soviet defence industry is not immune from the vicissitudes of the economy at large. The Soviet military do not enjoy carte blanche. They contribute extensively to civilian needs, both in terms of goods and services. But, in turn, they extract benefits from a wide range of civilian endeavors. The military-political culture, rooted in an older Moscovy, and reinforced by Lenin's Clausewitzian leanings, is quite different from that which prevails in the west. There is no military-industrial complex threatening the Soviet State. In the USSR the military is OF the State, integral to a wider establishment. The military burden cannot be specified, for much is inextricably fused with the burden of State, and culture. It is systemic. It will be sustained. Because it is OF the System. Western debate is ethnocentric. We need new research, new under standing.

2000 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-51
Author(s):  
Jason Beckett

Strategic Information Warfare (SIW) has recently begun to garner significant interest among the military and strategic defence communities. While nebulous and difficult to define, the basic object of SIW is to render an adversary's information systems inoperative or to cause them to malfunction. While information is the key, the means, and the target of SIW, real world damage is the intention and effect. It is, nonetheless, an area which has been almost completely ignored by positive international law. The purpose of the present article is to begin to resolve this lacuna by analysing the applicability to, and effect of, international humanitarian law (IHL) on SIW. The author makes recommendations as to possible alterations and improvements to IHL to resolve this lacuna. [In] 1956 when Khrushchev said: “We will bury the West.” What he was really saying was that the military industrial complex of the Soviet Union would win out over the military industrial complex of the West – and note that it's industrial. What Khrushchev didn't understand was that 1956 was the first year in the United States that white-collar and service employees outnumbered blue-collar workers. […] The industrial complex, military or not, was at its end point.Alvin Toffler, Novelist and Social Theorist


1984 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 597-618 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew A. Evangelista

The authors of three recent books attempt to account for Soviet military developments by exploring a wide range of possible explanations. In Soviet Strategic Forces, Berman and Baker adopt a“requirements“approach; they argue that the Soviet strategic posture has developed mainly in response to threats generated by the West. Andrew Cockburn, in The Threat, maintains that internal factors—in particular, bureaucratic politics and the workings of the military-industrial complex—are responsible for Soviet weapons decisions. David Holloway's more eclectic explanation, in The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, describes both the internal and external determinants of Soviet military policy. The evolution of Soviet regional nuclear policy, and particularly the deployment of the SS-20 missile, can be accounted for by several different explanations—indicating a problem of overdetermination of causes. One way to resolve this problem is by adopting a framework developed by James Kurth to explain U.S. weapons procurement. It suggests that the“modes of causation” for Soviet weapons decisions are generally the opposite of those for American decisions. This generalization is consistent with what an analysis based on the relative strengths of state and societal forces in the two countries would predict.


1992 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-169 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Roe

Summary To date governments have been slow to appreciate that, as well as a peace dividend, arms reduction will bring social and economic hardship to communities which have relied upon defence expenditure for employment. Conversion of military bases, let alone restructuring of defence industries, cannot be left to market forces to achieve; government intervention is required to ensure the successful adjustment of communities. During the Cold War, the dominance of the “military-industrial complex” spread the notion that disarmament would threaten not only security, but jobs. Current geopolitical changes present an opportunity to challenge this argument. Local employment initiatives are essential to prevent defence cuts from causing unemployment.


1978 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 250-267 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert D. Cuff

Is there a “military-industrial complex” in the United States? What is the relationship between business, government, and the military with its needs for vast quantities of goods and services? How has organization for war and defense changed since the demands of World War I first made such questions important? How much do we know about what actually happened between World War I and Vietnam to change the relationship between private and public organizations? Professor Cuff discusses the complexities involved in trying to answer such historical questions, and prescribes a professional historian's regimen for future work on this subject.


1992 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 275-299
Author(s):  
Roger W. Lotchin

Like many modern historians’ concepts, the notion of political culture comes to us from the social sciences, especially anthropology and political science. One assumes that political culture is a term familiar to most readers. The term metropolitan-military complex may require some explanation. I coined the phrase some years ago when undertaking a study of San Francisco politics. At the time, the inquiry was fairly conventional. Yet as I worked through the struggles over municipal services, labor and management problems, political structure, mass transit, minorities, parties, reformers, bosses, and so forth, the role of the military loomed ever larger. The longer the military was investigated, the more important that role appeared to be. Eventually, I changed the focus of my study from politics, conventionally defined, to the relationship between cities and the military. President Dwight D. Eisenhower used the term military-industrial complex in his 1961 farewell address to describe an alliance among technicians, congressmen, bureaucrats, military men, and businessmen. He did not define his words rigorously, but he left the definite impression that the military-industrial complex (MIC) was national in scope and something close to a conspiracy on behalf of greater defense spending. The president also implied that the MIC had only recently appeared. Subsequent commentators on the subject have largely followed this approach, stressing the importance of conspiracy, militarism, Washington bureaucrats, big business, and big congressmen. They have also accepted the World War II or cold war origins of the alliance as well as its national scope.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-20
Author(s):  
Irina Orlova ◽  
Artem Sukharev ◽  
Maria Sukhareva ◽  
Mikhail Deikun

The main objective of the article is to substantiate a systematic approach to the introduction of all types of innovations in the development of the military-industrial complex of the Russian Federation. The relevance of the study is due to the fact that in the modern world it is especially important to ensure the national security of the country and the defense industry plays a crucial role in this. At the same time, one cannot but note the importance of the defense industry in the production of high-tech civilian products and dual-use products, which enhances the country's competitiveness in the world market. In addition, the relevance of the topic is due to the presence of rather serious problems in the Russian defense industry, which require immediate resolution. The article uses the methodology of structurally functional analysis, the institutional approach and the method of comparative assessments. The authors conclude that technological innovation alone will not be able to achieve strategic results for ensuring national security, only in conjunction with organizational, product, social and marketing innovations, the domestic defense industry is able to solve its tasks.


Cinema’s Military Industrial Complex examines how the American military has used cinema and related visual, sonic, and mobile technologies to further its varied aims. The essays in this book address the way cinema was put to work for purposes of training, orientation, record keeping, internal and external communication, propaganda, research and development, tactical analysis, surveillance, physical and mental health, recreation, and morale. The contributors examine the technologies and types of films that were produced and used in collaboration among the military, film industry, and technology manufacturers. The essays also explore the goals of the American state, which deployed the military and its unique modes of filmmaking, film exhibition, and film viewing to various ends. Together, the essays reveal the military’s deep investment in cinema, which began around World War I, expanded during World War II, continued during the Cold War (including wars in Korea and Vietnam), and still continues in the ongoing War on Terror.


2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (11) ◽  
pp. 2103-2123
Author(s):  
V.L. Gladyshevskii ◽  
E.V. Gorgola ◽  
D.V. Khudyakov

Subject. In the twentieth century, the most developed countries formed a permanent military economy represented by military-industrial complexes, which began to perform almost a system-forming role in national economies, acting as the basis for ensuring national security, and being an independent military and political force. The United States is pursuing a pronounced militaristic policy, has almost begun to unleash a new "cold war" against Russia and to unwind the arms race, on the one hand, trying to exhaust the enemy's economy, on the other hand, to reindustrialize its own economy, relying on the military-industrial complex. Objectives. We examine the evolution, main features and operational distinctions of the military-industrial complex of the United States and that of the Russian Federation, revealing sources of their military-technological and military-economic advancement in comparison with other countries. Methods. The study uses military-economic analysis, scientific and methodological apparatus of modern institutionalism. Results. Regulating the national economy and constant monitoring of budget financing contribute to the rise of military production, especially in the context of austerity and crisis phenomena, which, in particular, justifies the irrelevance of institutionalists' conclusions about increasing transaction costs and intensifying centralization in the industrial production management with respect to to the military-industrial complex. Conclusions. Proving to be much more efficient, the domestic military-industrial complex, without having such access to finance as the U.S. military monopolies, should certainly evolve and progress, strengthening the coordination, manageability, planning, maximum cost reduction, increasing labor productivity, and implementing an internal quality system with the active involvement of the State and its resources.


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