scholarly journals Ajdukiewicz and the Notion of Conceptual Apparatus

2021 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
pp. 226-229
Author(s):  
Marsonet Michele
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Donald Davidson ◽  
Conceptual Scheme ◽  
Conceptual Apparatus ◽  
Nicholas Rescher

The Polish philosopher Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz adopted the notion of “conceptual apparatus”, which is very similar to the idea of “conceptual scheme” put forward by Donald Davidson, Willard V. Quine, Nicholas Rescher and others. Ajdukiewicz’s theses are, in this regard, very important although less known, and he treated cognitive processes as inseparably connected with language.

scholarly journals Learning and knowing as semiosis: Extending the conceptual apparatus of semiotics

2020 ◽  
Vol 47 (3/4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Cary Campbell ◽  
Alin Olteanu ◽  
Kalevi Kull
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
State Of The Art ◽  
Life Sciences ◽  
The State ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Conceptual Apparatus ◽  
Knowing That ◽  
Semiotic Perspective ◽  
Semiotic Theory

If all knowing comes from semiosis, more concepts should be added to the semiotic toolbox. However, semiotic concepts must be defined via other semiotic concepts. We observe an opportunity to advance the state-of-the-art in semiotics by defining concepts of cognitive processes and phenomena via semiotic terms. In particular, we focus on concepts of relevance for theory of knowledge, such as learning, knowing, affordance, scaffolding, resources, competence, memory, and a few others. For these, we provide preliminary definitions from a semiotic perspective, which also explicates their interrelatedness. Redefining these terms this way helps to avoid both physicalism and psychologism, showcasing the epistemological dimensions of environmental situatedness through the semiotic understanding of organisms’ fittedness with their environments. Following our review and presentation of each concept, we briefly discuss the significance of our embedded redefinitions in contributing to a semiotic theory of knowing that has relevance to both the humanities and the life sciences, while not forgetting their relevance to education and psychology, but also social semiotic and multimodality studies.

The Criticism of Concepts and the Concept of Criticism

1972 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-145
Author(s):  
C. B. Macpherson
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Framework ◽  
Reverse Order ◽  
Conceptual Scheme ◽  
Central Concept ◽  
Conceptual Apparatus

I am grateful to Professor Wand for devoting so much space to my “conceptual apparatus.” I should have been more grateful if he had got it more nearly right. His criticism of my concepts, particularly of the central concept of powers, is so wide of the mark that one wonders about his concept of criticism. The puzzle is how he can pronounce with such assurance his “grave charges” that my thought is confused and misleading. The answer I shall suggest is partly (a) that he has not paid attention to my definitions, and partly (b) that he has tried to fit my argument into a conceptual framework – his own – which he assumes has some absolute validity. Perhaps (b) accounts for (a): he was perhaps unable to read what I wrote because it does not fit his conceptual scheme. Let me take in reverse order his criticisms of the three concepts he deals with.

scholarly journals On Accelerations in Science Driven by Daring Ideas: Good Messages from Fallibilistic Rationalism

2015 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Witold Marciszewski
Keyword(s):  
Problem Solving ◽  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Classical Version ◽  
Conceptual Apparatus ◽  
Processing Information ◽  
New Ideas ◽  
The Senses

Abstract The first good message is to the effect that people possess reason as a source of intellectual insights, not available to the senses, as e.g. axioms of arithmetic. The awareness of this fact is called rationalism. Another good message is that reason can daringly quest for and gain new plausible insights. Those, if suitably checked and confirmed, can entail a revision of former results, also in mathematics, and - due to the greater efficiency of new ideas - accelerate science’s progress. The awareness that no insight is secured against revision, is called fallibilism. This modern fallibilistic rationalism (Peirce, Popper, Gödel, etc. oppose the fundamentalism of the classical version (Plato, Descartes etc.), i.e. the belief in the attainability of inviolable truths of reason which would forever constitute the foundations of knowledge. Fallibilistic rationalism is based on the idea that any problem-solving consists in processing information. Its results vary with respect to informativeness and its reverse - certainty. It is up to science to look for highly informative solutions, in spite of their uncertainty, and then to make them more certain through testing against suitable evidence. To account for such cognitive processes, one resorts to the conceptual apparatus of logic, informatics, and cognitive science.

Myles Brand. Introduction: defining “causes.”The nature of causation, edited and with an introduction by Myles Brand, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Chicago, and London, 1976, pp. 1–44. - Ernest Nagel. The logical character of scientific laws. The nature of causation, edited and with an introduction by Myles Brand, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Chicago, and London, 1976, pp. 77–110. (Reprinted from XL 262(11), pp. 47–78.) - Roderick M. Chisholm. Law statements and counterfactual inference. A reprint of XXI 86. The nature of causation, edited and with an introduction by Myles Brand, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Chicago, and London, 1976, pp. 111–121. - Nelson Goodman. The problem of counterfactual conditionals. A reprint of XII 139. The nature of causation, edited and with an introduction by Myles Brand, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Chicago, and London, 1976, pp. 123–149. - Robert Stalnaker. A theory of conditionals. The nature of causation, edited and with an introduction by Myles Brand, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Chicago, and London, 1976, pp. 151–166. (Reprinted from Studies in logical theory, edited by Nicholas Rescher, American philosophical quarterly monograph series, no. 2, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1968, pp. 98–112; also reprinted in Causation and conditionals, edited by Ernest Sosa, Oxford readings in philosophy, Oxford University Press, London etc. 1975, pp. 165–179.) - Arthur Burks. The logic of causal propositions. A reprint of XVI 277. The nature of causation, edited and with an introduction by Myles Brand, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Chicago, and London, 1976, pp. 255–276. - J. L. Mackie. Causes and conditions. The nature of causation, edited and with an introduction by Myles Brand, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Chicago, and London, 1976, pp. 307–344. (Reprinted from American philosophical quarterly, vol. 2 (1965), pp. 245–264.) - Donald Davidson. Causal relations. The nature of causation, edited and with an introduction by Myles Brand, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Chicago, and London, 1976, pp. 353–367. (Reprinted from The journal of philosophy, vol. 64 (1967), pp. 691–703; also reprinted in The logic of grammar, edited by Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman, Dickenson Publishing Company, Inc., Encino and Belmont, Calif., 1975, pp. 246–254.)

1982 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 470-473 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Jackson
Keyword(s):  
Donald Davidson ◽  
Logical Theory ◽  
Ernest Sosa ◽  
University Of Illinois ◽  
Nelson Goodman ◽  
Counterfactual Conditionals ◽  
Oxford University ◽  
Nicholas Rescher ◽  
Scientific Laws ◽  
Gilbert Harman

Herbert A. Simon. The logic of rational decision. The British journal for the philosophy of science, vol. 16 no. 63 (1965), pp. 169–186. - Herbert A. Simon. The logic of heuristic decision making. The logic of decision and action, edited by Nicholas Rescher, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh1967, pp. 1–20. - Robert Binkley. Comments on H. Simon's “The logic of heuristic decision making.”The logic of decision and action, edited by Nicholas Rescher, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh1967, pp. 21–26. - Nuel D. Belnap Jr. Comments on H. Simon's “The logic of heuristic decision making.”The logic of decision and action, edited by Nicholas Rescher, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh1967, pp. 27–31. - Herbert A. Simon. Reply to comments. The logic of decision and action, edited by Nicholas Rescher, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh1967, pp. 32–35. - Nicholas Rescher. Semantic foundations for the logic of preference. The logic of decision and action, edited by Nicholas Rescher, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh1967, pp. 37–62. - Alan Ross Anderson. Comments on N. Rescher's “Semantic foundations for the logic of preference.”The logic of decision and action, edited by Nicholas Rescher, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh1967, pp. 63–70. - Robert Ackermann. Comments on N. Rescher's “Semantic foundations for the logic of preference.”The logic of decision and action, edited by Nicholas Rescher, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh1967, pp. 71–76. - Nicholas Rescher. Reply to comments. The logic of decision and action, edited by Nicholas Rescher, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh1967, pp. 77–79. - Donald Davidson. The logical form of action sentences. The logic of decision and action, edited by Nicholas Rescher, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh1967, pp. 81–95. - E. J. Lemmon. Comments on D. Davidson's “The logical form of action sentences.”The logic of decision and action, edited by Nicholas Rescher, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh1967, pp. 96–103. - Hector-Neri Castañeda. Comments on D. Davidson's “The logical form of action sentences.”The logic of decision and action, edited by Nicholas Rescher, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh1967, pp. 104–112. - Roderick M. Chisholm. Comments on D. Davidson's “The logical form of action sentences.”The logic of decision and action, edited by Nicholas Rescher, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh1967, pp. 113–114. - Donald Davidson. Reply to comments. The logic of decision and action, edited by Nicholas Rescher, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh1967, pp. 115–120. - Georg Henrik von Wright. The logic of action—a sketch. The logic of decision and action, edited by Nicholas Rescher, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh1967, pp. 121–136. - Roderick M. Chisholm. Comments on von Wright's “The logic of action.”The logic of decision and action, edited by Nicholas Rescher, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh1967, pp. 137–139. - John Robison. Comments on von Wright's “The logic of action.”The logic of decision and action, edited by Nicholas Rescher, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh1967, pp. 140–143. - Georg Henrik von Wright. Reply to comments. The logic of decision and action, edited by Nicholas Rescher, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh1967, pp. 144–146. - Alan Ross Anderson. Appendix I. The formal analysis of normative systems. The logic of decision and action, edited by Nicholas Rescher, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh1967, pp. 147–213. - Nicholas Rescher. Appendix II. Aspects of action. The logic of decision and action, edited by Nicholas Rescher, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh1967, pp. 215–219.

1973 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 135-144
Author(s):  
Edward E. Dawson
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
British Journal ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Formal Analysis ◽  
Logical Form ◽  
Donald Davidson ◽  
Rational Decision ◽  
University Of Pittsburgh ◽  
Logic Of Action ◽  
Nicholas Rescher

Elaborating the role of reflection and individual differences in the study of folk-economic beliefs

2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin Arceneaux
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Individual Differences ◽  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Evolutionary History ◽  
Behavioral Responses ◽  
History Of ◽  
Economic Beliefs

AbstractIntuitions guide decision-making, and looking to the evolutionary history of humans illuminates why some behavioral responses are more intuitive than others. Yet a place remains for cognitive processes to second-guess intuitive responses – that is, to be reflective – and individual differences abound in automatic, intuitive processing as well.

A cognitive approach to cumulative technological culture is useful and necessary but only if it also applies to other species

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thibaud Gruber
Keyword(s):  
Social Learning ◽  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Learning Processes ◽  
Cognitive Approach ◽  
Technological Culture ◽  
Social Learning Processes

Abstract The debate on cumulative technological culture (CTC) is dominated by social-learning discussions, at the expense of other cognitive processes, leading to flawed circular arguments. I welcome the authors' approach to decouple CTC from social-learning processes without minimizing their impact. Yet, this model will only be informative to understand the evolution of CTC if tested in other cultural species.

Reaction Time and Brain Waves in Omitted Stimulus Tasks

2010 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oscar H. Hernández ◽  
Muriel Vogel-Sprott
Keyword(s):  
Reaction Time ◽  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Young Male ◽  
Event Related Potential ◽  
Auditory Stimuli ◽  
Motor Action ◽  
Cognitive Component ◽  
Sensory Modalities ◽  
Two Measures ◽  
Somatosensory Stimuli

A missing stimulus task requires an immediate response to the omission of a regular recurrent stimulus. The task evokes a subclass of event-related potential known as omitted stimulus potential (OSP), which reflects some cognitive processes such as expectancy. The behavioral response to a missing stimulus is referred to as omitted stimulus reaction time (RT). This total RT measure is known to include cognitive and motor components. The cognitive component (premotor RT) is measured by the time from the missing stimulus until the onset of motor action. The motor RT component is measured by the time from the onset of muscle action until the completion of the response. Previous research showed that RT is faster to auditory than to visual stimuli, and that the premotor of RT to a missing auditory stimulus is correlated with the duration of an OSP. Although this observation suggests that similar cognitive processes might underlie these two measures, no research has tested this possibility. If similar cognitive processes are involved in the premotor RT and OSP duration, these two measures should be correlated in visual and somatosensory modalities, and the premotor RT to missing auditory stimuli should be fastest. This hypothesis was tested in 17 young male volunteers who performed a missing stimulus task, who were presented with trains of auditory, visual, and somatosensory stimuli and the OSP and RT measures were recorded. The results showed that premotor RT and OSP duration were consistently related, and that both measures were shorter with respect to auditory stimuli than to visual or somatosensory stimuli. This provides the first evidence that the premotor RT is related to an attribute of the OSP in all three sensory modalities.

Do Event-Related Brain Potentials Reflect Mental (Cognitive) Operations?

2002 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 129-149 ◽  
Author(s):  
Boris Kotchoubey
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Internal Variables ◽  
Brain Potentials ◽  
Cognitive Operations ◽  
External Variables ◽  
Series Of Experiments ◽  
Mental Operations ◽  
A Chain ◽  
Processing Mechanisms

Abstract Most cognitive psychophysiological studies assume (1) that there is a chain of (partially overlapping) cognitive processes (processing stages, mechanisms, operators) leading from stimulus to response, and (2) that components of event-related brain potentials (ERPs) may be regarded as manifestations of these processing stages. What is usually discussed is which particular processing mechanisms are related to some particular component, but not whether such a relationship exists at all. Alternatively, from the point of view of noncognitive (e. g., “naturalistic”) theories of perception ERP components might be conceived of as correlates of extraction of the information from the experimental environment. In a series of experiments, the author attempted to separate these two accounts, i. e., internal variables like mental operations or cognitive parameters versus external variables like information content of stimulation. Whenever this separation could be performed, the latter factor proved to significantly affect ERP amplitudes, whereas the former did not. These data indicate that ERPs cannot be unequivocally linked to processing mechanisms postulated by cognitive models of perception. Therefore, they cannot be regarded as support for these models.

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