Commitment or Equivocation

2020 ◽  
pp. 112-115
Author(s):  
Alasdair Roberts
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Arrangements ◽  
National Defense ◽  
Credible Commitment ◽  
Scholarly Writing ◽  
The Future ◽  
Governance Strategies ◽  
Commitment Devices ◽  
Commitment Problems ◽  
Credibility Problem

This chapter distinguishes between commitment and equivocation in the design of governance strategies. For the last thirty years, “credible commitment” has been a stock phrase in scholarly writing about government. Governments are said to have a credibility problem, because citizens and businesses do not trust them to keep promises about how they will behave in the future. The task for leaders is to find techniques for demonstrating that they will keep their word, by designing institutions that make it hard to break promises. These institutional arrangements are called commitment devices. It can then be concluded that leaders are mainly concerned with finding clever ways to solve commitment problems. Commitment, it seems, is the key to prosperity, order, and legitimacy. Leaders want people and businesses to make choices that stimulate growth and deepen their own attachment to the existing order. However, the situation confronting leaders is actually more difficult than this. Sometimes equivocation rather than commitment is the sound choice. Leaders know that there will inevitably be emergencies where everyday rules have to be put aside, and they do not want to make it impossible to do this. For example, property might need to be seized in the name of national defense.

Accessing the state: Executive constraints and credible commitment in dictatorship

2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 568-599 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne Meng
Keyword(s):  
Case Studies ◽  
State Power ◽  
The State ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Credible Commitment ◽  
The Future ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Distribution Of Power ◽  
Commitment Problems

When do executive constraints provide credible commitment power in dictatorships, and under what conditions do leaders establish such constraints? This article argues that institutions successfully constrain autocrats only when elites are given real access to state power, such as appointments to key governmental positions. I present a game theoretic model in which an autocratic leader decides whether to establish binding constraints at the start of her rule. Doing so shifts the future distribution of power in favor of elites, alleviating commitment problems in bargaining. I show that leaders are likely to place constraints on their own authority when they enter power especially weak, and these initial decisions shape the rest of their rule. Even if a leader enters power in a uniquely weak position vis-á-vis other elites, and is on average, quite strong, the need to alleviate commitment problems in the first period swamps expectations about the future distribution of power. I illustrate the model’s findings through case studies of Cameroon and Côte d’Ivoire.

scholarly journals Allies or Commitment Devices? A Model of Appointments to the Federal Reserve

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith Schnakenberg ◽  
Ian R Turner ◽  
Alicia Uribe-McGuire
Keyword(s):  
Federal Reserve ◽  
Typical Case ◽  
Economic Uncertainty ◽  
Credible Commitment ◽  
Legislative Bargaining ◽  
The Face ◽  
Ideal Points ◽  
Commitment Devices ◽  
Commitment Problems ◽  
Central Bankers

We present a model of executive-legislative bargaining over appointments to independent cen-tral banks in the face of an uncertain economy with strategic economic actors. The model highlights the contrast between two idealized views of Federal Reserve appointments. In one view, politicians prefer to appoint conservatively biased central bankers to overcome credible commitment problems that arise in monetary policy. In the other, politicians prefer to appoint allies, and appointments are well described by the spatial model used to describe appointments to other agencies. Both ideals are limiting cases of our model, which depend on the level of economic uncertainty. When economic uncertainty is extremely low, politicians prefer very conservative appointments. When economic uncertainty increases, politicians’ prefer central bank appointees closer to their own ideal points. In the typical case, the results are somewhere in between: equilibrium appointments move in the direction of politician’s preferences but with a moderate conservative bias.

Remarks by Col. Gary Corn

2017 ◽  
Vol 111 ◽  
pp. 57-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary Corn
Keyword(s):  
Department Of Defense ◽  
National Defense ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Moment ◽  
The U.S

First, I should note that I am speaking today in my personal capacity only, and my views do not represent those of the U.S. government, the Department of Defense, or U.S. Cyber Command. At the outset, let me provide a brief overview of U.S. Cyber Command. It is a relatively new command within the Department of Defense. Established about seven years ago as a subunified command, it is an operational headquarters at the strategic level but at the moment subordinate to U.S. Strategic Command, one of the combatant commands within the Department of Defense. The 2017 National Defense Authorization Act included a provision stating that there shall be established a combatant command known as U.S. Cyber Command. As a result, there is now a lot of movement afoot to see how we will meet that legislative intent. In all likelihood, U.S. Cyber Command will elevate at some time in the future as a full combatant command.

Governing Complex Systems

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oran R. Young
Keyword(s):  
Nonlinear Dynamics ◽  
Complex Systems ◽  
Goal Setting ◽  
Institutional Arrangements ◽  
Emergent Properties ◽  
New Governance ◽  
Effective Governance ◽  
Directional Change ◽  
Governance Strategies ◽  
Governance Arrangements

Governing for sustainability in a world of complex systems will require new social capital in the form of innovative steering mechanisms that differ in important respects from those familiar to us from past experience. Complex systems feature high levels of connectivity, nonlinear dynamics, directional change, and emergent properties. Creating effective governance arrangements in such settings calls for an ability to combine the durability required to guide behavior with the agility needed to adjust or reform institutional arrangements to cope with rapidly changing circumstances. Success in such endeavors will depend on a capacity to supplement mainstream regulatory approaches to governance with new governance strategies. Promising examples include governance through goal-setting and principled governance. But additional innovations in this realm will be necessary to address needs for governance arising in the Anthropocene. The way forward in this effort will be to build cooperative relations between analysts and practitioners rather than treating them as separate communities that respond to different incentives and operate in different worlds.

Scientific Management of the World Stocks of Tunas, Billfishes, and Related Species

1973 ◽  
Vol 30 (12) ◽  
pp. 2471-2482 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Joseph
Keyword(s):  
Related Species ◽  
Institutional Arrangements ◽  
Past Experience ◽  
Secondary Market ◽  
Scientific Study ◽  
Scientific Management ◽  
The World ◽  
The Future

This paper reviews past experience in tuna research and management, and proposes guidelines for the future. The resources discussed include three major groups: the six principal market species of tunas, which are heavily exploited; the billfishes, which are in most cases heavily exploited; and the secondary market species of smaller tuna and tuna-like fishes, which are generally underexploited. A brief review of their nomenclature, biology, and fisheries is given, followed by comments on the condition of the stocks. A discussion of institutional arrangements for the scientific study and management of tuna resources is presented, and such arrangements are examined in the light of problems which might be unique to tuna and tuna-like fishes. These special problems and ways in which they might be handled are considered.

scholarly journals THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF THE CAMBRIDGE LAW JOURNAL

2021 ◽  
Vol 80 (S1) ◽  
pp. S8-S32
Author(s):  
Lionel Bently
Keyword(s):  
Open Access ◽  
Institutional Arrangements ◽  
The Past ◽  
Introductory Essay ◽  
The World ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Status ◽  
History Of ◽  
Two Stages

This introductory essay reviews the history of the Journal, divided into two stages: the period from 1921 to 1953; and that from 1954 to today. It examines the changing institutional arrangements, personnel, as well as some of the highlights in the content of the Journal. If there is a theme, it is that the Journal was established by and developed its reputation because of the efforts of many of the outstanding scholars at Cambridge who over the decades offered the outputs of their talents to the Journal; and that the Journal has used that reputation more and more to attract the scholars outside Cambridge – indeed from all over the world. Whatever the aims of those who established the Cambridge Law Journal in 1921, and without much self-consciousness, the Journal incrementally acquired the status and practices of a learned journal. Finally, the essay reflects on the future, in particular the challenges of digitisation, open access and inclusivity.

The Credible Commitment Problem in the Third-Party Mediation of the Mindanao Peace Process, 1975–2014

2021 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 181-207
Author(s):  
John Lee Candelaria
Keyword(s):  
Civil Wars ◽  
Peace Process ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Process Tracing ◽  
Credible Commitment ◽  
Negotiated Settlements ◽  
Commitment Problem ◽  
Long Time ◽  
Monitoring And Enforcement ◽  
Commitment Problems

Abstract Negotiated settlements of civil wars are challenging since incompatibilities take a long time to resolve. Many scholars have approached this puzzle by identifying information asymmetry and commitment problems as critical deterrents to resolution. Similarly, this article argues that third-party mediation could improve or worsen the parties’ credible commitment problems, as illustrated in the Mindanao peace process mediation that spanned almost four decades. Following a contingency framework in analyzing third-party mediation, this article analyzes existing reports, statements, and peace process agreements using a process tracing methodology. The article argues that the success of a peace process could be attributed to how mediation resolves the parties’ credible commitment problems, which are evident in three aspects of the peace process: getting the parties to negotiate, the use of mediator leverage, and the promise of third-party monitoring and enforcement.

Commons in the Past and the Future of Law and Economics

Global Jurist ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Aleksandar Stojanovic
Keyword(s):  
Economic Theory ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Economic Activity ◽  
Law And Economics ◽  
Institutional Arrangements ◽  
Analytic Framework ◽  
Yale University ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Future

Abstract This article explores the role of commons in law and economics under the assumption that its strength (following Calabresi. 2016. The Future of Law and Economics: Essays in Reform and Recollection. Yale University Press) comes from the ability to amplify economic theory by integrating elements of institutional reality into the analytic framework. Following an analysis of the role that the spoilage of commons has played in the early developments of the transaction cost framework, the article considers the ways in which the success of commons could amplify the law and economics further. I conclude these costs could be conceptualized by extending Calabresi’s own past work on the role of values in institutional arrangements in the direction of understanding the contributions and losses of different arrangements concerning the capacity of values motivate economic activity.

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