Iraq, Vietnam, and the Meaning of Victory

The Last Card ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 239-259
Author(s):  
Andrew Preston

This chapter offers a comparison of George W. Bush's decision-making process in the Iraq War with that of Lyndon B. Johnson's in the Vietnam War. In both Vietnam and Iraq, the United States had to fight an insurgent campaign that was supported by powerful regional adversaries determined to bring down a US-backed government. In both Vietnam and Iraq, America's superior military technology had limited effectiveness against an enemy who relied on simple but lethal weapons and could blend into the general population. In both Vietnam and Iraq, gaining the trust of that population was vital to the success of the overall mission yet proved frustratingly elusive. And in deciding what to do in response, the national security decision-making apparatus in both the Johnson and Bush administrations ultimately produced a consensus behind the president's decision, either to surge US troops to restore deteriorating security and political stability (in 1965 and 2007) or to begin the process of de-escalation and eventually withdrawal (1968). There were key differences, too, which the chapter also explores, but the similarities are uncanny.

Author(s):  
Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar ◽  
Jerry L. Mashaw

The economic analysis of regulation is a broad topic, with implications for environmental protection, communications and technology policy, public health, immigration, national security, and other areas affecting risk and welfare in society. This chapter covers only a portion of the relevant ground, focusing on the following essential topics: First, what do we mean by “economic analysis” and what do we mean by “regulation”? Second, why has this topic become an important one, not only the United States, but in most advanced democracies? Third, why is economic analysis and regulation a contested, even contentious, aspect of modern regulatory activity? Finally, and most important, how is economic analysis structured into regulatory decision-making, and how might existing arrangements evolve over time?


2021 ◽  
pp. 99-146
Author(s):  
Carlos A. Ball

This chapter explores how Congress, the courts, and we the people have permitted presidents for the last ninety years to accumulate an immense amount of power with few meaningful and effective restraints. In doing so, the chapter shows how Trump’s abuses of presidential authority were not only the actions of a reckless and autocratic leader, but were also the outgrowth of the steady accumulation of presidential powers that has taken place since the 1930s under both Republican and Democratic administrations. Although progressives since the Vietnam War have worked to limit presidential authority in matters related to armed conflicts and national security, they generally have not pushed for restraining that authority in domestic matters. It is time for progressives to take into account the extent to which proposed laws, regulations, and executive orders expand presidential domestic powers when determining whether such measures merit their political support. This means that there may be times when progressives should refuse to support measures that unduly expand presidential authority even in instances in which the exercise of that authority advances progressive goals. To illustrate this point, the chapter argues that progressives should have been more cognizant of the extent to which President Barack Obama’s humanitarian but unilateral decision to cease deporting Dreamers—the large number of undocumented immigrants brought to the United States as children—expanded presidential powers.


2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 299-318
Author(s):  
Joseph Paul Vasquez

Abstract I argue that constructivism can help us understand the political dimension of sports generally and specifically the norms, meaning, and social identity of American football. More specifically, I contend that football’s development in the United States built it into a cultural force associated with militarist and patriotic norms that politicians could leverage for political support when deep domestic divisions existed concerning national security. This phenomenon resulted from the game’s social transformation from a primarily civilian, leisure-time form of recreation and entertainment into a socially constructed symbol for military recruitment by a reinforcing “gridiron triangle” comprised of actors from the military bureaucracy, football teams and leagues, and the sports media. Because of this social phenomenon, American presidents such as Richard Nixon and Donald Trump have attempted to use football as a cultural asset for bolstering support when their national security credentials were seriously questioned. In the case of Nixon, it happened when the United States was divided over the Vietnam War. As for the Trump administration, a similar situation emerged amid investigations of collusion between the Russian government and the Trump campaign and the subsequent manipulation of military aid designed to contain Russian expansion in Ukraine for partisan, electoral gains.


Author(s):  
Steven Hurst

The United States, Iran and the Bomb provides the first comprehensive analysis of the US-Iranian nuclear relationship from its origins through to the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015. Starting with the Nixon administration in the 1970s, it analyses the policies of successive US administrations toward the Iranian nuclear programme. Emphasizing the centrality of domestic politics to decision-making on both sides, it offers both an explanation of the evolution of the relationship and a critique of successive US administrations' efforts to halt the Iranian nuclear programme, with neither coercive measures nor inducements effectively applied. The book further argues that factional politics inside Iran played a crucial role in Iranian nuclear decision-making and that American policy tended to reinforce the position of Iranian hardliners and undermine that of those who were prepared to compromise on the nuclear issue. In the final chapter it demonstrates how President Obama's alterations to American strategy, accompanied by shifts in Iranian domestic politics, finally brought about the signing of the JCPOA in 2015.


Author(s):  
Attarid Awadh Abdulhameed

Ukrainia Remains of huge importance to Russian Strategy because of its Strategic importance. For being a privileged Postion in new Eurasia, without its existence there would be no logical resons for eastward Expansion by European Powers.  As well as in Connection with the progress of Ukrainian is no less important for the USA (VSD, NDI, CIA, or pentagon) and the European Union with all organs, and this is announced by John Kerry. There has always ben Russian Fear and Fear of any move by NATO or USA in the area that it poses a threat to  Russians national Security and its independent role and in funence  on its forces especially the Navy Forces. There for, the Crisis manyement was not Zero sum game, there are gains and offset losses, but Russia does not accept this and want a Zero Sun game because the USA. And European exteance is a Foot hold in Regin Which Russian sees as a threat to its national security and want to monopolize control in the strategic Qirim.


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