A HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF OIL DISPERSANT GUIDELINES FOR ALASKA

1987 ◽  
Vol 1987 (1) ◽  
pp. 189-191
Author(s):  
Michael A. Conway

ABSTRACT The Oil Dispersant Guidelines for Alaska, Cook Inlet Section, were implemented on August 6, 1986, when the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Coast Guard, and Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation signed a Memorandum of Agreement. State and federal agencies, private industry, commercial fishermen, and environmentalists had to work together toward this achievement. Without this cooperative effort, there would be no planning for effective dispersant use in Alaska as a spill control method.

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 299651
Author(s):  
Lydia Miner ◽  
Robert Klieforth ◽  
Eppie Hogan

Oil discharge prevention and contingency plans (ODPCPs) have been required under Alaska statutes and regulations for oil exploration, production, storage, and transportation facilities since 1992. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc. (BPXA) has prepared and submitted their North Slope ODPCPs (Milne Point, Endicott, Greater Prudhoe Bay, and Northstar) as a single volume for each facility under these requirements. However, in 2011, when the four plans were renewed, BPXA elected to present their ODPCPs in two volumes for each facility. The purpose of this organizational change from one to two volumes was to focus information in each volume; the first volume is a stand-alone Emergency Action Plan for spill responders, dedicated to spill response planning and preparedness, and the second volume is dedicated to spill prevention requirements and procedures. The 2-volume edition allows BPXA's plan writers, operators, and regulators to concentrate on specific response or prevention topics and regulatory compliance. The 2-volume plan is easier to use and revise through the amendment process. This approach is allowed under Alaska regulations and was embraced by the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation. Federal regulators (Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, US Environmental Protection Agency, US Coast Guard, and US Department of Transportation) have reviewed and approved the 2-volume response plans as well. According to regulators, with such large ODPCPs, the effort to maintain publication efficiency during public review creates a potential risk of confusion or lack of sufficient detail, which may lead to comments that focus on form or style, rather than content. Working with two volumes circumvented this potential problem. Due to the size and lengthy history of the facilities, an comprehensive Alaska regulations governing the contents of ODPCPs, two volumes allowed BPXA to include all of the necessary information for the plans without creating a storage or ergonomic problem for the reviewers. Regular users of the ODPCPs at the BPXA facilities have found that working with a smaller, more focused volume is more efficient.


2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 311-315
Author(s):  
John Bauer ◽  
Jean Cameron ◽  
Larry Iwamoto

ABSTRACT The Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force (Oil Spill Task Force) and the Alaska Regional Response Team (RRT) are collaborating to develop decision-making and planning guidelines which “operationalize” the International Maritime Organization's Places of Refuge guidelines. These guidelines will incorporate the authorities of the US and Canadian Coast Guards, state, provincial, local, and tribal governments, and resource agencies. The decision-making section of the guidelines provides step-by-step procedures and checklists to analyze the risks of allowing a ship in need of assistance to proceed to a place of refuge. The planning section of the guidelines provides a process to pre-identify information necessary for responding to requests for places of refuge and identifying potential places of refuge prior to an incident. The Oil Spill Task Force effort involves a workgroup of regional stakeholders co-chaired by the Task Force agencies and the US Coast Guard, Pacific Area. The separate Alaska initiative is being accomplished by a workgroup of the Alaska RRT co-chaired by the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC) and US Coast Guard, District 17. Both projects are developing concurrently and include persons serving as liaisons between the two efforts in order to promote consistency and share information. The Oil Spill Task Force Guidelines provide a template for member states and the province to use in developing decisionmaking and pre-incident plans tailored to their area. The Alaska guidelines were drafted concurrently with the Oil Spill Task Force process, and sections of their guidelines were modified to reflect area-wide conditions. The Oil Spill Task Force's final guidelines are to be used as a planning annex to US Area Contingency Plans on the West Coast. Alaska will include their guidelines in the Federal/State Unified Plan and subarea plans. Transport Canada and Canadian Coast Guard authorities will adapt the guidelines as appropriate for Canada.


1995 ◽  
Vol 1995 (1) ◽  
pp. 1036-1037
Author(s):  
Robert A. Levine

ABSTRACT ARCO Marine, Inc. (AMI) has been holding regular oil spill drills for its spill team members since the mid-1970s. Over the years the drills have gotten more elaborate and more costly, employing equipment and testing initial response and transition management. By the 1993 drill, it was found, the drills were losing their educational benefits and for the most part had become well-rehearsed stage plays, with spill team members and other participants as actors and equipment as props. The drills were not providing the education necessary to develop team members for their roles as response managers. AMI rethought the drill process and, with the concurrence of the U.S. Coast Guard, the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation, and the Ship Escort and Response Vessel System, decided that it was time to “drill for reality.”


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 300126
Author(s):  
Mike Popovich ◽  
Tim L. Robertson ◽  
Gary Folley

Conducting oil spill recovery operations in remote regions/environments is a daunting challenge. Increased shipping and oil exploration in the Arctic drives the need for developing innovative ways to mitigate oil spills in remote regions. This includes bolstering near-shore spill response to protect coastal resources. The Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation, in conjunction with the United States Coast Guard, and Alaska oil spill response organizations, has developed a Nearshore Operations Response Strategy (NORS) that provides planners and responders with a framework to plan for and carry out long-term oil removal and shoreline protection strategies in the Alaskan near-shore environment. NORS addresses the logistical challenges that exist when considering sustained operations in remote areas without shore-based support facilities. This strategy begins with tactics developed using best available technology to recover oil and protect resources in the near-shore environment. The components of a Nearshore Response Group designed to implement these tactics over a ten mile radius are described. Finally, the elements of a marine logistical base to support the Group for up to 21 days in remote regions are developed.


1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 867-868
Author(s):  
Grant Vidrine ◽  
Larry Dietrick ◽  
Carl Lautenberger ◽  
Charlene Hutton

ABSTRACT The North Slope of Alaska Oil Operators—ARCO, (Alaska), Inc.; BP Exploration (Alaska), Inc.; and Alyeska Pipeline Service Company—and their governing agencies—Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)—currently use some form of the Incident Command System (ICS) to manage oil spill incidents and exercises. Although the ICS principles are similar, the structure, terminology and forms are diverse. The North Slope operators and regulatory agencies in Alaska are “thinking out-of-the-box” these days with the development of a new, all hazards, systems to maximize the use of resources on the North Slope. The new integrated Incident Management System (IMS) was designed to offer benefits such as standardized processes, forms and nomenclature, integrated organizational structures, common management/training, enhanced interactions, shared learning's, central coordination, standard Emergency Operation Center layouts, and access to equipment and personnel.


1991 ◽  
Vol 1991 (1) ◽  
pp. 189-191
Author(s):  
John R. Knorr ◽  
Nancy Lethcoe ◽  
Andy Teal ◽  
Sharon Christopherson ◽  
John Whitney

ABSTRACT Following the spill of 11 million gallons of North Slope crude oil by the Exxon Valdez in Alaska on March 24, 1989, a major cooperative effort to plan for the cleanup of Prince William Sound and the Gulf of Alaska shorelines was undertaken in Valdez, Alaska. All aspects of the spill response—the lightering of oil remaining on the stricken tanker, the containment of free-floating oil, and the unknown miles of remote shoreline to be cleaned up—were much larger than anything in American experience. The event provided unprecedented organizational challenges in shoreline cleanup planning and execution. The scope of the shoreline cleanup and the extended cleanup time anticipated, due to geography, weather, logistics, and other factors, required an organization not specifically identified in the National Contingency Plan or the Alaska regional contingency plan. The Interagency Shoreline Cleanup Committee—an interdisciplinary, interagency cleanup planning group—evolved in Valdez concurrently with the larger response organization implemented under existing contingency plans. As a day-to-day working group serving the needs of the federal on-scene coordinator, it included Exxon, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation, federal and state land and resource management agencies, Alaska natives, and commercial fishing and environmental groups. The planning model that evolved was refined and streamlined in early 1990 and carried through the remaining cleanup seasons.


1977 ◽  
Vol 1977 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-68
Author(s):  
Harry L. Franklin

ABSTRACT The Corpus Christi Area Oil Spill Control Association, founded in 1970 as a nonprofit Texas corporation to provide the Coastal Bend area of South Texas with a reasonable capability to contain and harvest oil spills on the area's shallow waters, can be considered a successful cooperative for two primary reasons. The first is the smooth blending of industry with federal, state, and local governments to create a working entity. The association, originally funded by each of these partners, is governed by a five-man board with a representative from each. Its operating budget is shared by government and industry alike on a 50-50 basis. The second reason is the low average cleanup cost, 40 cents per gallon. To date the association has cleaned up 167 assorted spills with the first occurring in November 1971. The largest spill amounted to 8,000 barrels, covering approximately 10 miles of ship channel area; the smallest spill was less than one barrel. The association has been commended by the Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S. Coast Guard, the State of Texas, and industry groups. It is the recipient of the Gold Medal Award from the National Sports Foundation and has been assigned the use of EPA's unique beach sand cleaner.


2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (2) ◽  
pp. 1411-1416
Author(s):  
Elliott Taylor ◽  
Lee Egland ◽  
Stephen Wilson

ABSTRACT The Alaska Petroleum Distributors and Transporters (APD&T) group formulated a proposal to the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC) for a realistic and reasonable marine response capability throughout Alaska's waters. USCG requested the proposal in an effort to reach a mutually satisfactory alternate compliance solution to the planning standards enacted as part of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90). A final agreement for oil spill prevention and discharge planning compliance was reached in June 1999, initiating a 5-year preparedness development implementation program. Economically and operationally realistic planning standards are at issue in coastal Alaska, where more than 30,000 miles of coastline have practically no road access. The APD&T proposal first assessed the exposure or perceived risk of oil transport operations in each of the nine coastal ADEC planning regions (subareas) in Alaska by studying the oil volumes transported along specific routes, frequency and locations of oil transfers, and environmental conditions. The assessed risk and level of response capability were then used as a basis by oversight agencies to identify the areas in which additional resources and logistical infrastructure were required. The key components of the Agreement for Final Compliance in Alaska, are as follows: oil barge operators will maintain a strict tow-wire maintenance program and utilize only twin-screw tugs; spill response equipment for response to average and maximum most probable discharges will be maintained onboard each barge; emergency lightering pumps, independent of oil offloading pumps, will pre-located to ensure their availability within 24 hours; a minimum shoreside response capacity, including boom, sweeps, vessels, personnel, and wildlife and beach kits, will be emplaced in each subarea to supplement the onboard equipment; a logistical infrastructure will be developed at a hub within each of seven subareas to support the planned response capabilities; and a training and exercise program, following National Preparedness for Response Exercise Program (NPREP guidelines, will be conducted in each subarea to ensure in-region readiness by personnel and equipment. This poster presentation discusses the risk study, strategies, and committed approach to implement a response capability throughout Western Alaska.


Author(s):  
J. R. Etherton ◽  
E. A. McKenzie ◽  
J. R. Powers

Fatal injuries have occurred to operators of zero-turn riding mowers when these machines rolled over during high speed sharp turns or on uneven terrain. These mowers are frequently operated in low clearance conditions such as around trees and when loaded onto low-roofed trailers. The automatically deployable rollover protective structure (AutoROPS) can provide both protection during rollover events and the capability to operate a mower in low clearance conditions. Until recently, AutoROPS technology development has occurred only in a government laboratory. In the current phase of development, private industry has taken an interest in the AutoROPS technology and is pursuing, with NIOSH, the product testing and development needed to commercialize the AutoROPS on a zero-turn riding mower. The government’s role, as a partner with private industry in bringing new safety technology into practical application, is discussed. Importantly, for the AutoROPS product to be as effective as possible, it should not introduce additional, unacceptable risks. Previous product safety assessments led by government laboratories are reviewed. These assessments were made to minimize hazards in products developed in government labs. A product safety assessment was performed on the AutoROPS during its design phase. In addition to minimizing the severity and frequency of operator injury resulting from an accidental rollover, the assessment considered 1) environmental factors such as corrosion, electromagnetic interference, and vibration; 2) human error avoidance; and 3) safeguard reliability analysis. This assessment was a cooperative effort between the safety engineering design team at the Division of Safety Research of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health; a ROPS manufacturer; and a zero-turn riding mower manufacturer. Design features are being incorporated into the prototype AutoROPS to address hazards encountered in normal use of these machines.


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