scholarly journals Safeguarding the Public Interest: A Look At Government Policies That Affect the Opa 90 Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund and Oil Spill Costs1

1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 725-729 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael de Bettencourt ◽  
Gary Merrick ◽  
Timothy Deal ◽  
Bob Travis
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Government Policies ◽  
Trust Fund ◽  
Best Response ◽  
The Government ◽  
Measurement And Evaluation ◽  
Oil Spill Cleanup

ABSTRACT U.S. government policies concerning the management of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) may be responsible for increased costs of oil spill cleanup in the United States. By not requiring measures of effectiveness and efficiency, and by enforcing policies that are disincentives to cost control, the government may be encouraging increased oil spill removal costs. The costs of an oil spill have increased substantially since the enactment of OPA 90, this despite improved spill response techniques and contingency planning. Rising costs have been attributed to:The government's acute sensitivity to public concerns about spill cleanupThe increased costs of natural resource damageThe inefficiency of spill response management This paper discusses the steps necessary to curb rising cleanup costs by changing policies relative to the management of the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund OSLTF and by instituting measurements of spill response efficacy. Section I of the paper describes the current state of OPA 90 and the OSLTF. Section II outlines measurement and evaluation of oil spill responses using a Best Response model currently being developed by the U.S. Coast Guard. Section III describes several disincentives currently in place under policies of the OSLTF managers that have an effect on allowing increased costs for oil spill response.

The Oil Spill Response Fund – Four Decades of Success

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 2146-2158
Author(s):  
Allen R. Thuring
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Oil Spills ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Trust Fund ◽  
Us Economy ◽  
The Us ◽  
Response Team ◽  
Oil Spill Response

ABSTRACT This paper examines the oil pollution response fund created by Section 311(k) of the 1972 CWA and then modified, culminating with the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) established by OPA. Could the CWA have been successful absent the provision for a federal fund? This Fund is now four decades old. Has it passed the “test of time”? Did it meet the goals set at its birth? Is it still relevant? Should it continue? CWA Section 311 and later OPA created a range of response tools to deal with oil and hazmat spills on the waters of the US. They established a public/private solution to spill response. Key components:An expectation that the spiller was responsible and liable to clean up the spill;The National Contingency Plan and the Federal On-Scene Coordinator/FOSC;Establishing expertise on “special teams”: the CG's National Strike Force and EPA's Emergency Response Team;An up-front trust fund available only to the FOSC that pays for removals if the responsible party (RP) does not step forward. The fund exists to:Pre-empt the RP from using delay as a response option, despite the law.Give the FOSC money to quickly hire private response companies, if the RP does not act or if the spill's origin is a mystery. Equally important, the CWA and OPA did NOT designate a government agency to “clean up” oil spills. Rather, the law envisioned private companies performing that role, paid for by the spillers/RP or the 311(k)/OSLTF Fund, under the oversight of the USCG or the EPA. It tasked the USCG with managing this Fund. The Fund achieved its results. The US has a robust private oil spill removal sector that responsible parties hire when needed. If an RP does not act, the CG and EPA FOSCs use the Fund to mobilize those same companies to remove oil spills on US waters. The US economy has grown, as has the number of oil spills reported. Cases each year requiring Fund use have not increased proportionally. Responsible parties continue to clean up their spills, as the CWA envisioned. The Fund retains its ability to respond simultaneously to major spills, even during Exxon Valdez and Deepwater Horizon. In forty two years, the Fund has always been available for an FOSC directed removal. The opinions stated in this paper are the author's alone, and do not reflect the official policies of the United States Coast Guard.

PREVENTIVE SALVAGE: THE GAP IN OPA POLLUTION DEFENSES

1993 ◽  
Vol 1993 (1) ◽  
pp. 659-661
Author(s):  
John Arnold Witte
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
The United States ◽  
Strong Emphasis ◽  
The World ◽  
Oil Spill Cleanup ◽  
Marine Environmental

ABSTRACT Despite the strong emphasis on oil spill cleanup in the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, the United States still faces a major gap in its defenses against oil pollution: the lack of adequate professional ship salvage capability. Availability of preventive salvage capability would contribute to the most effective way of preventing a marine environmental catastrophe: keeping the oil, or chemicals, in the ship. This is especially important in view of the increasing age of the world tanker fleet.

The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund: How Effective an Instrument of U.S. Public Policy Has It Been?1

1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 655-658
Author(s):  
Daniel F. Sheehan
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
The United States ◽  
Time Frame ◽  
Trust Fund ◽  
International Regime ◽  
Exxon Valdez ◽  
The Public ◽  
International Liability ◽  
The Impact

ABSTRACT The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) was forged in the legislative cauldron of the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez casualty. However, its genesis really began with Congressional consideration and debate concerning whether to adopt an international liability and compensation regime or improve the unilateral system unique to the United States. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 significantly expanded the scope of the unique U.S. mechanism, while at the same time it urged the Administration to continue to examine the possibilities of becoming party to an international regime. Ten years after the Exxon Valdez casualty provides a convenient and appropriate time frame for reflection on how well the public has been served by the establishment and implementation of the regime of which the OSLTF is a major element. The impact on various publics served and stakeholders impacted will be analyzed and evaluated. While there are clearly differences in scope, application, and funding mechanisms between the U.S. and international regime, there are substantial similarities in terms of process, administration, areas of concern and interest.

Integrated Vessel Response Plan Format

1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 635-638
Author(s):  
William C. Rogers ◽  
Jean R. Cameron
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
West Coast ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
Task Force ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Response Planning ◽  
Vessel Response ◽  
Response Plan ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT Oil shipping companies operating on the West Coast of the United States are subject to international, federal, and state oil spill prevention and response planning regulations. Many companies wrote separate plans for each jurisdiction with the result that tank vessels carried several different plans on board and parent companies faced an administrative burden in keeping plans current. In June 1996, oil shipping company representatives proposed that the States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force work with them to develop a format incorporating West Coast states' and U.S. Coast Guard contingency planning requirements. A workgroup comprised of representatives of the Task Force, industry, and the U.S. Coast Guard, working cooperatively, eventually proposed a voluntary integrated plan format based on the key elements of the U.S. Coast Guard Vessel Response Plan. This format allowed correlation with state planning requirements as well as with the Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan (SOPEP) required by international regulations. The U.S. Coast Guard, the Canadian Ministry of Transport, and all West Coast states have subsequently documented their agreement to accept vessel plans in this format, to coordinate review as needed, and to allow references to public documents such as Area Plans.

scholarly journals United States and Canada Transboundary Oil Spill Liability and Compensation Regimes: An Overview

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Helkei S. Hemminger
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Natural Resources ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Marine Habitat ◽  
Inland Waterways ◽  
Funding Sources ◽  
The Impact

Abstract # —1141278 — In 2018, the Canadian government purchased the Trans Mountain pipeline, running from Alberta to British Columbia, along with the plans for expansion. The expansion could triple the transport capacity from 300,000 to 890,000 barrels of oil per day, and would increase the tanker traffic in the inland waterways of the Salish Sea, an area known for its sensitive marine habitat, and narrow, difficult to navigate passages. The anticipated increase in tanker traffic in this busy waterway continues to raise concerns about the impact of an oil spill and the financial means to address related injuries, particularly to natural resources. The transboundary nature of any spill further complicates the situation vis-à-vis the applicable liability regimes and response resources. Under the Canada-United States Joint Marine Contingency Plan (“JCP”), the United States Coast Guard and Canadian Coast Guard acknowledge each country's responsibility to fund their own response actions and pursue reimbursement of those costs within their respective jurisdictions. The availability of funding for a response, and to compensate injured parties, however, including the limits of liability of the responsible party, differs under each regime, and could impact the nature and scope of a response. For spills into or posing a substantial threat to the navigable waters of the United States, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 governs and a national fund, the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (“OSLTF”), is immediately available to address an incident, including emergency restoration to natural resources. Canada's Marine Liability Act enables the Ship-source Oil Pollution Fund (“SOPF”) to pay claimants who have incurred damages as a result of oil pollution. Both countries' funds operate under the same principal—the polluter pays—but the compensation structure, and claims processes and procedures are entirely different. This paper provides an overview of these funding sources and claims procedures, comparing and contrasting the different systems. The discussion is meant to provide an overall understanding of potential funding pools available for spill responses under each scheme in order to facilitate transboundary spill planning and discussion.

THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT COMPONENT OF AN OIL SPILL CLEANUP MODEL

1981 ◽  
Vol 1981 (1) ◽  
pp. 695-700 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. D. Nyhart ◽  
Harilaos N. Psaraftis ◽  
Walter S. Laird
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Damage Assessment ◽  
The United States ◽  
Legal Aspects ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Legal Environment ◽  
Massachusetts Institute Of Technology ◽  
Delegation Of Authority ◽  
Institute Of Technology ◽  
Oil Spill Cleanup

ABSTRACT An oil spill and its cleanup can be viewed as occurring within a legal environment separable into categories including legal aspects of planning, response action, environmental protection, liability, and compensation. Each may provide enabling rules and constraints that affect the delegation of authority and responsibility to a range of actors. These include the spiller, terminal/facility owner, local emergency cleanup personnel, the Coast Guard, other government officers, volunteers, cleanup contractors, equipment manufacturers, and those damaged by the spill. This paper describes the legal components of an oil spill cleanup model being developed in a Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Sea Grant College Program project involving several representative actors from the above categories. It focuses on the relevant existing legal environment in the United States and its relationship to the different actors. It explores how these relationships, expressed as enabling rules or constraints, may be integrated into the project's strategic, tactical, operational, and damage assessment models.

scholarly journals UNITED STATES COAST GUARD ENVIRONMENTAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPABILITY “THEN” AND “NOW”

2008 ◽  
Vol 2008 (1) ◽  
pp. 459-461
Author(s):  
Leonard Rich
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Emergency Response ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Oil Recovery ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Security Measures ◽  
Worst Case ◽  
Oil Spill Response

ABSTRACT The intent of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA90) is to ensure the U.S. Government is prepared to protect the environment from a catastrophic spill of the magnitude and complexity of the 1989 EXXON VALDEZ oil spill. The OPA90 legislation resulted in an overall restructuring and enhancement of the National Strike Force (NSF), and establishment of District Response Groups who are staffed and equipped with mechanical spill recovery assets and are prepared to take prompt actions to mitigate a worst case discharge scenario. During the early 1990s, over $31 million dollars worth of oil spill response equipment was acquired and placed at 23 locations throughout the United States. Since then, an additional $10 million dollars of environmental emergency response equipment has been added to the USCG'S inventory, and are now located at 16 additional sites. This paper will elaborate on the evolution of the USCG'S environmental emergency response capabilities. In terms of preparedness, it will explain how, where and why the Coast Guard has adjusted its resources and capabilities since the OPA90 legislation. The expanded mission requirements include; redistributing and adjusting the locations of the Vessel of Opportunity Skimming Systems, expanding functional use of the pre-positioned equipment for dewatering during shipboard fires, designing and implementing an offload pumping system for viscous oil at each NSF Strike Team, revisiting the condition and continued use of OPA90 procured first response “band-aid’ equipment, modifying the basic response equipment systems for fast current spill response, and the implementation of the Spilled Oil Recovery System. These actions reflect policy and mission adjustments influenced by an ever changing environment. The Coast Guard has re-organized from the bottom up to meet increased port security measures, and the capability to respond to all-hazard incidents. We must continue to maintain a high state of readiness in the oil spill response environment and accept the need to incorporate change to the equipment and the way we conduct our support to the American public.

scholarly journals The Marine Salvage Industry: Proven in Preventing Oil Spills

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (1) ◽  
pp. 684710
Author(s):  
Jim Elliott
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Protection ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Oil Recovery ◽  
Oil Spills ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
The United States ◽  
Vital Role ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
New Policies ◽  
The U.S

Abstract The marine salvage industry plays a vital role in protecting the marine environment. Governments, industry and the public, worldwide, now place environmental protection as the driving objective, second only to the safety of life, during a marine casualty response operation. Recognizing over 20 years after the passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 that the effectiveness of mechanical on-water oil recovery remains at only about 10 to 25 percent while the international salvage industry annually prevents over a million tons of pollutants from reaching the world's oceans, ten years ago the United States began implementing a series of comprehensive salvage and marine firefighting regulations in an effort to improve the nation's environmental protection regime. These regulations specify desired response timeframes for emergency salvage services, contractual requirements, and criteria for evaluating the adequacy of a salvage and marine firefighting service provider. In addition to this effort to prevent surface oil spills, in 2016, the U.S. Coast Guard also recognized the salvage industries advancements in removing oil from sunken ships and recovering submerged pollutants, issuing Oil Spill Removal Organization (OSRO) classification standards for companies that have the capabilities to effectively respond to non-floating oils. Ten years after the implementation of the U.S. salvage and marine firefighting regulatory framework, this paper will review the implementation of the U.S. salvage and marine firefighting regulations and non-floating oil detection and recovery requirements; analyze the impacts and effectiveness of these new policies; and present several case studies and recommendations to further enhance salvage and oil spill response effectiveness.

THE STATES/BC OIL SPILL TASK FORCEAN—INTERNATIONAL MODEL FOR FORMULATING AND INFLUENCING PUBLIC POLICY

1993 ◽  
Vol 1993 (1) ◽  
pp. 263-265
Author(s):  
Jon Neel ◽  
John Bones ◽  
Elizabeth Dimmick ◽  
Lynn J. Tomich Kent ◽  
Roger Dunstan ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
British Columbia ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Oil Spills ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
Task Force ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
International Response ◽  
Regional Coordination

ABSTRACT The States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force was established in 1989 to enhance spill coordination among the West Coast states and British Columbia, and to address a number of issues that became apparent during the Nestucca barge and Exxon Valdez oil spills. Task Force members are the directors of the oil spill prevention and response agencies in Alaska, British Columbia, California, Oregon, and Washington. The Task Force has become a national model for facilitating cooperation and building consensus between coastal states and provinces and their federal governments. In October of 1990, the task force issued a report containing a comprehensive set of recommendations addressing oil spill prevention, preparedness, and response. The group had achieved remarkable consensus, and many of the report's recommendations have been included in recent legislation enacted by the member states. The success of the task force's approach to regional coordination has also reduced the need for a proposed Pacific Oceans Resources Interstate Compact, which has been proposed to expand the states' role in areas of regulation that are otherwise federally preempted. The task force has become an effective mechanism for developing vigorous, productive relationships between government agencies, industry, and the public in both the United States and Canada. It has created important linkages between state/provincial and federal regulatory activities; for example, by providing input to Coast Guard and EPA rulemaking that implemented the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. It also assisted in assuring a well-coordinated international response to the July 1991 Tenyo Maru oil spill outside the Strait of Juan De Fuca between Washington and British Columbia. The task force is continuing to advance its goals of promoting public policy on oil spill prevention; cooperative management of major spills by government and industry; protection of the states/provincial rights and their natural and economic resources; and inter-governmental consistency in regulations adopted for oil spill prevention, contingency planning, and resource damage assessment.

Oil Spill Response Under the NCP and the NRF/Stafford Act - Incompatible Regimes?

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 1050-1058 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allen R. Thuring
Keyword(s):  
Hurricane Katrina ◽  
Federal Government ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Homeland Security ◽  
Environmental Protection Agency ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Federal Funds ◽  
National Response

ABSTRACT This paper examines oil pollution response during disaster situations when the Stafford Act is invoked by the President and the National Response Framework provides funding under ESF-10. The interrelationship between the National Contingency Plan (NCP), created by various pollution statues (Clean Water Act/CWA, Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability/CERCLA, Oil Pollution Act/OPA) and the National Response Framework (NRF), created to deal with declared disasters under the Stafford Act, is becoming more fractious as time passes and the financial scope of disasters grows. The paradigm that existed when Hurricane Katrina made landfall in 2005 was not in evidence when Hurricanes Isaac and Sandy made landfall in the fall of 2012. The NCP envisions oil and chemical spill response in the context of a single spill, ideally with a known responsible party (RP), who takes action to respond to the spill. That RP is liable for costs and damages resulting from the spill. Action commences when the spill occurs and the Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) determines that federal action is required. If the federal funds (Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund/OSLTF, CERCLA/SUPERFUND) are used, the federal government seeks cost recovery afterwards. The NRF envisions the federal government acting like a “no-fault insurance” regime, providing federal resources/funds to states when their capabilities are overwhelmed and their citizens require immediate succor. FEMA action commences when the State requests and the President approves aid. The states agree to a cost share – not to exceed 25% of Federal funding. There is no private party liability when actions are complete. The Homeland Security Act established the NRF, and operationally subsumes the NCP under it. However, the Homeland Security Act does not address what fund (Stafford or the pollution funds) will be used when a declared disaster occurs. Furthermore, the Stafford Act structure (State requests, Presidential approvals, Federal Emergency Management Agency Federal Coordinating Officer (FEMA FCO) appointment, area surveys, mission assignments) becomes sclerotic in a large incident when compared to the much more nimble NCP process (spill, FOSC decision, immediate funding). The effect for Coast Guard (CG) and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) field responders is to lean forward with NCP processes to protect the public. FEMA, faced with dwindling resources, observes this tendency and declines to provide disaster funding when the other federal funds “can be used”. The paper proposes a new paradigm for the “Makris-Suiter” Agreement of 1998 between EPA and FEMA. The opinions stated in this paper are the author's alone, and do not reflect the official policies of the United States Coast Guard.

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