MODELING IMPACTS OF RESPONSE METHOD AND CAPABILITY ON OIL SPILL COSTS AND DAMAGES FOR WASHINGTON STATE SPILL SCENARIOS

2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 467-473
Author(s):  
Dagmar Schmidt Etkin ◽  
Deborah French McCay ◽  
Jill Rowe ◽  
Linda Pilkey-Jarvis

ABSTRACT The issues and results of modeling major crude oil spill scenarios in outer coast and sound locations in the state of Washington, USA, to determine relative costs and impacts are explored. Oil spill trajectory and fate and effects modeling were coupled with modeling of response operation strategies (conventional mechanical containment and recovery operations; dispersant application with concurrent mechanical containment and recovery; and in-situ burning with concurrent mechanical containment and recovery) to estimate oil spill response costs and socioeconomic and environmental impacts. The complex issues in modeling the impact of response capability and timing of initial response operations were also examined, comparing the US Coast Guard (USCG) federal response capability standards, proposed Washington State standards, and potential theoretical higher response capability standards. Results of initial modeling showed little difference in costs and impacts between on-water response options and capability levels, with the exception of being significantly lower than the “no response” option, in which only protective shoreline response, but no on-water removal, were employed. The extremely high level of theoretical oil recovery (50 to 70%) that occurred in the modeling was adjusted in a second analysis to account for increasing inefficiencies in recovery capability with time, demonstrating that oil recovery under Washington State's earlier and more aggressive response standard was three times as high as under the federal response standard. Greater differences in costs and impacts were then realized. Increasing on-water oil removal through more efficient oil slick surveillance, training in strategic response, and more timely response can all contribute to reducing spill impacts and costs.

2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 457-461 ◽  
Author(s):  
Deborah P. French-McCay ◽  
Jill J. Rowe ◽  
Nicole Whittier ◽  
Subbayya Sankaranarayanan ◽  
Dagmar S. Etkin ◽  
...  

ABSTRACT Oil spill fate and effects modeling and analysis were performed to evaluate the implications of spill response options being considered by the Washington State Department of Ecology in their rulemaking related to oil spill preparedness (WA State Contingency Plan Rule). The impacts of potential spills in Washington's outer coast, sound and river environments were modeled varying response options and operational timing, including use of conventional mechanical containment and recovery operations; dispersant application with concurrent mechanical containment and recovery; and in-situ burning with concurrent mechanical containment and recovery. US Coast Guard federal response capability standards, current Washington State standards, and potential theoretical higher response capability standards were simulated for scenarios involving spills of crude oil, bunker fuel and diesel into Washington waters (in the Strait of Georgia, Strait of Juan de Fuca, outer coast, and lower and upper Columbia River). The modeling was performed in probabilistic mode, i.e., by randomly varying location along tanker routes, spill date, and time, and so environmental conditions during and after the release among potential conditions that would occur. The model results were analyzed to estimate mean, standard deviation (SD), and 5th, 50th and 95th percentile results for surface water and shoreline oiling, water column and sediment contamination, biological impacts, and natural resource damages (NRD). NRD costs were based on the Washington Compensation Schedule and Oil Pollution Act (OPA) NRD procedures involving compensatory restoration scaling and associated costs. Response costs and socioeconomic damages were evaluated in a companion study by D.S. Etkin (Environmental Research Consulting). The fates, impacts and NRD cost results for two scenarios are presented here: those for the outer coast spills assuming (1) only protective booming and (2) protective booming plus the mechanical removal up to Washington State standards. The results of these and other scenarios are being incorporated into a rulemaking process and cost-benefit analysis by the Department of Ecology.


1993 ◽  
Vol 1993 (1) ◽  
pp. 127-133
Author(s):  
Mac W. McCarthy ◽  
John McGrath

ABSTRACT On July 22, 1991, the Tuo Hai, a 46,500 ton Chinese grain carrier, collided with the Tenyo Maru, a 4,800 ton Japanese fish processing ship, off the coast of Washington State. The Tenyo Maru sank, creating an oil spill that cost upwards of $4 million (U.S.) to clean up. The incident initiated a joint response from the U.S. and Canadian governments. As part of this response, the Canadian Coast Guard mobilized an SRN-6 hovercraft. This air cushioned vehicle (ACV) provided logistical support to responders on both sides of the international boundary. The response operation along the Pacific Coast was extensive. Dense fog and the remote location of the impacted area provided formidable challenges to the cleanup effort. It was the mission scenario of the Canadian SRN-6 hovercraft to provide logistical support—as an experiment in ACV utility—to the organizations responding to this incident. Based on this experience, it can be argued that the hovercraft offers great potential value in responding to marine oil spills. Appropriate application of ACV technology can enhance oil spill response work, spill waste management, and incident surveillance. This paper discusses the contribution of the SRN-6 hovercraft to the Tenyo Maru response, briefly examines the use of another, very different hovercraft, during a response in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and reviews a new hovercraft design and discusses its potential contributions.


1983 ◽  
Vol 1983 (1) ◽  
pp. 205-209
Author(s):  
Lindon A. Onstad

ABSTRACT Exploration of outer continental shelf (OCS) lands off Southern California has been expanding at a rapid rate for the past two years. Lease Sales 48, 53, and 68 have provided the impetus for this rapid development. The Bureau of Land Management has predicted several spills in excess of 1,000 barrels will occur as a result of these sales and subsequent exploration activities. Legitimate concerns have been raised by federal, state and local governments as well as numerous citizen groups concerning the ability of industry to respond adequately to a major offshore oil spill. As a result of these concerns, the California Coastal Commission has ordered a study and evaluation of the California Oil Spill Cooperatives with an objective of ensuring they will possess an adequate response capability. Concurrent with this study, the U.S. Coast Guard and the Interior Department's Minerals Management Service have entered into a Memorandum of Understanding concerning review of oil spill plans and equipment in OCS waters. With expanding geographic areas to cover, the cooperatives have begun to purchase new state-of-the-art equipment in hopes of satisfying the regulatory agencies and concerned groups. This paper examines the process of the federal government, state of California and industry in upgrading oil spill response capability in waters offshore southern California. The process is shown to have occurred systematically with a view toward the response system rather than individual pieces of equipment. Recommendations to California concerning acceptance of federal guidelines, joint reviews and use of dispersants are discussed.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 2017425
Author(s):  
Cassidee Shinn ◽  
Joe Stewart ◽  
Yvonne Addassi

California has approximately >10,000 vessels calling its ports each year, and 200–300 facilities state wide, many of which are required to have a California Oil Spill Contingency Plan (Contingency Plan) on file with Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR). Spill Management Teams (SMT), either staffed by Contingency Plan holders' employees or contracted out, and the use of the Incident Command System (ICS) structure must be described in these plans. OSPR introduced an unannounced SMT drill program (Program) in 2012 to ensure that Contingency Plan holders can successfully complete the proper initial notifications, activate their SMT, and use ICS in accordance with their approved Contingency Plan and California Code 820.01, Drills and Exercises. There are multiple goals of this Program, including the enhanced capability of SMTs, OSPR, and other partners. This Program provides continued education and training for Contingency Plan holders and SMTs in an effort to bolster the initial response phase of an actual incident. Through these drills, SMTs must demonstrate that they could make proper notifications and decisions during an actual incident and be staffed with trained personnel in ICS to fill positions before State and Federal representatives respond. Additionally, SMTs should deploy resources listed in their approved Contingency Plans and ensure those resources are up to date, available, and sufficient. Furthermore, drills provide an opportunity for OSPR and SMTs to build relationships through testing these procedures, which should make the initial response more efficient and effective. Lastly, the drills are often conducted with representatives from United States Coast Guard and Environmental Protection Agency, both of which have their own drill programs. Working in conjunction with federal partners ensures continuity and fewer required drills of SMTs. Since the beginning of the Program, SMTs continue to improve their response capabilities, validated by more successfully completed unannounced drills. OSPR has conducted 30 unannounced drills, all of which were on SMTs for marine facilities and vessels. With the expanded authority of OSPR to regulate facilities statewide in 2015, this Program will continue to grow. Ultimately, a more comprehensive Program should lead to enhanced SMT capability statewide, and therefore better protection of the State's natural resources overall. The goal of this poster will be to describe: 1) the history and purpose of this Program; 2) the lessons learned and improvements of SMTs and Contingency Plans; and 3) the expansion of the Program from marine to statewide.


Author(s):  
Helkei S. Hemminger

Abstract # —1141278 — In 2018, the Canadian government purchased the Trans Mountain pipeline, running from Alberta to British Columbia, along with the plans for expansion. The expansion could triple the transport capacity from 300,000 to 890,000 barrels of oil per day, and would increase the tanker traffic in the inland waterways of the Salish Sea, an area known for its sensitive marine habitat, and narrow, difficult to navigate passages. The anticipated increase in tanker traffic in this busy waterway continues to raise concerns about the impact of an oil spill and the financial means to address related injuries, particularly to natural resources. The transboundary nature of any spill further complicates the situation vis-à-vis the applicable liability regimes and response resources. Under the Canada-United States Joint Marine Contingency Plan (“JCP”), the United States Coast Guard and Canadian Coast Guard acknowledge each country's responsibility to fund their own response actions and pursue reimbursement of those costs within their respective jurisdictions. The availability of funding for a response, and to compensate injured parties, however, including the limits of liability of the responsible party, differs under each regime, and could impact the nature and scope of a response. For spills into or posing a substantial threat to the navigable waters of the United States, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 governs and a national fund, the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (“OSLTF”), is immediately available to address an incident, including emergency restoration to natural resources. Canada's Marine Liability Act enables the Ship-source Oil Pollution Fund (“SOPF”) to pay claimants who have incurred damages as a result of oil pollution. Both countries' funds operate under the same principal—the polluter pays—but the compensation structure, and claims processes and procedures are entirely different. This paper provides an overview of these funding sources and claims procedures, comparing and contrasting the different systems. The discussion is meant to provide an overall understanding of potential funding pools available for spill responses under each scheme in order to facilitate transboundary spill planning and discussion.


Author(s):  
Per Johan Brandvik ◽  
Jørgen Skancke ◽  
Ragnhild Daae ◽  
Kristin Sørheim ◽  
Per S. Daling ◽  
...  

Abstract The low oil recovery rates reported during Macondo (3–5% of the released oil) have caused discussions regarding the efficiency of mechanical recovery compared to other oil spill response options. These low recovery rates have unfortunately been used as reference recovery rates in several later modelling studies and oil spill response analysis. Multiple factors could explain these low rates, such as operational priorities, where dispersants and/or in situ burning are given priority before mechanical recovery; extended safety zones; availability of adequate equipment and storage capacity of collected oil; the number of units available; the level of training and the available remote sensing support to guide operations. This study uses the OSCAR oil spill model to simulate a deep-water oil release to evaluate the effect of different response options both separately and in combination. The evaluated response options are subsea dispersant injection, mechanical recovery, and a combination of these. As expected, Subsea Dispersant Injection (SSDI) was highly effective and resulted in a significant reduction in residual surface oil (8% of released oil volume, versus 28% for the non-response option, NR). However, using large offshore oil recovery systems also reduced residual surface oil with a similar amount (9% of released oil volume). These results deviate significantly from the efficiency numbers reported after the Macondo incident and from later modelling studies scaled after the Macondo recovery rates. The increased efficiency of mechanical reported in this study is mainly due to inclusion of updated descriptions of response capabilities, reduced exclusion zone, a more realistic representation of surface oil distribution and modelling of response units' interactions with oil, (efficient oil recovery only on thick parts of the oil slick). The response capabilities and efficiency numbers for the different response options used in this study are based on equipment specifications from multiple response providers and authorities (Norwegian Clean Seas organisation (NOFO), Oil Spill Response (OSRL), Norwegian Coastal Administration (NCA), US Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) and others). These capabilities are justified by well-established contingency plans, offshore exercises and annual equipment performance testing with oil.


1979 ◽  
Vol 1979 (1) ◽  
pp. 497-499 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shawn D. Gill ◽  
W. Ryan

ABSTRACT Early in 1978, the Canadian Coast Guard acquired a diesel-powered vessel-mounted ACW-400 oil skimmer developed by Frank Mohn A/S of Norway. The skimmer was landed in St. John's, Newfoundland, where a series of static and field trials were undertaken preparatory to its addition to the hardware countermeasures inventory of the marine emergency organization of the Canadian Coast Guard. The results of these acceptance trials are described hereunder with an evaluation of the unit with respect to the specific requirements of the Canadian Coast Guard. Following this deployment, the ACW-400 was shipped to Tuktoyaktuk on the Beaufort Sea where it became a component of the Canadian Coast Guard contingency plan for offshore petroleum exploration in that theatre. From this experience it was apparent that the ACW-400 was well designed and met the safety, transportability, flexibility, sea-keeping, and oil recovery criteria required to fulfill the specific countermeasures obligations of the marine emergency organization of the Canadian Coast Guard.


2008 ◽  
Vol 2008 (1) ◽  
pp. 459-461
Author(s):  
Leonard Rich

ABSTRACT The intent of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA90) is to ensure the U.S. Government is prepared to protect the environment from a catastrophic spill of the magnitude and complexity of the 1989 EXXON VALDEZ oil spill. The OPA90 legislation resulted in an overall restructuring and enhancement of the National Strike Force (NSF), and establishment of District Response Groups who are staffed and equipped with mechanical spill recovery assets and are prepared to take prompt actions to mitigate a worst case discharge scenario. During the early 1990s, over $31 million dollars worth of oil spill response equipment was acquired and placed at 23 locations throughout the United States. Since then, an additional $10 million dollars of environmental emergency response equipment has been added to the USCG'S inventory, and are now located at 16 additional sites. This paper will elaborate on the evolution of the USCG'S environmental emergency response capabilities. In terms of preparedness, it will explain how, where and why the Coast Guard has adjusted its resources and capabilities since the OPA90 legislation. The expanded mission requirements include; redistributing and adjusting the locations of the Vessel of Opportunity Skimming Systems, expanding functional use of the pre-positioned equipment for dewatering during shipboard fires, designing and implementing an offload pumping system for viscous oil at each NSF Strike Team, revisiting the condition and continued use of OPA90 procured first response “band-aid’ equipment, modifying the basic response equipment systems for fast current spill response, and the implementation of the Spilled Oil Recovery System. These actions reflect policy and mission adjustments influenced by an ever changing environment. The Coast Guard has re-organized from the bottom up to meet increased port security measures, and the capability to respond to all-hazard incidents. We must continue to maintain a high state of readiness in the oil spill response environment and accept the need to incorporate change to the equipment and the way we conduct our support to the American public.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (1) ◽  
pp. 684710
Author(s):  
Jim Elliott

Abstract The marine salvage industry plays a vital role in protecting the marine environment. Governments, industry and the public, worldwide, now place environmental protection as the driving objective, second only to the safety of life, during a marine casualty response operation. Recognizing over 20 years after the passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 that the effectiveness of mechanical on-water oil recovery remains at only about 10 to 25 percent while the international salvage industry annually prevents over a million tons of pollutants from reaching the world's oceans, ten years ago the United States began implementing a series of comprehensive salvage and marine firefighting regulations in an effort to improve the nation's environmental protection regime. These regulations specify desired response timeframes for emergency salvage services, contractual requirements, and criteria for evaluating the adequacy of a salvage and marine firefighting service provider. In addition to this effort to prevent surface oil spills, in 2016, the U.S. Coast Guard also recognized the salvage industries advancements in removing oil from sunken ships and recovering submerged pollutants, issuing Oil Spill Removal Organization (OSRO) classification standards for companies that have the capabilities to effectively respond to non-floating oils. Ten years after the implementation of the U.S. salvage and marine firefighting regulatory framework, this paper will review the implementation of the U.S. salvage and marine firefighting regulations and non-floating oil detection and recovery requirements; analyze the impacts and effectiveness of these new policies; and present several case studies and recommendations to further enhance salvage and oil spill response effectiveness.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 300184
Author(s):  
Tony Hout ◽  
Tony Parkin ◽  
Samantha Smith ◽  
Regina Ward

The toolbox of oil spill response resources now available includes alternative options for organizing, managing, and conducting a response. Best Available Technology (BAT) for Tracking & Surveillance provides an enhanced capability to direct on-water assets when over-flight information may be unavailable. Containment booming systems have the ability to be towed beyond traditional containment boom towing speeds, increasing oil encounter rates. Advances in skimming technology have led to higher oil recovery rates and higher skimmer efficiency rates, and therefore help reduce on-water storage requirements. The ability to combine this BAT into a single recovery system provides for timely and effective on-water response. Using BAT systems allows Operations Section Chiefs to organize a response into geographically defined divisions as opposed to traditional on-water groups with Task Force Leaders (TFLs) making autonomous, in-field decisions. This is an important enhancement in oil spill response. When conditions preclude over-flights for oil trajectory information, new surveillance BAT may still provide TFLs with information to assist in continuing efficient operations. With oil spill response vessels (OSRVs) with high skimming and storage capabilities operating at the source of the spill, TFLs can direct BAT recovery systems into heavily impacted areas away from the source. Each system can consist of: one TF leader vessel with BAT tracking and surveillance assets and an assigned Area of Responsibility (AOR); two advanced containment booming systems with assigned vessels; and [any number of?] highly efficient skimmers. Combining these response assets with adequate on-water storage of recovered liquids, the TF leader is better able to direct each recovery system into the thickest parts of the oil to maximize on-water encounter and recovery rates.


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