THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE IRANIAN CHARSHANBE SURI FESTIVAL IN THE YEZIDI TRADITION

The aim of this article is to clarify the transformation of the Iranian Charshanbe Suri festival in the Yezidi religious system. Charshanbe Suri is celebrated on the eve of the last Wednesday before the Iranian New year - Nōwrūz. It is considered to be the point of transition between the old and new years and is associated with cleansing and purifying. Yezidis celebrate Charshama Sor on the first Wednesday after April 13 (according to the Gregorian Calendar). Unlike Charshanbe Suri, Charshama Sor is not considered a transition between the old and new years. Charshama Sor symbolizes the awakening of nature, the arrival of Spring, the New Year, as well as cosmogony, the creation and renewal of the world, and the “birth” of one of the Yezidi saints, Tausi Malak. There is no doubt that the Yezidi Charshama Sor is a version of the Iranian Charshanbe Suri. This study of Charshama Sor reveals that the Yezidi tradition has preserved Charshanbe Suri and its main symbols but has also endowed it with new, Yezidi interpretations.

JAPAN'S ECONOMIC POLICY IN ARMENIA (1992-2021)

The purpose of this article is to show the economic policy of Japan towards Armenia after the establishment of Armenian-Japanese diplomatic relations. The article presents three phases of Japan's economic policy, taking into account the type of assistance provided by Japan to Armenia, which is correlated with Armenia's economic and GDP’s growth. The first phase covers 1992-99, during which bilateral economic relations were limited to grant assistance provided by Japan to Armenia, with the aim of supporting the economic recovery of the newly independent state and ensuring sustainable economic growth. The second phase (2000-04) marked the beginning of economic cooperation between the two countries. Due to its stable economic growth, Armenia received loans from Japan for developing economic infrastructures. During the third phase (2005- up to date) Japan has expanded its cooperation with the Republic of Armenia and begun to provide technical equipment for the development of targeted sectors. At this stage, Japan clearly defined the direction of its assistance and the sectors necessary for the stimulation of the Armenian economy, in particular, the energy sector, small and medium-sized businesses, as well as the development of villages. Japan also greatly supports Armenia by providing Japanese technologies for risk prevention in natural disaster zones and organizing training courses and discussion- meetings for Armenian specialists aimed to promote capacity building on the implementation of disaster risk reduction and emergency situations. Since 2018, Japan has begun to consider Armenia as a full-fledged economic entity, and review the possibility to build mutually beneficial economic relations. The main witnesses are the signed agreement on investment liberalization in 2018, the visit of Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Kono to Armenia for developing bilateral relations in the fields of banking, innovation, food security, information technology, artificial intelligence, cultural exchange, scientific and educational projects, as well as active contacts of Armenian President with Japanese organizations.

SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION AS A PLATFORM FOR PROMOTING THE AGENDA OF CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE

The article discusses main issues and tendencies of two China-proposed initiatives, namely Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The key focus of the research combines the major points and expected results of BRI and the growing role of SCO in current International Relations. While exploring these two structures, we conclude that SCO is pushing forward BRI, serving as a strong influential and effective platform. The organization helped China to build up unprecedentedly intense ties with local states, creating natural conditions to play an active and constructive role in BRI agenda. From the very beginning Chinese BRI is closely related with SCO sharing reciprocal approaches, common features, principles and goals. They are historically linked together both geographically and ideologically. Specific projects under BRI together with the existing economic cooperation structure of SCO are truly complementing each other. SCO members view the BRI favorably, and China’s effective usage of the SCO has already resulted in many of its foreign policy goals being reached or at least had significant progress.

TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE ISLAMIC EXTREMISM AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE “ISLAMIC STATE” (FROM THE END OF 20TH CENTURY TILL 2014)

The Islamic extremism has deep roots in the Middle East. They were especially active towards the end of the 20th century and in the first and second decades of the 21st century. They took on a new nature with the terrorist acts against the US on September 11 in 2001. In the mid-2000s new and dangerous trends of the Islamic extremism became evident in the Middle East, which became visible in Syria with the declaration of the “Islamic State” (IS) in 2014.

DEMOGRAPHIC PROCESSES IN THE WESTERN PART OF THE ARMENIAN HIGHLAND (LATE XV-XIV CENTURIES BC)

The cuneiform Hittite texts of the XV-XIV centuries BC contain important information dealing with at least two different population movements happened along the Upper Euphrates region. First of these is fixed in the treaty signed between the Hittite king Tudḫaliyaš II (second part of the XV century BC) and Šunaššura, king of Kizzuwatna. The second migration took place later, during the reign of Tudḫaliyaš III. This second migration is of interest since in that population movement was involved a great number of people from different parts of Asia Minor. The study of several Hittite prayers compiled during the reign of Arnuwandaš I allow to assume that this second migration is definitely connected with continuous famine, hunger, plague and attacks of neighboring countries which could force the population of several regions to migrate first to Išuwa and from there to Ḫayaša.

THE INTRODUCTION OF NET-PLATFORM-CENTRIC WARFARE IN THE CHINESE ARMY (PLA)

It is no surprise that just like the previous years, this year as well China has expanded its military budget, put another ship to sea, demonstrated new weaponary at the military parade, etc. For the last two decades, all the combat arms of the Chinese army has been developing at a high rate. Many authors claim very specific reasons for the Chinese armaments especially highlighting the conflicts with its immediate neighbors. From a geopolitical point of view, an interesting balance of power is being formed in the East. It’s been several years now that there are some precise problems in China-Japan conflict related to the power over some islands. China actively builds artificial islands which can serve as military bases far away from its shores approximately at an operative depth. And this matter deeply concerns the Philippines and Vietnam. In this light, it would be very interesting to study the balance of forces in the region and to analyze the American military doctrine on the one hand and the Chinese specific military and military-political attempts to appose it on the other hand. It is common knowledge that in political and professional circles in the USA are concerned about the actions and capabilities of China and Russia, which can considerably restrict the US access to key regions of Eurasia: Today, China and Russia have great potential to influence on the traditional American Net-platform weaponary, Air Forces, Navy, command and control networks, and even the orbital groupings. The two countries mentioned above, which are perceived as potential adversaries in the USA, strive to reach the level of the American military by all possible means and develop powerful techonologies. Russia and especially China are designing powerful satellite systems, various long-range missiles, fighter jets, UAVs, etc. New Electronic Warfare (EW) systems are being developed, to suppress or weaken the command and management systems of the US or its allies. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China also has the capacity to destroy settelites, disrupt extraterrestrial intelligence, wreck command and control networks, etc. According to experts, there is no guarantee that the armed forces of the USA can ensure reliable and secure communication and conncetion during conflicts on the theater of military operations, in particular on operational and strategic levels.

THE CAMPAIGNS OF THE FIRST THREE YEARS OF TUKULTĪNINURTA’S I (1242-1206 BC)

The chronology of events during the reign of Tukultī-Ninurta I does not stand out with particular accuracy, which often sparked controversy. In particular, it refers to the irregular sequence of events in the king's records. In this article, examining the records of the Assyrian king, we have singled out the raids of his first three years, 1242-1239 BC.

A SHORT STORY OF MULLAH NASREDDIN IN THE ANBARĀNI DIALECT OF THE TALYSHI LANGUAGE: TEXT, TRANSLATION, GLOSSARY AND COMMENTS

Talyshi, classified as belonging to the Northwestern Iranian group of languages, includes a wide range of dialects, which, based on phonological, grammatical and lexical factors, are traditionally divided into three main clusters: Northern, Central and Southern (see Bazin 1980; Stilo 1981; Yarshater 1996). Anbarāni is a Northern Talyshi dialect spoken in Anbarān district (baxš) of Namin sub-provincial district (šahrestān) (Ardabil province) of Iran, in the city of Anbarān and adjacent villages. Relatively a large number of studies deal with the Northern Talyshi dialects spoken in the Republic of Azerbaijan. For example, “The Talyshi Texts” by Professor of Iranian Studies Boris Miller, includes short stories, anecdotes, conversations, poetic verses (see Miller 1930) written down in these dialects. Unlike the Northern Talyshi dialects spoken in the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Anbarāni dialect is little known and less studied therefore the number of texts, published in this dialect, is quite limited. The aim of this paper is to broaden the scope of knowledge on Anbarāni by introducing a short story of Mullah Nasreddin and analyzing a number of morphological, syntactical and lexical dialectal features based on the text.

ONCE MORE ABOUT THE MAIN FUNCTION OF THE ARMENIAN PITIASHKHS (BDEAŠXS)

At present, it can be assumed with great confidence that the main function of the Armenian pitiashkhs-governorships was mi¬litary. They were responsible for protecting the external border of neighboring small allied states, and in this matter the entire ar¬my of the satellite state was subordinate to them. Thus, the pitiashkhs of Gugarq were responsible for pro¬tec¬ting the external border of the kingdom of Iberia (Virq), the pi¬tiashkhs of Ałdzniq were responsible for protecting the external border of the kingdom of Osroene (Edessa), the pitiashkhs of the Nor-Shirakan sides were responsible for protecting the external bor¬der of the kingdom of Adiabene (Assyria), and the pitiashkhs of Kor¬duq were responsible for protecting the external border of the kingdom Aruastan (Migdonia). As compensation for their ser¬vice, the pitiashkhs received control over small areas of the neighboring satellite states. Probably, such an Iranian institution of pitiashkhs was introduced in Armenia by Tigran II during the acceptance of the rights and duties of the king of kings. Analysis of information from Armenian sources shows that several border principalities / governorships also had similar pi¬tiashkh functions. Thus, specific rela¬tions were formed between some individual pitiashkhs of the Ar¬menian Kingdom (the bdeašxs) and neighboring states, which sometimes led to sepa¬ra¬tist tendencies. One of the striking examples of this is the relationship between the Armenian principalities / governorship of Gardman on the right bank of the Kura River and the kingdom of Albania Proper on the left bank of the Kura. In the 4th century the principalities / viceroyalties of the Eas¬tern side of Armenia (Gardmanatsiq and Gorozuayq - “Gargara¬tsiq” who were separated from Syuniq) - on behalf of the king of Greater Armenia, performed military pitiashkh functions with respect to the Albanian and Bağasakan kingdoms on the left bank of the Kura, bearing supreme responsibility for the pro¬tec¬tion of their external (northern) borders.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF STAGES AND METHODS OF ARMENIAN GENOCIDE IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND TUTSI GENOCIDE IN RWANDA

In genocide studies, for a more comprehensive, objective study of genocide committed against victim groups, the method of comparative analysis is used, which allows to identify both similarities and features between different examples of this crime. In the framework of the article, a comparative analysis of the stages and methods of the Armenian-Tutsi genocides was made. The choice of the Rwandan genocide as a subject of comparison with the Armenian Genocide is due to the fact that, unlike the organizers of the Armenian Genocide in the Ottoman Empire, who were convicted by Turkish military tribunals, the organizers of the Tutsi genocide in Rwanda were prosecuted by the International Tribunal, created by the UN Security Council in 1994. Revealing the similarities between the stages and methods of committing two identical crimes will provide an opportunity to reveal the precedent of condemning the Rwandan Genocide in the International Tribunal and the possibilities of applying it to the Armenian Genocide case in the future in an international court. As a result of the comparative analysis of the stages of the two genocides, the methods of implementation, in addition to many similarities, significant differences were registered, from which we have separated the following: 1. In order to end the Armenian Genocide, the Turkish authorities chose the period of World War II, when influential world politicians were engaged in hostilities on different fronts of the war and they would not be able to intervene and prevent its implementation, while the Tutsi genocide in Rwanda took place during the civil war that broke out in this country. 2. If the Russian Caucasus Army was an obstacle to the criminal policy of genocide of the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire, which during the hostilities on the RussianTurkish front with the support of Armenian volunteer units occupied the provinces of Erzurum, Van, Bitlis in Western Armenia, as well as Trabzon. The complete extermination of the Tutsis in Rwanda was halted by the advance of their military formation, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RWF), which managed to enter the capital, Kigali, to end the Houthi regime's criminal policy against the Tutsis. Unlike the RSF, the Armenian volunteer detachments in the Russian Caucasus Army did not act independently, they were not a military force capable of stopping the genocidal policy of the Ottoman Empire against the Armenian population. 3. The presence of the Russian Caucasus Army in some parts of Western Armenia, which was to some extent a guarantee of security for the genocidal Armenian population, as well as the Russian-Turkish front line, only temporarily stopped the continuation of the criminal policy of the Turkish authorities towards Armenians. During the revolutionary upheavals in Russia in 1917, the Russian Caucasian army was demoralized and disbanded, after which the Turkish authorities were able to continue the policy of the Armenian Genocide not only in the territories of Western Armenia formerly controlled by Russian troops, but also in Eastern Armenia and the Caucasus. The same can be said about Cilicia, when after the departure of the French troops, the Kemalists had the opportunity to continue the policy of genocide against the Armenians of Cilicia.