When Good People Sexually Harass: The Role of Power and Moral Licensing on Sexual Harassment Perceptions and Intentions

<p>History has shown that people who embody responsibility-focused power have been credibly accused of sexual harassment (SH). We seek to understand why. Drawing on Power-Approach Theory (Keltner et al., 2003) and moral licensing theory (Effron & Monin, 2010) we present two complementary studies examining how responsibility-focused power triggers moral licensing, which, in turn, decreases perceptions of SH (Study 1) and increases intentions to engage in SH (Study 2). In Study 1, 376 adults read scenarios of a man who embodies responsibility-focused power, egocentric power, or low power and then made moral crediting ratings (a form of moral licensing). Then they read a case where the man had been accused of SH. SH judgments against the responsibility-focused power holder, compared to others, were less severe, and several effects were mediated by moral crediting. In Study 2, 310 adults were primed to experience responsibility-focused power or low power. Responsibility-focused power increased SH intentions through effects on communal feelings and moral crediting. This research develops a new theoretical perspective on why SH occurs and why we deny perceiving it. We provide practical recommendations for abating the effects of power and moral licensing. </p>

When Good People Sexually Harass: The Role of Power and Moral Licensing on Sexual Harassment Perceptions and Intentions

<p>History has shown that people who embody responsibility-focused power have been credibly accused of sexual harassment (SH). We seek to understand why. Drawing on Power-Approach Theory (Keltner et al., 2003) and moral licensing theory (Effron & Monin, 2010) we present two complementary studies examining how responsibility-focused power triggers moral licensing, which, in turn, decreases perceptions of SH (Study 1) and increases intentions to engage in SH (Study 2). In Study 1, 376 adults read scenarios of a man who embodies responsibility-focused power, egocentric power, or low power and then made moral crediting ratings (a form of moral licensing). Then they read a case where the man had been accused of SH. SH judgments against the responsibility-focused power holder, compared to others, were less severe, and several effects were mediated by moral crediting. In Study 2, 310 adults were primed to experience responsibility-focused power or low power. Responsibility-focused power increased SH intentions through effects on communal feelings and moral crediting. This research develops a new theoretical perspective on why SH occurs and why we deny perceiving it. We provide practical recommendations for abating the effects of power and moral licensing. </p>

Neural basis of corruption in power-holders

Corruption often involves bribery, when a briber suborns a power-holder to gain advantages usually at a cost of moral transgression. Despite its wide presence in human societies, the neurocomputational basis of bribery remains elusive. Here, using model-based fMRI, we investigated the neural substrates of how a power-holder decides to accept or reject a bribe. Power-holders considered two types of moral cost brought by taking bribes: the cost of conniving with a fraudulent briber, encoded in the anterior insula, and the harm brought to a third party, represented in the right temporoparietal junction. These moral costs were integrated into a value signal in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex was selectively engaged to guide anti-corrupt behaviors when a third party would be harmed. Multivariate and connectivity analyses further explored how these neural processes depend on individual differences. These findings advance our understanding of the neurocomputational mechanisms underlying corrupt behaviors.

The Supervision of Village Fund Management to Prevent Corruption

Indonesian village government is required to carry out its duties properly. The village government has an obligation to understand legal instruments in many laws and regulations. The legal instruments serve as a guideline to carry out the accountability of the village officials to execute programs that use village funds. Unfortunately, the requirements have not been materialized due to the increasing corruption involving village heads who abused village funds. The study aims to find out the form of accountability of the village head as the power holder of village fund users when there are allegations of village fund corruption and the supervisory function that can be carried out by the Village Consultative Body (BPD – Badan Perwakilan Desa) in preventing of village funds to be corrupted by the village head. The study shows that the legal instruments and implementation of the use of village funds are basically in accordance with the principles and principles of managing state finances, even though the arrangements are separate from the provisions on regional government, where these arrangements and management must be under the objectives of state life as regulated in the 1945 Constitution. Moreover, the form of accountability of the village head regarding the use of village funds refers to the guidelines stipulated in the legal instrument. Still, when the alleged corruption of village funds committed by the village head is proven, the case is resolved according to the criminal law provisions. The supervisory function by the BPD in the management of village funds by the village apparatus is carried out as a form of increasing prosperous village communities. However, the supervision is still weak due to political interests between the village apparatus and the BPD institution in the institutional position of the village government. We can conclude that legal instruments are essential as a guide in managing village funds, including accountability for the use of village funds. In addition, the supervisory function in village management has an important role, especially in preventing the misuse of village funds, leading to corruption allegations.

The Truth-Holder

This chapter starts with the observation that inner democracy faces not only the power-holder as an important obstacle but also the presence of a truth-holder within. One has the inclination to dig oneself into the trenches of one’s own sense of being right, in which alternative or contrary viewpoints are no longer taken into consideration, and a productive dialogue with oneself or another person or group cannot come about. Providing knowledge about certain subject matter does not add much in this particular case, because many people are inclined to assume a point of view without knowledge about the underlying facts. In that context, the obstinacy with which we defend moral viewpoints and the intolerance for ambiguity are discussed.

The Power-Holder

In this chapter the reader is invited to look in the dark mirror of the power-holder in ourselves as someone who wants to dominate and limit other individuals or groups in the development of their potential. Referring to an obedience experiment, a prison experiment, and autobiographical material, the chapter aims to show that not only in situations in which obedience is required but also in situations in which people have some freedom to act as they want, power over someone else can manifest itself in an unbridled way. After describing the outcomes of these experiments, the chapter continues to explore the mechanisms of authoritarianism as a phenomenon that is spreading in contemporary societies like an oil slick.

Oposisi dan Koalisi: Potret Kultur Demokrasi Indonesia

Democracy allows the people to have equal rights in decision-making that can change their lives. Consequently, opposition and coalition exist in this political system. While the opposition aims to correct and evaluate various government decisions, the coalition is the power holder or supporter of the government. Because Indonesia is a country that uphold legal formal consisting of many political parties, a coalition government party must be formed. This is done by gathering other parties until the government can run effectively so that it has the basis of a combination and effective legitimacy. In the second period of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's cabinet, the emergence of political parties that were powerless and did not dare to become the government's opposition became evidence of the need for democratization. The emergence of elitism, centralization, and anti-public, as well as the freezing of political structures and the backwardness of the cultural attitudes of the Indonesian people caused the opposition to stand on the word of democratization. Therefore coalitions and opposition are two important parts in building a democratic governance system in Indonesia. This article underlines that democracy in the political elite tends to produce a pseudo and half-hearted democracy. Therefor, the portrait of democratization is needed as a reinforcement of all elements of civil society and thus is not seen as a "devout movement of the state", but an urgent movement to change the attitude of the state through changes in the political composition within it.

The Burden of Power: Construing Power as Responsibility (Rather Than as Opportunity) Alters Threat-Challenge Responses

Power usually lowers stress responses. In stressful situations, having high (vs. low) power heightens challenge and lowers threat. Yet, even power-holders may experience threat when becoming aware of the responsibility that accompanies their power. Power-holders can construe (i.e., understand) a high-power position primarily as opportunity to “make things happen” or as responsibility to “take care of things.” Power-holders construing power as responsibility (rather than opportunity) may be more likely to experience demands—such as taking care of important decisions under their control—as outweighing their resources, resulting in less challenge and more threat. Four experiments with subjective and cardiovascular threat-challenge indicators support this. Going beyond prior work on structural aspects (e.g., power instability) that induce stress, we show that merely the way how power-holders construe their power can evoke stress. Specifically, we find that power construed as responsibility (vs. opportunity) is more likely to imply a “burden” for the power-holder.

EASTERN EUROPE - DEINDUSTRIALIZED, INCAPACITATED, DEMORALIZED, OVERINDEBTED, RE-FEUDALIZED, RARIFIED AND DE-SLAVICIZED

The single trend of negative growth (incl. the income levels and income distribution, inequality extraction ratio, suicide rates and functional illiteracy figures) comparable by its duration and severity to this of Eastern Europe, is situated only in (the countries of Chad lake- Grand lakes- Horn of Africa triangle of) sub-Saharan Africa. Further on, recent generational accounting figures illuminate a highly disturbing future prospect for the youth of Eastern Europe. Neither their economic performance nor birth rates would sustain the financial burden left for the future by the present irresponsible and defeatist generation. Simply, set up to fail.Is today’s Eastern Europe a classic case of indirect rule? Is that a deterrito- rialized deep imperial periphery of nominally independent native rulers, while in reality the true power holder resides outside, although is domestically supported by a dense web of NGOs, multinational corporations and handpicked local ‘elites’?