Both for Karol Wojtyła, the future Pope John Paul II, and Józef Tischner, freedom is a key matter. However, freedom must be e x p e r i e n c e d ; it is not revealed in objective metaphysics or in science.For Wojtyła, it is an experience of the moral a c t : freedom is a condition and in-gredient of the moral act and responsibility for it. It enters into the composition of the essential structure of the person, which means “self-restraint,” or shaping oneself through free choices. Freedom has the power to create man through itself: referring to others in morality, I at the same time refer to myself, deciding who I will be. This existential weight of freedom – responsibility for oneself before others, God, and oneself – is the price of freedom which, let us add, is inevitable. Even the rejection of freedom or resignation from it is still an expression of freedom. For Wojtyła, freedom shapes man through an instinc-tive, completely not induced reference to the truth about values. However, in this reference and in acting the subject is dependent only on itself. The weight of the action, whose truth we decipher in our conscience, is what most impresses Wojtyła. The lack of a need for the concept of grace in this vision is striking. The subject is independent, autonomous, and thus responsible. With regards to this point, Wojtyła is close to Thomism and its respect for the innateness of creation.For Tischner, freedom is key and is also an innate value that is experienced. Its essence is above all freeing, liberating; thus Tischner does not hesitate to discern it in extra-moral phenomena such as dancing, which liberates beauty, and even extra-human ones, such as the beauty of an elk jumping across a brook. Beauty and good require freedom. However, the true liberation of freedom is opening oneself to the freedom of the other in encoun-ter, as thanks to this I can enter into a relationship of love and fidelity; I can s a c r i f i c e myself and through this fulfill the highest act of freedom, an act that is not induced by pre-established responsibility for the other, as in Levinas’ philosophy. Although it is not induced, this act assumes in an essential way the relationality of the subject and at the same time its finiteness.