scholarly journals Introduction

Author(s):  
Sebastian Löbner ◽  
Thomas Gamerschlag ◽  
Tobias Kalenscher ◽  
Markus Schrenk ◽  
Henk Zeevat

AbstractIn order to help to explain cognition, cognitive structures are assumed to be present in the mind/brain. While the empirical investigation of such structures is the task of cognitive psychology, the other cognitive science disciplines like linguistics, philosophy and artificial intelligence have an important role in suggesting hypotheses. Researchers in these disciplines increasingly test such hypotheses by empirical means themselves. In philosophy, the traditional way of referring to such structures is via concepts, i.e. those mental entities by which we conceive reality and with the help of which we reason and plan. Linguists traditionally refer to the cognitive structures as meanings—at least those linguists with a mentalistic concept of meaning do who do not think of meaning as extra-mental entities.

Author(s):  
Francisco J. Varela ◽  
Evan Thompson ◽  
Eleanor Rosch

This chapter describes cognitive science. In its widest sense, the term cognitive science is used to indicate that the study of mind is in itself a worthy scientific pursuit. At this time, cognitive science is not yet established as a mature science. It does not have a clearly agreed upon sense of direction and a large number of researchers constituting a community. Rather, it is really more of a loose affiliation of disciplines than a discipline of its own. Interestingly, an important pole is occupied by artificial intelligence—thus, the computer model of the mind is a dominant aspect of the entire field. The other affiliated disciplines are generally taken to consist of linguistics, neuroscience, psychology, sometimes anthropology, and the philosophy of mind. Each discipline would give a somewhat different answer to the question of what is mind or cognition, an answer that would reflect its own specific concerns.


The research incorporated encircles the interdisciplinary theory of cognitive science in the branch of artificial intelligence. It has always been the end goal that better understanding of the idea can be guaranteed. Besides, a portion of the real-time uses of cognitive science artificial intelligence have been taken into consideration as the establishment for more enhancements. Before going into the scopes of future, there are many complexities that occur in real-time which have been uncovered. Cognitive science is the interdisciplinary, scientific study of the brain and its procedures. It inspects the nature, the activities, and the elements of cognition. Cognitive researchers study intelligence and behavior, with an emphasis on how sensory systems speak to, process, and change data. Intellectual capacities of concern to cognitive researchers incorporate recognition, language, memory, alertness, thinking, and feeling; to comprehend these resources, cognitive researchers acquire from fields, for example, psychology, artificial intelligence, philosophy, neuroscience, semantics, and anthropology. The analytic study of cognitive science ranges numerous degrees of association, from learning and choice to logic and planning; from neural hardware to modular mind organization. The crucial idea of cognitive science is that "thinking can best be understood in terms of representational structures in the mind and computational procedures that operate on those structures."


Author(s):  
Francisco J. Varela ◽  
Evan Thompson ◽  
Eleanor Rosch

This chapter looks at Marvin Minsky's and Seymour Papert's recent proposal to study the mind as a society, which takes the patchwork architecture of cognition as a central element. Minsky and Papert present a view in which minds consist of many “agents” whose abilities are quite circumscribed: each agent taken individually operates only in a microworld of small-scale or “toy” problems. This model of the mind as a society of numerous agents is intended to encompass a multiplicity of approaches to the study of cognition, ranging from distributed, self-organizing networks to the classical, cognitivist conception of localized, serial symbolic processing. The society of mind purports to be, then, something of a middle way in present cognitive science. This middle way challenges a homogenous model of the mind, whether in the form of distributed networks at one extreme or symbolic processers at the other extreme.


2013 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stan Franklin ◽  
Steve Strain ◽  
Ryan McCall ◽  
Bernard Baars

Abstract Significant debate on fundamental issues remains in the subfields of cognitive science, including perception, memory, attention, action selection, learning, and others. Psychology, neuroscience, and artificial intelligence each contribute alternative and sometimes conflicting perspectives on the supervening problem of artificial general intelligence (AGI). Current efforts toward a broad-based, systems-level model of minds cannot await theoretical convergence in each of the relevant subfields. Such work therefore requires the formulation of tentative hypotheses, based on current knowledge, that serve to connect cognitive functions into a theoretical framework for the study of the mind. We term such hypotheses “conceptual commitments” and describe the hypotheses underlying one such model, the Learning Intelligent Distribution Agent (LIDA) Model. Our intention is to initiate a discussion among AGI researchers about which conceptual commitments are essential, or particularly useful, toward creating AGI agents.


Author(s):  
Jonardon Ganeri

That the two kinds of description are distinct is evident. There is no obvious way to translate the terms of either account into those of the other or in any other way to achieve a nomological reduction of one account to the other. The ambitions of the two accounts are different: one seeks to describe what consciousness must be if mind is able intentionally to ‘bend onto’ world; the other attempts to describe how the mind departs from its natural state of rest and instead consciously to take up some aspect of the world about it. A distinction popular in cognitive science, the endogenous/exogenous distinction, is rejected. A conception of reality is defended according to which the world is not normatively inert.


AI Magazine ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 13-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
John E. Laird ◽  
Christian Lebiere ◽  
Paul S. Rosenbloom

The purpose of this article is to begin the process of engaging the international research community in developing what can be called a standard model of the mind, where the mind we have in mind here is human-like. The notion of a standard model has its roots in physics, where over more than a half-century the international community has developed and tested a standard model that combines much of what is known about particles. This model is assumed to be internally consistent, yet still have major gaps. Its function is to serve as a cumulative reference point for the field while also driving efforts to both extend and break it.


Author(s):  
Juan C. Vélez

RESUMENLa teoría representacional de la mente, basada en el concepto de representación, ha sido muy criticada, especialmente por recientes enfoques en la ciencia cognitiva, provenientes de la Biología y la Inteligencia Artificial. En este trabajo me centro especialmente en el punto de vista de Francisco Varela, quien sugiere la exclusión del término representación en la explicación de los sistemas cognitivos. Muestro que ello no es necesario, y que hay razones para hablar de representaciones en la relación que tenemos con el mundo en términos de conocimiento, por tanto, el antirrepresentacionalismo de Varela es inadecuado. En ese sentido me parece más afortunada la apreciación que hacen de la ciencia cognitiva y la filosofía de la mente Andy Clark y Pascual Martínez-Freire, y ésta es la postura que defenderé en contra de Varela.PALABRAS CLAVEMENTE, REPRESENTACIÓN, COGNITIVISMO, CONDUCTA, SISTEMAABSTRACTThe representational theory of the mind, based on the concept of representation, has been very criticized, specially by recent approaches to cognitive science, originated from Biology and Artificial Intelligence. In this work I focus my attention specially on the point of view of Francisco Varela, who suggests the exclusion of the term representation in the explanation of cognitive systems. I show that it is unnecessary, and that there are reasons to talk about representations in the relation that we have with the world in terms of knowledge, and therefore, Varela’s antirepresentacionalism is inadequate. In that connection the appreciation that Andy Clark and Pascual Martínez-Freire do of cognitive science and the philosophy of the mind seems more fortunate to me, and this is the position that I will defend against Varela.KEYWORDSMIND, REPRESENTATION, COGNITIVISM, BEHAVIOR, SYSTEM


2013 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 215-237
Author(s):  
Piotr Luczys

The development of geographic information accompanied by the expansion towards accumulation of the greater and greater amount of geospatial data – initiated the specific theoretical marriage of reflection on objectivizing character of the digital imago mundi and the cognitive relationship between the “state of the world” and the “state of the mind”. Whereby, electronic repositories of “geoevery- kind” data constitute the direct articulation of consciously acquiring and organising spatial data, additionally supported by the evidence of emergence of the new and inspired by “the sciences of cognition” (that is: cognitive psychology, cognitive science, philosophy of the mind, etc.) technologicalsolutions in this realm. Such a theoretically-technical amalgam of information considerably limits – and being the clue of this paper – the explanatory usefulness of digital spatial data in the sociological analysis and deforms the contemporary state of knowledge regarding spatially-driven collective behaviours, leading to the rise of the mentioned myths.


Philosophy ◽  
1997 ◽  
Vol 72 (280) ◽  
pp. 189-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. Proudfoot

Cognitive science is held, not only by its practitioners, to offer something distinctively new in the philosophy of mind. This novelty is seen as the product of two factors. First, philosophy of mind takes itself to have well and truly jettisoned the ‘old paradigm’, the theory of the mind as embodied soul, easily and completely known through introspection but not amenable to scientific inquiry. This is replaced by the ‘new paradigm’, the theory of mind as neurally-instantiated computational mechanism, relatively opaque to introspection and the proper subject of detailed empirical investigation. Second, in the constitutive disciplines of cognitive science (cognitive psychology, neuroscience, computer science etc.) we have for the first time the theoretical, experimental and technological resources to begin this investigation. My concern here is to show that, despite its scientific and philosophical sophistication, the new (computational) paradigm is in certain striking ways very similar to the old paradigm and that Wittgenstein's criticisms of the former apply to much of the latter.


2005 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 425-427
Author(s):  
Csaba Pléh

Ádám György: A rejtozködo elme. Egy fiziológus széljegyzetei Carpendale, J. I. M. és Müller, U. (eds): Social interaction and the development of knowledge Cloninger, R. C.: Feeling good. The science of well being Dunbar, Robin, Barrett, Louise, Lycett, John: Evolutionary psychology Dunbar, Robin: The human story. A new history of makind's evolution Geary, D. C.: The origin of mind. Evolution of brain, cognition and general intelligence Gedeon Péter, Pál Eszter, Sárkány Mihály, Somlai Péter: Az evolúció elméletei és metaforái a társadalomtudományokban Harré, Rom: Cognitive science: A philosophical introduction Horváth György: Pedagógiai pszichológia Marcus, G.: The birth of the mind. How a tiny number of genes creates the complexities of human thought Solso, R. D.: The psychology of art and the evolution of the conscious brain Wray, A. (ed.): The transition to language


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