The Development of Cooperation Between Member States of the Arctic Council 1996–2019: Environmental Partnership or Struggle for Resources

Author(s):  
Anastasiia V. Sboychakova
Polar Record ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 284-292 ◽  
Author(s):  
Svein Vigeland Rottem

ABSTRACTOn 12 May 2011 at the seventh ministerial meeting, the member states of the Arctic Council (AC) signed the Arctic SAR agreement, the first legally binding agreement negotiated under the auspices of the AC. Its objective is to strengthen search and rescue cooperation and coordination in the Arctic. The purpose of this article is to explore why an agreement on search and rescue under the auspices of the AC has been negotiated; what its key features are; and lastly, how it is and will be implemented. It is argued that the SAR agreement is more important for the AC than for Norway. It has had limited practical consequences in that country. The agreement may be politically and symbolically significant but it has neither financially nor organisationally changed Norwegian search and rescue policy.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (9) ◽  
pp. 5527-5546
Author(s):  
Thomas Kühn ◽  
Kaarle Kupiainen ◽  
Tuuli Miinalainen ◽  
Harri Kokkola ◽  
Ville-Veikko Paunu ◽  
...  

Abstract. We use the ECHAM-HAMMOZ aerosol-climate model to assess the effects of black carbon (BC) mitigation measures on Arctic climate. To this end we constructed several mitigation scenarios that implement all currently existing legislation and then implement further reductions of BC in a successively increasing global area, starting from the eight member states of the Arctic Council, expanding to its active observer states, then to all observer states, and finally to the entire globe. These scenarios also account for the reduction of the co-emitted organic carbon (OC) and sulfate (SU). We find that, even though the additional BC emission reductions in the member states of the Arctic Council are small, the resulting reductions in Arctic BC mass burdens can be substantial, especially in the lower troposphere close to the surface. This in turn means that reducing BC emissions only in the Arctic Council member states can reduce BC deposition in the Arctic by about 30 % compared to the current legislation, which is about 60 % of what could be achieved if emissions were reduced globally. Emission reductions further south affect Arctic BC concentrations at higher altitudes and thus only have small additional effects on BC deposition in the Arctic. The direct radiative forcing scales fairly well with the total amount of BC emission reduction, independent of the location of the emission source, with a maximum direct radiative forcing in the Arctic of about −0.4 W m−2 for a global BC emission reduction. On the other hand, the Arctic effective radiative forcing due to the BC emission reductions, which accounts for aerosol–cloud interactions, is small compared to the direct aerosol radiative forcing. This happens because BC- and OC-containing particles can act as cloud condensation nuclei, which affects cloud reflectivity and lifetime and counteracts the direct radiative forcing of BC. Additionally, the effective radiative forcing is accompanied by very large uncertainties that originate from the strong natural variability of meteorology, cloud cover, and surface albedo in the Arctic. We further used the TM5-FASST model to assess the benefits of the aerosol emission reductions for human health. We found that a full implementation in all Arctic Council member and observer states could reduce the annual global number of premature deaths by 329 000 by the year 2030, which amounts to 9 % of the total global premature deaths due to particulate matter.


Author(s):  
JULIA V. ZVORYKINA ◽  
◽  
KIRILL S. TETERYATNIKOV ◽  
DANEK А. PAVLOVSKY ◽  
◽  
...  

The article is meant to analyze new opportunities of the forthcoming presidency of the Russian Federation in the Arctic Council designed to implement the Arctic Development Strategy of the Russian Federation, strengthen international cooperation and give a new impetus to largescale national and international sustainable development projects in the Arctic, focused on improving the resilience of the environment and population of the Council member states. The authors considered the approaches to formulation of sustainable development priorities in international law and Russian legislation, peculiarities of sustainable development projects in the Arctic, prospective directions of Russian chairmanship in the Arctic Council taking into account postpandemic development of the world economy. Relevant proposals and recommendations on specific areas of cooperation and major projects that could be implemented in the interests of all member states of the Arctic Council are given. A proposal for Arctic Development Bank foundation has been put forward and substantiated.


2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margrét Cela

Abstract Iceland is one of eight member states of the Arctic Council and claims to be the only sovereign state that is entirely located in the Arctic. Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that the region has gained a priority status in Iceland’s foreign policy. The developments in the Arctic will inevitably affect the country in one way or the other. This paper is divided into three sections; the first one discusses recent internal and external developments. The second section is about three different aspects of security, traditional, human and environmental, and furthermore, discusses those types of security in Icelandic context. The last section is on Iceland’s priorities in the Arctic, which are then measured against Lassi Heininen’s policy fields or indicators, and Arctic solutions presented by Alyson Bailes. Main conclusions are that even though Iceland has been going through challenging times in the resent years, the Arctic still remains somewhat a priority area, policy wise, and the Icelandic priorities, for the most part, fit within the frameworks of Arctic solutions and the policy fields they are measured against.


2019 ◽  
Vol 113 (4) ◽  
pp. 831-833

The Arctic Council convened for the eleventh time in early May 2019 in Rovaniemi, Finland, for a two-day conference. On May 7, the Arctic Council released a Joint Ministerial Statement that affirmed the desire of the eight member states to work together to face upcoming challenges but made no substantive commitments and no mention of climate change. In remarks to the Council, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo expressed wariness about collective decision making and warned against potential effects of Chinese activity in the Arctic.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Kühn ◽  
Kaarle Kupiainen ◽  
Tuuli Miinalainen ◽  
Harri Kokkola ◽  
Ville-Veikko Paunu ◽  
...  

Abstract. We use the aerosol-climate model ECHAM-HAMMOZ to assess the effects of black carbon (BC) mitigation measures on Arctic climate. To this end we constructed several mitigation scenarios that implement all currently existing legislation and then implement further reductions of BC in a successively increasing global area, starting from the eight member states of the Arctic Council, expanding to its active observer states, then to all observer states, and finally to the entire globe. These scenarios also account for the reduction of the co-emitted organic carbon (OC) and sulphate (SU). We find that, even though the additional BC emission reductions in the member states of the Arctic Council are small, the resulting reductions in Arctic BC mass burdens can be substantial, especially in the lower atmosphere close to the surface. This in turn means that reducing BC emissions only in the Arctic Council member states can reduce BC deposition in the Arctic by about 30 % compared to the current legislation, which is about 60 % of what could be achieved if emissions were reduced globally. Emission reductions further south affect Arctic BC concentrations at higher altitudes and thus only have small additional effects on BC deposition in the Arctic. The direct radiative forcing scales fairly well with the total amount of BC emission reduction, independent of the location of the emission source, with a maximum direct radiative forcing in the Arctic of about 0.4 W/m2 for a global BC emission reduction. On the other hand, the Arctic effective radiative forcing due to the BC emission reductions, which accounts for aerosol-cloud interactions, is small compared to the direct aerosol radiative forcing. This happens because BC and OC containing particles can act as cloud condensation nuclei, which affects cloud reflectivity and lifetime, and counter-acts the direct radiative forcing of BC. Additionally the effective radiative forcing is accompanied by very large uncertainties that origin from the strong natural variability of meteorology, cloud cover, and surface albedo in the Arctic. We further used the model TM5-FASST to assess the benefits of the aerosol emission reductions on human health. We found that a full implementation in all Arctic Council member and observer states could reduce the annual global amount of premature deaths by 339 000 by 2030.


Author(s):  
L. S. Voronkov ◽  
A. A. Smirnova

The article emphasizes that the Arctic Council (AC) is a high level forum of cooperation, based on taking decisions by consensus that are carried out by member states on a voluntary basis and in accordance with their national interests. The AC does not meet the criteria of a classical international intergovernmental organization – IGO and may not be referred to as an international non-governmental organization – INGO due to its members. The high performance of the AC activity in the absence of a complex organizational structure, any executive body and a court is rooted in respect for national sovereignty of its member states. This informal international organization of new type became the core, around which a significant group of states, IGOs and INGOs, that received observer status at the AC, is created. Within the framework of its activity innovative tools of financing of ongoing programs have been developed. Participation of other member states of the AC in the anti-Russian sanctions does not become an obstacle for continuation of the close cooperation of all Arctic states in addressing the major problems of common concern in the Arctic. During the sanctions they established the Arctic economic council, signed the agreements on cooperation between coastal guards of all Arctic states, on scientific cooperation in the Arctic and on preventing unregulated fishing in the central part of the Arctic ocean. Negotiations on possible new agreements are going on between them. The model of informal international cooperation, demonstrated by the Arctic Council, is being successfully implemented also in the activities of the Nordic Council of Ministers, the Council of Barents/Euro-arctic Region, BRICS and other international organizations. This gave the authors the reason to conclude that this type of international organizations will be further developed in contemporary international relations.


2020 ◽  
Vol 84 ◽  
pp. 02001
Author(s):  
Daria Synchikova ◽  
Regina Elizaveta Kudriavtceva ◽  
Javed Zafar

Russia is one of the 8 member states of the Arctic Council, so the Arctic is one of the priority areas of Russia’s foreign policy. Another player in the Arctic territories in cooperation with Russia is Belarus, which can provide assistance in many areas related to technological progress. In this article, the author examines which areas of cooperation between Russia and Belarus are the most successful, and what platforms (The Union State of Russia and Belarus or the EAEU) and institutions exist for this purpose. In addition, it is important to consider the problems that arise in the process of cooperation, as well as the question of whether a confrontation is possible within the integration association. The author also notes further lines of cooperation and opportunities for both states in the Arctic.


2021 ◽  
pp. 75-84
Author(s):  
Arseniy V. KIRGIZOV-BARSKIY ◽  

Since 2008, the European Union has unsuccessfully tried to obtain permanent observer status in the Arctic Council, the central cooperation forum in the Arctic. The analysis shows that the EU's failures in this area are connected both with its location mostly outside of the region and remoteness from the northern realities, as well as global geopolitical tensions. However, the EU has had de facto observer ad hoc status since 2013, allowing it to participate in almost all formats of interaction in the Arctic Council. Considering this fact, the permanent observer status has rather a symbolic meaning and is equivalent to joining a kind of “privileged Arctic club”. An analysis of the EU's functioning in its relations with the Arctic Council and its members shows that the EU is ready to adapt and listen to the opinion of the Arctic countries in order to become a legitimate Arctic actor. The Arctic Council is of uneven importance for the different EU member states: Denmark, Finland and Sweden are full members, several countries are permanent observers, but most EU countries are not interested in the Arctic issues. Because of this multifaceted nature, the collective EU is more of an extra-regional player on the platform, but one with serious Arctic claims. The EU is actively working on a common Arctic policy. It is represented in the Arctic Council by the Ambassador-at-Large for Arctic Affairs, introduced in 2017, who acts in coordination with the European Commission and the member states concerned. The EU's overall approach is not unsuccessful: it has managed to engage more member states on the Arctic vector, and European expertise and input on sustainable development issues is already becoming an integral part of the AC's work and promises to evolve further.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document