Ontology and Transcendental Phenomenology Between Husserl and Heidegger

1997 ◽  
pp. 13-36
Author(s):  
Steven Galt Crowell
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Phenomenology

Transcendental Philosophy and the Challenge of the Human Body: Merleau-Ponty and Kant

PARADIGMI ◽  
2012 ◽  
pp. 157-171
Author(s):  
Angelica Nuzzo
Keyword(s):  
Human Body ◽  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Transcendental Philosophy ◽  
Lived Body ◽  
Phenomenology Of Perception ◽  
Lecture Notes ◽  
Critical Account

This essay discusses Merleau-Ponty's assessment of Kant's philosophy looking first at his critique of Kant's transcendental idealism in the preface to the 1945 Phenomenology of Perception, and second at his account of the duality of the concepts of nature in the 1956-57 lecture notes on Nature at the Collčge de France. In both cases, Merleau-Ponty points to the encounter with the issue of the living/lived body as the stumbling block that halts the transcendental inquiry leading to his transcendental phenomenology. Along this itinerary, countering Merleau-Ponty's reading a different interpretation of Kant is offered. The claim is made that Kant did not evade the problem of the human body but made it functional to his own transcendental inquiry. Task of this essay is to measure the distance that separates the two accounts of Kant's view of sensibility, namely, the critical account that inspires Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of the lived body leading him beyond the alleged impasse of Kant's transcendental idealism, and what the author claims to be Kant's own transcendental view of sensibility.

Husserl and Levinas

2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (51) ◽  
pp. 115-126
Author(s):  
João Carvalho ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
Fundamental Difference ◽  
The Other ◽  
Close Reading ◽  
Key Concepts ◽  
Alter Ego

This paper presents two different, although related, approaches to the problem of the experience of the other person: E. Husserl’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity and E. Levinas’ ethics. I begin by (1) addressing the transcendental significance of the experience of intersubjectivity in the broader context of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. I then turn to (2) Husserl’s solution to the paradox of constituting the alter ego, identifying and elucidating the key‑concepts of his inquiry. I hold that throughout his analysis there is a dominant underlying meaning in which the alterity of the other person is progressively suppressed and, ultimately, elided. Finally, I discuss (3) the consequences of Husserl’s analysis of the other in light of Levinas’ ethics. I hold that Husserl’s claim that there is a fundamental difference between the experience of myself and my analogical experience of the other is the basis upon which Levinas’ develops a new concept of experience, not as perception but as encounter. Upon close reading, I claim that Levinas’ revision of the topic of alterity is, ultimately, a consequence of Husserl’s transcendental analysis of intersubjectivity.

scholarly journals The Earth and Pregivenness in Transcendental Phenomenology

2020 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-52
Author(s):  
Denis Džanić
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
Transcendental Function ◽  
The Earth ◽  
The World

Abstract The doctrine of the pregivenness of the world features prominently in Husserl’s numerous phenomenological analyses and descriptions of the role the world plays in our experience. Properly evaluating its function within the overall system of transcendental phenomenology is, however, by no means a straightforward task, as evidenced by many manuscripts from the 1930s. These detail various epistemological and metaphysical difficulties and potential paradoxes encumbering the notion of the pre-given world. This paper contends that some of these difficulties can be alleviated by revisiting Husserl’s late concept of the earth and, more specifically, disclosing its transcendental function in the constitution of pregivenness. To test this claim, I turn to Husserl’s 1931 manuscript describing the paradox of “the originary acquisition of the world.” I argue that the paradox is dissolved by introducing the transcendental-phenomenological concept of the earth.

scholarly journals A. Staiti, Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology

2015 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Corijn van Mazijk
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Phenomenology

scholarly journals THE CONCEPT OF KUNSTLEHRE IN THE HUSSERL’S PHENOMENOLOGY

2021 ◽  
pp. 16-26
Author(s):  
Svetlana Berdaus
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
Research Literature ◽  
Scientific Study ◽  
Main Task ◽  
Theoretical Level ◽  
Study Program ◽  
Important Place ◽  
Pure Logic ◽  
Logical Investigations ◽  
Practical Level

The article proposes a reconstruction of the Kunstlehre concept, which occupies an important place in the structural and disciplinary section of Husserl's phenomenology. The key point of the presented reconstruction is its separation from the traditional interpretation of Kunstlehre criticized by Husserl and the advancement of a new project that coordinates three levels – theoretical, normative and practical. The theoretical level (pure logic), being complementary to the normative level (pure norms of reason), forms the basis of the disciplines represented by the program of science of knowledge (Wissenschaftslehre). The scientific study program falls on the period of the so- called logicism of Husserl, regarding which there is an opinion in the research literature that it was interrupted by the founder of phenomenology immediately after the writing of the first volume of “Logical Investigations”. However, on the basis of textual arguments, we show that this program was extended by Husserl up to his last works. The nature of this expansion is related to the practical level of Kunstlehre (transcendental phenomenology). The main task of this level was to provide science and scientists with noetic conditions, i.e. skills of transcendental criticism of consciousness. It is suggested that the presented reconstruction of Kunstlehre shows the permanent development of the program of logicism by Husserl, and also demonstrates the connection of this program with transcendental phenomenology.

scholarly journals Davos 1929: “¿Qué es el Hombre?” El desencuentro entre Cassirer y Heidegger. Razones filosófica y política

2021 ◽  
pp. 177
Author(s):  
Julio Quesada
Keyword(s):  
Martin Heidegger ◽  
Edmund Husserl ◽  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Existential Philosophy ◽  
Ernst Cassirer ◽  
Anti Semitism ◽  
History Of

Mi ensayo ha querido explicar genealógicamente y de forma contextualizada el desencuentro entre Ernst Cassirer y Martin Heidegger en Davos, y la deriva de éste hacia el nazismo desde los presupuestos de su filosofía existencial. ¿Qué papel juega el antisemitismo espiritual en la crítica heideggeriana al neokantismo y la fenomenología trascendental? ¿Por qué la fenomenología de Edmund Husserl es "una monstruosidad"? ¿Por qué Kant se convierte en batalla y campo de batalla de la Kulturkampf? ¿Por qué se lee a Heidegger como se lee? ¿Qué sentido tiene la práctica de la historia de la filosofía en el “final” de la filosofía?My essay wanted to explain genealogically and in a contextualized way the disagreement between Cassirer and Heidegger in Davos, and its drift towards Nazism from the budgets of their existential philosophy. What role does spiritual anti-Semitism play in the Heideggerian critique of neo-Kantianism and transcendental phenomenology? Why is Husserl's phenomenology "a monstrosity"? Why does Kant become the battle and battlefield of the Kulturkampf? Why do you read Heidegger as you read? What is the meaning of the practice of the history of philosophy in the “final” of philosophy?

scholarly journals Relativity of Taste without Relativism. An Introduction to Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 46-81
Author(s):  
Carlos Lobo
Keyword(s):  
Physical Theory ◽  
Aesthetic Experience ◽  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
Theory Of Relativity ◽  
Phenomenological Interpretation ◽  
Value Judgements ◽  
The Common ◽  
Artistic Values ◽  
Aesthetic Values

The author explores Ingarden’s aesthetics taking as a leading thread his repeated attempts at a refutation of the common locus of relativity of taste. Ingarden’s position is summarized in four theses: (1) values do exist as the proper correlates of aesthetic experience, (2) aesthetic values must be distinguished from artistic values, (3) artistic and aesthetic values are founded in other ontic strata, and finally (4) acts of valuation in aesthetic experience are presupposed by value judgements. In the light of the philosophical and phenomenological interpretation of the physical theory of relativity (special and general) by authors such as Weyl or Geiger, Ingarden’s refutation of the relativity of taste appears as incomplete. The phenomenology of aesthetic experience formulated by Geiger and Husserl and their own refutations of relativism in general and aesthetic relativism in particular suggest a more fruitful approach, which is undermined by Ingarden: the transcendental phenomenology of intersubjective aesthetic experience.

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