scholarly journals The Possibility/Impossibility of Ethical Community during the COVID-19 Pandemic: a Philosophical Reflection

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-243
Author(s):  
Shining Star Lyngdoh

AbstractThe outbreak of COVID-19 has raised a global concern and calls for an urgent response. During this perpetual time of epidemic crisis, philosophy has to stand on trial and provide a responsible justification for how it is still relevant and can be of used during this global crisis. In such a time of crisis like that of COVID-19, this paper offers a philosophical reflection from within the possibility/impossibility of community thinking in India, and the demand for an ethical responsivity and response-ability to act ethically towards the Other (autrui) to show that philosophy always already emerges from within the context of crisis. As an alternative outlook to the thinking of totalitarian singularity and individualism, community—in its possible and impossible making—can offer more meaningful engagement with the other human being by being responsible and extending care towards the Other. The thinking of a shared community life is the facticity of one’s own being-together-in-common without the dismissal of individual differences as can be seen in the works of Jean-Luc Nancy, and there is an ethical demand that comes from the face-to-face ethical relationship with the Other as argued by Emmanuel Levinas.

2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 279-297
Author(s):  
Bob Plant

Emmanuel Levinas’ semi-phenomenological analyses of the “face-to-face” encounter with “the other” are frequently alluded to in the therapeutic literature. Indeed, for some therapists, Levinas provides the conceptual apparatus to reconfigure traditional therapeutic practice. While acknowledging the importance of his work, in this article I raise critical questions about the way Levinas’ ideas are often used by psychotherapists. The discussion is divided into five sections: First, I provide a short explanation of the motivations for writing this paper. Second, I offer an overview of some prominent themes therapists typically draw from Levinas’ writings. Next, I present my own reconstruction of the face-to-face encounter. Then, drawing on the previous reconstruction, I outline the main questions Levinas-inspired therapists need to address. Finally, I reconsider the potential significance of Levinas’ work for therapists.


Religions ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (12) ◽  
pp. 381
Author(s):  
Steve Larocco

Adi Ophir has suggested that the political realm is an order of evils, producing and managing regular forms of suffering and violence rather than eliminating them. Thus, the political is always to some extent a corrupted order of justice. Emmanuel Levinas’ work presents in its focus on the face-to-face relationship a means of rethinking how to make the political more open to compassionate justice. Though Levinas himself doesn’t sufficiently take on this question, I argue that his work facilitates a way of thinking about commiserative shame that provides a means to connect the face-to-face to its potential effects in the political sphere. If such shame isn’t ignored or bypassed, it produces an unsettling relation to the other that in its adversity motivates a kind of responsibility and care for the other that can alter the public sphere.


The Monist ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 103 (1) ◽  
pp. 38-62
Author(s):  
Irene McMullin

Abstract For both Levinas and Løgstrup, the moral encounter is characterized by an asymmetrical prioritization of the other over the self. Some take Løgstrup’s account to be an improvement on Levinas’s, however, insofar as it appears to both foreswear the hyperbole of the latter’s view and ground the ethical claim in the natural conditions of human life (thereby avoiding Levinas’s alleged nominalism). This paper argues, in contrast, that Løgstrup’s own account is equally hyperbolic in its characterization of the self as fundamentally evil, and that his attempt to ground the ethical demand in structures of ‘life’ raises serious difficulties. I will argue that Levinas’s stronger commitment to phenomenology both rules out the problematic metaphysical claims on which Løgstrup’s ontological ethics depends and helps explain the methodological function of Levinas’s own hyperbole. Unlike Løgstrup, Levinas insists that the challenge is not eradicating the claims of the self, but rather resisting its pretention to a global normative priority. In making this case I refute the argument that Levinas, unlike Løgstrup, is committed to a ‘command’ view of morality—whereby it is the other person’s authoritative status that underwrites the moral force of the claim, not the content of the claim itself. But on Levinas’s view, ‘demand’ and ‘command’ accounts merge in his understanding of the face-to-face encounter because responding to the content of the demand—that I treat the other’s claim as reason-giving—just is to see the other person as an authority capable of making legitimate claims on me.


2021 ◽  
pp. 000332862110238
Author(s):  
Armand E Larive

Rather than a general theory of gratitude, the paper focuses on gratitude as a human dynamic in appreciative recognition of others. The phenomenology of Emmanuel Levinas’ face-to-face ethics is discussed as the subject’s call to responsibility for an Other. Following Jacques Derrida’s criticism of how this responsibility binds the subject into a hostage position regarding the Other, Paul Ricoeur repairs the working value of Levinas’ ethics by loosening the face-to-face obligation of the Other into one of reconnaissance, or thankful recognition. Without losing the face-to-face dynamic, the expression of reconnaissance is then investigated through J. L. Austin’s theory of performatives where gratitude is expressed as a speech act, or with the help of Judith Butler, where performativity is an activity expressing a reconnaissance between people over time. Three examples are given at the end.


2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (29) ◽  
pp. 137-157
Author(s):  
Editha Soebagiyo

This article contains the most fundamental text of Emmanuel Levinas. His unique contribution is his argument that the morality is not a branch of philosophy, but first philosophy (TI 304). His starting point is the actual concrete encounter, with the “face” of the other, that underlies our sense of self and identity, and this, in turn is the beginning of Levinas’ understanding of what Philosophy is. Philosophy begins with the other and ethics is undertood as a relation of infinite responsibility to the other person. By this, he means that when we face someone, before we decide to respond others (to wish someone “great day”, to give or not to give money to a beggar), we are already put into a relationship with them. This is the reason why he calls that relationship ‘the original relation’. This unconditional responsibility is not something we take on or a rule by which we agree to be bound, it exists before us and we are ‘thrown’ into inexhaustible responsibility for them without any choice.  Although his big idea is not adequate for the solution of all our ethical problems, we find the strength of Levinas’ position in reminding us to the nature of ethical demand, which must be presupposed at the basis of all moral theories.


Problemos ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 84 ◽  
pp. 138-152
Author(s):  
Irina Poleshchuk

The paper discusses a formation of the ethical body in Levinas’ philosophy. The central question is how different modalities of subjectivity, brought into light in face-to-face relation with the other, constitute a particular ethical and sensible embodiment. The main topics of the paper are caress, touch, and pain, and their role in constructing ethical embodiment. The focus is given to such existential modalities as being-in-one’s-own-skin, the-one-for-the-other and having-the-other-under-one’s-own-skin. The conceptual work of maternity and the feminine in the face-to-face situation accentuate a meaning of responsive and responsible sensibility which Levinas reveals in his major works Otherwise than Being or Beyond the Essence and Totality and Infinity. Keywords: Emmanuel Levinas, sensibility, embodiment, flesh, face, the other, skin, caress, touch, pain, maternity, feminineAtveriant kūną kitam: leviniškoji motinystės ir moteriškumo interpretacijaIrina Poleshchuk SantraukaStraipsnyje analizuojamas etinis kūnas Levino filosofijoje. Pagrindinis klausimas – kaip skirtingi subjektyvybės modalumai, išnirę į šviesą betarpiškoje akistatoje su Kitu, įsteigia konkretų etinį ir juslinį įkūnytumą. Pagrindinės straipsnio temos yra glamonė, lietimas ir skausmas bei jų vaidmuo kuriant etinį įsikūnijimą. Dėmesys skiriamas tokiems egzistenciniams modalumams kaip „buvimas savo paties odoje“, „vienas kitam“, „kito buvimas po mano oda“. Motinystės ir moteriškumo konceptualinis veikimas akistatos situacijoje išryškina reikšmę atsakančio ir atsakingo juslumo, kurį Levinas atskleidžia savo pagrindiniuose darbuose „Kitaip negu būtis, arba anapus esmės“ ir „Totalybė ir begalybė“.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: Emmanuel Levinas, juslumas, įkūnytumas, kūnas, veidas, kitas, oda, glamonė, lietimas, skausmas, motinystė, moteriškumas.


2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 143
Author(s):  
Hizkia Fredo Valerian

<p>This article presents a philosophical reflection on the story of Hotel Rwanda’s film from the Ethic’s perspective of Emmanuel Levinas. Hotel Rwanda’s Film tells a story about the conflict between two of Rwanda’s native tribes, Hutu and Tutsi, that highlighting violence and genocide as the impact of the racial discrimination paradigm. By analyzing some events that were pictures from the film, I saw that two interesting ideas to reflect by Levinas’ Ethic perspective. First, about the dangerous tendency of totality by stigmatizing other people by ideas. And the second is the philosophical idea regards to the meaning of encountering the face of the other, as the basis of responsibility to the other man. In that way, Hotel Rwanda’s film can be presenting a relevant illustration for some core on Levinas’ thought that focusing on the ethical problem concerning justice and humanity</p><p>Keywords: Hutu, Tutsi, Genocide, The Face, <em>The other, </em>Ethics.</p>


Dialogue ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 769-791
Author(s):  
BERIL İDEMEN SÖZMEN

Animals in Emmanuel Levinas’ ethics can neither respond to the ethical demand, nor can they be the Other from whom the demand emanates. Levinas’ characterisation of the Other as human seems to be incompatible with his description of the Other as infinitely transcendent and of the face as refusing to be contained. A corrective can be found in Martin Buber’s two-dimensional account of the encounter. Buber widens the scope of entities with which morally demanding encounters are possible. Complementing the Levinasian account of the encounter with Buber’s provides a way of recognising non-human animals as the Other in the moral encounter.


Trictrac ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Petru Adrian Danciu

Starting from the cry of the seraphim in Isaiahʹ s prophecy, this article aims to follow the rhythm of the sacred harmony, transcending the symbols of the angelic world and of the divine names, to get to the face to face meeting between man and God, just as the seraphim, reflecting their existence, stand face to face. The finality of the sacred harmony is that, during the search for God inside the human being, He reveals Himself, which is the reason for the affirmation of “I Am that I Am.” Through its hypnotic cyclicality, the profane temporality has its own musicality. Its purpose is to incubate the unsuspected potencies of the beings “caught” in the material world. Due to the fact that it belongs to the aeonic time, the divine music will exceed in harmony the mechanical musicality of profane time, dilating and temporarily cancelling it. Isaiah is witness to such revelation offering access to the heavenly concert. He is witness to divine harmonies produced by two divine singers, whose musical history is presented in our article. The seraphim accompanied the chosen people after their exodus from Egypt. The cultic use of the trumpet is related to the characteristics and behaviour of the seraphim. The seraphic music does not belong to the Creator, but its lyrics speak about the presence of the Creator in two realities, a spiritual and a material one. Only the transcendence of the divine names that are sung/cried affirms a unique reality: God. The chant-cry is a divine invocation with a double aim. On the one hand, the angels and the people affirm God’s presence and call His name and, on the other, the Creator affirms His presence through the angels or in man, the one who is His image and His likeness. The divine music does not only create, it is also a means of communion, implementing the relation of man to God and, thus, God’s connection with man. It is a relation in which both filiation and paternity disappear inside the harmony of the mutual recognition produced by music, a reality much older than Adam’s language.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abimael Francisco do Nascimento

The general objective of this study is to analyze the postulate of the ethics of otherness as the first philosophy, presented by Emmanuel Levinas. It is a proposal that runs through Levinas' thinking from his theoretical foundations, to his philosophical criticism. Levinas' thought presents itself as a new thought, as a critique of ontology and transcendental philosophy. For him, the concern with knowledge and with being made the other to be forgotten, placing the other in totality. Levinas proposes the ethics of otherness as sensitivity to the other. The subject says here I am, making myself responsible for the other in an infinite way, in a transcendence without return to myself, becoming hostage to the other, as an irrefutable responsibility. The idea of the infinite, present in the face of the other, points to a responsibility whoever more assumes himself, the more one is responsible, until the substitution by other.


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