Trilemma and tripartition: The regulatory paradigms of cross-border personal data transfer in the EU, the U.S. and China

2021 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
pp. 105610
Author(s):  
Guan Zheng
2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Patzak ◽  
Mark C. Hilgard ◽  
Tim Wybitul

AbstractEuropean Companies involved in U.S. litigation proceedings are often subject to disclosure requests by the opponent party. In such case they are forced to disclose personal data which are protected by European privacy laws. As European privacy laws do not contain any explicit regulations, this article gives practical guidance how to comply with disclosure requests on the one hand and with the national privacy laws on the other hand.


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (102) ◽  
pp. 305
Author(s):  
Rosario Serra Cristóbal

Resumen:La gestión coordinada de las fronteras y el funcionamiento eficaz de los sistemas de tratamiento de datos de circulación de personas pueden servir como mecanismo de alerta temprana frente al riesgo de ataques terroristas. Puede fortalecer la capacidad colectiva de los Estados para detectar, prevenir y combatir el terrorismo al facilitar el intercambio oportuno de información, permitiendo así adoptar de forma responsable decisiones cruciales.Este trabajo analiza los concretos instrumentos de gestión de datos en fronteras que pueden ser útiles en la lucha antiterrorista, porque el primer paso en inteligencia reside en la obtención de información, que luego será analizada y tratada para convertir esa información en conocimiento. Como tendremos oportunidad de comprobar, muchas de las bases de datos en fronteras se crearon para controlar la entrada de inmigrantes en las fronteras europeas, pero la información que ofrecen dichos sistemas puede servir también para luchar contra ese reto que nos amenaza, el del terrorismo yihadista. No obstante, este trabajo subraya que se trata de fenómenos distintos.Es cierto que la nueva oleada de ataques yihadistas ha coincidido, en el mismo espacio temporal, con la mayor crisis migratoria a la que se ha tenido que enfrentar Europa debido a crisis humanitarias y posteriormente a la guerra de Siria u otros conflictos. Pero, no son lo mismo. El terrorismo yihadista y la inmigración poco o nada tienen que ver, por mucho que se hayan querido vincular o se hayan pretendido justificar determinadas políticas contra la inmigración como algo necesario para luchar contra el terrorismo yihadista, con el fácil argumento de que frenando la inmigración se evita la entrada de potenciales terroristas en Europa.El trabajo advierte del riesgo de que la lucha contra el terrorismo sea utilizada para reforzar los controles de personas en las fronteras con el verdadero objetivo de frenar los flujos migratorios. Al tiempo, subraya la necesidad de que en dichos controles se sigan directrices y prácticas claras y se respeten plenamente las obligaciones que los Estados tienen de conformidad con el Derecho internacional, tal como ha recordado el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos y el Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea. De hecho, no son pocos los casos en los que estos Tribunales han subrayado la relevancia indubitada de principios como la reserva de ley, la necesidad o la proporcionalidad como sustrato de la licitud de muchas medidas que incluyen el tratamiento de datos personales.Summary:1. Jihadist terrorism as a cross-border phenomenon. 2. The benefit of data exchange on crossing-borders in the Schengen area. 3. New guidelines on data processing and the safeguard of national security. 4. The register of passengers (The Personal Name Record or PNR). 5. When the data cross the external borders. The exchange of data with third countries. 5.1. The failed PNR Agreement with Canada and the EU Court of Justice’s standards regarding the transfer of passengers’ data. 5.2. The exchange of data with the United States. The EU-US Umbrella Agreement and the Privacy Shield. 6. The use of profiles and blacklists of alleged terrorists in cross-bording. 7. ConclusionsAbstract:EU Coordinated border management and effective functioning of data processing systems related to the movement of persons may serve as an early warning mechanism against the risk of terrorist attacks. It can strengthen the collective capacity of States to detect, prevent and combat terrorism by facilitating the timely exchange of information, thereby enabling crucial decisions to be adopted in a responsible manner.This paper analyzes the concrete border data management tools that can be useful in the fight against terrorism. The first step in intelligence lies in obtaining information, which will then be analyzed and treated to turn that information into useful knowledge. As we will have an opportunity to verify, numerous border databases were created to control the entry of immigrants into European borders, but the information offered by these systems can also serve to fight against this challenge that threatens us, that of jihadist terrorism.Nevertheless, we emphasize that terrorism and immigration are different phenomena. The truth is that the new wave of Jihadist attacks took place along the largest migratory crisis that Europe faced due to different humanitarian crises and to the war in Syria and other conflicts. But they represent different realities. Jihadist terrorism and immigration have little or nothing in common. In spite of this, many wish to link both with a view to justify certain anti-immigration policies as necessary actions for coping with Jihadist terrorism. This has been done based on a simple narrative: holding back immigration prevents the entry of potential terrorists in Europe.This paper shows that the risk that the fight against terrorism will be used as a basis to reinforce people controls at the borders, while the true objective of these measures is to curb migratory flows. At the same time, it underlines the need for clear guidelines and practices to be followed when implementing such controls. It also vindicates the need for States to observe their obligations laid down by international law, as recalled by the European Court of Human Rights and the EU Court of the Justice. In fact, in many cases, these jurisdictions highlighted the undoubted relevance of the statutory reserve principle, the principle of necessity or the principle of proportionality, as legal basis for the adoption of measures that include personal data processing.


2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nelson Villoria ◽  
Rachael Garrett ◽  
Florian Gollnow ◽  
Kimberly Carlson

Abstract Supply chain policies that leverage the upstream market power of trading companies and importing countries offer great promise to address forest clearing1,2 in regions of rapid commodity expansion but weak forest governance3,4. Yet leakage—when deforestation is not eliminated but instead pushed to other regions—is a potentially major but unquantified factor that could dilute the global effectiveness of regionally successful supply chain policies5,6. We find substantial domestic leakage rates (43-50%) induced by zero deforestation policy implementation in Brazil’s soy sector, but insignificant cross-border leakage (<3%) due to the interdependence of soy production in the U.S. and Brazil. Currently implemented zero-deforestation policies in the Brazilian soy sector offset 0.9% of global and 4% of Brazilian deforestation from 2011-2016. However, completely eliminating deforestation from the supply chains of all firms exporting soy to the EU or China over the same period could have reduced global deforestation by 2% and Brazilian deforestation by 9%. If major tropical commodity importers adopt policies that require traders to eliminate deforestation from their supply chains, as currently proposed in the EU, it could help bend the curve on global forest loss.


Author(s):  
Smijter Eddy De ◽  
Gasparon Philipp ◽  
Berghe Pascal

This chapter studies the cooperation between the European Commission and competition authorities and courts outside the EU, at both bilateral and multilateral level, and highlights the importance of that cooperation in the context of proliferation of competition regimes and the continual increase in cross-border business activities. In more than half of its enforcement activities, the Commission cooperates with one or more foreign jurisdictions, obviously with varying degrees of intensity. The bulk of this international cooperation, in the fields of both merger control and anticompetitive practices, is with the U.S. and the Canadian competition authorities. The chapter then sets out the legal framework for international cooperation and explains the principles determining the Commission’s jurisdiction in cases having an international dimension. It also considers cooperation in antitrust enforcement, with particular attention given to the exchange of information and disclosure of evidence.


2008 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 1-44
Author(s):  
Johanna G. Tan

AbstractThe dialogue on data protection has so far been dominated by European and American voices. There are currently a few international conventions in place such as the Council of Europe's 1981 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Automatic processing of personal data, the 1980 OECD Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data , which apply to 30 OECD countries, and the EU Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data, which binds EU member states but has had some impact on non-European countries due to the restriction on cross border flow of information.This has changed with the emergence of the APEC Privacy Framework in 2004 which focuses on the importance of the free flow of information in the digital age. Does the APEC Privacy Framework have anything of value to add or does it dilute the standards already in place? This article will examine these questions and argue that perhaps the APEC Privacy Framework is the first step towards a truly global standard for data protection.


Cyber Crime ◽  
2013 ◽  
pp. 832-850
Author(s):  
Grigore-Octav Stan ◽  
Georgiana Ghitu

This chapter outlines the Romanian data protection legal regime governing the cross-border transfers of personal data, both to countries located in the European Union (EU) or in the European Economic Area (EEA), as well as to non-EU or non-EEA countries. In addressing the Romanian legal requirements related to international transfers of personal data, a high level insight into the background of Romanian data protection principles and main rules applicable in the broader context of privacy proves useful. Although this chapter analyzes mainly the Romanian legal regime of data protection, with a special emphasis on cross-border transfer of personal data, a similar interpretation and application of the data protection related requirements may also be encountered in other European jurisdictions. While expounding primarily on data transfer related matters, this chapter also looks at how the EU Data Protection Directive (Directive No. 95/46 EC), as well as the relevant secondary legislation in the field of data protection, has been implemented into Romanian law.


2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 700-722 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrycja DĄBROWSKA-KŁOSIŃSKA

AbstractThe article tackles the issue of personal data protection in case of tracing (looking for) individual persons who have been exposed to health risks pursuant to the EU Decision 1082/2013 on Serious, Cross-border Health Threats. This problem exemplifies just one among many challenges of the health-security nexus in the EU. That is, it regards a certain trade-off between the limitation of individual rights and securing populations’ safety. The text appraises the safeguards for the (lawful) limitation of the right to data protection after an in-depth examination of the provisions of the Health Threats Decision, its implementing measures, the reports on its operation, and in light of the general EU data protection laws. In conclusion, it claims that a number of improvements are needed because of the incompleteness, and the insufficient coherence and transparency of the EU regime for health threats. The established shortcomings are, at least in part, caused by the new EU “integrated approach” to health and security. In effect, an overall philosophy of reforms of public health policy in the name of “all-hazards security” applied in the Health Threats Decision can result in a reduction of the adequate level of protection of individuals’ personal data.


Author(s):  
A. A. Koval ◽  
A. D. Levashenko

The export of services is not related to the physical movement of goods across the border but is directly dependent on the cross-border movement of data. Cross-border data flows play a vital role in the cross-border provision of digital services. The international community pays particular attention to issues regarding the application of data localization policies. Indeed, this requirement significantly affects global trade in services. The data localization policy provides, according to the WTO, limiting the ability of companies to transfer data about internal users to foreign countries. Developing countries (Russia, China, etc.) involve the application of the localization requirement, i.e., first records in the country, personal data of citizens, while the EU and the US consider the total need of data localization as a barrier to international trade. The article assesses the impact of data regulation requirements on the export and import of digital services.


2017 ◽  
Vol 107 ◽  
pp. 53-81
Author(s):  
Patrycja Dąbrowska-Kłosińska

APPLYING THE RULES ON CROSS-BORDER THREATS TO HEALTH AND THE PROTECTION OF PERSONAL DATA IN THE EUThe paper concerns a possible conflict between the scope of data protection of individuals, including their medical data, and the necessity of preparing and reacting to serious cross-border health threats at the EU level, for example, to pandemics. The case-study of Mr Andrew Speaker, who was ordered not to leave the US by the US Centre for Disease Prevention and Control because of his TB infection, but was travelling through Europe in 2007, provides an illustration to problematic legal issues. The text presents EU regulatory tools which aim at preventing the spread of infectious diseases and other serious cross-border health threats as provided by Decision 1082/2013 and the relevant provisions ensuring data protection of individuals in this context. The objective of the extensive normative analysis of the current regulatory framework is an attempt at assessment whether the current system of EU rules can offer an effective protection of personal data when the provisions on pandemics’ prevention are applied.


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