scholarly journals You get what you deserve! Reactance, greed and altruism in the dictator game with offer suggestions by the receiver

2022 ◽  
Vol 185 ◽  
pp. 111271
Author(s):  
Johannes Rodrigues ◽  
Linda Caporale ◽  
Isabel Euen ◽  
Simeon Schäfer ◽  
Britta Schneider ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco Margoni ◽  
Elena Nava ◽  
Luca Surian

Most cooperative interactions involve the expectation of mutual reciprocation and are based on interpersonal trust. Thus, understanding when and how humans acquire interpersonal trust can help unveiling the origins and development of children’s cooperative behavior. Here, we investigated whether prior socio-moral information about trading partners modulates the choice of preschool- (4-5 years) and school-age children (7-8 years) to share their own goods in a child-friendly version of the Trust Game. In this game, the trustee partner can repay the child’s initial investment or keep everything and betray the trustor. In two studies, we addressed whether trust is modulated by trustees exhibiting prosocial versus antisocial behaviors (Study 1, ‘helpers and hinderers’), or respect-based versus fear-based power (Study 2, ‘leaders and bullies’). Preschoolers trusted the leader more than the bully, and trusted the hinderer less than a neutral agent, but did not yet trust the helper more than the hinderer. The tendency to trust helpers more than hinderers increased with age as a result of the increased propensity to trust the prosocial agent. In Study 3, a group of preschoolers played the Dictator Game, a measure of pure generosity, with the same agents used for Study 1. Sharing rates were reliably lower than in Study 1, suggesting that the rates of investment in the trust game cannot be due solely to altruistic or indirect reciprocity motives. Overall, these findings indicate that, by age five, children understand complex cooperative exchanges and start relying on socio-moral information when deciding whom to trust.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Santiago Alonso Diaz ◽  
Nicolás Enrique Arévalo Jaimes ◽  
Sebastian Balcucho ◽  
Daniel Duque ◽  
Tatiana García ◽  
...  

Exposure to violence has lasting effects on economic behavior years after it has ended. Previous literature has proved that there is an increase in altruism, impatience, and risk-seeking. However, it is unknown if regular citizens, not directly involved in the conflict, perceive such economic behavior in post-conflict actors. We asked participants to report, relative to them, how Colombia's post-conflict actors (ex-guerrillas, ex-paramilitaries, and victims) behave in different economic games (dictator game, lotteries, and intertemporal discounting). Our sample of university students believes that victims are less altruistic than current evidence with real victims, not particularly risky, and impatient. Also, that former combatants are risk-seeking, impatient, and altruistic towards victims. These beliefs about post-conflict actors' economic behavior do not consistently coincide with behavioral changes found in actual actors involved in violence and could guide reintegration policies.


Author(s):  
Minha Lee ◽  
Gale Lucas ◽  
Jonathan Gratch

AbstractRecent research shows that how we respond to other social actors depends on what sort of mind we ascribe to them. In a comparative manner, we observed how perceived minds of agents shape people’s behavior in the dictator game, ultimatum game, and negotiation against artificial agents. To do so, we varied agents’ minds on two dimensions of the mind perception theory: agency (cognitive aptitude) and patiency (affective aptitude) via descriptions and dialogs. In our first study, agents with emotional capacity garnered more allocations in the dictator game, but in the ultimatum game, agents’ described agency and affective capacity, both led to greater offers. In the second study on negotiation, agents ascribed with low-agency traits earned more points than those with high-agency traits, though the negotiation tactic was the same for all agents. Although patiency did not impact game points, participants sent more happy and surprise emojis and emotionally valenced messages to agents that demonstrated emotional capacity during negotiations. Further, our exploratory analyses indicate that people related only to agents with perceived affective aptitude across all games. Both perceived agency and affective capacity contributed to moral standing after dictator and ultimatum games. But after negotiations, only agents with perceived affective capacity were granted moral standing. Manipulating mind dimensions of machines has differing effects on how people react to them in dictator and ultimatum games, compared to a more complex economic exchange like negotiation. We discuss these results, which show that agents are perceived not only as social actors, but as intentional actors through negotiations, in contrast with simple economic games.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (7) ◽  
pp. 863
Author(s):  
Michael Schaefer ◽  
Anja Kühnel ◽  
Franziska Rumpel ◽  
Matti Gärtner

Do empathic individuals behave more prosocially? When we think of highly empathic individuals, we tend to assume that it is likely that those people will also help others. Most theories on empathy reflect this common understanding and claim that the personality trait empathy includes the willingness to help others, but it remains a matter of debate whether empathic individuals really help more. In economics, a prominent demonstration that our behavior is not always based on pure self-interest is the Dictator Game, which measures prosocial decisions in an allocation task. This economic game shows that we are willing to give money to strangers we do not know anything about. The present study aimed to test the relationship between dispositional empathy and prosocial acting by examining the neural underpinnings of prosocial behavior in the Dictator Game. Forty-one participants played different rounds of the Dictator Game while being scanned with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Brain activation in the right temporoparietal junction area was associated with prosocial acting (number of prosocial decisions) and associated with empathic concern. Behavioral results demonstrated that empathic concern and personal distress predicted the number of prosocial decisions, but in a negative way. Correlations with the amount of money spent did not show any significant relationships. We discuss the results in terms of group-specific effects of affective empathy. Our results shed further light on the complex behavioral and neural mechanisms driving altruistic choices.


2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (8) ◽  
pp. 847-857 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kun Zhao ◽  
Eamonn Ferguson ◽  
Luke D. Smillie

Growing evidence has highlighted the importance of social norms in promoting prosocial behaviors in economic games. Specifically, individual differences in norm adherence—captured by the politeness aspect of Big Five agreeableness—have been found to predict fair allocations of wealth to one’s partner in the dictator game. Yet, most studies have used neutrally framed paradigms, where players may default to norms of equality in the absence of contextual cues. In this study ( N = 707), we examined prosocial personality traits and dictator allocations under salient real-world norms of equity and need. Extending on the previous research, we found that—in addition to politeness—the compassion aspect of agreeableness predicted greater allocations of wealth when they were embedded in real-world norms. These results represent an important step in understanding the real-world implications of laboratory-based research, demonstrating the importance of both normative context and prosocial traits.


2015 ◽  
Vol 18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leonardo Rodrigues Sampaio ◽  
Michelle Franca Dourado Neto Pires

AbstractThe goal of the present study was to examine the influence of social context in young children’s sharing behavior. Sixty-three children, aged between 3 and 8 years, participated in a dictator game in which they were requested to distribute stickers between themselves and an anonymous child. Results showed that the quantities the participants expected to receive were greater than those which were distributed to the others, t(63) = –6, 28, p < .01. Moreover, older participants shared more stickers when they were being observed than when they allocated stickers alone (p = .001, ηp2 = .30). It is believed that increasing age leads to a greater respect for the societal rule of equity. These results are discussed in light of previous studies on sharing behavior during childhood.


2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 761-787 ◽  
Author(s):  
John F. McCauley

AbstractInformal institutions continue to govern political exchange in Africa, but the traditional, ethnic-based form of “big man rule” is now threatened by an alternative informal institution — charismatic Pentecostalism. This study evaluates the status of Pentecostalism empirically, in a micro-level experiment in Ghana. Using data from a variant of the dictator game, in which participants divide a resource endowment with randomly assigned partners as well as cultural leaders, the study provides evidence of Pentecostal exclusivity, excessive allegiance to leaders, and a shift away from ethnic-based patronage to Pentecostal patronage. As Pentecostalism continues to expand, these findings suggest a modification in the exchange of resources for loyalty in Africa, and grounds for viewing the movement as a new form of big man rule in the region.


2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
William H.B. McAuliffe ◽  
Daniel E. Forster ◽  
Eric J. Pedersen ◽  
Michael E. McCullough

The Dictator Game, a face valid measure of altruism, and the Trust Game, a face valid measure of trust and trustworthiness, are among the most widely used behavioural measures in human cooperation research. Researchers have observed considerable covariation among these and other economic games, leading them to assert that there exists a general human propensity to cooperate that varies in strength across individuals and manifests itself across a variety of social settings. To formalize this hypothesis, we created an S–1 bifactor model using 276 participants’ Dictator Game and Trust Game decisions. The general factor had significant, moderate associations with self–reported and peer–reported altruism, trust, and trustworthiness. Thus, the positive covariation among economic games is not reducible to the games’ shared situational features. Two hundred participants returned for a second session. The general factor based on Dictator Game and Trust Game decisions from this session did not significantly predict self–reported and peer–reported cooperation, suggesting that experience with economic games causes them to measure different traits from those that are reflected in self–assessments and peer–assessments of cooperativeness. © 2018 European Association of Personality Psychology


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