Two variants of the Russian radical right: Imperial and social nationalism

2009 ◽  
Vol 42 (4) ◽  
pp. 505-526 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timm Beichelt

The text combines three lines of discussion. First, on the empirical level two Russian political parties e the CPRF and the LDPR e are characterized with regard to their specific profiles of right-wing radicalism. Second, these profiles are attributed to specific variations of the interpretation of the Russian past. Third, the empirical findings are traced for insights into the Leninist legacy concept. The main hypothesis on the empirical level is that Russian ultranationalist actors refer to different currents of a common national imagination in order to combine nationalist ideological elements with other programmatic features. On the conceptual level, the legacy concept is able to render systematic insights not into the history of a given state but into varying interpretations of what can be seen as ‘usable pasts’ from the perspective of various intellectual entrepreneurs.

Author(s):  
Elisabeth Ivarsflaten ◽  
Scott Blinder ◽  
Lise Bjånesøy

The “populist radical right” is a contested concept in scholarly work for good reason. This chapter begins by explaining that the political parties usually grouped together under this label are not a party family in a conventional sense and do not self-identify with this category. It goes on to show how political science scholarship has established that in Europe during the past thirty or so years we have seen the rise of a set of parties that share a common ideological feature—nativism. The nativist political parties experiencing most electoral support have combined their nativist agenda with some other legitimate ideological companion, which provides deniability—a shield against charges that the nativist agenda makes the parties and their supporters right-wing extremist and undemocratic. The chapter goes on to explain that in order to make progress on our understanding of how and why the populist radical right persuades citizens, we need to recognize: first, that nativism is the only necessary ingredient without which the populist radical right loses its force; and second, that nativism in contemporary established democracies has tended not to persuade a large share of voters without an ideological companion.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason Blazakis ◽  
Colin Clarke

The global far right is extremely broad in nature and far from monolithic. While the “far right” is often used as an umbrella term, using the term runs the risk of over-simplifying the differences and linkages between white supremacist, anti-immigration, nativist, and other motivating ideologies. These beliefs and political platforms fall within the far-right rubric, and too often the phrase presents a more unified image of the phenomena than is really the case. In truth, the “far right” and the individual movements that comprise it are fragmented, consisting of a number of groups that lack established leadership and cohesion. Indeed, these movements include chauvinist religious organizations, neo-fascist street gangs, and paramilitary organs of established political parties. Although such movements largely lack the mass appeal of the interwar European radical right-wing extreme, they nevertheless can inspire both premeditated and spontaneous acts of violence against perceived enemies. This report is intended to provide policymakers, practitioners, and the academic community with a roadmap of ongoing shifts in the organizational structures and ideological currents of radical right-wing extremist movements, detailing the difference between distinct, yet often connected and interlaced echelons of the far right. In particular, the report identifies and analyzes various aspects of the broader far right and the assorted grievances it leverages to recruit, which is critical to gaining a more nuanced understanding of the potential future trajectory of these movements.


Author(s):  
Belén Fernández Suárez

This article aims to analyse the gender equality and immigration discourse of VOX. VOX is a member of the European radical right-wing family of political parties that are characterised by the ideological principles of conservatism, nationalism, and nativism. In its analysis of the growth of such forces in Europe, this article focuses on the intersection between the fields of migration studies and gender studies. Qualitative methodology is employed to analyse the official documents and parliamentary speeches of this political party. The results of the analysis obtained show that VOX calls for greater border control and tougher penalties for irregular immigration, which they view as a crime. On gender issues they seek to preserve traditional roles and the division of labour along gender lines, attack feminism as an ideology, and finally, promote natalist policies.


2019 ◽  
pp. 101269021989165
Author(s):  
Gyozo Molnar ◽  
Stuart Whigham

Given the contemporary growth of ‘populist’ political parties and movements in a number of highly developed democratic states in Europe and North America, there has been a resurgence in academic interest around the various causes for the groundswell of support for political populism. Given this broader political context, this paper explores the interconnection between sport and populist politics in Hungary, with a particular emphasis on the appropriation of sport by ‘right-wing’ populist political actors. In particular, this paper will examine the politics–sport interconnection by discussing how the Prime Minister of Hungary, Victor Orbán, uses football, and sport more broadly, and the ways in which the Hungarian government have attempted to reinvent a strong nation and national identity through sport and related political populism. These attempts have been influenced by the interaction between forces of Westernisation and the country’s continuing post-communist transition, with the view to (re)inventing the Hungarian nation.


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 100
Author(s):  
Onvara Vadhanavisala

Radical right-wing politics and ultra-nationalism have always been important issue across Europe's political spectrum. However, the recent flourishing of right-wing and populist parties in Europe in the past couple years were provoked by the European migrants and refugee crisis. The European institutions fail to solve the crisis. We witnessed various terrorist attacks occurred in major cities in Europe such as Paris, Berlin, and Italy etc. This had led not only the European people but all over the world to grow more suspicious of the EU institutions and their capabilities to manage the incident. As a consequence, the radical right-wing nationalist and right-wing political parties in Europe have taken this opportunity to claim and run their campaigns on a strong anti-refugees and immigrants. As a result, right-wing politicians and parties tend to gain more popularity among voters and achieved electoral success in many European countries such as Marine Le Pen in France, Andrej Babiš in Czech Republic, the Freedom Party (FPÖ) in Austria, Viktor Orbán's Fidesz party in Hungary and elsewhere in Europe. These right-wing nationalists and political parties represent themselves as a defender of European Christian values, the protector of Europe, the savior of Christianity. They are working in every way to prevent the land of Europe from Muslims. This kind of rhetoric is spreading across Europe and developed as an anti-refugee/immigrant campaign which can be seen in both online and offline media especially in the case of Hungary. It has signified as a backlash against the political establishment and a wave of discontent. Furthermore, the rise of right-wing politics has created concerns over human rights, national identity, refugee and migrant issues.


2020 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
pp. 197-209
Author(s):  
Astrid Barrio

This paper analyses why Populism has failed to take root in Spain despite a ‘soil’ that has favoured its seeding and growth elsewhere. At first sight, Spain seems to provide the conditions in which Populism can thrive: a deep economic crisis (which began with the financial meltdown in 2008) and a succession of corruption scandals affecting all the main political parties. Even so, Populism has failed to gain a hold in Spain. The traditional Far Right is very weak, and new parties such as Podemos and Ciudadanos cannot be considered Populist. While Vox displays all the features of a radical right-wing party, it is one from which Populism is absent. We argue that the lack of Populism in Spain can mainly be explained by the highly fractured nature of the country’s politics, with left-right and national fault lines shaping how political competition plays out in the nation.


Author(s):  
Herbert Kitschelt

This chapter presents an introduction to different theories of party competition, as exemplified by the substantive puzzle of radical right-wing partisan rise. The first task, however, is to conceptualize radical right party fortunes within the context of competitive party systems. The next three sections discuss the initial rise of radical right parties through three lenses: spatial theories of party competition, institutional and historical mediators of current competitive opportunities for radical right entry, and non-spatial theories of party competition based on valence and issue ownership. This is followed by a report on research about the ongoing strategic interaction between radical right parties and their competitors after the former’s initial rise to electoral prowess. The chapter concludes with several general synthesizing hypotheses about the life cycle of political parties, with the radical right’s rise and possible future demise being a particular application.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (6) ◽  
pp. 1166-1192
Author(s):  
Laura Kwak ◽  

The myth that Canada has resisted the “West’s populist wave” persists despite evidence that demonstrates otherwise. This article traces how the assumption that Canada has avoided the rise of right-wing populism and white nationalism is tethered to the fiction that Canada has been a raceless society. After briefly reviewing the myth of racelessness and the history of right-populism in Canada, the article explores how the Reform Party of Canada conceptualized “the people” in racialized terms. This article examines how the Conservative Party of Canada’s appeals to symbolic “diversity” and denial of systemic oppression have enabled more overt forms of racism. By examining the recent rise of hate crimes, this article makes the case that a direct link can be traced between the Conservative government’s seemingly neutral discourses about the preservation of Canadian “heritage” and “common values” and the re-emergence of right-wing populism and the re-emboldening of white nationalism in Canada. El mito de que Canadá ha resistido la “ola populista de Occidente” perdura a pesar de que se puede demostrar lo contrario. Este artículo expone que la aceptación generalizada de que Canadá ha evitado el auge del populismo de derechas y del nacionalismo blanco está unida a la ficción de que Canadá ha sido una sociedad sin razas. Tras repasar brevemente el mito de la ausencia de razas y la historia del populismo de derechas en Canadá, el artículo explora cómo el Partido Reformista de Canadá conceptualizó “el pueblo” en términos racializados, y examina cómo las apelaciones del Partido Conservador de Canadá a la “diversidad” simbólica y su negación de cualquier opresión sistemática han permitido formas más abiertas de racismo. Al analizar el aumento reciente de crímenes de odio, el artículo argumenta que se puede hallar un nexo directo entre el discurso aparentemente neutral del gobierno conservador sobre la defensa del “patrimonio” y los “valores comunes” de Canadá y el resurgimiento del populismo de derechas y el reforzamiento del nacionalismo blanco en Canadá.


Author(s):  
Matthijs Rooduijn ◽  
Stijn van Kessel

At the conceptual level, populism and Euroskepticism are both closely related and inherently distinct. Notably, populism is a general set of ideas about the functioning of democracy, while Euroskepticism concerns a position toward a more concrete political issue (European integration). When focusing on the political supply side (political parties) as well as the demand side (citizens), populism and Euroskepticism can often be observed in tandem. In practice, many populist parties are Euroskeptic, and many Euroskeptic parties are populist. Euroskepticism and populism can typically be found at the ideological fringes of party systems, in particular among parties with radical left socioeconomic positions on the one hand and radical right sociocultural positions on the other. While little is known about the relationship between populist and Euroskeptic attitudes among citizens, it is clear that such attitudes contribute to support for populist and Euroskeptic parties. Moreover, preliminary analyses indicate that at the level of voters, populist and Euroskeptic attitudes often coincide. Future studies (considering both the supply and the demand sides) should focus in greater depth on how the two concepts are related and how they interact in practice.


2012 ◽  
pp. 47-59
Author(s):  
Massimo Congiu

Fidesz and Jobbik are the most important Hungarian right wing parties. The first one leads actually a government which has such a majority in the Parliament that gives it the opportunity to rule the country without having to face an effective opposition. This situation allowed it to change the pre-existing Constitution with a conservative and nationalist Charter. The second one represents the most extreme aspirations of the Hungarian political right wing and its references are more proletarian and militant than the ones of the Fidesz. Jobbik has actually three eurodeputies and 47 deputies at the Hungarian Parliament. For a better comprehension of the Magyar nationalism it is very useful to consider such crucial moments of the contemporary history of the country as for instance the peace treaties that followed the end of the First World War and imposed to Hungary such severe territorial losses. The treaties have become the subject of a rhetoric which is based upon the historical injustice that Hungary suffered. This aspect is part of the Hungarian collective feeling and it is one of the main topics of the conservative circles and the radical right wing.


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