Transformative Vision of Islamic Jurisprudence and the Pursuit of Common Ground for the Social Good in Pluralist Societies

2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 305-335
Author(s):  
Ezieddin ELMAHJUB

AbstractNotions of the social good including rights, fairness, and economic efficiency influence our choices of law and policymaking. The discussion on social good is normally a heated one in pluralistic societies with multiple worldviews on the right thing to do. This article brings a novel Islamic perspective on the social good in pluralistic societies. In doing so, it makes and defends three propositions: first, religious notions of the social good, including those derived from the Islamic worldview, should not be excluded from public justifications when making moral and policy choices. There is no good reason for plural/secular societies to reject the benefits of religious presence in public discourse given the overwhelming evidence on religious precepts being a mobilizing force to promote co-existence and social cooperation. Second, Islamic notions of social good can contribute to that end. The article criticizes the common perception of Islamic ethics that views Islamic doctrine as a rigid positivist system which imposes inflexible moral codes limiting the influence of independent human intellect and agency. I show that Islamic notions of the social good are dynamic and adaptable to change. The third part of the article shows that the social good in Islamic doctrine has always been defined with reference to essential human needs, including the promotion of life, intellect, social cooperation, and justice. At their core, Islamic notions of the social good exhibit an overarching deontological orientation towards moral choices. They broadly overlap with comparative and influential frameworks on human flourishing, including the ‘Human Development Paradigm’ and the ‘Capabilities Approach’.

1998 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 34-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Sugden

Liberals have often been attracted by contractarian modes of argument— and with good reason. Any system of social organization requires that some constraints be imposed on individuals' freedom of action; it is a central problem for any liberal political theory to show which constraints can be justified, and which cannot. A contractarian justification works by showing that the constraints in question can be understood as if they were the product of an agreement, voluntarily entered into by every member of society. Thus, no one is required to give up his freedom for someone else's benefit, or in the pursuit of someone else's conception of the social good.


2017 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 88-109
Author(s):  
Terrence Reynolds

The late Richard Rorty famously argued that faith-based positions grounded in comprehensive worldviews or unassailable texts served as ‘conversation-stoppers’ and should be excluded from the public sphere. This article argues that Rorty’s position flies in the face of his own postmodern epistemology as well as his insistence on the humility and virtues that should attend the collective pursuit of the social good. It suggests that there are two Rortys at work and that his epistemological ambivalence undermines the force of his argument.


2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 253-268
Author(s):  
Spyridon Stelios ◽  

Professional ethics refer to the rights and obligations of practitioners within any profession or sector. Engineering ethics can be discussed based on the nature of the engineer profession and its implications for professional morality. This paper takes the virtue ethics lens to discuss engineering ethics and argues that, since human and social good derives from professional virtues, protecting the public interest is a professional virtue of engineers. Further, since the protection of the public interest redounds to human and social good, then engineers are bound by the nature of their professional role to achieve these two interconnected aims, namely, protecting the public interest and promoting human good. The importance of virtues is eminent in the way an engineer improves her professional conduct and this has an impact on the social environment and on human good in general. Given an engineer’s concern with the broad public needs of people, the engineer’s function counts as a morally good role, and therefore can be described as one that can lead to human flourishing.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amy Nusbaum ◽  
Toby SantaMaria

The scientific enterprise reflects society at large, and as such it actively disadvantages minority groups. From an ethical perspective, this system is unacceptable as it actively undermines principles of justice and social good, as well as the research principles of openness and public responsibility. Further, minority social scientists lead to better overall scientific products, meaning a diverse scientific body can also be considered an instrumental good. Thus, centering minority voices in science is an ethical imperative. This paper outlines what can be done to actively center these scientists, including changing the way metrics are used to assess the performance of individual scientists and altering the reward structure within academic science to promote heterogenous research groups.


Author(s):  
Mary L. Hirschfeld

There are two ways to answer the question, What can Catholic social thought learn from the social sciences about the common good? A more modern form of Catholic social thought, which primarily thinks of the common good in terms of the equitable distribution of goods like health, education, and opportunity, could benefit from the extensive literature in public policy, economics, and political science, which study the role of institutions and policies in generating desirable social outcomes. A second approach, rooted in pre-Machiavellian Catholic thought, would expand on this modern notion to include concerns about the way the culture shapes our understanding of what genuine human flourishing entails. On that account, the social sciences offer a valuable description of human life; but because they underestimate how human behavior is shaped by institutions, policies, and the discourse of social science itself, their insights need to be treated with caution.


Author(s):  
Samuel Freeman

This chapter argues that distributive justice is institutionally based. Certain cooperative institutions are basic: they are necessary for economic production and the division of labor, trade and exchange, and distribution and consumption. These background institutions presuppose principles of justice to specify their terms, allocate productive resources, and define fair distributions. Primary among these basic institutions are property; laws and conventions enabling transfers of goods and productive resources; and the legal system of contract and agreements that make transfers possible and productive. Political institutions are necessary to specify, interpret, enforce, and make effective the terms of these institutions. Thus, basic cooperative institutions are social; they are realizable only within the context of social and political cooperation—this is a fixed empirical fact about cooperation among free and equal persons. Given the nature of fair social cooperation as a kind of reciprocity, distributive justice is primarily social rather than global in reach.


Author(s):  
Michael Moehler

This book develops a novel multilevel social contract theory that, in contrast to existing theories in the liberal tradition, does not merely assume a restricted form of reasonable moral pluralism, but is tailored to the conditions of deeply morally pluralistic societies that may be populated by liberal moral agents, nonliberal moral agents, and, according to the traditional understanding of morality, nonmoral agents alike. To develop this theory, the book draws on the history of the social contract tradition, especially the work of Hobbes, Hume, Kant, Rawls, and Gauthier, as well as on the work of some of the critics of this tradition, such as Sen and Gaus. The two-level contractarian theory holds that morality in its best contractarian version for the conditions of deeply morally pluralistic societies entails Humean, Hobbesian, and Kantian moral features. The theory defines the minimal behavioral restrictions that are necessary to ensure, compared to violent conflict resolution, mutually beneficial peaceful long-term cooperation in deeply morally pluralistic societies. The theory minimizes the problem of compliance by maximally respecting the interests of all members of society. Despite its ideal nature, the theory is, in principle, applicable to the real world and, for the conditions described, most promising for securing mutually beneficial peaceful long-term cooperation in a world in which a fully just society, due to moral diversity, is unattainable. If Rawls’ intention was to carry the traditional social contract argument to a higher level of abstraction, then the two-level contractarian theory brings it back down to earth.


2021 ◽  
pp. 088832542097764
Author(s):  
Jolanta Arcimowicz ◽  
Mariola Bieńko ◽  
Beata Łaciak

Within sociological literature, including that which analyses systemic changes in the countries of the former Eastern Bloc, denunciation is one of the least studied issues, both empirically and theoretically. In Poland after the political transformation, as well as in other post-communist countries, the problem of dealing with security service and secret police informers and collaborators has not gone away. News media report a rapidly growing number of denunciations directed to various institutions and administrative offices, and legal regulations regarding denunciations have also appeared. In public discourse, denunciation and whistleblowing are increasingly often equated. Encouragement to inform about aberrations, confronted with the consequences that whistleblowers face, shows the legal and social vacuum around the institution of whistleblowing in Poland. This article, in response to questions about the modern social image of denunciation, is based on analysis of in-depth individual interviews conducted during 2015–2017 with children, adults, and administrative officials in three Polish cities. The results show that both children and adults treat denunciation as a form of harming others, though they do differentiate their moral judgments depending on the delator’s intention, but they rarely attribute any motive other than personal gain to whistleblowers’ actions. Finally, the existing administrative acquiescence and institutional support for denunciation are sometimes interpreted in terms of the weakness of democracy, immaturity of civic society, and the legacy of a totalitarian state.


1974 ◽  
Vol 94 ◽  
pp. 114-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. M. Snodgrass

I begin with two modern texts, both as it happens printed on the first page of earlier issues of this journal, and each, I think, expressive of a strong body of opinion in Homeric scholarship, at least in the English-speaking countries, at the time of their writing. First, Miss Dorothea Gray in 1954: ‘Belief in an historical Homeric society dies hard’. Secondly, Professor Adkins in 1971: ‘I find it impossible to believe … that the bards of the oral tradition invented out of their own imaginations a society with institutions, values, beliefs and attitudes all so coherent and mutually appropriate as I believe myself to discern in the Homeric poems. This aspect of the poems is based upon some society's experience’. Miss Gray's prophecy, whether or not one shares the misgivings that it embodied, was thus soundly-based: the seventeen years between these two quotations have indeed witnessed a powerful revival of the belief that the social system portrayed in the Homeric poems, and with it such attendant features as the ethical code and the political structure, are in large measure both unitary and historical. One good reason for the vitality of this belief is the simple fact that it has been alive since Classical times. Another is that it has received support from several influential recent works: if pride of place should be given to M. I. Finley's The World of Odysseus, on whose conclusions Professor Adkins expressely says that he takes his stand, a number of others should be acknowledged also. Whereas Finley located the social system of the Odyssey most probably in the tenth and ninth centuries B.C., A. Andrewes in his book The Greeks extends this type of inference when he argues for an historical origin in the ‘migration period’ of the twelfth and eleventh centuries for the Homeric political system. As influences on the other side, one may mention T. B. L. Webster's work in isolating Mycenaean practices and features, whose divisive effect on the social pattern is apparent; while G. S. Kirk has a significantly entitled chapter in his The Songs of Homer, ‘The cultural and linguistic amalgam’ (my italics). Most recently, the early chapters in the German Archaeologia Homerica have shown a certain tendency to discern a consistent and historical pattern in the allied area of the material and technological practices of the poems. It is true that in one chapter the author is led to conclude that the metallurgical picture of the Iliad is substantially earlier than that of the Odyssey, and that the date of composition of the former poem must accordingly be very much earlier. But this is only because he is pressing the arguments for the ‘historical’ case one step further: the historical consistency of the metallurgical pictures in each of the two poems is, for him, so apparent and so precise that each can and must be given an historical setting, even if the two are separated by a long period.


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