Mobilization of Liberal Strength in the House, 1955–1970: The Democratic Study Group

1974 ◽  
Vol 68 (2) ◽  
pp. 667-681
Author(s):  
Arthur G. Stevens ◽  
Arthur H. Miller ◽  
Thomas E. Mann
Keyword(s):  
Communication Network ◽  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Voting Behavior ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
Study Group ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Longitudinal Patterns ◽  
Policy Goals ◽  
Central Hypothesis ◽  
Democrats And Republicans

In 1959 a number of progressive Democratic congressmen organized the Democratic Study Group (DSG) as a vehicle for countering certain conservative biases then present in the decision-making process in the House of Representatives. This paper presents brief descriptions of the difficulties faced by these congressmen in their efforts to pass more “liberal” legislation and of the organization and activities of the DSG. The analytical focus is on an assessment of DSG success in developing an effective communication network as a means of achieving its policy goals. The central hypothesis is that this communication network has had an impact on the voting behavior of DSG members. Roll-call data from the 84th through the 91st Congress are examined to ascertain whether longitudinal patterns in the voting of DSG members, non-southern non-DSG Democrats, southern Democrats, and Republicans tend to confirm or deny this hypothesis.

scholarly journals Congressional Decision Making and the Separation of Powers

2001 ◽  
Vol 95 (2) ◽  
pp. 361-378 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew D. Martin
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Civil Rights ◽  
Voting Behavior ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Formal Model ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Decision Context ◽  
Policy Goals ◽  
Strategic Model

To what extent does the separation of powers affect congressional roll call voting behavior? To answer this question, I offer a strategic model of congressional decision making that asserts members of Congress pursue public policy goals when casting roll call votes. From the equilibrium predictions of a formal model, I generate testable hypotheses by computing the expected net amount of sophisticated (nonsincere) congressional behavior given changes in decision context. I test the predictions of the theoretical model with data from all civil rights roll call votes from the 83d to the 102d Congress. The results demonstrate that both the other legislative chamber and the Supreme Court profoundly constrain House members and senators when casting roll call votes. This is strong evidence of the importance of policy outcomes to members of Congress when voting on the floor.

Inter-Party Constituency Differences and Congressional Voting Behavior

1963 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lewis A. Froman
Keyword(s):  
Voting Behavior ◽  
National Level ◽  
The United States ◽  
Political Activity ◽  
Social Environments ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Congressional Districts ◽  
Small Areas ◽  
Party Differences ◽  
Democrats And Republicans

Academic studies of roll-call voting in Congress have tended to stress two factors: (1) the substantial degree of party cohesion in Congress on most issues, and (2) the importance of constituency factors in explaining deviations from party votes within parties. These studies indicate that party is the single most important predictor of roll-call behavior, and that constituency factors explain most of the deviation from party votes. No such study, however, describes constituency differences between Democrats and Republicans on the national level—that is, inter-party differences on constituency variables as opposed to intra-party differences. We will attempt, in this study, to demonstrate that differences between Democrats and Republicans are not merely a matter of party label or ideology (few really contend otherwise), but that they are rooted in basic differences in the kinds of constituencies from which Democrats and Republicans come. We will then go on to show that these constituency factors are also important in explaining intra-party differences in voting in Congress, but only by way of supporting the hypothesis that party voting patterns reflect constituency differences.The general theory underlying this analysis posits gross relationships between sociological variables and political behavior, especially in democratic systems which permit relatively wide latitude in political activity. Since shared attitudes about various problems confronting people are often the result of sharing similar environments, and since economic and social environments vary widely in the United States, it is not surprising to find people located in similar environments choosing up sides in similar ways on matters of public policy, and differing with those who do not share the same environment. These effects should be most noticeable in relatively small areas, such as congressional districts.

Legislator Adoption of the Fake News Label: Ideological Differences in Republican Representative Use on Twitter

The Forum ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 389-413
Author(s):  
Mike Cowburn ◽  
Michael T. Oswald
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Empirical Data ◽  
Voting Behavior ◽  
Fake News ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Roll Call Voting ◽  
Ideological Differences ◽  
Twitter Users

Abstract We examine the extent to which Republican members of the House of Representatives have attempted to delegitimize established media by adopting the fake news label on Twitter since Donald Trump’s election. We find that a significant minority of Republican representatives used the fake news label on Twitter. Ideology, measured through roll-call voting behavior (DW-NOMINATE), was the strongest indicator of likely adoption, with conservative representatives using the label at significantly higher rates than comparative moderates. Quantity of tweets sent was a further significant predictor of use, with active Twitter users more disposed to use the label on the platform. District partisanship (PVI) provided no explanatory value beyond ideology, suggesting limited ‘tactical’ use of the label for electoral gain. We discuss potential reasons for these findings and consider consequences for various actors, including Trump. We respond to a call in the literature for more empirical data concerning the use of the fake news label by actors other than President Trump by assessing the extent to which House Republicans have adopted this behavior.

Party Messaging in the U.S. House of Representatives

2021 ◽  
pp. 106591292110297
Author(s):  
Tyler Hughes ◽  
Gregory Koger
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Voting Behavior ◽  
Policy Debate ◽  
Strategic Decisions ◽  
The Public ◽  
Substantive Content ◽  
Legislative Agenda ◽  
The Media ◽  
Party Members ◽  
The U.S

Both Congressional parties compete to promote their own reputations while damaging the opposition party’s brand. This behavior affects both policy-making agendas and the party members’ communications with the media and constituents. While there has been ample study of partisan influence on legislative agenda-setting and roll call voting behavior, much less is known about the parties’ efforts to shape the public debate. This paper analyzes two strategic decisions of parties: the timing of collective efforts to influence the public policy debate and the substantive content of these “party messaging” events. These dynamics are analyzed using a unique dataset of 50,195 one-minute speeches delivered on the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives from 1989 to 2016. We find a pattern of strategic matching—both parties are more likely to engage in concurrent messaging efforts, often on the same issue.

scholarly journals Public Opinion and Public Policy in Advanced Democracies

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Wlezien
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Public Opinion ◽  
Voting Behavior ◽  
Descriptive Representation ◽  
Political Systems ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
The Public ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Government

The representation of public opinion in public policy is of obvious importance in representative democracies. While public opinion is important in all political systems, it is especially true where voters elect politicians; after all, opinion representation is a primary justification for representative democracy. Not surprisingly, a lot of research addresses the connection between the public and the government. Much of the work considers “descriptive representation”—whether the partisan and demographic characteristics of elected politicians match the characteristics of the electorate itself. This descriptive representation is important but may not produce actual “substantive representation” of preferences in policy. Other work examines the positions of policymakers. Some of this research assesses the roll call voting behavior of politicians and institutions. The expressed positions and voting behavior of political actors do relate to policy but are not the same things. Fortunately, a good amount of research analyzes policy. With but a handful of exceptions noted below, this research focuses on expressed preferences of the public, not their “interests.” That is, virtually all scholars let people be the judges of their own interests, and they assess the representation of expressed opinion no matter how contrary to self-interest it may seem.

Congressional Voting on Labor Issues: The Role of PACS

ILR Review ◽  
1987 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory M. Saltzman
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Political Action ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Roll Call Voting ◽  
Congressional Voting ◽  
Action Committee ◽  
Labor Issues ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Significant Direct Effect

This study measures the impact of labor and corporate political action committee (PAC) contributions on the voting of members of the House of Representatives on labor issues during 1979–80. It also analyzes the allocation of labor PAC contributions among House candidates. PAC contributions were found to have a significant direct effect on roll-call voting, even controlling for the Representative's political party and characteristics of the constituency. Since PAC money also affects roll-call voting indirectly (by influencing which party wins elections), the overall impact of PAC money on Congressional voting is probably substantial. The author also finds that labor PACs have focused more on influencing the outcome of elections than on currying favor with powerful members of the House who are likely to be re-elected anyway.

The Stability of Coalitions on Roll Calls in the House of Representatives

1962 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-65 ◽  
Author(s):  
William H. Riker ◽  
Donald Niemi
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Voting Behavior ◽  
The Other ◽  
Considerable Degree ◽  
Congressional Voting ◽  
Rational Explanation ◽  
Stability Of Coalitions ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Do So

In some recent discussions of roll calls in Congress a model of interacting blocs has often been adopted and to a considerable degree verified. This model assumes the existence of several fairly cohesive blocs along with, perhaps, some unattached members. Furthermore, it is assumed that some of these blocs are fairly consistently opposed on roll calls, while others ally now with one side, now with the other. This model is attractive, not only because it accords with the usage of journalists, but also because it seems to provide a rational explanation of what sometimes appears to be the almost random confusion of Congressional voting behavior. As the evidence here presented suggests, however, this model is somewhat too neat and requires modification to account for shifting alliances over (often relatively short periods of) time. In a trial, reasoning from the assumptions of this model, we attempted to pick out those blocs and members who shifted from side to side. We were, however, unable to do so except in a few instances, largely, we believe, because the model as heretofore developed is static.

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