The Stability of Coalitions on Roll Calls in the House of Representatives

1962 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-65 ◽  
Author(s):  
William H. Riker ◽  
Donald Niemi
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Voting Behavior ◽  
The Other ◽  
Considerable Degree ◽  
Congressional Voting ◽  
Rational Explanation ◽  
Stability Of Coalitions ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Do So

In some recent discussions of roll calls in Congress a model of interacting blocs has often been adopted and to a considerable degree verified. This model assumes the existence of several fairly cohesive blocs along with, perhaps, some unattached members. Furthermore, it is assumed that some of these blocs are fairly consistently opposed on roll calls, while others ally now with one side, now with the other. This model is attractive, not only because it accords with the usage of journalists, but also because it seems to provide a rational explanation of what sometimes appears to be the almost random confusion of Congressional voting behavior. As the evidence here presented suggests, however, this model is somewhat too neat and requires modification to account for shifting alliances over (often relatively short periods of) time. In a trial, reasoning from the assumptions of this model, we attempted to pick out those blocs and members who shifted from side to side. We were, however, unable to do so except in a few instances, largely, we believe, because the model as heretofore developed is static.

The State Delegations and the Structure of Party Voting in the United States House of Representatives

1956 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 1023-1045 ◽  
Author(s):  
David B. Truman
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Voting Behavior ◽  
The United States ◽  
The State ◽  
Congressional Voting ◽  
Minor Significance ◽  
Party Voting ◽  
The Individual ◽  
State Delegations

Recent controversies over the degree of responsibility displayed by American parties have underscored at least one feature of voting in the Congress. Whatever the merits of the contending interpretations and demands, the facts adduced on both sides suggest relatively fluid, unstructured voting patterns, especially in the House of Representatives. Although the party label is clearly the single most reliable indicator of congressional voting behavior, it is admittedly somewhat less than perfect. The individual Representative may fairly often dissent from the views of most of his party colleagues, not only on matters of local or minor significance but also on issues of national or even global import.The Representative's “independence” is most commonly, and in a good many instances accurately, ascribed to peculiarities of his constituency which generate demands for a non-conforming vote or, perhaps more frequently, are expected to be the source of recriminations and penalities if he does not display independence of his party colleagues on certain types of issues. But the Member of Congress is by no means always able to predict the electoral consequences of his choices even though he is sure that they may produce repercussions in his district.

Congressional Voting over Legislative Careers: Shifting Positions and Changing Constraints

2000 ◽  
Vol 94 (3) ◽  
pp. 665-676 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Stratmann
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Voting Behavior ◽  
Congressional Voting ◽  
Empirical Results ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
Party Line ◽  
Voting Decisions

The proposed model predicts that voting behavior of legislators is more variable early in their career and that junior members are more likely to vote with their party than senior members. The results from the analysis of voting patterns in the House of Representatives and the Senate are consistent with the hypotheses: Party line voting and variability of voting decisions decline with increasing seniority. Changes in voting behavior are also induced by redistricting. The empirical results show that legislators subject to redistricting change their voting behavior to accord better with altered constituency preferences.

A Research Note on the Impact of Interparty Competition on Congressional Voting in a Competitive Era

1973 ◽  
Vol 67 (1) ◽  
pp. 153-156 ◽  
Author(s):  
David W. Brady
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Voting Behavior ◽  
Predictive Ability ◽  
Party Competition ◽  
Strongly Correlated ◽  
Congressional Voting ◽  
Party Support ◽  
Party Voting ◽  
Modern House ◽  
The Impact

In the modern House of Representatives party competition for seats is not strongly correlated with or predictive of party voting behavior. The most plausible explanation for this weak relationship is that less than 20 per cent of House seats are competitive from one census to the next. In this study the Hasbrouck-Jones Fluidity Index was applied to House elections in the 1890—1900 period, and almost 50 per cent of House seats in this era were found to have been competitive at that time.From the 1892—1900 period the 55th and 56th U.S. Houses were selected for analysis. A varimax factor analysis was run on the party votes in these Congresses, and the resultant factor scores formed a unidimensional measure of the number of times a member voted with a party majority. A multiple regression analysis was run, with these party support scores used as the dependent variable and with party competition and occupational composition of the district used as the independent variables. The results showed that in both houses party competition was strongly correlated with and predictive of party support scores. The same analysis on the 89th House yielded much weaker correlations and showed little predictive ability.

Uniformity of Magnification from Different Electron Microscopes

1967 ◽  
Vol 25 ◽  
pp. 32-33
Author(s):  
Godfrey C. Hoskins ◽  
V. Williams ◽  
V. Allison
Keyword(s):  
Diffraction Grating ◽  
The Other ◽  
Carbon Replica ◽  
Electron Microscopes ◽  
The Stability

The method demonstrated is an adaptation of a proven procedure for accurately determining the magnification of light photomicrographs. Because of the stability of modern electrical lenses, the method is shown to be directly applicable for providing precise reproducibility of magnification in various models of electron microscopes.A readily recognizable area of a carbon replica of a crossed-line diffraction grating is used as a standard. The same area of the standard was photographed in Phillips EM 200, Hitachi HU-11B2, and RCA EMU 3F electron microscopes at taps representative of the range of magnification of each. Negatives from one microscope were selected as guides and printed at convenient magnifications; then negatives from each of the other microscopes were projected to register with these prints. By deferring measurement to the print rather than comparing negatives, correspondence of magnification of the specimen in the three microscopes could be brought to within 2%.

Challenging Gender Hierarchies in Narratives of the Nation: Representations of Women in Zintgraff and the Battle of Mankon and Hard Choice

Imbizo ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Naomi Epongse Nkealah ◽  
Olutoba Gboyega Oluwasuji
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Literary Texts ◽  
Gender Differentiation ◽  
Hard Choice ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Gender Hierarchies ◽  
The Face ◽  
The One ◽  
Representations Of Women ◽  
Do So

Ideas of nationalisms as masculine projects dominate literary texts by African male writers. The texts mirror the ways in which gender differentiation sanctions nationalist discourses and in turn how nationalist discourses reinforce gender hierarchies. This article draws on theoretical insights from the work of Anne McClintock and Elleke Boehmer to analyse two plays: Zintgraff and the Battle of Mankon by Bole Butake and Gilbert Doho and Hard Choice by Sunnie Ododo. The article argues that women are represented in these two plays as having an ambiguous relationship to nationalism. On the one hand, women are seen actively changing the face of politics in their societies, but on the other hand, the means by which they do so reduces them to stereotypes of their gender.

Euthyphro, Apology, and Crito

2019 ◽  
pp. 117-140
Author(s):  
Hugh H. Benson
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Virtuous Life ◽  
The One ◽  
Do So

This chapter presents a reading of Plato’s Euthyphro, Apology, and Crito. These dialogues, in which Plato depicts the weeks leading up to Socrates’s last day, are replete with various philosophical explorations. Among those explorations is the question of how to live our lives. On the one hand, Socrates is clear and straightforward. We should live the examined life—making logoi and examining ourselves and others in order to determine whether we are as wise as we think we are, and we should live the virtuous life. This is how Socrates lives his life. On the other hand, the examined life undercuts, or at least should undercut, the confidence with which he seeks to live the virtuous life. It may help bring some stability to the general principles by which he lives his life, but it can do so only defeasibly and without certainty.

scholarly journals Black Hole Algorithm for Sustainable Design of Counterfort Retaining Walls

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (7) ◽  
pp. 2767 ◽  
Author(s):  
Víctor Yepes ◽  
José V. Martí ◽  
José García
Keyword(s):  
Black Hole ◽  
Sustainable Design ◽  
Retaining Walls ◽  
The Other ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Construction Company ◽  
Geometric Variables ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Black Hole Algorithm

The optimization of the cost and CO 2 emissions in earth-retaining walls is of relevance, since these structures are often used in civil engineering. The optimization of costs is essential for the competitiveness of the construction company, and the optimization of emissions is relevant in the environmental impact of construction. To address the optimization, black hole metaheuristics were used, along with a discretization mechanism based on min–max normalization. The stability of the algorithm was evaluated with respect to the solutions obtained; the steel and concrete values obtained in both optimizations were analyzed. Additionally, the geometric variables of the structure were compared. Finally, the results obtained were compared with another algorithm that solved the problem. The results show that there is a trade-off between the use of steel and concrete. The solutions that minimize CO 2 emissions prefer the use of concrete instead of those that optimize the cost. On the other hand, when comparing the geometric variables, it is seen that most remain similar in both optimizations except for the distance between buttresses. When comparing with another algorithm, the results show a good performance in optimization using the black hole algorithm.

Party Messaging in the U.S. House of Representatives

2021 ◽  
pp. 106591292110297
Author(s):  
Tyler Hughes ◽  
Gregory Koger
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Voting Behavior ◽  
Policy Debate ◽  
Strategic Decisions ◽  
The Public ◽  
Substantive Content ◽  
Legislative Agenda ◽  
The Media ◽  
Party Members ◽  
The U.S

Both Congressional parties compete to promote their own reputations while damaging the opposition party’s brand. This behavior affects both policy-making agendas and the party members’ communications with the media and constituents. While there has been ample study of partisan influence on legislative agenda-setting and roll call voting behavior, much less is known about the parties’ efforts to shape the public debate. This paper analyzes two strategic decisions of parties: the timing of collective efforts to influence the public policy debate and the substantive content of these “party messaging” events. These dynamics are analyzed using a unique dataset of 50,195 one-minute speeches delivered on the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives from 1989 to 2016. We find a pattern of strategic matching—both parties are more likely to engage in concurrent messaging efforts, often on the same issue.

scholarly journals A Fractional SAIDR Model in the Frame of Atangana–Baleanu Derivative

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 32
Author(s):  
Esmehan Uçar ◽  
Sümeyra Uçar ◽  
Fırat Evirgen ◽  
Necati Özdemir
Keyword(s):  
Existence And Uniqueness ◽  
Laplace Transformation ◽  
Cell Phones ◽  
Mobile Network ◽  
The Other ◽  
Banach Fixed Point Theorem ◽  
Propagation Models ◽  
Computer Worms ◽  
Computer Viruses ◽  
The Stability

It is possible to produce mobile phone worms, which are computer viruses with the ability to command the running of cell phones by taking advantage of their flaws, to be transmitted from one device to the other with increasing numbers. In our day, one of the services to gain currency for circulating these malignant worms is SMS. The distinctions of computers from mobile devices render the existing propagation models of computer worms unable to start operating instantaneously in the mobile network, and this is particularly valid for the SMS framework. The susceptible–affected–infectious–suspended–recovered model with a classical derivative (abbreviated as SAIDR) was coined by Xiao et al., (2017) in order to correctly estimate the spread of worms by means of SMS. This study is the first to implement an Atangana–Baleanu (AB) derivative in association with the fractional SAIDR model, depending upon the SAIDR model. The existence and uniqueness of the drinking model solutions together with the stability analysis are shown through the Banach fixed point theorem. The special solution of the model is investigated using the Laplace transformation and then we present a set of numeric graphics by varying the fractional-order θ with the intention of showing the effectiveness of the fractional derivative.

scholarly journals Competing Conventions with Costly Information Acquisition

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 53
Author(s):  
Roberto Rozzi
Keyword(s):  
Information Acquisition ◽  
Evolutionary Model ◽  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
The Other ◽  
Group Interactions ◽  
Social Coordination ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Stochastic Stability Analysis ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Cost

We consider an evolutionary model of social coordination in a 2 × 2 game where two groups of players prefer to coordinate on different actions. Players can pay a cost to learn their opponent’s group: if they pay it, they can condition their actions concerning the groups. We assess the stability of outcomes in the long run using stochastic stability analysis. We find that three elements matter for the equilibrium selection: the group size, the strength of preferences, and the information’s cost. If the cost is too high, players never learn the group of their opponents in the long run. If one group is stronger in preferences for its favorite action than the other, or its size is sufficiently large compared to the other group, every player plays that group’s favorite action. If both groups are strong enough in preferences, or if none of the groups’ sizes is large enough, players play their favorite actions and miscoordinate in inter-group interactions. Lower levels of the cost favor coordination. Indeed, when the cost is low, in inside-group interactions, players always coordinate on their favorite action, while in inter-group interactions, they coordinate on the favorite action of the group that is stronger in preferences or large enough.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document