On Joining Interest Groups: An Empirical Consideration of the Work of Mancur Olson Jr.

1976 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 257-271 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Marsh

The academic literature on interest groups has tended to concentrate on the assessment of the relative influence of these groups in different political systems, and on the implications of the activities of interest groups for democratic ideology. In recent years, however, the work of Mancur Olson has stimulated an increasing interest in the formation of interest groups, and in the reasons why individuals (or corporate bodies) join them. The aim of this article is to examine Olson's analysis in the light of a study of one major British economic interest group, the Confederation of British Industry. In the course of this examination I hope to illustrate some of the weaknesses of Olson's analysis and to suggest how it might be refined and developed.

Author(s):  
Stefanie Walter ◽  
Ari Ray ◽  
Nils Redeker

The politics of adjustment in deficit countries were characterized by strong domestic discontent, leading to significant political upheaval. Why did policymakers in these countries nonetheless implement unprecedented austerity and painful structural reforms? Zooming in on the domestic drivers of this adjustment choice, this chapter highlights mechanisms by which internal adjustment grew more politically feasible in deficit countries. The chapter draws on original survey data on the policy preferences of 359 economic interest groups in Ireland, Spain and Greece. It finds that while groups were consistently negative to a full range of scenarios by which external adjustment could be achieved in deficit countries, their preferences toward austerity measures and structural reforms varied much more widely. This variation, it is argued, facilitated the formation of pro-internal adjustment coalitions in deficit country contexts. Moreover, the chapter shows that opportunity costs mattered. While opposed to internal adjustment in absolute terms, a large majority of interest groups in deficit countries grew pliable to the prospect of it when faced with a choice between this and the alternative of abandoning the euro; even if internal adjustment programs were comprised of policies that groups themselves distinctly opposed.


2021 ◽  
pp. 003232172110645
Author(s):  
Juho Vesa ◽  
Anne Skorkjær Binderkrantz

A growing body of studies analyzes interest groups’ media visibility. Yet little is known about how the drivers of media access may vary across different interest group systems. This article focuses on two major mechanisms through which organizations can gain media visibility: media management efforts and the newsworthiness of elite actors. We hypothesize that media effort explains interest groups’ media access more strongly in competitive, pluralist interest group systems and that insider (i.e. “elite”) status does so more strongly in hierarchical, corporatist systems. We analyze surveys and media data on interest groups in the pluralist United Kingdom, the moderately corporatist Denmark, and the more strongly corporatist Finland. As hypothesized, media effort is most effective in the UK and weakest in Finland. However, we find only weak support for the insider status hypothesis: there is some evidence of the expected cross-country differences, but the effects are small and unrobust.


1975 ◽  
Vol 69 (1) ◽  
pp. 68-75 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter M. Leslie

The article examines four themes of Robert J. Lieber's article in the APSR of March 1972: “Interest Groups and Political Integration: British Entry into Europe,” bringing in new evidence from the Norwegian and Danish EEC decisions of 1972. The conclusions are that:—(a) there is conflicting evidence regarding the applicability of functionalist theories of political integration to the geographical expansion of an existing union;(b) the attempt to link theories of interest group activity and theories of political integration is based on a premature if not unwise generalization about decision-making processes within interest organizations;(c) politicization (as Lieber defines it) is inherently neither favorable nor unfavorable to integration; and(d) in discussing political integration, the distinction between “high” politics (Hoffman) and welfare considerations is best abandoned, provided the observer remembers that there are more dimensions to critical decisions than the economic.The article concludes with the suggestion that there are slim prospects for developing a theory of political integration applicable to the creation or extension of a union, and that the appropriate “vocation” for such a theory is to elucidate the workings of political systems which have two or more “levels” of political authorities.


1978 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 375-380 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. R. Shackleton

In a recent article (‘On Joining Interest Groups: An Empirical Consideration of the Works of Mancur Olson Jr.’, this Journal, VI (1976), 257–72), David Marsh has attempted to test Mancur Olson's hypotheses concerning the rationale for individual or corporate membership of interest groups by using data from a study of the Confederation of British Industry. It is the purpose of this Note to defend Professor Olson's broad theoretical approach from some of Dr Marsh's criticisms. Olson applies the insights of established economic analysis to political theory; it is not his methodology which represents an innovation, but rather the use to which it is put. A defence of Olson's approach is, then, of necessity to some extent a more general defence of economic analysis.


2020 ◽  
pp. 172-205
Author(s):  
Stefanie Walter ◽  
Ari Ray ◽  
Nils Redeker

A key characteristic of the Eurozone crisis is that the burden of adjustment was carried almost exclusively by crisis countries. Surplus countries did not contribute to the necessary rebalancing, even though internal adjustment likely would have reduced some of the pressure on deficit states. The chapter argues that surplus countries’ resistance to internal adjustment is rooted in domestic distributive struggles about the design of possible adjustment policies. To explore this argument, original survey data is leveraged from 357 economic interest groups from Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands and qualitative interviews with interest group representatives. The chapter shows that although there is general support for internal adjustment among economic interest groups, they disagree heavily about how exactly to achieve this goal. Together with a broad consensus to avoid a breakup of the Eurozone, the resulting deadlock turned interstate financing—such as bailouts to crisis countries—into a politically attractive strategy. Rather than being rooted only in ordoliberal ideology or export orientation, distributive conflicts thus contributed significantly to surplus countries’ resistance to adjust.


2002 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 115-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Horowitz ◽  
C. Marsh

What explains variation in investment climates across China's provinces and urban autonomous regions? Three main explanations are considered: variation in the character and size of economic interest groups, in central government policies, and in pre-communist provincial identities and traditions. There is statistical and anecdotal support for the interest group and provincial identity factors. On the other hand, there is little evidence that variation in central government policy has had much effect. Future work should refine statistical tests and case studies to better understand the joint influence of interest group pressures and provincial identities.


1993 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 98-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Curtis E. Beus ◽  
Riley E. Dunlap

AbstractControl of agricultural policymaking by the “agricultural establishment” has been challenged by a wide range of interests concerned with the externalities of modern industrialized agriculture. An “externalities/alternatives” or “ex/al” coalition appears to be an emerging force in agricultural policy debates. We surveyed three alternative agriculture groups, three conventional agriculture groups, and a statewide sample of farmers to learn whether each category forms a distinct, unified interest group whose perspectives on agricultural policy diverge substantially from the others'. There is considerable similarity among the alternative agriculture groups and among the conventional agriculture groups, the differences between them being much greater than the differences within each category. The statewide farmer sample is generally intermediate between the two sets of interest groups, but is closer to the conventional perspective on most issues.


1979 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 126-128 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wyn Grant

Following the exchange between Shackleton and Marsh on the work of Olson and its applicability to the case of the Confederation of British Industry, I wish to criticize some of Shackleton's points and develop some of those made by Marsh. I intend to ignore some of Shackleton's criticisms of the methodology Marsh and I employed in our book (for example, our use of semi-structured interviews, a respectable technique in elite interviewing) and instead to concentrate on substantive questions of more general interest.


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