Measuring the Median: The Risks of Inferring Beliefs from Votes

2012 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 157-175 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Warwick ◽  
Maria Zakharova
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Direct Measurement ◽  
Median Voter ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Simulation Experiments ◽  
Voter Opinion ◽  
Democratic Systems ◽  
Ideological Congruence

AbstractA large number of studies of ideological congruence, and of the effect of public opinion on policy outcomes more generally, have relied on the Kim-Fording (KF) measure of median voter opinion. This measure has the great virtue of being readily calculable – no direct measurement of voter opinion is required – but it rests on assumptions concerning party locations and voter behaviour that are unquestionably incorrect, at least some of the time. This article explores the sensitivity of the KF measure to violations of its core assumptions through simulation experiments. It then uses public opinion data to assess the degree to which consequential levels of violation occur in actual democratic systems. The article concludes with a discussion of what the KF median really measures and where it can – and cannot – be safely used.

Public Opinion, Party Politics, and the Welfare State

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johannes Lindvall ◽  
David Rueda
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Welfare State ◽  
Party System ◽  
Median Voter ◽  
Party Politics ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Party Positions ◽  
Long Run ◽  
The 1960S ◽  
The Welfare State

This chapter examines the long-run relationship between public opinion, party politics, and the welfare state. It argues that when large parties receive a clear signal concerning the median voter’s position on the welfare state, vote-seeking motivations dominate and the large parties in the party system converge on the position of the median voter. When the position of the median voter is more difficult to discern, however, policy-seeking motivations dominate, and party positions diverge. This argument implies that the effects of government partisanship on welfare state policy are more ambiguous than generally understood. The countries covered in the chapter are Denmark, France, Germany, Norway and the United Kingdom (going back to the 1960s). The number of observations is (necessarily) limited, but the diverse cases illustrate a common electoral dynamic centered around the position of the median voter.

Voting Equilibria Under Proportional Representation

2014 ◽  
Vol 108 (2) ◽  
pp. 281-296 ◽  
Author(s):  
SEOK-JU CHO
Keyword(s):  
Median Voter ◽  
Critical Role ◽  
Solution Concept ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Main Concern ◽  
Policy Outcome ◽  
Equilibrium Concept ◽  
Number Of Parties ◽  
Robust Equilibrium

This article studies the consequences of strategic voting by outcome-oriented voters in elections under proportional representation (PR). I develop a model of elections under PR, in which voters choose among an arbitrary finite number of parties, and the policy outcome is determined in a postelection bargaining stage. I use a new solution concept, robust equilibrium, which greatly mitigates the well-known problem of indeterminate predictions in multicandidate competition. Applying the equilibrium concept to the model, I find that PR promotes representation of small parties in general, even when voters are strategic. However, the median voter plays a critical role in shaping policy outcomes, which reflects the majoritarian nature of parliamentary policy making rules. Thus, PR may not be incompatible with the majoritarian vision of representative democracy if voters’ main concern is policy outcomes.

Public Opinion and Policy Making in Canada 1994–2001

2004 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 505-529 ◽  
Author(s):  
François Petry ◽  
Matthew Mendelsohn
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Significant Drop ◽  
Majority Opinion ◽  
The Public ◽  
Opinion Publique ◽  
Low Profile ◽  
Jean Chretien ◽  
The Right ◽  
Pour Cent

Abstract. This study examines the consistency between public opinion and public policy during the period 1994–2001 by matching responses to national survey questions on 230 issues with enacted policy proposals on the same issues. Policy outcomes were consistent with majority opinion 49 per cent of the time. This represents a significant drop from 69 per cent during the Mulroney years (1985–1993). Low opinion-policy consistency since 1994 is primarily attributable to divergences between public majorities that are increasingly supportive of a change toward the right and the policies of Jean Chrétien that are more leftist and status quo oriented than those of his predecessor. We argue that these divergences go largely unnoticed by the public because they tend to occur on low-profile issues. On the other hand, the evidence suggests a much tighter correlation between opinion and policy on a small number of high-profile issues of which the public is much more aware, thereby creating the appearance of attentiveness to Canadian public opinion.Résumé. En comparant les décisions sur 230 enjeux de politiques publiques avec les résultats de sondages nationaux sur ces mêmes enjeux, cet article cherche à quantifier le degré d'adéquation entre l'opinion publique et la politique gouvernementale entre 1994 et 2001. Les calculs révèlent que seulement 49 pour cent des décisions du gouvernement de Jean Chrétien sont allées dans le même sens que l'opinion publique, en nette diminution par rapport aux 69 pour cent observés pendant la période Mulroney (1985–1993). La baisse de corrélation depuis 1994 est principalement attribuable à la divergence entre une opinion publique de plus en plus favorable au changement et idéologiquement orientée à droite et la politique du gouvernement de Jean Chrétien sensiblement plus résistante au changement et idéologiquement plus à gauche que celle de son prédécesseur. Le public a tendance à ignorer le manque de corrélation entre l'opinion et les politiques gouvernementales parce que les enjeux en question sont relativement peu importants. Par contre, il semble que la corrélation entre l'opinion et les politiques soit beaucoup plus forte dans un petit nombre d'enjeux importants que le public reconnaît, créant ainsi l'apparence d'un gouvernement attentif aux souhaits de l'opinion publique canadienne.

How Courts Structure State-Level Representation

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan P. Kastellec
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Public Opinion ◽  
Median Voter ◽  
State Level ◽  
The United States ◽  
Federal Courts ◽  
State Courts ◽  
Judicial Decisions ◽  
Structure State ◽  
The Relationship

I examine how courts condition the relationship between state-level public opinion and policy. The system of federalism in the United States allows federal and state courts to establish the types of policies that states are constitutionally allowed to implement. In particular, federal courts can set “federal floors” for policy, below which no states can go. State courts, in turn, can raise the level of this floor. Thus, both federal and state courts shape whether state policy can match the preferences of the median voter in a given state. Analyzing data on public opinion, judicial decisions, and state-level policy on the issue of abortion, from 1973 to 2012, I show that changes in the set of allowable abortion restrictions, according to the combined decisions of state and federal courts, significantly affect whether states implement majority-preferred policies. I also show that ignoring the influence of courts on the policymaking environment significantly affects the estimated level of policy congruence and thus conclusions about the scope of representation. These results demonstrate the importance of placing courts in the larger study of state-level representation.

How Clientelistic Parties Go Programmatic: The Strategic Logic of Responsiveness in a Least Likely Case (the AKP of Turkey)

2020 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 333-356 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alper T. Bulut
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Empirical Research ◽  
Significant Relationship ◽  
Democratic Theory ◽  
Party System ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Program Policy ◽  
Policy Program ◽  
Democratic Systems ◽  
Emerging Democracy

Policymakers in democratic systems are expected to respond to the issue preferences of citizens and fulfill their electoral mandate as this responsiveness is central to democratic theory. Most empirical research on opinion-policy/program-policy linkage found a significant relationship between opinion and policy as well as program and policy. However, these studies have concentrated on a few developed Western countries with programmatic party systems. I focus on an emerging democracy with a highly clientelistic party system, Turkey, and address the following questions: Are policymakers' priorities driven by public opinion? Do parties take into account their electoral mandate in the legislature? To answer these questions, I use a novel dataset of parliamentary activities and public priorities in Turkey. I also offer an alternative method to measure party priorities which proves superior to the currently used measures.

Constituencies and Public Opinion

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Louise Campbell ◽  
Michael W. Sances
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Social Policy ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Group Influence ◽  
The Public ◽  
Target Populations ◽  
Social Provision ◽  
Degree Of Redistribution ◽  
Modest Degree ◽  
Interest Group Influence

Public opinion alone cannot explain the trajectory of American social policy, but it is crucial in explaining the nature of social provision. Although most Americans are not highly knowledgeable about or interested in politics, and although their opinions are often shaped by misinformation, misperception, and framing effects, public opinion can offer broad guidance to politicians. Indeed, American social policy reflects majority preferences in a variety of ways: in the differential generosity of programs for "deserving" and "undeserving" target populations; in the extensive use of hidden and obscured modes of social provision such as tax expenditures; and in the modest degree of redistribution the American welfare state achieves. In addition, attentive and well-resourced members of the public, who receive the largest benefits from the system, have successfully prevented retrenchment attempts. Public opinion typically operates in conjunction with other factors, such as interest group influence or the institutional structure of the American system, to shape social policy outcomes.

Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies

1991 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 479-512 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Risse-Kappen
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Public Opinion ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Public Attitudes ◽  
The United States ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Liberal Democracies ◽  
Policy Making Process ◽  
The Impact

The paper discusses the role of public opinion in the foreign policy-making process of liberal democracies. Contrary to prevailing assumptions, public opinion matters. However, the impact of public opinion is determined not so much by the specific issues involved or by the particular pattern of public attitudes as by the domestic structure and the coalition-building processes among the elites in the respective country. The paper analyzes the public impact on the foreign policy-making process in four liberal democracies with distinct domestic structures: the United States, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Japan. Under the same international conditions and despite similar patterns of public attitudes, variances in foreign policy outcomes nevertheless occur; these have to be explained by differences in political institutions, policy networks, and societal structures. Thus, the four countries responded differently to Soviet policies during the 1980s despite more or less comparable trends in mass public opinion.

Partisan agenda control in the US house: A theoretical exploration

2012 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 555-570 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffery A Jenkins ◽  
Nathan W Monroe
Keyword(s):  
Agenda Setting ◽  
Median Voter ◽  
Voter Model ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Agenda Control ◽  
Majority Party ◽  
Party Government ◽  
The Us ◽  
Median Voter Model ◽  
Party Members

While a number of scholars have focused on the importance of partisan agenda control in the US House, few have examined its uneven consequences within the majority party. In this paper, we explore ‘counterfactual’ utility distributions within the majority party, by comparing policy outcomes under a party-less median voter model to policy outcomes under party-based positive and negative agenda control models. We show that the distribution of policy losses and benefits resulting from agenda control are quite similar for both the positive and negative varieties. In both cases, moderate majority-party members are made worse off by the exercise of partisan agenda control, while those to the extreme side of the majority-party median benefit disproportionately. We also consider the benefit of agenda control for the party as a whole, by looking at the way changes in majority-party homogeneity affect the summed utility across members. Interestingly, we find that when the distance between the floor and majority-party medians decreases, the overall value of positive and negative agenda control diminishes. However, we also find support for the ‘conditional party government’ notion that, as majority-party members’ preferences become more similar, they have an increased incentive to grant agenda-setting power to their leaders.

"What They Say or What They Do?" The Impact of Elite Explanation and Policy Outcomes on Public Opinion

1995 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 53 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kathleen M. McGraw ◽  
Samuel Best ◽  
Richard Timpone
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
The Impact

Introduction: Looking for Democratic Constraint

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew A. Baum ◽  
Philip B. K. Potter
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Public Opinion ◽  
Policy Formulation ◽  
Electoral Institutions ◽  
Media Access ◽  
Political Opposition ◽  
The Public ◽  
Democratic Systems ◽  
The Masses ◽  
Flow Of Information

This book examines how media and electoral institutions influence the extent of democratic constraint by shaping the flow of information from leaders to citizens. It asks why, when it comes to foreign policy, some leaders are seemingly constrained by public opinion, even in the earliest stages of policy formulation, while others are more insulated from it. It argues that the reliability of the flow of information from elites to the masses most directly determines the degree to which citizens can constrain their leaders. The book considers two aspects of democratic systems that affect both the generation and the flow of information about foreign policy by influencing the extent of independent political opposition and their ability to reach the public with their messages: political opposition and media access.

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