scholarly journals Niṣkāmakarma: A Philosophical Analysis in Light of the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Concept of Degrowth

2019 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
pp. 3-30
Author(s):  
Tommi Lehtonen ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
The Other ◽  
Economic Activities ◽  
Non Profit ◽  
Personal Benefit ◽  
The Common ◽  
Harmful Effects

The prisoner's dilemma famously shows that individuals seeking their own benefit end up with a worse outcome than could be achieved through cooperation. This dilemma provides an effective but neglected method for the study of the Hindu principle of "desireless action" (niṣkāmakarma). In the context of the prisoner's dilemma, one or the other of the following decision-making strategies is feasible for prisoners who want to follow the principle of "desireless action": (1) to be indifferent and to leave the decision to chance (e.g. by arbitrarily drawing lots) or (2) to pursue the common good or the benefit of the other (by remaining silent) instead of seeking primarily to benefit oneself (by confessing). The second strategy is more appropriate assuming the following: the followers of the principle of "desireless action" can be goal-oriented and target-driven, as long as unselfish goals are considered, while remaining indifferent and non-attached in terms of personal benefit. This interpretation is tested and further discussed in this article in light of the values of the modem environmental and anti-consumerist degrowth movement. A non-profit orientation and the emphasis on duties are shared by the concepts of degrowth and niṣkāmakarma. Social- or reality-centredness rather than self-centredness is also common to both concepts. The degrowth movement focuses on economic contraction and deceleration, and thus its scope is narrower and more specific than that of niṣkāmakarma. Moreover, the degrowth movement rejects economic grovrth because of its ecologically and socially harmful effects, such as pollution and income inequality, but it is - at least in theory - indifferent to the harmless results of economic activities. On the contrary, the principle of niṣkāmakarma involves a critical stance toward both good and bad results of actions, insofar as they are pursued because of self-regarding desires.

Prisoner's Dilemma Popularized: Game Theory and Ethical Progress

Dialogue ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 295-304
Author(s):  
Peter Danielson
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Moral Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Strict Sense ◽  
Rational Agents ◽  
Science Writer ◽  
The Common ◽  
Zero Sum

Is game theory good for us? This may seem an odd question. In the strict sense, game theory—the axiomatic account of interaction between rational agents—is as morally neutral as arithmetic. But the popularization of game theory as a way of thinking about social interaction is far from neutral. Consider the contrast between characterizing bargaining over distribution as a “zero-sum society” and focussing on “win-win” cooperative solutions. These reflections bring us to the book under review, Prisoner's Dilemma, a popular introduction to game theory and its relation to ethics by the respected science writer William Poundstone. The book begins with a moral dilemma and ends by discussing the evolution of co-operation. Poundstone emphasizes—correctly, to my mind—the ethical potential of game theory. He concludes his first chapter with this striking claim: “Today's practitioners of game theory are attempting to forge a kind of ethical progress. Is there any way to promote the common good in a prisoner's dilemma? The attempt to answer this question is one of the great intellectual adventures of our time” (p. 9).

scholarly journals Evangelical and Catholic Timespace in Work: An Argument against a Homeless Eschatology

Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 199
Author(s):  
Maria Ledstam
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Study ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Ethnographic Study ◽  
The Other ◽  
Faith Based ◽  
Business As Mission ◽  
Achievable Goal ◽  
The Common ◽  
The One ◽  
The Relationship

This article engages with how religion and economy relate to each other in faith-based businesses. It also elaborates on a recurrent idea in theological literature that reflections on different visions of time can advance theological analyses of the relationship between Christianity and capitalism. More specifically, this article brings results from an ethnographic study of two faith-based businesses into conversation with the ethicist Luke Bretherton’s presentation of different understandings of the relationship between Christianity and capitalism. Using Theodore Schatzki’s theory of timespace, the article examines how time and space are constituted in two small faith-based businesses that are part of the two networks Business as Mission (evangelical) and Economy of Communion (catholic) and how the different timespaces affect the religious-economic configurations in the two cases and with what moral implications. The overall findings suggest that the timespace in the Catholic business was characterized by struggling caused by a tension between certain ideals on how religion and economy should relate to each other on the one hand and how the practice evolved on the other hand. Furthermore, the timespace in the evangelical business was characterized by confidence, caused by the business having a rather distinct and achievable goal when it came to how they wanted to be different and how religion should relate to economy. There are, however, nuances and important resemblances between the cases that cannot be explained by the businesses’ confessional and theological affiliations. Rather, there seems to be something about the phenomenon of tension-filled and confident faith-based businesses that causes a drive in the practices towards the common good. After mapping the results of the empirical study, I discuss some contributions that I argue this study brings to Bretherton’s presentation of the relationship between Christianity and capitalism.

The Prisoner's Dilemma Game and Cooperation in the Rat

1984 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 687-696 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rick M. Gardner ◽  
Terry L. Corbin ◽  
Janelle S. Beltramo ◽  
Gary S. Nickell
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Visual Communication ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Human Subjects ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
The Other ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Cooperative Behaviors

Cooperation in pairs of rats playing the prisoner's dilemma game was investigated. Six pairs of animals were taught to make either cooperative or uncooperative responses by running to one or the other end of a T-maze. Two T-mazes were joined together such that animals could respond simultaneously. Animals were run under conditions in which visual communication was present and absent. Mutually uncooperative responses were the most common and mutually cooperative behaviors the least preferred. Introduction of a barrier between the mazes, which removed visual communication between pairs, sharply accentuated uncooperative behavior. Similarities of the present findings to results with human subjects and the implications of using game theory for studying cooperative behavior in animals are discussed.

scholarly journals Luther and Economic Questions

1910 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 131-150 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Alfred Faulkner
Keyword(s):  
Common Good ◽  
Kingdom Of God ◽  
The Other ◽  
Word Of God ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
The Poor ◽  
Special Knowledge ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Church

There are two facts to be borne in mind in regard to Luther's whole attitude to social and economic questions. The first is that ordinarily this was a territory to be confined to experts, in which ministers should not meddle. He believed that a special knowledge was necessary to deal with some of these matters, and that they had better be left to those to whom Providence had assigned them, whether the jurists, those clever in worldly knowledge, or the authorities. The other fact is that the Church after all has social duties, and that Church and clergy must fight flagrant abuses and try to bring in the Kingdom of God on earth. The Church must use the Word of God against sin and sinners, and so by spiritual ministries help the needs of the time. The authorities on their part shall proceed by strict justice against evil doers. But there is another fact here which it is necessary to mention to get Luther's whole attitude, viz., that the State's function is not simply to administer justice, but to secure the general weal. They shall do the very best they can for their subjects, says Luther. “The authorities shall serve their subjects and use their office not petulantly [nicht zu Mutwillen] but for the advancement of the common good, and especially for the poor.” The princes shall give laws which shall limit as far as possible social misery and national dangers. They should listen to the proposals of the Church to this end, and on the ground of wise counsels of churchmen, do away with old laws and make new ones.

scholarly journals Translucent players: Explaining cooperative behavior in social dilemmas

2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 371-408
Author(s):  
Valerio Capraro ◽  
Joseph Y Halpern
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Dominant Strategy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Conflict Situations ◽  
Novel Approach ◽  
Equity And Efficiency

In the past few decades, numerous experiments have shown that humans do not always behave so as to maximize their material payoff. Cooperative behavior when noncooperation is a dominant strategy (with respect to the material payoffs) is particularly puzzling. Here we propose a novel approach to explain cooperation, assuming what Halpern and Pass call translucent players. Typically, players are assumed to be opaque, in the sense that a deviation by one player in a normal-form game does not affect the strategies used by other players. However, a player may believe that if he switches from one strategy to another, the fact that he chooses to switch may be visible to the other players. For example, if he chooses to defect in Prisoner’s Dilemma, the other player may sense his guilt. We show that by assuming translucent players, we can recover many of the regularities observed in human behavior in well-studied games such as Prisoner’s Dilemma, Traveler’s Dilemma, Bertrand Competition, and the Public Goods game. The approach can also be extended to take into account a player’s concerns that his social group (or God) may observe his actions. This extension helps explain prosocial behavior in situations in which previous models of social behavior fail to make correct predictions (e.g. conflict situations and situations where there is a trade-off between equity and efficiency).

Democratic Deliberations, Equality of Influence, and Pragmatism

1998 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
pp. 253-272
Author(s):  
Judith Baker
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Deliberative Democracy ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Minority Group ◽  
Political Equality ◽  
Current Program ◽  
The Common ◽  
To Come ◽  
Ideal Framework ◽  
The Ideal

Democracy is committed to procedures of decision-making which express the values of both political equality and truth. One current program, that of strong or deliberative democracy, explicitly defends institutions which reflect the dual commitments to truth and equality. Like many other political theorists, however, deliberative democrats do not address the issue of a minority group which always loses the vote. The presumption is that free and equal deliberation by agents who think in terms of the common good is sufficient for political equality. I will argue, however, that the proposed deliberative procedures do not preclude persistent failure for a minority, and that this problem should lead us to acknowledge that power relations can underpin decision-making arrangements even within the ideal framework of deliberative democracy. Political equality and effective political equality seem to come apart.In order to come closer to the idea of effective political equality, this paper will look at the notion of equality of influence. It may seem tautological, and so redundant, to argue that political egalitarians and particularly deliberative democrats need to recognize equality of influence.

scholarly journals Getting to agreement: mechanisms of deliberative decision-making

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 374-408 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erik O. Eriksen
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
The European Union ◽  
International Affairs ◽  
Moral Value ◽  
Social Events ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Right ◽  
Political Decision Making

Deliberation has not only epistemic and moral value, it also has transformative value. Even if deliberation faces the problem of indeterminacy, it is assumed to have explanatory power. This article spells out why this is so and suggests a way to establish the causing effect of deliberation. It outlines a reason-based (RB) model of political decision-making applicable also to international affairs. By specifying a theory of argumentation on collective decision-making, we get to the nuts and bolts of deliberative decision-making, which, when supported by institutional powers, ensures a justified and well-grounded decision. The model contains a set of rules of inference and offers ‘mechanismic’ accounts of social events. It allows for explanations, but not predictions. The RB model conceives of decision-making as consisting of three sequences: claims-making, justification, and learning, each containing a set of explanatory mechanisms: values referring to conceptions of the common good, mandatory norms concerning the right thing to do, and evidence to the fact that non-compliance is wrong. The explanatory potential of this scheme is exemplified with reference to agreement making in the European Union. Some actors changed opinion voluntarily with regard to empowering the European parliament.

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