Davidson on Pure Intending: A Non-Reductionist Judgement-Dependent Account

Dialogue ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
Ali Hossein Khani
Keyword(s):  
Mental Content ◽  
First Person ◽  
The Subject

Abstract I will argue that Davidson's account of pure intending can be construed as a first-person-based judgement-dependent account of intention. For Davidson, pure intending to do φ is to make an all-out judgement that φing is desirable. On this anti-reductionist account, intention is treated as an irreducible state of the subject. I will draw a comparison between this account and Wright's and I will show that Davidson's account can be viewed as a non-reductionist judgement-dependent account along the lines suggested by Wright. I then explain how this account can help deal with various perplexities in Davidson's later view of meaning and mental content.

Ockham on the Possibility of Self-Knowledge: Knowing Acts without Knowing Subjects

Vivarium ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 52 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 220-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sonja Schierbaum
Keyword(s):  
Mental Content ◽  
Second Step ◽  
First Person ◽  
Specific Kind ◽  
Cognitive Access ◽  
Mental Language ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
William Ockham ◽  
Mental Acts

My aim in this paper is to show that William Ockham (ca. 1287-1347) succeeds in accounting for a particular kind of self-knowledge, although in doing so he restricts the direct cognitive access to mental acts and states as they occur, in a way similar to the restriction in contemporary debates on self-knowledge. In particular, a considerable number of Ockham-scholars have argued that Ockham’s theory of mental content bears a substantial likeness to contemporary ‘externalist’ approaches, and I will argue for the success of this theory in three steps: first, I show that, although the form of what is judged (‘I am F’) implies the ascription of an act to oneself (as the subject of the act), through ‘intuition’ it suffices to directly cognize the act but not the subject. In Ockham’s conception, intuition is a specific kind of singular cognition. In the second step I show that, according to Ockham’s thesis of mental language, Person is an aspect of mental verbs and not of acts of intuition. Lastly I argue that the correctness of first-person judgments about one’s acts is guaranteed by an ontological fact, and not an epistemological fact. It becomes apparent that this reading is compatible with an epistemological externalism.

The Autobiographical Subject and the Death Penalty

2013 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-187
Author(s):  
E. S. Burt
Keyword(s):  
Death Penalty ◽  
First Person ◽  
Philosophical Investigation ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Individual

Why does writing of the death penalty demand the first-person treatment that it also excludes? The article investigates the role played by the autobiographical subject in Derrida's The Death Penalty, Volume I, where the confessing ‘I’ doubly supplements the philosophical investigation into what Derrida sees as a trend toward the worldwide abolition of the death penalty: first, to bring out the harmonies or discrepancies between the individual subject's beliefs, anxieties, desires and interests with respect to the death penalty and the state's exercise of its sovereignty in applying it; and second, to provide a new definition of the subject as haunted, as one that has been, but is no longer, subject to the death penalty, in the light of the worldwide abolition currently underway.

THE PROBLEM OF EXPRESSION NON-CATEGORICAL STATEMENTS IN LINGUISTIC TEXTS

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 91-97
Author(s):  
Nigora Mukhamedova ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Mental Content ◽  
Scientific Communication ◽  
Scientific Text ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Evaluative Attitude

The article deals with the issues based on the study of non-categorical statements in a linguistic text in modern English. The essence of scientific communication is a message, or the transmission by means of language of some mental content, including the expression of an intellectual-evaluative attitude to the subject of speech. The content of intellectual assessments is conditioned by knowledge and experience of intellectual and material activities of people.In a scientific text, this attitude can be the result of verifying the truth of what is expressed by the author himself or by another scientist or a team of researchers, as well as confirmation or refutation of apreviously formed assessment that served as the basis for further discussion

Boutwerk, Balthazar Barbosa, Willaschek e os Paradoxos da Filosofia do Direito de Kant

2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
João Carlos Brum Torres
Keyword(s):  
First Person ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Objective Reality ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Epistemic Access ◽  
External Character ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Kantian Philosophy ◽  
Positive Character ◽  
Made In

O artigo tem por objeto o exame de três registros de gritantes e distintos paradoxos na Doutrina do Direito de Kant. Registros feitos em tempos e contextos históricos diferentes por Friedrich Bouterwek, Marcus Willaschek e Balthazar Barbosa Filho. Bouterwek atribuiu a Kant a mais paradoxal das proposições jamais enunciadas por qualquer autor, a de que a mera ideia de soberania deve obrigar-nos a obedecer como a nosso inquestionável senhor a quem quer que se haja estabelecido como tal, sem que caiba indagar quem lhe deu o direito de comandar-nos. Willaschek aponta a incompatibilidade de duas teses centrais da doutrina kantiana: a do caráter externo dos vínculos jurídicos e a da incondicionalidade obrigacional do direito positivo, pois não é possível entender como é possível termo-nos como obrigados por imperativos jurídicos e, ao mesmo, vermo-nos internamente isentados do dever de obedecê-los. O ponto crítico de Balthazar é alegar que não pode haver na filosofia kantiana uma crítica da razão político e jurídica, simplesmente porque o conceito de imputação, base da normatividade própria dessas esferas, pressupõe uma pluralidade de agentes livres que, justamente, só pode ser uma pressuposição, pois nosso acesso à normatividade prática só pode ter lugar em primeira pessoa. No exame a que o artigo submete essas alegações, o artigo argumenta, em objeção à tese de Balthazar, que o caráter universal e categórico da força que vincula o sujeito quando confrontado com a lei moral em primeira pessoa necessariamente se desvaneceria se, ao mesmo tempo, ele não fosse tomado pela evidência de que a realidade objetiva dos princípios morais é não só instanciável, mas assegurada pela múltipla instanciação. Com relação às dificuldades levantadas por Willaschek e Bouterwek, o artigo argumenta que o princípio exeundum e statu naturali, enquanto norma metapositiva, anterior à divisão do domínio prático entre doutrina do direito e doutrina da virtude, permite ao mesmo tempo compreender a exigência de obediência ao poder constituído e a restrição das obrigações jurídico-políticas exclusivamente ao foro externo.AbstractThe object of the article is to examine three claims about three distinct and allegedly blatant paradoxes in Kant's Doctrine of Right. These three critical points had been made in distinct times and contexts by Friedrich Bouterwek, Marcus Willaschek e Balthazar Barbosa Filho. Bouterwek attributed to Kant the most paradoxical of all paradoxical propositions, the statement that by the mere idea of sovereignty we are obliged to obey as our lord who has imposed himself upon us, without questioning from where he got such right. Willaschek points out the incompatibility of two main theses of Kantian doctrine of right: the claims that the legal bounds are of external character and that they are the source of unconditional obligations, since it seems impossible to understand how it would be possible to be obliged by juridical norms and decisions and at the same time to be exempted of the internal duty of compliance. The radical objection of Professor Balthazar is the claim that in the context of Kantian Philosophy it is impossible to admit a critique of the juridical and political reason because the concept of imputation, ground of the normativity in these domains, requires not only the presupposition of free agents, but a true and secure epistemic access to them, which is, according to him, impossible considering that the moral law and the other practical principles are accessible for us only in the first person. In the course of the appraisal of such claims, the article contest that objection arguing that the universal and categorical force of the normative bound experienced by the subject when confronted with the moral law in the first person would ineluctably vanish if, at the same time, he had not been taken by the evidence that the objective reality of the moral principles is secured by multiple instancing. Regarding the difficulties raised by Willaschek and Bouterwek, the article argues that the principle exeundum e statu naturali, as a norm of meta-positive character, prior to the division of practical domains between the doctrine of right and the doctrine of virtue, is the cue both to the understanding of the requirement of unquestioning obedience to the constituted power and to the restriction of the validity of this requirement only in foro externo.

Inverse agreement in Hungarian

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
András Bárány
Keyword(s):  
First Person ◽  
Personal Pronouns ◽  
Second Person ◽  
Morphological Effect ◽  
Object A ◽  
Feature Sets ◽  
Explicit Analysis ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Agreement Morphology ◽  
Object Agreement

This chapter turns to object agreement with personal pronouns in Hungarian. Pronouns are interesting because they do not always trigger agreement with the verb: first person objects never trigger object agreement (morphology), and second person pronouns only do with first person singular subjects. It is proposed that the distribution of object agreement is a morphological effect and argues that all personal pronouns do in fact trigger agreement, but agreement is not always spelled out. This means that Hungarian has an inverse agreement system, where the spell-out of agreement is determined by the relative person feature (or person feature sets) of the subject and the object. A formally explicit analysis of the syntax and the morphological spell-out of agreement is provided.

Borrowing non-canonical inverse between Kabardian and Abaza

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 148-173
Author(s):  
Peter M. Arkadiev
Keyword(s):  
Language Contact ◽  
Close Relative ◽  
First Person ◽  
Verbal Morphology ◽  
Second Person ◽  
Indirect Object ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Intransitive Verbs ◽  
Person Hierarchy ◽  
Distant Relative

Abaza, a polysynthetic ergative Northwest Caucasian language, shares with its neighbour and distant relative Kabardian a typologically peculiar use of the deictic directional prefixes monitoring the relative ranking of the subject and indirect object on the person hierarchy. In both languages, the cislocative (‘hither’) prefixes are used if the indirect object outranks the subject on the person hierarchy, and the translocative (‘thither’) prefixes are used in combinations of first person subjects with second person singular indirect objects. This pattern, reminiscent of the more familiar inverse marking and hence called ‘quasi-inverse’, is observed with ditransitive and bivalent intransitive verbs and is almost fully redundant, since all participants are unequivocally indexed on verbs by pronominal prefixes. I argue that this isogloss, shared by West Circassian (a close relative to Kabardian) but not with Abkhaz, the sister-language of Abaza, is a result of pattern replication under intense language contact, which has led to an increase of both paradigmatic and syntagmatic complexity of Abaza verbal morphology.

GENRE OF IN MODERN TATAR LITERATURE: FEATURES OF FUNCTIONING (BASED ON THE MATERIAL OF R. GABDULKHAKOVA'S "SMALL" PROSE)

2021 ◽  
pp. 83-90
Author(s):  
В.Р. Аминева
Keyword(s):  
Space Time ◽  
Moral Truth ◽  
First Person ◽  
The Third ◽  
Third Person ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Lyrical Subject ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Third Person

На материале произведений современной татарской писательницы Р. Габдулхаковой выявляются конститутивные черты жанра парча в современной татарской литературе. Охарактеризованы жанровые разновидности парчи в творчестве Р. Габдулхаковой, которые соответствуют двум направлениям сюжетного движения: от внешнего к внутреннему или от единичного к универсальному и двум типам повествования - от 1-го или от 3-го лица. Художественное завершение в парчах первого типа определяется постижением некой нравственной истины, вытекающей из лично пережитой лирическим субъектом ситуации, в парчах второго типа оно создается переходом от отдельных явлений к их суммирующему итогу. Сделан вывод о том, что внутреннюю меру жанра определяет характер соотношения повествовательной фабулы и обобщающей ее «концовки». Описаны свойственные этому жанру пространственно-временные отношения и принципы организации субъектной сферы. Структурообразующая роль в парчах Р. Габдулхаковой отводится субъективно-лирическому началу в повествовании. В произведениях писательницы проявились как особенности ее творческой индивидуальности, так и типологические черты женской прозы в целом с ее повышенной эмоциональностью, автобиографичностью и проникновенностью. Большинство миниатюр Р. Габдулхаковой написаны от первого лица и представляют сознание женщины, сосредоточенной на переживании своего одиночества и «холода жизни», безответной любви и позднего раскаяния, боли утраты, преследующей каждого человека после ухода матери. Парчи, написанные от третьего лица, раскрывают сознание человека, знающего о существовании объективных закономерностей и пытающегося найти личный выход из безнадежных ситуаций. В творчестве Р. Габдулхаковой парча функционирует как синтетический жанр, вбирающий в себя элементы других жанровых форм. On the material of works of the modern Tatar writer R. Gabdulhakova the constitutive features of the genre of the parcha are revealed. Genre varieties of parcha in the work of R. Gabdulkhakova are characterized, which correspond to two directions of plot movement: from the external to the internal or from the individual to the universal, and two types of narrative-from 1 or 3 persons. Artistic completion in the parcha of the first type is determined by the realization of a certain moral truth arising from the situation personally experienced by the lyrical subject, in the parcha of the second type it is created by the transition from individual phenomena to their summing result. It is concluded that the internal measure of the genre determines the nature of the relationship between the narrative plot and its generalizing "ending". Space-time relations and principles of organization of the subject sphere peculiar to this genre are described. The structure-forming role in the parcha of R. Gabdulkhakova is assigned to the subjective-lyrical beginning in the narrative. The works of the writer manifested both the features of her creative individuality and the typological features of female prose in general with its increased emotionality, autobiography and penetration. Most of R. Gabdulhakova’s miniatures are written in the first person and represent the consciousness of a woman focused on experiencing her loneliness and “cold life”, unrequited love and late repentance, the pain of loss that haunts every person after leaving her mother. Рarcha written in the third person reveal the consciousness of a person who knows about the existence of objective laws and tries to find a personal way out of hopeless situations. Allegorical or symbolic imagery at the same time turns a personal scenario - into a typical, universal human one. In the work of R. Gabdulhakova parcha functions as a synthetic genre, incorporating elements of other genre forms.

Self and Self-Representation in the Long Twentieth Century

2021 ◽  
pp. 295-316
Author(s):  
Christopher Peacocke
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
The Self ◽  
First Person ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Person Concept

Six issues are salient in discussions of the first person since 1900: immunity to error through misidentification; the possibility of survival without survival of one’s body; the elusiveness of the self; the role of the first person attitudes in the explanation of action; the first person component in mental concepts; and the role of the first person simulation in explaining the actions of others. Since 1900, there have been accounts both of the nature of the first person concept, and accounts of the nature of subjects of experience. This paper discusses the achievements and limitations of these accounts in addressing the preceding six issues. These issues are also assessed against a wider range of possibilities, both for the first person and for the subject to which it refers, than are considered in this literature.

Being at the Centre

2020 ◽  
pp. 66-71
Author(s):  
Jonardon Ganeri
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Property ◽  
Available P ◽  
First Person ◽  
Conceptual Distinction ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The One

We can begin to unravel the enigma of heteronymy if we note that a rather similar puzzle arises in the context of dreaming. I may certainly figure within my own dream, and there is therefore a conceptual distinction between the dreaming subject and the subject-within-a-dream. But is it possible for me to have a dream such that, within the dream, I am a subject other than the subject I am? The puzzle is to know what makes it the case that in the dream I am X and not JG: on what grounds should we answer the question ‘Which one is me?’ J. J. Valberg’s proposal is to call attention to what he calls a ‘positional use’ of the first person, distinct from its mundane use as an indexical, and a corresponding positional conception of self. Using ‘I’ positionally, I am the one to whom all this is presented, the one to whom every phenomenal property is directed, or, as Valberg puts it, the one who is ‘at the centre’ of the manifold of presentation which he calls the experiential horizon. The positional conception of self is one which Pessoa quite explicitly puts at the heart of his philosophy. With the positional conception of self to hand, a solution to the enigma of heteronymy is available.

scholarly journals Symmetrical and asymmetrical cascaded multilevel inverter for photovoltaic system

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (4.5) ◽  
pp. 732
Author(s):  
J. Gowrishankar ◽  
G. Balasundaram ◽  
R. JayaKishore ◽  
J. Belwin Edwardd
Keyword(s):  
Multilevel Inverter ◽  
Photovoltaic System ◽  
First Person ◽  
Third Person ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Cascaded Multilevel Inverter

The manuscript should contain an abstract. The abstract should be self-contained and citation-free and should not exceed 200 words. The abstract should state the purpose, approach, results and conclusions of the work. The author should assume that the reader has some knowledge of the subject but has not read the paper. Thus, the abstract should be intelligible and complete in it-self (no numerical references); it should not cite figures, tables, or sections of the paper. The abstract should be written using third person instead of first person. 

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