Three Futures: Global Geopolynomic Transition and the Implications for Regional Security in Northeast Asia

2005 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 761-792
Author(s):  
BRENDAN HOWE

Future predictions in security studies tend to fall into two broad intellectual traditions, liberal modernist hypotheses, and structural-realist or geopolitical hypotheses. These two major schools of thought essentially agree on the rationality of participants, but disagree about the nature of the environment facing policymakers and thereby framing their decisions. This project considers theoretical, rational, and statistical models associated with these approaches, analyzes the available data for future projection with regard to the Northeast Asian sub-region, and introduces a third rational future based on the social construction of a regional geopolynomic community, with America as a political entrepreneur, her regional allies as a winning coalition, and China and Russia as partners for peace. The focus of this work is on the Northeast Asian subset of the international system, containing the countries of China, Japan, Mongolia, Russia, North and South Korea, and considering the undeniable role played by the United States in the region, although at times statistical and theoretical evidence forces representation of a larger constituency.

2021 ◽  
pp. 100
Author(s):  
chensheng wang

The color revolution, which is a “low-cost and high-return” method in regime change, has become the main mean and priority option for America to subvert dissident regimes. In recent years, with the raising strength of containing and suppressing between China with Russia by the United States, America has tried its best to plan “color revolution” not only around China and Russia, but also within the borders of the two countries. China and Russia have become the key target of America in implementing the “color revolution”, however, the situation of the two countries to prevent the “color revolution” is particularly urgent. The “color revolution” not only disrupts the balance of the international system and regional security, but also seriously affects the stability of the country's political power and the healthy development of the economy. In view of this, it is now necessary for China and Russia to work together to prevent “color revolution”. Regarding the new changes, methods changed from non-violent to violent me, more advanced organizational methods, the younger generation of the participants, and changes in manifestations by the “color revolution”, as well as the underlying causes of the “color revolution”, China and Russia should have uindividualized strategies. China and Russia can strengthen cooperation in different areas, such as politics, economy, culture, ideological education, and regional coordination. China and Russia should take advantages of their respective experiences in dealing with “color revolution”, strengthen sharing and communicating experience with other countries in the region, and jointly build a barrier to prevent “color revolution” and protect the security and stability in China and Russia and the surrounding areas.


2016 ◽  
Vol 08 (02) ◽  
pp. 58-67
Author(s):  
Tai Wei LIM

Trilateral diplomacy offers an opportunity for Northeast Asian leaders to meet and talk in a business-like manner, rather than having the region risk skirmishes between maritime coastguards and fishermen, helicopter landings by politicians on disputed islands and icy-cold poses during leadership summits. In such conversations, the United States remains the most acceptable common denominator for other large states and middle powers in the international community.


2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 611-644
Author(s):  
Pedro Vinícius Pereira Brites

A região do Nordeste Asiático destaca-se por sua singularidade geopolítica. É uma região na qual predominam atores cujas ações possuem alcance global, mesmo quando se trata da Coreia do Norte, o país mais pobre da região. Além da Coreia do Norte, as interações entre China, Rússia, Japão, Coreia do Sul, e Estados Unidos como potência extrarregional com presença militar na região, afetam a distribuição de poder no Sistema Internacional. A consolidação da China como Grande Potência reconfigurou a região e tem evidenciado o papel crucial que esse subsistema regional exerce para a polaridade no século XXI. Nos últimos anos, a consolidação do programa nuclear norte-coreano, a ascensão de Xi Jinping na China, a busca por reafirmação japonesa, a chegada de Donald Trump ao poder, reorientam as relações regionais. O presente artigo procura discutir as transformações na ordem regional no Nordeste Asiático desde o final da Guerra Fria até seus desdobramentos recentes e seus efeitos sobre as disputas hegemônicas. Assim, avaliam-se os processos que vêm ampliando a tendência à militarização e competição na região e o papel que a dissuasão nuclear exerce como fator determinante para o balanço regional.     Abstract: The region of Northeast Asia stands out for its geopolitical singularity. It is a region dominated by actors whose actions are global in scope, even when it comes to North Korea, the region's poorest country. In addition to North Korea, interactions between China, Russia, Japan, South Korea, and the United States as an extra-regional power with military presence in the region affect the distribution of power in the International System. The consolidation of China as a Great Power has reconfigured the region and has highlighted the crucial role that this regional subsystem plays in polarity in the twenty-first century. In recent years, the consolidation of North Korea's nuclear program, the rise of Xi Jinping in China, the search for Japanese reaffirmation, reorient regional relations. This article discusses the transformations in the regional order in Northeast Asia from the end of the Cold War until its recent unfolding and its effects on the hegemonic disputes. Thus, are evaluated the processes that have been increasing the tendency towards militarization and competition in the region and the role that nuclear deterrence plays as a determining factor for the regional balance. Keywords: Northeast Asia; Hegemonic Recomposition; Regionalism.     Recebido em: Agosto/2018. Aprovado em: Dezembro/2018.


Author(s):  
Andrii Subotin

The random and indeterminate nature of the current unipolar world is marked by a condition of increasing entropy. This claim is maintained by two assumptions. First, relative capability advantages under unipolarity do not translate as easily as they once did into power and influence over others. Second, systemic constraint is a property that limits actors’ freedom of action by imposing costs and benefits on certain kinds of actions. Unlike past multipolar and bipolar systems, the current unipolar system exerts only weak, systemic constraints on the unipolar power and all other actors as well. Thus, polarity has become a largely meaningless concept. Today, system process rather than structure best explains international politics, and this process is one of entropy. Finally, the author suggests two pathways from unipolarity to a more balanced international system: one is fairly consistent with standard balance-of-power realism; the other restores equilibrium by means of entropy. This current unipolar moment may become transcendent when the most powerful international actor, - the United States of America, - would choose to adapt to and to harness the social power of numerous nonstate international actors that are due take over the leading role in the future world’s politics.


2020 ◽  
Vol 06 (01) ◽  
pp. 53-77
Author(s):  
Keyu Gong

The Northeast Asian security landscape is fast evolving amid intensifying China-U.S. strategic competition and a still raging coronavirus pandemic. Frequent summit meetings among regional leaders, including the historic meetings between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un, have not translated into broader security dialogues and joint efforts to build a robust and durable regional security architecture. Divergent security perceptions, America’s dominant security role, and a mosaic pattern of regional security arrangements and mechanisms are the major factors shaping Northeast Asian security dynamics. Beijing remains committed to the declared path of peaceful development amid growing suspicion and concern over its strategic intention and capabilities; with strategic patience and perseverance, it is determined to play a larger role in forging consensus, building institutions, advancing cooperation, and coordinating relations in regional security matters.


Author(s):  
Wissal Werfelli

The article analyzes the issue of the Middle East security. The Arab countries are facing a lot of regional threats and a fundamental shift in the regional security system, which has become one of the basic variables for the Middle East through the transition to a new form of regional and international interactions. The existence of mutual influences between the nature of the international system and the regional order of the Middle East and the Gulf region is already considered as an incubator for all intractable conflicts and crises.  We cannot study the concept of regional security in separate from the global effects and repercussions. After the end of the Cold War and after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the structural transformations and global changes led to the emergence of profound changes in the international system, which resulted in the restructuring of the general features of the international environment.  The international transformation is marked by the fact that the new world order increased the chances of emergence of new international powers in both Europe and Asia, whether countries or major economic or political blocs trying to establish a multi-polar international order, which prompted the United States to pursue a policy of cooperation with competing powers.  And in light of this international environment, it was natural for the regions of strategic importance, particularly the Middle East, to be affected because they were linked to relations of mutual influence with the international system, as international balances affect regional balances.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Walter Ladwig ◽  
Anit Mukherjee

This special issue of Asia Policy scrutinizes the Indo-U.S. strategic partnership byexamining the prospects for bilateral cooperation in Asia. Although peacetimeforeign policy collaboration between major powers is a rarity, China’s rapid rise inthe international system appears to have forced the United States and India intounprecedentedly close consultation on regional security issues. Will this consultationmature into active cooperation? To answer this question, this introductory essay firstexamines the concept of strategic partnerships—a nebulous type of politicalrelationship that have proliferated since the end of the Cold War. It then highlightsthe obstacles to peacetime cooperation between major powers in other regions of the world. Following this, attention turns to the articles in this special issue whichexamine the history of Indo-U.S. cooperation in various sub-regions of Asia.Collectively, these pieces challenge misperceptions and misunderstandings of eachcountry’s policies and past behavior, as well as identify the differing understandingsof both the bilateral relationship and the region held by each party. Taken together,these articles provide a clearer sense of the geopolitical scope and depth, as well asthe important limitations, of the Indo-U.S. strategic partnership. The articleconcludes by identifying the key insights that come from this collection and offerssome thoughts the overall trajectory of U.S.-India relations.


2020 ◽  
pp. 62-104
Author(s):  
David Shambaugh

This chapter discusses America’s “contemporary” roles in Southeast Asia. It examines the Obama and Trump administrations’ policies and actions in the region, and considers three categories of the US footprint at present: commerce, security, and soft power/public diplomacy. For Southeast Asia, the United States continues to be an important guarantor of regional security and stability—but its commercial contributions and soft power appeal are also strong attractive features. If America has a pronounced weakness in the region it is in the area of diplomatic engagement. This is not new—as the strategic and economic importance of Northeast Asia and the “tyranny of distance” to Southeast Asia have long conspired to limit Washington’s attention span. The Obama administration was the exception to the rule, as it prioritized ASEAN as never before. The Trump administration does seem to have relatively downgraded the region when compared with the Obama years. Still, this has been a relative downgrading—and, if anything, a return to the more traditional pattern of episodic US (in)attention.


2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (03) ◽  
pp. 19-31
Author(s):  
Sunil KIM

This study discusses the rise of populism in the United States and its political ramification in the Northeast Asian region, surrounding the recent North Korean nuclear crisis. Rather than simply blaming the irrational behaviours of political leaders, this study argues that their different political preferences originating from their background as well as the demographic nature of their core constituency are the fundamental sources of instability in the region. Unlike the conventional understanding, this study claims that the key problem that has been driving countries in the region towards the nuclear debacle—as well as the sudden volte-face—is US political leader’s very rationality, unbounded by ideological or partisan traditions, rather than his irrational, or oft-regarded as deranged, personality.


2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 45-67
Author(s):  
Qi Huaigao ◽  
Li Kaisheng

The Northeast Asian (NEA) power structure demonstrates a weakening unipolarity of the United States (U.S.), which will evolve into a power structure with “multilateral co-opetition of two superpowers (China and the U.S.) and three regional great powers (Russia, Japan, and South Korea)” during the 2020s. In the context of this shifting power structure, the other fi ve NEA states will adjust their diplomatic policies. Japan, Russia, and South Korea, which occupy the second tier of the NEA power structure, will pursue regional great power diplomacy and regional interests. Russia will maintain a careful balance with China and the U.S., and will use investments from the other NEA states pragmatically to develop its Far East region. Japan will seek to maximize its security guarantees from the U.S. while actively obtaining economic benefi ts from China, and will try to remain fl exible in terms of its NEA strategic choice. South Korea will implement the so-called “two superpowers diplomacy” in relation to the U.S. and China in order to enhance its strategic autonomy. With relatively weak national power, North Korea and Mongolia occupy the third tier of the NEA power structure, and they will try to ensure the survival of their respective regimes and promote national security. China’s strategic choices for NEA in the next decade are likely to include fi ve aspects: 1) to avoid a “new Cold War” and achieve a strategic balance with the U.S.; 2) to maintain friendly and close strategic ties with Russia; 3) to actively promote economic cooperation with the other NEA countries; 4) to promote the establishment of a regional security mechanism in the future that includes all the NEA states, for example, a “Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Organization” (NEAPCO); and 5) to construct a collective NEA identity.


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