Malthus, Jesus, and Darwin

1987 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-246 ◽  
Author(s):  
John M. Pullen

Malthus' theological ideas were most clearly presented in the final two chapters of the first edition (1798) of his Essay on the Principle of Population. They can be classified under eight main headings. (i) He admitted that the pressure of population causes much misery and evil, but he did not accept that this in any way impugned the benevolence of the Creator. He situated the population problem within the general context of the problem of evil, and argued that population pressure is permitted and ordained by the Creator as a means of stimulating mankind to attain a higher good. (ii) He opposed the traditional Christian notion that this world is a state of trial, with population pressure being one aspect of that trial. He believed that this notion of a state of trial is inconsistent with the notion of an omniscient Creator, and that it is therefore necessary to reject the notion of a state of trial in order to save the notion of Divine omniscience. (iii) Instead of viewing this world as a state of trial, he viewed it ‘as the mighty process of God, not for the trial, but for the creation and formation of mindr. This notion of the growth of mind is the central aspect of Malthus' theology. (iv) He expressed doubts about the omnipotence of the Creator, arguing that God did not have the power to create perfect human beings instantaneously, but required a certain process or a certain time to form beings with ‘exalted qualities of mind’. Malthus seemed to argue that Divine omnipotence and Divine benevolence are incompatible – because a truly benevolent creator would not have subjected mankind to the miseries of this world if He had the power to create a perfect world. Malthus was prepared to sacrifice the notion of Divine omnipotence in order to save the notion of Divine benevolence. (v) He saw the principle of population as part of the Divine plan for the replenishment of the earth, i.e. its full cultivation and peopling. (vi) His attitude to worldly pleasures and comforts was distinctly unpuritanical, and leaning towards hedonism. His ethics were world-enhancing, rather than world-denying and retreatist. (This point is discussed more fully in Part II below.) (vii) He gave a naturalistic interpretation of the Biblical doctrine of original sin, describing original sin as the original state of torpor and sluggishness of every human being at the moment of birth. The purpose of the principle of population, and of the other difficulties encountered in life, is to stimulate man to raise himself out of this original state. (viii) Finally, Malthus' theology included the doctrine of annihilationism (or conditional immortality), according to which eternal life is not an essential part of the human soul at birth, but is granted only to those who attain during life on earth an adequate growth of mind. The others are, at death, not condemned to eternal suffering, but are annihilated, body and soul.

Author(s):  
Michael C. Rea

This book is the second of two volumes collecting together the most substantial work in analytic theology that I have done between 2003 and 2018. The first volume contains essays focused, broadly speaking, on the nature of God; this second volume contains essays focused more on doctrines about humanity, the human condition, and how human beings relate to God. The essays in the first part deal with the doctrines of the incarnation, original sin, and atonement; the essays in the second part discuss the problem of evil, the problem of divine hiddenness, and a theological problem that arises in connection with the idea God not only tolerates but validates a response of angry protest in the face of these problems.


Vox Patrum ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 55 ◽  
pp. 293-305
Author(s):  
Karolina Kochańczyk-Bonińska

The article presents how Maximus as Christian and philosopher understands death and eternal life. First of all, Confessor connects death with original sin and separation from God. In another meaning death is for him separation of body and soul, so that our life becomes continues preparation for death. Another important problem presented is if and how different elements of human being (intellect, soul and body) would cooperate in eternal life. Author presents Maximus’ attitude towards the conception of apocatastasis and shows that there is no place for such conception in Maxim’s writings. The last important problem presented in the article is deification understood as union with God (not only human beings but whole creation united with Creator) and Sabbath, which is the end of all movement and rest in God.


Author(s):  
L'ubomír Batka

Martin Luther did not write a specific treatise solely on sin. Nevertheless, the topic of sin is important to him. There are very few treatises where the topic of sin does not appear, as there are few treatises where Luther would not use Scripture as the base for his argumentation. Luther’s hermeneutical preconditions for development of the doctrine on sin are both Old Testament and New Testament passages. The beginning of Luther’s doctrine of sin is tied to his discovery of Augustine’s anti-Pelagian writings during his “Lectures on Romans” (1515–1516). Luther equated concupiscence with original sin and reasoned about human passivity in the process of salvation. With the formulation of new reformational theology, the emphasis on original sin as the corruption of bodily and spiritual powers in its universal, total, and radical aspect grew. Luther came to the conviction that peccatum radicale is unbelief in God, a distrust in Christ’s promises, as clearly expressed in his treatise “The Freedom of a Christian.” The reformer did not develop his teaching on original sin from some sort of “original state theology.” A helpful tool to approach Luther is to use the parable from New Testament (Matt. 7:16–20 and 12:33, Luke 6:43–45) about a good tree bearing good fruits. This motive became the central place in the iconographic depiction of the process of salvation by Lucas Cranach’s woodcut Law and Grace (1529/1530). In its illustrative power it offers generally understandable conclusions and is pedagogically effective: good works do not make a good man, but a good man does good works; evil works do not make a wicked man, but a wicked man does evil works. Under the law, the sinner is entirely and totally without good fruits coram deo. Luther became firmly convinced that the true nature of sin is to be found entirely in peccatum radicale and not in peccatum actuale. The essence of the “root sin” is the disobedience to the first commandment and unbelief as lack of trust in God’s promises. Luther was rather unspeculative on the question about the origin of sin. His radical perspective related to sin has the advantage of being able to point to the tragical effect of sin on human beings bearing “fruits of sin”, making them captive to self-destructive conditions as perdition. Luther’s doctrine of sin is holistic, and it formed his homiletical, catechetical, and pastoral language with the conviction that “making sin great” is inseparably connected with exalting only God’s grace and salvation only in Christ only through faith.


2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 539-554 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tom Roberts

The notion that the Earth has entered a new epoch characterized by the ubiquity of anthropogenic change presents the social sciences with something of a paradox, namely, that the point at which we recognize our species to be a geologic force is also the moment where our assumed metaphysical privilege becomes untenable. Cultural geography continues to navigate this paradox in conceptually innovative ways through its engagements with materialist philosophies, more-than-human thinking and experimental modes of ontological enquiry. Drawing upon the philosophy of Gilbert Simondon, this article contributes to these timely debates by articulating the paradox of the Anthropocene in relation to technological processes. Simondon’s philosophy precedes the identification of the Anthropocene epoch by a number of decades, yet his insistence upon situating technology within an immanent field of material processes resonates with contemporary geographical concerns in a number of important ways. More specifically, Simondon’s conceptual vocabulary provides a means of framing our entanglements with technological processes without assuming a metaphysical distinction between human beings and the forces of nature. In this article, I show how Simondon’s concepts of individuation and transduction intersect with this technological problematic through his far-reaching critique of the ‘hylomorphic’ distinction between matter and form. Inspired by Simondon’s original account of the genesis of a clay brick, the article unfolds these conceptual challenges through two contrasting empirical encounters with 3D printing technologies. In doing so, my intention is to lend an affective consistency to Simondon’s problematic, and to do so in a way that captures the kinds of material mutations expressive of a particular technological moment.


2013 ◽  
Vol 62 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlo Casini ◽  
Marina Casini

Dopo vivacissisimi dibattiti e diverse decisioni giudiziarie, il Parlamento irlandese ha approvato nel luglio 2013 la legge sull’aborto Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act (2013) che però non ha fatto cessare le discussioni né sopito le inquietudini. Il contributo, supportato da un’ampia documentazione, si muove contemporaneamente su tre piani: vengono esaminati i profili giuridici (costituzionali, referendari, legislativi e giurisprudenziali) della storia dell’aborto in Irlanda, evidenziando gli aspetti che rendono peculiare la vicenda irlandese rispetto a quella degli altri Paesi europei; affronta la questione dello statuto giuridico dell’embrione umano nell’ordinamento irlandese sia nell’ambito dell’aborto, sia in quello della fecondazione artificiale (diffusa nella prassi e legittimata dalla giurisprudenza); offre interpretazioni e prospettive concrete per tutelare la vita umana sin dal momento della fecondazione in un contesto che, invece, tende a sottrarre la protezione nei primi 14 giorni di vita dell’embrione umano. One of us, l’iniziativa dei cittadini europei, promossa sulla base del Trattato di Lisbona, si presenta come una straordinaria occasione per svolgere un ruolo di contenimento delle possibili derive negative della legge recentemente approvata e per mantenere nella società la consapevolezza che la dignità umana è uguale per tutti gli esseri umani, così tutti, sin dal concepimento, sono titolari del diritto alla vita. I cittadini irlandesi potrebbero confermare con la vastità delle adesioni a “Uno di noi” la stessa volontà manifestata nei referendum del 1983, del 1997 e del 2002: “lo Stato riconosce il diritto alla vita del bambino che deve nascere”. ---------- After several lively debates and judicial decisions, the Irish parliament passed a law on abortion in July 2013 Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act (2013) which, however, has not put an end to the discussion or calmed anxieties. The contribution, supported by extensive documentation, moves simultaneously on three levels: 1. examining the legal aspects (constitutional, referendums, legislation and judicial decisions) of abortion’s history in Ireland highlighting those that make that history unique compared to other European countries; 2. dealing with the question of the legal status of the human embryo into the Irish legal system regarding both abortion, and artificial insemination (widely practiced and legitimized by law); 3. offers interpretations and concrete prospects for protecting human life from the moment of fertilization in a context which, however, tends to deprive human life of protection in the first 14 days of life. One of us, the European citizens’ initiative, promoted on the basis of the Treaty of Lisbon, is presented as an extraordinary opportunity to play a role in limiting the possible negative tendencies of the law recently passed and to maintain awareness in society that human dignity is the same for all human beings. So everyone, from conception, is entitled to the right to life. In particular, One of us gives Irish citizens the great chance to confirm the same desire expressed in the referenda of 1983, 1992 and 2002 – “The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn child” – by signing in great numbers the “One of Us” citizen’s initiative.


Author(s):  
Stephen Laurence ◽  
Eric Margolis

This article explains different views on concepts, which are among the most fundamental constructs in cognitive science. Michael Dummett argues that nonhuman animals are not capable of full-fledged conceptual thought but only a diminished form of thought, which he calls, proto-thought. Human beings can remove themselves from the moment and can rise above the confined world of current perceptions because of their linguistic abilities. Donald Davidson, a contemporary philosopher, denies that animals are capable of conceptual thought and claim that conceptual content requires a rich inferential network. Donald Davidson made an argument against animals having conceptual thought. Davidson's original formulation of the argument begins with the claim that having a belief requires having the concept of a belief but adds that having the concept of belief requires possession of a natural language. It follows, then, that to have a belief requires facility with natural language. The characterization of the conceptual/nonconceptual distinction that is implicit in Davidson's metacognitive argument is a complex one involving a capacity for belief about beliefs, a concept of belief, and concepts of truth and falsity. Both Robert Brandom and John McDowell argued that conceptual thought requires more than a capacity for detection. They claim that conceptual thought requires the ability to appreciate the reasons that would justify a given concept's application and use, and this, in turn, is inherently a social practice that is dependent on natural language


Author(s):  
Laura W. Ekstrom

This book focuses on arguments from suffering against the existence of God and on a variety of issues concerning agency and value that they bring out. The central aim is to show the extent and power of arguments from evil. The book provides a close investigation of an under-defended claim at the heart of the major free-will-based responses to such arguments, namely that free will is sufficiently valuable to serve as the good, or to serve prominently among the goods, that provides a God-justifying reason for permitting evil in our world. Offering a fresh examination of traditional theodicies, it also develops an alternative line the author calls a divine intimacy theodicy. It makes an extended case for rejection of the position of skeptical theism. The book expands upon an argument from evil concerning a traditional doctrine of hell, which reveals a number of interesting issues concerning fault, agency, and blameworthiness. In response to recent work contending that the problem of evil is defanged since God’s baseline attitude toward human beings is indifference, the book defends the essential perfect moral goodness of God. Finally it takes up the question of whether or not it makes sense to live a religious life as an agnostic or as an atheist.


Author(s):  
David P. Barshinger

This chapter describes Jonathan Edwards’s doctrine of sin and evil. It emphasizes the role of the Bible as foundational to his theology while also highlighting his desire to defend the reasonableness of traditional Christian doctrine in light of eighteenth-century intellectual challenges. The chapter explores Edwards’s theodicy in response to the problem of evil—how he sought to absolve God of the charge that he is the author of evil. It describes Edwards’s doctrine of original sin and human depravity, which he explained by defending the universality of sin and the transmission of Adam’s sin to his posterity and in which he developed an innovative metaphysic using occasionalism and continuous creationism. As a pastor, Edwards preached on sin to warn people of punishment, call them to repentance, and emphasize redemption in Christ. The chapter recommends giving greater attention to Edwards’s sermons and pastoral ministry in understanding his view of sin and evil.


Author(s):  
George I. Mavrodes

Predestination appears to be a religious or theological version of universal determinism, a version in which the final determining factor is the will or action of God. It is most often associated with the theological tradition of Calvinism, although some theologians outside the Calvinist tradition, or prior to it (for example, Augustine and Thomas Aquinas), profess similar doctrines. The idea of predestination also plays a role in some religions other than Christianity, perhaps most notably in Islam. Sometimes the idea of predestination is formulated in a comparatively restricted way, being applied only to the manner in which the divine grace of salvation is said to be extended to some human beings and not to others. John Calvin, for example, writes: We call predestination God’s eternal decree, by which he compacted with himself what he willed to become of each man. For all are not created in equal condition; rather, eternal life is foreordained for some, eternal damnation for others. Therefore, as any man has been created to one or the other of these ends, we speak of him as predestined to life or to death. (Institutes, bk 3, ch. 21, sec. 5) At other times, however, the idea is applied more generally to the whole course of events in the world; whatever happens in the world is determined by the will of God. Philosophically, the most interesting aspects of the doctrine are not essentially linked with salvation. For instance, if God is the first cause of all that happens, how can people be said to have free will? One answer may be that people are free in so far as they act in accordance with their own motives and desires, even if these are determined by God. Another problem is that the doctrine seems to make God ultimately responsible for sin. A possible response here is to distinguish between actively causing something and passively allowing it to happen, and to say that God merely allows people to sin; it is then human agents who actively choose to sin and God is therefore not responsible.


Author(s):  
Christopher Kirwan

Pelagius, a Christian layman, was active around ad 400. The thesis chiefly associated with his name is that (i) human beings have it in their own power to avoid sin and achieve righteousness. Critics objected that this derogates from human dependence on the grace of God. Pelagius did not deny that the power to avoid sin is itself a gift of God, an enabling grace; but he was understood to deny the need for cooperative grace, divine aid in using the power rightly, or at least to assert that (ii) such aid is a reward for human effort, and so not an act of grace. Later thinkers who held that God’s aid, though not a reward, goes only to those who do make an effort, were accused of believing that (iii) there is no need of prevenient grace in causing the effort in the first place. So Pelagianism is a tendency to magnify human powers: its defenders saw it as a (frightening) challenge to humans, its detractors as an insult to God. It was hard without Pelagianism to find a place for free will, or with it for original sin.


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