The Informal Game Theory in Hume's Account of Convention

1998 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 215-247 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Vanderschraaf
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Economic Theory ◽  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Social Interaction ◽  
Strategic Interaction ◽  
General Account ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Number Of Authors ◽  
General Conditions

Hume is rightly credited with giving a brilliant, and perhaps the best, account of justice as convention. Hume's importance as a forerunner of modern economics has also long been recognized. However, most of Hume's readers have not fully appreciated how closely Hume's analysis of convention foreshadows a particular branch of economic theory, namely, game theory. Starting with the work of Barry (1965), Runciman and Sen (1965) and Lewis (1969), there has been a flowering of literature on the informal game-theoretic insights to be found in classics of political philosophy such as Hobbes (1651), Locke (1690), Hume (1740) and Rousseau (1755). A number of authors in this tradition, including Lewis (1969), Gauthier (1979), Mackie (1980), and Postema (1995), have identified passages in Hume which they interpret as giving informal examples of specific games. Yet, unlike his predecessors, Hobbes and Locke, Hume does much more than present examples which have a game-theoretic structure. In his account of convention, Hume gives general conditions which characterize the resolution of social interaction problems, and in the examples he uses to illustrate this account, Hume outlines several different methods by which agents can arrive at such a resolution. Hume's general account of convention and his explanations of the origins of particular conventions together constitute a theory of strategic interaction, which is precisely what game theory aspires to be.

scholarly journals Papers on pragmasemantics

2009 ◽  
Vol 51 ◽  
pp. 216
Author(s):  
Anton Benz ◽  
Reinhard Blutner
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Natural Language ◽  
Optimality Theory ◽  
Cognitive Skills ◽  
Research Programme ◽  
Strategic Interaction ◽  
Mathematical Framework ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Bidirectional Optimality Theory ◽  
Game Theoretic Pragmatics

Optimality theory as used in linguistics (Prince & Smolensky, 1993/2004; Smolensky & Legendre, 2006) and cognitive psychology (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001) is a theoretical framework that aims to integrate constraint based knowledge representation systems, generative grammar, cognitive skills, and aspects of neural network processing. In the last years considerable progress was made to overcome the artificial separation between the disciplines of linguistic on the one hand which are mainly concerned with the description of natural language competences and the psychological disciplines on the other hand which are interested in real language performance. The semantics and pragmatics of natural language is a research topic that is asking for an integration of philosophical, linguistic, psycholinguistic aspects, including its neural underpinning. Especially recent work on experimental pragmatics (e.g. Noveck & Sperber, 2005; Garrett & Harnish, 2007) has shown that real progress in the area of pragmatics isn’t possible without using data from all available domains including data from language acquisition and actual language generation and comprehension performance. It is a conceivable research programme to use the optimality theoretic framework in order to realize the integration. Game theoretic pragmatics is a relatively young development in pragmatics. The idea to view communication as a strategic interaction between speaker and hearer is not new. It is already present in Grice' (1975) classical paper on conversational implicatures. What game theory offers is a mathematical framework in which strategic interaction can be precisely described. It is a leading paradigm in economics as witnessed by a series of Nobel prizes in the field. It is also of growing importance to other disciplines of the social sciences. In linguistics, its main applications have been so far pragmatics and theoretical typology. For pragmatics, game theory promises a firm foundation, and a rigor which hopefully will allow studying pragmatic phenomena with the same precision as that achieved in formal semantics. The development of game theoretic pragmatics is closely connected to the development of bidirectional optimality theory (Blutner, 2000). It can be easily seen that the game theoretic notion of a Nash equilibrium and the optimality theoretic notion of a strongly optimal form-meaning pair are closely related to each other. The main impulse that bidirectional optimality theory gave to research on game theoretic pragmatics stemmed from serious empirical problems that resulted from interpreting the principle of weak optimality as a synchronic interpretation principle. In this volume, we have collected papers that are concerned with several aspects of game and optimality theoretic approaches to pragmatics.  

Consensus Hypotheses and Conflict of Interest: an Attempt at Theory Integration

1973 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-98
Author(s):  
Ian Budge
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Social Interaction ◽  
Conflict Of Interest ◽  
Spatial Model ◽  
Theory Integration ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Democratic Stability ◽  
Policy Agreement

Axelrod has demonstrated the equivalence of a measure of structural propensity to conflict, based on game-theory and applicable to certain types of social interaction, and spatial conceptions of policy agreement. However his spatial model rests on assumptions of interval status not commonly met by data from which consensual interpretations have evolved and against which they have been tested. The generality and rigour of consensual explanations of democratic stability can be enhanced by integration with Axelrod's framework. At the same time consensus hypotheses focus on a question left unanswered by game-theoretic formulations: why do democratic political games continue to be played by existing rules? Following Axelrod's recommendation to integrate conflict of interest with other bodies of theory, 1 this paper assesses points of contact between Axelrod's discussion and one line of consensual reasoning, extends the equivalence between conflict of interest and policy agreement to all levels of measurement, and details the contributions which game-theoretic and consensual formulations can make to each other.

The Empirical Promise of Game Theory

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexandre Debs
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
International Security ◽  
Strategic Interaction ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Scientific Enterprise ◽  
Qualitative Evidence ◽  
Comparison Approach ◽  
Potential Benefits ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Solid Foundation

Game theory is a set of mathematical tools used to analyze the strategic interaction between decision makers. Proponents of game theory have offered different perspectives about its potential benefits in the study of politics: It is a rigorous apparatus that can offer a solid foundation for the scientific enterprise; it offers predictions that could be tested with statistical analysis; it can account for the essence of unique cases and could be tested with qualitative evidence. Critics of game theory, in political science and international security specifically, argued in the 1990s that it had generated few empirical insights. Two decades later, game-theoretic approaches to international security remain a robust research program, but their prevalence remains limited. It is important to evaluate the potential benefits of game theory and the contributions that it has made to international security, so as to devise appropriate strategies to maximize its empirical purchase. The controlled comparison approach, using qualitative evidence on a medium number of cases, appears especially promising.

Game theory can build higher mental processes from lower ones1

2007 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 16-18
Author(s):  
George Ainslie
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Strategic Interaction ◽  
Mental Processes ◽  
Mental Functions ◽  
Reward Seeking ◽  
Complex Processes ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Higher Mental Functions

The question of reductionism is an obstacle to unification. Many behavioral scientists who study the more complex or higher mental functions avoid regarding them as selected by motivation. Game-theoretic models in which complex processes grow from the strategic interaction of elementary reward-seeking processes can overcome the mechanical feel of earlier reward-based models. Three examples are briefly described.

scholarly journals The anti-mercenary norm and the market for combat force

2021 ◽  
pp. 002070202199451
Author(s):  
Ulrich Petersohn
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Strategic Interaction ◽  
Strategic Interactions ◽  
Norm Violation ◽  
Reputational Costs

Since 2013, combat services have been increasingly exchanged on the market. This development is puzzling since the practice emerged despite an anti-mercenary norm banning such services, and without any revision of the norm. The article argues that the combat market is not a deliberate design, but the result of strategic interaction. For some, compliance with the anti-mercenary norm is the best strategy, while for others, violating the norm is best. However, once the norm violation occurs, it is in the interest of all actors to maintain a façade of compliance. Non-compliant actors benefit from the combat services, and compliant actors do not have to engage in costly sanctioning of the norm violation, and avoid the reputational costs associated with non-enforcement. The article employs game theory to investigate the strategic interactions of actors across 11 combat contracts from 2013 to 2019.

Development of Game Theoretic Protocols for Multilevel Design

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ayan Sinha ◽  
Farrokh Mistree ◽  
Janet K. Allen
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Geometric Modeling ◽  
Underwater Vehicle ◽  
Design Problems ◽  
Single Level ◽  
Engineering Teams ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Multiple Levels ◽  
The Relationship

The effectiveness of the use of game theory in addressing multi-objective design problems has been illustrated. For the most part, researchers have focused on design problems at single level. In this paper, we illustrate the efficacy of using game theoretic protocols to model the relationship between multidisciplinary engineering teams and facilitate decision making at multiple levels. We will illustrate the protocols in the context of an underwater vehicle with three levels that span material and geometric modeling associated with microstructure mediated design of the material and vehicle.

Strategic Interaction and the Statistical Analysis of International Conflict

1999 ◽  
Vol 93 (2) ◽  
pp. 279-297 ◽  
Author(s):  
Curtis S. Signorino
Keyword(s):  
International Conflict ◽  
Empirical Support ◽  
Interaction Model ◽  
Strategic Interaction ◽  
Monte Carlo Analysis ◽  
Discrete Choice Models ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
International Interaction ◽  
True Values

Although strategic interaction is at the heart of most international relations theory, it has largely been missing from much empirical analysis in the field. Typical applications of logit and probit to theories of international conflict generally do not capture the structure of the strategic interdependence implied by those theories. I demonstrate how to derive statistical discrete choice models of international conflict that directly incorporate the theorized strategic interaction. I show this for a simple crisis interaction model and then use Monte Carlo analysis to show that logit provides estimates with incorrect substantive interpretations as well as fitted values that can be far from the true values. Finally, I reanalyze a well-known game-theoretic model of war, Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman's (1992) international interaction game. My results indicate that there is at best modest empirical support for their model.

The philosophical interpretation of language game theory

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nick Zangwill
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Language Game ◽  
Linguistic Meaning ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Philosophical Interpretation ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

Abstract I give an informal presentation of the evolutionary game theoretic approach to the conventions that constitute linguistic meaning. The aim is to give a philosophical interpretation of the project, which accounts for the role of game theoretic mathematics in explaining linguistic phenomena. I articulate the main virtue of this sort of account, which is its psychological economy, and I point to the casual mechanisms that are the ground of the application of evolutionary game theory to linguistic phenomena. Lastly, I consider the objection that the account cannot explain predication, logic, and compositionality.

Maximizing, Moralizing, and Dramatizing

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan Ryan
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Economic Theory ◽  
Social Interaction ◽  
Social Life ◽  
Voting Behavior ◽  
Karl Popper ◽  
Crucial Element ◽  
The Social ◽  
Theory Of Democracy

This chapter describes a “dramatistic,” “dramatic,” or “dramaturgical” approach to the study of social interaction. It asks whether the dramaturgical model insists on the theatricality of social life merely in the sense of insisting that people fill roles just as persons act parts in a play. This is the question of whether the crucial element in the dramaturgical picture is that cluster of insights that goes under the general heading of “role distance.” The chapter considers the peculiarities of rational explanation and about the role of reconstructions of “the thing to do” other than the role of explaining an action or series of actions by focusing on voting behavior in the terms proposed by Anthony Downs's An Economic Theory of Democracy. It also examines some recent accounts of the phenomenon of suicide, along with the rationality principle, which Karl Popper calls “false but indispensable” to the social sciences.

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