LÉON WALRAS’S THEORY OF PUBLIC INTEREST GOODS: TOWARD AN ORGANIC VIEW OF THE STATE

2019 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 553-572
Author(s):  
Alain Béraud ◽  
Guy Numa

The purpose of this essay is to analyze Léon Walras’s theory of public interest goods. For him, “services and products of public interest are theoretically those that interest men as members of the community or of the State emanating from the authority to establish social conditions, that is, from the satisfaction of needs that are the same and equal to all” ([1875, 1897a] 1992, EEPA, p. 187). In Walras’s mind, this definition meant that public interest goods could not be factored into the utility function, in sharp contrast with the standard approach in public goods theory. Walras did not imply that public interest goods were not useful, but he maintained instead that their utility was felt only by the community as a whole and not by the individual. Walras developed an anti-individualistic view of the State in which the collective interest was not reducible to the sum of private interests.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Piotr Bartula

ASOCIAL “WE” The problems discussed in the book are revealed by the well-known view of Aristotle that man is a cultural, social and political being: ...And he who by nature and not by mere accident lives outside the state, is either a wretch or superhuman being; he is ‘without lineage, law, hearth,‘ as denoted by Homer, because if someone is such a person by nature, he desires passionately war, being isolated, as a stone excluded from dice. Furthermore, It appears that the state is a creation of nature and most of all concerns the individual because when each person separately is not self-sufficient, he will be placed in the same relation to the state like these and other parts in relation to a whole. However, one who is unable to live in the community, or does not need it at all, being self-sufficient, such a person is not a member of the state, so he must be either a beast or god. Directed by the spirit of contrariness, I will add Friedrich Nietzsche’s comment : “Aristotle says that in order to live alone one must be either an animal or a god. The third alternative is lacking. A man must be both – a philosopher.”


The place of the state in the theory of shocks is predetermined by the increasing importance of the subjective component of the processes of self-movement of systemic integrities. The main problem is that the state formalizes the actions of subjects as economic agents, abstracting from social conditions that generate the individual values of a person implemented in the economy. So, the economic subject acquires its own individual values in a society with a sharp polarization of citizens' incomes, inequality of opportunities, a shrinking middle class, and an ineffective public healthcare system, as demonstrated by the coronavirus pandemic. As a result, a fundamental problem arises of the discrepancy between society and economy as well as formal and informal institutions that predetermine the opportunistic behavior of the economic subjects. Thus, the state persistently strives for financial stability in the economy, abstracting from the problems of social disunity.


Author(s):  
Daniel J. Hemel

This chapter suggests a human rights–based justification for national basic income schemes, contrasting it with justifications based on welfarist principles or notions of entitlement to a share of the global commons. Starting from the premise that a state is a collective enterprise that generates a surplus, it contends that any human being who is an “obedient” member of that state has a right to some share of the surplus. That right—which arises from the relationship between the individual and the state, and is independent of need—could justify the entitlement to a basic income. Such income should be provided in cash, not in kind, because the latter risks depriving the individual of the enjoyment of his share of the surplus—in effect, forcing him to forfeit or transfer it to others if he does not use the public goods or services provided by the state.


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (XX) ◽  
pp. 223-233
Author(s):  
Przemysław Niemczuk

The article aims to explore the concept of territorial autonomy. The research assumption is that public interest is one of the fundamental determinants of territorial autonomy. Territorial autonomy has not been defined by law. It is a general and relative term, and thus difficult to define (if such an enterprise is possible at all). However, one thing is certain - the idea behind this term determines the law regulating the organizational and territorial form of the state, i.e. the distribution of power between the centre and the territory. Further attempts to specify territorial autonomy are met with serious difficulties. Therefore, it is crucial to look at it through the prism of public interest. The term public interest has a relative meaning, because it depends on the constantly changing social conditions. This variability is, among others, a result of the territorial context. The national interest and the territorial interest will be defined in different ways. It seems, therefore, that in order to explicate the notion territorial autonomy, one should refer to the concept of public interest and then take into account the relationship between the interest of a territory and the interest of the whole state. This will make it possible to outline territorial autonomy through the prism of its determinant – the public interest.


1974 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 482-496 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stan Wilk

The psychological development of most human beings leads to the emergence of feelings of “belongingness” vis-à-vis certain social groupings. I shall denote such feelings by the term “loyalties.” With the emergence of the state, and increasingly on into the contemporary era, an attempt has been made by these maximal-sized, territorial-based political units, to develop a state-focused civic sense within their respective societies. According to Geertz (1963: 156), the civic sense involves “a definite concept of the public as a separate and distinct body and an attendant notion of a genuine public interest, which though not necessarily superior to, is independent of and at times even in conflict with both private and other sorts of collective interest.” However, within the confines of already existing states may be smaller territorial units who view themselves as political communities with their own publics.


2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 86-112
Author(s):  
Christopher Borucki

AbstractWhen it comes to environmental damage, a basic tenet is that the polluter should pay. Nonetheless, public authorities regularly incur clean-up costs. Environmental damage often transcends the individual polluter, affecting a plurality of personal and/or public goods. Its diffuse extent and complex nature make environmental protection a collective interest. Thus, it comes as no surprise that public authorities can be legally obliged to take preventive and remedial measures against environmental damage. However, when public authorities act on such a legal obligation, the question arises: whose burden are the costs of the measures taken? The emergence of the polluter pays principle indicates a preference to allocate the costs to those who elicit the legal obligation. What role has tort law to play in this regard? Even though it is certain that public authorities are not exempt from tortious liability themselves, doubts exist whether they can claim in tort as wronged parties. Public authorities represent society and embody the public interest. Tort law, however, seems to mainly focus on private interests. Nevertheless, the Belgian transposition of the European Environmental Liability Directive, which obliges the polluter to pay for the prevention and remedial measures, allows for a claim in tort. This contribution inquires whether such a claim allows for the recovery of all costs mentioned in the directive, even general expenses. From a comparative law perspective it examines how the polluter pays principle, advocated for on the international legal scene, is to be imbedded in national tort law. In particular, it examines whether national tort law acts as a straitjacket for the principle, or whether the principle might, conversely, serve as a crowbar to break open this field of law to allow compensation for harms that traditionally would not be eligible for damages. It finds the principle has a harmonising influence but is not absolute.


Author(s):  
Oksana V. Nardina ◽  

Introduction. Terrorism as a socio-political phenomenon that violates the security, rights and interests of the individual, society and the state, puts forward new tasks for constitutional construction in a globalizing world. That is why the article examines the current constitutional and legal models of countering terrorism. The author analyzes various points of view of scientists and politicians on the relationship of human rights, as well as other constitutional values with measures of response to an emergency. Theoretical analysis. The study of the constitutional and legal models of countering terrorism is important not only from a theoretical, but also from a practical point of view, since the most serious and systematic abuse of exclusive powers and violations of human rights occur during countering threats to public order and national security. Empirical analysis. Considering the models for the application of exceptional measures in emergency situations, we draw attention to the following important factors within the framework in which they are implemented: whether the exceptional anti-terrorist measures are aimed at protecting the constitutional order, human rights and freedoms or when they are introduced, other goal-setting is possible; whether the state considers anti-terrorist measures to be extraordinary or proceeds from the assumption that their use is possible in the normal course of the exercise of state power; whether the transition of the state from emergency measures to the usual regime of exercising state power has been ensured in a normative way. Results. Systematizing the views of scientists on the problem of state countering terrorism, we have identified the following basic constitutional and legal models: the absolutization of human rights, non-constitutional and based on achieving a balance of public and private interests.


Financial law ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 23-26
Author(s):  
Elena A. Tsvetkova ◽  

Protected legal interest is a legal category that allows to reflect all those interests that for one reason or another are not «covered» by subjective rights, but certainly have some importance for both society and the individual. It is convenient for the State, through such a tool as «protected legitimate interest», to take under its protection and protection those interests which, on the one hand, there is no need to translate into the rank of subjective rights, and on the other hand, when it is necessary for protection public interest, they gain a right and become the rights of the taxpayer.


2015 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 296-304
Author(s):  
Ana Benje

The report aims to illustrate how weakening of the statehood is reflected in the way EU and its member-states manage obesity epidemics. Private interests and behavioural turn in policy mechanisms call for more state involvement and rigorous democratic deliberation not only of nudges coming from the state, but those coming from the industry as well. The potential of nudging does not lie in the behavioural interventions it is capable of producing, but rather in the discourse it kick-started, as behavioural law and economics are paving their way into policy-making.


Author(s):  
Anna F. Meshcheryakova

This article is devoted to the study of such complex phenomena as civil society and the secular state and their subsequent influence on each other. The study takes a close look at religious associations, which constitute a structural element of civil society. Freedom of action granted by the state within the framework of secularity allows them to play the role of a link between the individual, the state, and society and coordinates common and private interests, and thus contributes to strengthening relations between these entities. Thus, secularity acts as a fundamental legal value. Taking into consideration the essential features of the secular state, we trace peculiarities of the relationship of religious associations to authorities at the present stage. It is proved that their active citizenship helps the state solve many issues related to meeting diverse needs of the individual. At the same time, the study focuses on the imperfection of Russian legislation governing various aspects of secularity, specifically on the vagueness and inaccuracy of some formulations which lead to a clash of opinions and interests of people with different worldviews and groundless accusations of authorities of clerical tendencies. At the same time, clericalization is a negative factor destabilizing civil society, hindering its normal development. We express an opinion on the admissibility and even expediency of statechurch interaction, which, with strict legislative regulation, cannot be identified with the attempts to clericalize power and society. The study also defines the freedom of religion limits (freedom of conscience) in the formation of a secular state and civil society


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