scholarly journals Constitutional and legal models of countering terrorism

Author(s):  
Oksana V. Nardina ◽  

Introduction. Terrorism as a socio-political phenomenon that violates the security, rights and interests of the individual, society and the state, puts forward new tasks for constitutional construction in a globalizing world. That is why the article examines the current constitutional and legal models of countering terrorism. The author analyzes various points of view of scientists and politicians on the relationship of human rights, as well as other constitutional values with measures of response to an emergency. Theoretical analysis. The study of the constitutional and legal models of countering terrorism is important not only from a theoretical, but also from a practical point of view, since the most serious and systematic abuse of exclusive powers and violations of human rights occur during countering threats to public order and national security. Empirical analysis. Considering the models for the application of exceptional measures in emergency situations, we draw attention to the following important factors within the framework in which they are implemented: whether the exceptional anti-terrorist measures are aimed at protecting the constitutional order, human rights and freedoms or when they are introduced, other goal-setting is possible; whether the state considers anti-terrorist measures to be extraordinary or proceeds from the assumption that their use is possible in the normal course of the exercise of state power; whether the transition of the state from emergency measures to the usual regime of exercising state power has been ensured in a normative way. Results. Systematizing the views of scientists on the problem of state countering terrorism, we have identified the following basic constitutional and legal models: the absolutization of human rights, non-constitutional and based on achieving a balance of public and private interests.

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 36-46
Author(s):  
Sergey Yadrikhinskiy

Introduction. Legal science traditionally considers the taxpayer as a person obliged, and the payment of tax in terms of unconditional, unilateral claims of the state. At the same time, the practice of taxation shows that not only the state, but also the taxpayer is interested in the proper execution of the tax duty. This article proposes to conduct a study of the performance of duties from the point of view of the legitimate interests of the taxpayer. Purpose. The purpose of this study is to consider the legal and organizational aspects of the obligation to pay tax, as well as the resolution of conflict issues in the balancing of public and private interests. Methodology. The methodological basis of the study consists of various General and special methods of cognition of the phenomena of legal reality. Among them, legal-dogmatic and historical-legal methods are particularly important. Results. The article reveals the signs of proper fulfillment of tax duties; distinguishes the concepts of “payment of tax” and “transfer of tax”; substantiates the idea that the implementation of tax duties is associated with the legitimate interests of the taxpayer, the accounting of which is an obligation on the part of the state in the face of law enforcement agencies (courts, tax authorities); analyzes the legal position of the constitutional Court of the Russian Federation on the payment of taxes and the performance of tax duties, defines the boundaries of good faith behavior of the taxpayer. Conclusions. The recognition of a duly performed tax duty is a legitimate interest of the taxpayer, which is subject to protection. Based on the analysis of the multistage process of tax payment and through the prism of the principle of justice, the conclusion about the inadmissibility of imposing all responsibility for not receiving money to the budget only on the taxpayer is substantiated. A practice that gives priority only to fiscal interest leads to an imbalance of private and public interests.


2020 ◽  
pp. 33-48
Author(s):  
Iwona Florek

Since the outbreak of the Covid-19 epidemic in November 2019 in Wuhan (China) countries experience negative impact of the coronavirus actions on their health care systems. Therefore different administrative regulations are imposed to flatten the disease curve, to ensure fluent and undisturbed work of health units. The goal of the article is to get a closer look at practical aspects of legal and administrative regulations that are imposed in different countries to prevent the spread of coronavirus and analyse them in the context of human rights restrictions. It is difficult, if not impossible, the give a simple answer whether or which restraints are needed. Therefore, the author aims at drawing attention on the slight borderline where the restrictions are necessary for the sake of health and where are they exaggeration of public authority’s power over individuals. The novum of the article is a look at the state-individual relationship according to the concept of W. Osiatyński in the situation of the Covid-19 epidemic. The research method used by the author is the analysis of the relationship between the state and the individual in terms of human rights, taking into account the provisions of law. The practical assessment of the implementation of the protection of individual rights was illustrated by the most recent press reports, both Polish and international.


2003 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 28-33
Author(s):  
Yolanda García Rodríguez

In Spain doctoral studies underwent a major legal reform in 1998. The new legislation has brought together the criteria, norms, rules, and study certificates in universities throughout the country, both public and private. A brief description is presented here of the planning and structuring of doctoral programs, which have two clearly differentiated periods: teaching and research. At the end of the 2-year teaching program, the individual and personal phase of preparing one's doctoral thesis commences. However, despite efforts by the state to regulate these studies and to achieve greater efficiency, critical judgment is in order as to whether the envisioned aims are being achieved, namely, that students successfully complete their doctoral studies. After this analysis, we make proposals for the future aimed mainly at the individual period during which the thesis is written, a critical phase in obtaining the doctor's degree. Not enough attention has been given to this in the existing legislation.


Author(s):  
Marina Aleksandrovna Kalievskaya

In this article, a model of the mechanism of ensuring public security and orderliness in accordance with the principles and tasks of the relevant institu- tions in public administration, taking into account resources, technologies, mea- sures for the state policy implementation in the spheres of ensuring the protection of human rights and freedoms, the interests of society and the state, combating crime, maintaining public security and order. It was found that ensuring public security and order in Ukraine is a mechanism for the implementation of national goals of state policy in the areas of ensuring the protection of human rights and freedoms, the interests of society and the state, combating crime, maintaining public security and order, by defining tasks according to certain principles. The idea is that if one considers the state policy in the spheres of ensuring the protec- tion of human rights and freedoms, the interests of society and the state, combat- ing crime, maintaining public security and order as a national priority (purpose, task), then the mechanism of ensuring public security and order in Ukraine needs coordination with the state development strategy. From the point of view of the implementation of the state policy in the areas of ensuring the protection of hu- man rights and freedoms, the interests of society and the state, combating crime, maintaining public security and order, the mechanism of ensuring public security and order in Ukraine can be considered as the main system providing intercon- nection such elements as institutions (implementing the specified state policy), resources (human resources, logistical, natural and so on, with the help of which it is possible to implement state policy), technologies (skills, knowledge, means and so on the implementation of state policy), measures (action plans), as well as external (internal) threats.


2020 ◽  
Vol 114 ◽  
pp. 193-199
Author(s):  
Sean D. Murphy ◽  
Claudio Grossman

Our conversation might begin by looking backward a bit. The human rights movement from 1945 onward has been one of the signature accomplishments of the field of international law, one that refocused our attention from a largely interstate system to a system where the individual moved in from the periphery to the center. Human rights champions point to numerous landmark treaties, numerous institutions, and the rise of NGOs as a critical vehicle for developing and monitoring human rights rules. Yet others look at the international human right system and still see the state as overly central, tolerating and paying lip service to human rights, but too easily discarding them when they prove to be inconvenient. The persistence of racism comes to mind. As a general matter, how would you assess the strengths and weaknesses of the system that was built essentially during your lifetime?


Sæculum ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-83
Author(s):  
Ionel Nariţa

AbstractBy „dispute” we mean an argumentative dialog where each of the two parts state opposite theses. Two sentences can be contrary if they have similar reference, but incompatible predicates (SIP – sentences with incompatible predicates). Usually, the disputes are solved using force in different ways, but that does not mean that the winner is right and his thesis is true. Therefore, we cannot evaluate a thesis on the ground of its success, but we need a reference mark for that. According to the Sophist school, the individual is the only reference mark, so any SIP is equally justified. The absolutist point of view claims that there is an objective reference mark and, consequently, the truth is, at its turn, objective and unique. Finally, the relativist orientation rejects any objective reference mark, but the right thesis is not arbitrary, as the sophists thought, it is true relatively to the state of the evaluator to a given moment. It follows that, for any evaluator, at a moment of time, only one SIP is true.


2003 ◽  
Vol 75 (9-10) ◽  
pp. 409-422
Author(s):  
Nikola Mihailović

A breach of any right or freedom under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, leads to but is not limited to liability of the State for damages. That liability is much stricter than the State liability for damage provided according to the domestic law provisions currently in force. The current provisions on State liability for the work of its judiciary do not include the damage caused by improper interpretation and application of the relevant legal provisions. In contrast, the liability of the Council of Europe Member States for the damage caused by their judicial and other authorities, through the breach of the human rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Convention includes their liability for improper interpretation and application of the relevant provisions of the Convention. That liability is so strict that it in fact comes equal to no-fault liability, from the point of view of its legal consequences. This is so, although it is regulated only as a presumed liability for which there are no grounds of limitation. As a result, two systems of liability for damage caused by judicial authorities will exist in our State Union and in its member states, after the ratification of the aforementioned Convention: liability pursuant to the domestic legal provisions and liability pursuant to the Convention. For that reason, a reform of the provisions on liability is necessary, which will lead to tightening of liability for damage caused by judiciary pursuant to the domestic rules. How to achieve this is a separate issue, which will not be discussed on this occasion.


Author(s):  
Daniel J. Hemel

This chapter suggests a human rights–based justification for national basic income schemes, contrasting it with justifications based on welfarist principles or notions of entitlement to a share of the global commons. Starting from the premise that a state is a collective enterprise that generates a surplus, it contends that any human being who is an “obedient” member of that state has a right to some share of the surplus. That right—which arises from the relationship between the individual and the state, and is independent of need—could justify the entitlement to a basic income. Such income should be provided in cash, not in kind, because the latter risks depriving the individual of the enjoyment of his share of the surplus—in effect, forcing him to forfeit or transfer it to others if he does not use the public goods or services provided by the state.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janina Dill

AbstractDoes International Humanitarian Law (IHL) impose a duty of care on the attacker? From a moral point of view, should it? This article argues that the legal situation is contestable, and the moral value of a legal duty of care in attack is ambivalent. This is because a duty of care is both a condition for and an obstacle to the ‘individualization of war’. The individualization of war denotes an observable multi-dimensional norm shift in international relations. Norms for the regulation of war that focus on the interests, rights, and duties of the individual have gained in importance compared to those that focus on the interests, rights, and duties of the state. As the individual, not the state, is the ultimate locus of moral value, this norm shift in international relations, and the corresponding developments in international law, are morally desirable. When it comes to IHL, the goal of protecting the interests of the individual creates strong reasons both for and against imposing a legal duty of care on the attacker. The enquiry into whether IHL does and should impose a legal duty of care therefore reveals that the extent to which war can be individualized is limited.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document