scholarly journals Constitutional identity and the European Courts

2007 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-181 ◽  
Author(s):  
JHR ◽  
LB

The Conseil constitutionnel has spoken again. In a decision of 27 July 2006, no. 2006-540 DC, the French constitutional court has further and significantly elaborated on earlier rulings on the status of Community directives in the French legal order. In the summer of 2004, it had ruled, in cases in which it was asked to declare unconstitutional an act of parliament implementing Community directives, that ‘the transposing of a Community directive results from a constitutional requirement with which non-compliance is only possible by reason of an express contrary provision of the Constitution’ (decisions of, inter alia, 10 June 2004, no. 2004-496 DC and 29 July 2004, no. 2004-498 DC). Very recently, the Conseil d'Etat, France's highest administrative court, took a similar stance in a case in which the constitutionality of a government decree implementing a directive was at stake (Decision of 8 February 2007, Société Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine et autres).

2016 ◽  
pp. 91-107
Author(s):  
TUDOREL TOADER ◽  
MARIETA SAFTA

The Constitutional Court has ruled that, by adhering to the legal order of the European Union, Romania agreed that, in those areas where exclusive jurisdiction is conferred on the European Union, regardless of the international treaties priorly signed, implementation of its obligations arising therefrom is subject to the rules of the European Union. Otherwise, this would result in the undesirable situation where, through bi or multilateral internationally assumed obligations, Member State would seriously affect the Union’s competence and, in practice, would act in its place in the aforementioned areas. For this reason, in the field of competition, any State aid falls within the competence of the European Commission and appeal proceedings fall within the jurisdiction of the European Union. Therefore, pursuant to Article 11 para. (1) and Article 148 para. (2) and (4) of the Constitution, Romania applies in good faith the obligations resulting from the Accession Instrument, without interfering with the exclusive competence of the European Union and, by virtue of the compliance clause contained in the text of Article 148 of the Constitution, Romania cannot adopt a legislative act contrary to the obligations assumed as a Member State. All those already highlighted are subject to certain limitations, expressed in what the Court described as “national constitutional identity”.


2013 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 267-271 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernard Stirn

Abstract Bernard Stirn’s presentation examines the status of international custom in French public law. He notes that international custom may be considered as covered by the reference in the preamble of the Constitution to the rules of public international law. He underlines the increased effects of international custom in the French domestic legal order as enshrined in the latest developments of the case-law of the Conseil d’Etat. He stresses that whilst French administrative judges may set aside a law in the event of a conflict with the provisions of an international treaty, they do not possess a similar power in the case of a conflict with a rule of customary international law. He concludes by citing cases in which the French constitutional court has made reference to international custom.


2005 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 553-568 ◽  
Author(s):  
Saša Beljin

On 14 October 2004 the German Federal Constitutional Court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht, delivered a decision of principal character regarding the status of the European Convention on Human Rights (Convention) and the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights in the German legal order. It is the first time the Bundesverfassungsgericht has so fundamentally dealt with this topic, moreover in the composition of the complete (second) Senate (not just a chamber of the court). That the constitutional court itself attaches high importance to its decision and expected international interest is witnessed by the fact that the court has made an English translation of the decision available. This is something that does not happen very often, at least until now.


Author(s):  
Erika De Wet

The Fick case which was decided by the Constitutional Court on 27 June 2013 was the first time since its inception that the Constitutional Court was confronted with the status of a binding international decision within the domestic legal order. It concerned a binding decision by the (now suspended) Southern African Development Community (SADC) Tribunal against Zimbabwe, which was also enforceable in South Africa. A key issue before the Court was whether or not the South African statutory rules of civil procedure for the enforcement of foreign judgments also covered judgments of international courts and tribunals (as anticipated by Article 32(1) of the Protocol on the SADC Tribunal). As none of the relevant statutory legislation was applicable in this instance, the common law remained the only possible avenue through which the SADC Tribunal’s decision could be enforced in South Africa. At the time of the decision, the common law on the enforcement of civil judgments had developed only to a point where it provided for the execution of judgments made by domestic courts of a foreign state (ie decisions of other national courts). The Court was therefore confronted with whether or not an international decision in the form of a cost order of the SADC Tribunal amounted to a “foreign judgment” as recognized by the South African common law. The Court answered this question in the affirmative by relying on those clauses in the Constitution that committed South Africa to the rule of law, as well as its obligations under international law, and to an international-law friendly interpretation of domestic law. Although the decision is to be welcomed and applied the law correctly to the facts of the case, it does raise the issue of the wisdom of equating international judgments with foreign judgments on a more general scale. This relates to the fact that it is generally accepted in most jurisdictions that the recognition and enforcement of a “foreign judgment” can be denied where it would result in a violation of domestic public policy. The public policy exception does not, however, fit well in a regime based on public international law, which does not permit States to use their domestic law as an excuse for not implementing their international obligations.


Author(s):  
Yaroslav Skoromnyy ◽  

The article presents the conceptual foundations of bringing judges to civil and legal liability. It was found that the civil and legal liability of judges is one of the types of legal liability of judges. It is determined that the legislation of Ukraine provides for a clearly delineated list of the main cases (grounds) for which the state is liable for damages for damage caused to a legal entity and an individual by illegal actions of a judge as a result of the administration of justice. It has been proved that bringing judges to civil and legal liability, in particular on the basis of the right of recourse, provides for the payment of just compensation in accordance with the decision of the European Court of Human Rights. It was established that the bringing of judges to civil and legal liability in Ukraine is regulated by such legislative documents as the Constitution of Ukraine, the Civil Code of Ukraine, the Explanatory Note to the European Charter on the Status of Judges (Model Code), the Law of Ukraine «On the Judicial System and the Status of Judges», the Law of Ukraine «On the procedure for compensation for harm caused to a citizen by illegal actions of bodies carrying out operational-search activities, pre-trial investigation bodies, prosecutors and courts», Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine in the case on the constitutional submission of the Supreme Court of Ukraine regarding the compliance of the Constitution of Ukraine (constitutionality) of certain provisions of Article 2, paragraph two of clause II «Final and transitional provisions» of the Law of Ukraine «On measures to legislatively ensure the reform of the pension system», Article 138 of the Law of Ukraine «On the judicial system and the status of judges» (the case on changes in the conditions for the payment of pensions and monthly living known salaries of judges lagging behind in these), the Law of Ukraine «On the implementation of decisions and the application of the practice of the European Court of Human Rights».


Author(s):  
Stefan Kadelbach

This chapter deals with the making, status, and interpretation of international treaties under the German Constitution. It describes the interrelationship of the different institutions in treaty-making and shows how a comparatively old provision of the German Basic Law has been adapted slowly to new circumstances over the past decades. Thus, even though foreign affairs has remained a domain of the executive, several developments have contributed to an enhanced role of Parliament over time. These developments are partly due to the role of special sectors of law such as EU law and the law governing the use of force and partly due to changes in constitutional practice. As for the status of treaties in German law, the Federal Constitutional Court has developed a stance according to which treaties generally share the rank of the legal act that implements them into domestic law. A notable exception is the European Convention of Human Rights, which has assumed a quasi-constitutional rank by means of consistent interpretation. Some reference is made to other continental systems to assess how far different constitutions bring about certain features; various systems appear similar in many respects at first sight, whereas features in which they differ may be a source of inspiration for future constitutional practice.


2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 130
Author(s):  
Titon Slamet Kurnia

Artikel ini mencerminkan pendapat penulis yang tidak setuju dengan keberadaan KPK dan Teori Konstitusi yang mendasarinya. Artikel ini didasarkan pada teori trias politica klasik dan mengajukan pendapat bahwa keberadaan badan-badan yang bersifat eksekutif harus sesuai dengan preskripsi teori unitary executive. Sesuai dengan teori unitary executive, presiden harus diberikan kewenangan to appoint and remove setiap pejabat eksekutif secara eksklusif. Kaidah ini didasarkan pada status presiden sebagai Chief Executive. Berdasar pengertian ini, KPK, sebagai badan independen, inkonstitusional. Seturut dengan Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi No. 36/PUU-XV/2017 yang mengkualifikasikan KPK sebagai eksekutif, tata konstitusional kita yang abnormal, dengan keberadaan KPK, harus dinormalkan sesuai dengan teori unitary executive. This article expresses the author’s view to disagree with the existence of the KPK and its supporting Constitutional Theory. This article is based on classical model of the trias politica theory and suggests that the existence of executive bodies should conform with the prescription of unitary executive theory. According to the unitary executive theory, the president should have the power to appoint and remove any executive official exclusively. This norm is based on the status of the president as the Chief Executive. According to this notion, the KPK, as independent agency, is unconstitutional. In line with the Constitutional Court Decision No. 36/PUU-XV/2017, qualifying the KPK as executive, our abnormal constitutional order, with the existence of the KPK, should be normalized in accordance with the unitary executive theory.


Yuridika ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 363
Author(s):  
Sopian Sitepu

The existence of State-Owned enterprises (SOE) as one of Indonesia’s legal entities, whereby the State owns part of all of the capital of the company has presented several legal issues. The BUMN Act that has become the basis for establishing State-Owned enterprises has become its own independent legal subject and separates itself from the wealth of the State and has adhered to the provisions of the Company Law Act so that the capital that is presented by the State to the corporation remains as the capital of the SOE and not form the State. However, existing legislations regarding State funds places the funds for SOE as being part of the State budget. This ambiguity in the status of BUMN Funds is not only found in legislations but also in two different constitutional court decisions that presents inconsistencies towards law enforcers. This clear distinction is crucial in the practice of law enforcement in Indonesia.


2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 239-242
Author(s):  
Ramot H.P Limbong ◽  
I Gusti Bagus Suryawan ◽  
I Nyoman Sutama

Political parties as legal entities may be subject to criminal liability as they are seen from the characteristic of political parties in accordance with the characteristics of the legal entity. The dissolution of political parties becomes one of the legal issues governed by Indonesian legislation. The problem of this research is: 1) how is the Constitutional Court Authority in the dissolution of political parties in Indonesia? 2) How is the mechanism of dissolution of political parties? The type of research and approach problems used is normative legal research and statutory approaches. The source of the legal material used is the primary source of legal material and the source of secondary legal material. The technique of collecting legal materials is the technique of library study. The collected legal materials are processed and analyzed using legal arguments. The result of this research is the procedure of the dissolution of political parties in the Constitutional Court as follows: Application submission, application registration and trial schedule, preliminary examination, trial examination, meeting Judge, the verdict of the Constitutional Court. The result of the dissolution of political parties may result in external rights and obligations, due to elected positions, due to the status of managers and members and the consequences of internal rights and obligations.


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