scholarly journals Representants and international orders

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-30
Author(s):  
Alena Drieschova

Abstract The paper introduces a new explanation of international order that focuses on representants. Representants are practices, artifacts, and language that stand in for the international system's units in international fora. They are crucial for International Relations (IR), given that IR deal with a macro-realm that can never be fully present, but needs to be made concrete in specific localities. Representants have four interrelated effects: (1) they define the units of the international system; (2) they legitimize them; (3) they provide them with differential degrees of power; and (4) they serve as tools for governing. When representants are seriously challenged, orders are in crisis; when new representants emerge, a new order has taken hold. The paper develops a mechanism of change emerging from struggles over representants. It studies the transition from the medieval order of universal monarchy to an order of divine right absolutism. Representants, such as gothic cathedrals, the mass, and coronation rituals maintained the medieval hierarchical order with the pope/emperor at the apex. The Reformation provided the last step in kings' challenge to the medieval order. Kings adapted existing representants, so that they would portray the independence of kings from the papacy/emperor, and simultaneously position kings above feudal lords.

Author(s):  
Salah Hassan Mohammed ◽  
Mahaa Ahmed Al-Mawla

The Study is based on the state as one of the main pillars in international politics. In additions, it tackles its position in the international order from the major schools perspectives in international relations, Especially, these schools differ in the status and priorities of the state according to its priorities, also, each scholar has a different point of view. The research is dedicated to providing a future vision of the state's position in the international order in which based on the vision of the major schools in international relations.


Author(s):  
John M. Owen IV

Liberalism has always been concerned with security, albeit the security of the individual; institutions, including the state, are all established and sustained by individuals and instrumental to their desires. Indeed, liberalism cannot be understood apart from its normative commitment to individualism. The tradition insists that all persons deserve, and it evaluates institutions according to how far they help individuals achieve these goals. Nor is liberalism anti-statist. Liberal theory has paid particular attention to the state as the institution defined by its ability to make individuals secure and aid their commodious living. Although liberal security literature that only examines individual states’ foreign policies may be guilty of denouncing the role of international interaction, the general liberal claim argues that the international system, under broad conditions, permits states choices. As such, for liberalism, states can choose over time to create and sustain international conditions under which they will be more or less secure. Liberalism’s history can be traced from the proto-liberalism in the Reformation to the emergence of the social contract theory and neo-theories, as well as liberalism’s focus on increasing security. Meanwhile, current debates in liberalism include the democratic peace and its progeny, reformulations of liberal international relations (IR) theory, and meta-theory. Ultimately, liberalism’s most striking recent successes concern the democratic peace and related research on democratic advantages in international cooperation. Liberalism is a useful guide to international security insofar as individuals and the groups they organize affect or erode states.


Author(s):  
Fulya Hisarlıoğlu ◽  
Lerna K Yanık ◽  
Umut Korkut ◽  
İlke Civelekoğlu

Abstract This article explores the link between populism and hierarchies in international relations by examining the recent foreign policy-making in Turkey and Hungary—two countries run by populist leaders. We argue that when populists bring populism into foreign policy, they do so by contesting the “corrupt elites” of the international order and, simultaneously, attempt to create the “pure people” transnationally. The populists contest the “eliteness” and leadership status of these “elites” and the international order and its institutions, that is, the “establishment,” that these “elites” have come to represent by challenging them both in discourse and in action. The creation of the “pure people” happens by discursively demarcating the “underprivileged” of the international order as a subcategory based on religion and supplementing them with aid, thus mimicking the distributive strategies of populism, this time at the international level. We illustrate that when populist leaders, insert populism into foreign policies of their respective states, through contesting the “corrupt elites” and creating the “pure people,” the built-in vertical stratification mechanisms of populism that stems from the antagonistic binaries inherent to populism provide them with the necessary superiority and inferiority labels allowing them to renegotiate hierarchies in the international system in an attempt to modify the existing ones or to create new ones.


2020 ◽  
Vol 57 (4) ◽  
pp. 344-360
Author(s):  
Sanjeev Kumar H. M.

The democratic peace hypothesis, which is embedded in the neo-Kantian romance of liberal cosmopolitan idealism, was framed in the spatiotemporal context of the Cold War bipolarity. Michael Doyle, who is one of its proponents, invoked the Kantian philosophical abstraction of ‘the perpetual peace’ by providing an intellectual defence and moral high ground for the values of the Liberal Capitalist world. In the post–Cold War setting, Francis Fukuyama re-casted the hypothesis and portrayed the triumph of liberal international order as ‘the end of history’. He attempted to reframe the democratic peace thesis, not only to celebrate liberal values as the normative exemplar for ordering a post–Cold War international system but also to provide an intellectual defence for the newly emerging space for American leadership in a post-hegemonic international system. This intellectual defence of the ethical supremacy of liberal idealism in the world, shaped by the leadership of the USA, was entrenched in the epistemological Imperialism of the West. Besides, it also reflected an exclusionary idea of the history of international relations that was heavily grounded in the chronology of the post-Westphalia international order. Situating ourselves in this framework, this article is an attempt to critique the epistemic foundations of the democratic peace hypothesis, by deconstructing its assertions in the geostrategic context of the regional security architecture in South Asia. The article criticizes the democratic peace thesis, using an analysis of the Kargil conflict (1999) between India and Pakistan, and by placing ourselves in the epistemological framework of the historical turn in international relations.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12(48) (4) ◽  
pp. 69-85
Author(s):  
Alla Kyrydon ◽  
Sergiy Troyan

Conceptual approaches to understanding the current stage of the evolution of international relations were put in place during the destruction of the bipolar world of the Cold War and the formation of new foundations of the world and international order. The distinctiveness of this process is that the collapse of the postwar system took place in peaceful conditions. Most often, two terms are used to describe the interconnectedness and interdependence of world politics after the fall of the Iron Curtain: the post-bipolar (post-westphalian) international system or international relations after the end of the Cold War. Two terms, post-bipolar international system and international relations after the end of the Cold War, have common features, which usually allows them to be used as synonyms and makes them the most popular when choosing a common comprehensive definition for the modern international relations. The collapse of the Soviet bloc and the global bipolar system put on the agenda issues that cannot be resolved within the traditional terms “poles,” “balance of power,” “configuration of the balance of power” etc. The world has entered a period of uncertainty and growing risks. the global international system is experiencing profound shocks associated with the transformation of its structure, changes in its interaction with the environment, which accordingly affects its regional and peripheral dimensions. In modern post-bipolar relations of shaky equilibrium, there is an obvious focus on the transformation of the world international order into a “post-American world” with the critical dynamics of relations between old and new actors at the global level. The question of the further evolution of the entire system of international relations in the post-bipolar world and the tendency of its transformation from a confrontational to a system of cooperation remains open.


2021 ◽  
pp. 7-25
Author(s):  
M. Fesenko

The article examines the problems and prospects of the consolidation of the international order. The thesis that the global systemic crisis is a counter phase or a crisis of consolidation of the international order, which must be overcome by the joint efforts of participants of international relations in order to maintain the stability of the international system and prevent its destruction, is justified. The sustainable development of the modern international system depends on the consolidation of participants in the international order and the deepening of constructive cooperation between its participants. The interconnectedness of numerous crises leads to the intensification of the global system crisis. Its presence is a logical result of the global development of the system of international relations. Among the main elements of the global system crisis one can distinguish the financial crisis, economic crisis, environmental crisis, demographic crisis, global governance crisis, security crisis, energy crisis, global climate crisis. The inability of participants of the international system to regulate global crisis is evidence of a global governance crisis. All these crises, as the most important elements of the global system crisis, shape its structure, reflect its essence and make it holistic. The combination of interdependent crises complicates the overcoming of the global system crisis and strengthens it. Therefore, the global governance crisis is both the cause and the consequence of the global system crisis, which in turn indicates the turbulent state of the international system, in which it is impossible to clearly determine its further development. It is proved that the inability of the participants of the international system to consolidate themselves in accordance with the scale of global political transformations is one of the reasons for the emergence and deepening of the global systemic crisis. The presence of a complex of global crisis phenomena and the lack of effective institutional mechanisms to overcome them in synergetic unity reinforce the effect of each other, which deepens the global systemic crisis. Overcoming it depends on the degree of consolidation of the international order, which aims to improve the mechanisms of global governance of the international system. The basis of a consolidated international order could be a reformed UN with expanded powers or another global international organization. The global systemic crisis requires the search for tools and factors that will help to stabilize socio-economic and political relations and to rethink the forms and mechanisms of effective global governance.


Author(s):  
Abdul Ghafoor Karim Ali ◽  
Younis Talaat Al-Dabbagh

The international system which was established after the end of second world war and the rise of two great states (USA) and (PCCC) (entice), America which represent the liberties states and capitalisms economic, and PCCC which represent the commend systems and social economic. Since the security and diplomatic efforts do the best efforts of reforms. Each relationship between states in the international systems of them has his role historically All states put majority of their efforts against  war and the relationships is going to establish a new international order depending on plurality system in the world.


2001 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 151-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
DANIEL J. WHITENECK

Recent literature in International Relations has argued that the absence of ‘balancing’ behaviour by European states during the Napoleonic Wars from 1798 to 1815 calls into question current explanations for the presence or absence of such behaviour in international relations. This literature has argued that: (1) Napoleonic France presented a significant threat to the stability of the international system; (2) European states did not balance against this threat from 1798 to 1813, and subsequently balanced only after Napoleon's defeat in Russia in 1812; (3) members of the system possessed adequate power to balance successfully against this threat; and (4) since European states engaged in co-opting, rewarding, avoiding, or bandwagoning behaviour towards the French threats to the system, a new explanation for the absence of balancing behaviour is required. Each of these four points can be refuted by: taking a longer time perspective of the international system during the period in question, expanding state motives to include interests other than security, using a long cycle model of coalition leadership by a global leader, recognizing the constraints faced by European states in their choices of balancing or bandwagoning behaviour under threats from France, and taking into account the role of innovation and change in a period of global war.


Author(s):  
Michael J. Kristiono

This paper attempts to investigate the reasons behind the negative sentiments directed towards Chinese Indonesians from an International Relations (IR) perspective. By tracing back the treatment of the New Order government towards ethnic Chinese, it was found that such demonization initially happened due to two politically motivated reasons. Firstly, as part of de-Soekarnoization done by the New Order, the Chinese were outcast because Chinese identity does not conform to the “Indonesian identity”, which was in essence, the Javanese identity. Secondly, the condition reflected the change in Indonesian foreign policy which drifted apart from People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the latter was suspected to be involved in September 30 Movement. Then, I argue that due to those reasons, coupled by systematic maltreatment from the New Order Government, Chinese Indonesians were constructed as the “others”, that is, as non-Indonesians. Such construct has been deeply embedded such that reconciliation attempts done by the Reformation Era government were not sufficient enough to stop ethnic discrimination towards Chinese Indonesians from happening even until the present.


2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-23
Author(s):  
Joachim Krause

Abstract: The international system is going through a period of fundamental change, which has similarities with earlier periods in history. Such periods of change might usher into war and instability if it turned out to be impossible to arrive at a new international order. The current period of change is characterized by the collapse of a liberal international order, which was established under conditions of Western hegemony. The coming anarchy is the consequence of unforeseen structural changes wrought about by globalization and other developments associated with the global spread of the liberal order.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document