How counterterrorism throws back wartime medical assistance and care to pre-Solferino times

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-38
Author(s):  
Françoise Bouchet-Saulnier
Keyword(s):  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
Military Operations ◽  
Medical Assistance ◽  
Simultaneous Application ◽  
Medical Mission ◽  
The Impact

Abstract Domestic counterterrorism (CT) frameworks have been increasingly employed to criminalize impartial medical care to wounded and sick from non-State armed groups labelled as criminal or terrorist in non-international armed conflicts (NIACs). It has also contributed to legitimize attacks and incidental damage on medical facilities in armed conflicts overlooking the international humanitarian law (IHL) protection afforded to the wounded and sick as well as to medical personnel and facilities. This article compares the treatment of the wounded and sick in both international armed conflicts (IACs) and NIACs in the context of the global war on terrorism. It demonstrates the impacts that CT measures have on the IHL protection of the medical mission while demonstrating the increased acceptance that some incidental damages, such as the downgrading of IHL core protections, are tolerated, by some countries in the global fight against terrorism. The article further illustrates how the special criminal status of wounded and sick from non-State armed groups in armed conflicts that are evolving in a CT context can mechanically contaminate the status of impartial humanitarian medical activities, facilities and personnel in such contexts. It also shows how the simultaneous application of CT and IHL in numerous contexts of armed conflict as well as the involvement of State armed forces under those two different bodies of law contributes to blurring the lines between IHL and CT, between protected or “criminal” humanitarian and medical activities. In contexts of complex military operations, this reality creates a mind-set conducive to legal mistakes and security incidents on the medical mission. Although there is a distinction between the protection from attacks and the protection from prosecution under IHL, in practice, numerous military operations to arrest are launched in ways similar to attacks and can end up with some killings. The article concludes that States could easily limit the impact of CT on IHL by adding an exemption in their CT framework for humanitarian and medical assistance that is compatible with IHL. This is the first necessary condition – even if obviously not a sufficient one – to end the legal ambiguity between IHL and State domestic law as to the criminalization or loss of the IHL protected status for the much necessary needed medical assistance and care activities in times of armed conflict that are evolving in a CT context.

Exploring the “continuous combat function” concept in armed conflicts: Time for an extended application?

2018 ◽  
Vol 100 (907-909) ◽  
pp. 267-285
Author(s):  
Sabrina Henry
Keyword(s):  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
Function Concept ◽  
Extended Application

AbstractThis paper focuses on the “continuous combat function” concept and proposes to extend its application. First, the article will demonstrate that the continuous combat function concept should be extended to certain members of organized armed groups in cases where those groups do not belong to any of the parties to an international armed conflict and whose actions do not reach the level of intensity required for a separate non-international armed conflict (NIAC) to exist. Secondly, the paper will look at the extension of this concept in order to determine individual membership in State armed forces in the context of a NIAC, while arguing that the notion of “armed forces” should be interpreted differently depending of the nature of the conflict, be it international or non-international.

scholarly journals THE LIMITATION OF CYBER WARFARE UNDER HUMANITARIAN LAW (Pembatasan Perang Siber dalam Hukum Humaniter)

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Laila Almira
Keyword(s):  
Armed Conflict ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Cyber Warfare ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
Military Operations ◽  
Legal Frameworks ◽  
The Impact

<p><em>States and non-State armed groups are increasingly employing cyber capabilities in their military operations in the digitalization environment today. There is a controversy about how current international legal frameworks, especially International Humanitarian Law (IHL), applies to such conduct in cyberspace, most notably in the context of armed conflict. Because one of the fundamental aims of the IHL is to protect civilians from the impact of armed conflict, it is critical to explore the norms of IHL that regulate such operations. This article will be likely to discuss about cyber warfare in the term of armed conflict. Lastly, the article will be reviewing the rules and principle that applies during the cyber warfare.</em></p><p><em> </em></p>

Part IV The Right to Reparation/Guarantees of Non-Recurrence, B Guarantees of Non-Recurrence of Violations, Principle 37 Disbandment of Parastatal Armed Forces/Demobilization and Social Reintegration of Children

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Duthie Roger ◽  
Mayer-Rieckh Alexander
Keyword(s):  
Transitional Justice ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Historical Background ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
Social Reintegration ◽  
Criminal Violence ◽  
The Right

Principle 37 focuses on the disbandment of parastatal armed forces and the demobilization and social reintegration of children involved in armed conflicts. It articulates measures designed to prevent the transformation of conflict violence to criminal violence through the dismantling and reintegration of all armed groups engaged in abuses, and outlines comprehensive responses to the injustices experienced by children during armed conflict. This chapter first provides a contextual and historical background on Principle 37 before discussing its theoretical framework and practice. It then examines the importance of reintegration processes and how they can be affected by transitional justice measures, along with their implications for former child combatants. It also highlights the relevance of measures for dealing with unofficial armed groups from an impunity standpoint, as well as the efforts of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs to address them.

Personal Self-Defense and the Standing Rules of Engagement

2018 ◽  
pp. 109-124
Author(s):  
Christopher M. Ford
Keyword(s):  
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
Self Defense ◽  
Aerial Vehicle ◽  
The Law ◽  
The U.S

The U.S. military Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) restrict the use of force in armed conflict to either self-defense or “mission-specific” rules of engagement, which refer to the use of force against members of enemy armed forces or organized armed groups that have been “declared hostile.” This bifurcation of authority works well in an international armed conflict, where the enemy force is uniformed and easily distinguished. In these circumstances, the overwhelming number of engagements are against identified hostile forces. In many non-international armed conflicts, however, combatants actively attempt to camouflage their status, and U.S. forces find themselves engaging enemy forces under a self-defense framework. This creates problems. Consider, for example, a situation where three individuals of unknown affiliation launch an attack against a U.S. military convoy in Afghanistan. After a short engagement, the attackers get in a van and speed away from the attack site. The U.S. convoy is disabled, but an unmanned aerial vehicle tracks the van as it retreats into the desert. Thirty minutes later an AH-64 Apache attack helicopter arrives on scene above the still-retreating van. Can the Apache attack the vehicle? The van is retreating and poses no threat, thus self-defense principles would not allow for the use of force, despite the fact that the occupants are clearly directly participating in hostilities. This chapter addresses three questions: Why are the SROE drafted in this manner? What is the basis in the law for the SROE’s approach to self-defense? What are the problems presented by this approach?

Examining the Use of Amnesties and Pardons as a Response to Internal Armed Conflict

2014 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 133-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew G Reiter
Keyword(s):  
Transitional Justice ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
Internal Armed Conflict ◽  
The Past ◽  
Peace And Security ◽  
Lasting Peace ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Internal Armed Conflicts

The use of amnesty for human rights violations has been heavily criticised on legal, ethical and political grounds. Yet amnesties have been the most popular transitional justice mechanisms over the past four decades, particularly in the context of internal armed conflict. States justify these amnesties by claiming they are important tools to secure peace. But how successful is amnesty in accomplishing these goals? This article seeks to answer this question by analysing the use and effectiveness of 236 amnesties used in internal armed conflicts worldwide since 1970. The article first creates a typology of the use of amnesty in the context of internal armed conflict. It then qualitatively examines the impact on peace of each type of amnesty. The article finds that most amnesties granted in the context of internal armed conflict have no demonstrable impact on peace and security. Yet amnesties granted as carrots to entice the surrender of armed actors occasionally succeed in bringing about the demobilisation of individual combatants or even entire armed groups. More importantly, amnesties extended as part of a peace process are effective in initiating negotiations, securing agreements, and building the foundation for long-lasting peace.

Introduction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Park
Keyword(s):  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Right To Life

The introduction sets out the broad questions to be addressed, namely: do states have right to life obligations during armed conflict; if so, what are these obligations; when do they apply, and in respect of whom; and how can states best ensure compliance with these obligations? The introduction also provides a précis of each chapter and the themes explored therein. Additionally, it makes reference to the fact that UK armed forces doctrine and procedures in respect of recent armed conflicts will be used as examples to explore the issues under consideration in the book. The aim is also to proffer a view on where the current UK procedures do not comply with the state’s right to life obligations and how this can be rectified.

Colombian border violence will Venezuela worsen crisis

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Armed Forces ◽  
Organised Crime ◽  
Border Crossings ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
Military Operations ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Criminal Violence ◽  
Organised Crime Groups

Significance The closure of border crossings since March 2020 has fuelled violent competition for control of lucrative informal crossings (trochas) and frontier towns. However, the Venezuelan military is ill-prepared to deal with the expanding presence of Colombia’s irregular armed groups. Recent incursions highlight weaknesses in the Venezuelan armed forces, which have suffered casualties. Impacts The penetration of organised crime groups into Venezuela’s disintegrating state and economy will continue to intensify. Organised criminal violence coupled with the violence of military operations will fuel displacement, COVID and civilian casualties. A speedy, negotiated solution to Venezuela’s political impasse is needed to preclude fusion with Colombia’s own protracted insurgency.

scholarly journals Armed conflicts as a source of new formations in the Russian language (on material of the armed conflict in Donbass)

2020 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Hate Speech ◽  
Word Formation ◽  
Russian Language ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
The South ◽  
New Interpretation ◽  
The Military ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Russian Language

The vocabulary of a language is a variable quantity, it is constantly changing, responding to the needs of life and reflecting its new realities. The events taking place in the South-East of Ukraine since March 2014 have significantly changed the usual picture of the world of the parties involved in this conflict, led to a new interpretation of reality, the emergence of new mental constructs, objectified in the language using a number of lexical innovations, most of which fall under the definition of „hate speech”. The purpose of this article is to try to examine the impact of the armed conflict in the South-East of Ukraine on the emergence of lexical innovations in the Russian language, to identify ways of forming new units and their main thematic clusters. The material for the work was neoplasms recorded in electronic Russian and Russian-speaking Ukrainian mass media, as well as selected from social networks and videos. The analysis showed that in the context of the armed conflict in the South-East of Ukraine, the characteristic manifestations of „hate speech” are mainly numerous new categories-labels with a pronounced conflict potential. The priority in this regard is offensive and derogatory nominations of representatives of the opposite camp, taking into account their worldview / ideological, national / ethnic, territorial / regional characteristics. The military jargon has also undergone a significant update, incorporating not only the reactualized slangisms of the era of the Afghan campaign of 1979-89, but also lexical innovations caused by the military and political realities of the current armed conflict in the Donbas. Neologisms are formed in accordance with the existing methods in the Russian language (word formation, semantic derivation, borrowing). At the same time, non-standard word-forming techniques are also used (language play, homophony, etc.).

scholarly journals The Impact of Armed Conflict on the Epidemiological Situation of COVID-19 in Libya, Syria and Yemen

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohamed A. Daw
Keyword(s):  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Early Stage ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Cumulative Number ◽  
The Novel ◽  
Global Pandemic ◽  
Large Numbers ◽  
Public Data ◽  
Novel Coronavirus ◽  
The Impact

Background: Since the Arab uprising in 2011, Libya, Syria and Yemen have gone through major internal armed conflicts. This resulted in large numbers of deaths, injuries, and population displacements, with collapse of the healthcare systems. Furthermore, the situation was complicated by the emergence of COVID-19 as a global pandemic, which made the populations of these countries struggle under unusual conditions to deal with both the pandemic and the ongoing wars. This study aimed to determine the impact of the armed conflicts on the epidemiology of the novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) within these war-torn countries and highlight the strategies needed to combat the spread of the pandemic and its consequences.Methods: Official and public data concerning the dynamics of the armed conflicts and the spread of SARS-COV-2 in Libya, Syria and Yemen were collected from all available sources, starting from the emergence of COVID-19 in each country until the end of December 2020. Datasets were analyzed by a set of statistical techniques and the weekly resolved data were used to probe the link between the intensity levels of the conflict and the prevalence of COVID-19.Results: The data indicated that there was an increase in the intensity of the violence at an early stage from March to August 2020, when it approximately doubled in the three countries, particularly in Libya. During that period, few cases of COVID-19 were reported, ranging from 5 to 53 cases/day. From September to December 2020, a significant decline in the intensity of the armed conflicts was accompanied by steep upsurges in the rate of COVID-19 cases, which reached up to 500 cases/day. The accumulative cases vary from one country to another during the armed conflict. The highest cumulative number of cases were reported in Libya, Syria and Yemen.Conclusions: Our analysis demonstrates that the armed conflict provided an opportunity for SARS-CoV-2 to spread. The early weeks of the pandemic coincided with the most intense period of the armed conflicts, and few cases were officially reported. This indicates undercounting and hidden spread during the early stage of the pandemic. The pandemic then spread dramatically as the armed conflict declined, reaching its greatest spread by December 2020. Full-blown transmission of the COVID-19 pandemic in these countries is expected. Therefore, urgent national and international strategies should be implemented to combat the pandemic and its consequences.

scholarly journals ANALYSIS OF EXPERIENCE IN THE APPLICATION OF MISSILE LAUNCH DETECTION SYSTEMS

2021 ◽  
pp. 118-129
Author(s):  
A. Pinchuk ◽  
M. Garbuz ◽  
P. Zeleny ◽  
D. Harnets ◽  
D. Ivanov
Keyword(s):  
High Speed ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
The United States ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Desert Storm ◽  
Detection Systems ◽  
The Face ◽  
Protected Object ◽  
Conducting Research ◽  
The Impact

Analysis of combat losses of aircraft in local armed conflicts in recent decades shows that most cases of aircraft hits are related to the impact of guided surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles equipped with homing warheads. The use of modern guided missiles equipped with homing warheads is one of the main threats to aircraft of various types. This is due to the fact that modern guided missiles are characterized by high speed, maneuverability, accuracy of aiming and difficulty of detection. Solving the problem of protecting aircraft from guided missiles consists of several stages: detection of missile launch; confirmation that the detected missile is heading directly toward the protected object; missile identification and decision-making on the most effective countermeasure system employment. At present, there are no missile launch detection systems that guarantee a 100% probability of threat detection, but an analysis of aviation combat losses in local armed conflicts in recent decades convincingly shows that the number of combat losses of aircraft equipped with such systems is much lower than those in which missile launch detection is carried out visually. For example, most of the Soviet Union's losses during the war in Afghanistan and the United States‟ losses during Operation “Desert Storm” in Iraq were related to the use of portable anti-aircraft missile systems, which missiles were equipped with infrared homing warheads. Realizing the scale of the threat posed by such missiles, most of the world's leading countries have significantly increased the expenses on development new or improvement existing countermeasures. As a result, the aggregate losses of coalition forces in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria since 2001 clearly suggest that these costs have paid off, with losses from the use of portable anti-aircraft missile systems significantly reduced, while the total number of combat sorties increased. Therefore, in the face of all the challenges and threats posed to Ukraine due to the aggressive actions of the Russian Federation, conducting research in the interests of aviation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to improve the effectiveness of missile detection systems for ensuring timely detection of threats, warning of aircraft crew and activation in the automatic mode the means of countermeasures is as relevant as ever.

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