Thinking Inconsistently

Author(s):  
Marija B. Petrović ◽  
Iris Žeželj

Abstract. People tend to simultaneously accept mutually exclusive beliefs. If they are generally prone to tolerate inconsistencies, irrespective of their content, we say they are prone to doublethink. We developed a measure to capture individual differences in this tendency and demonstrated its construct and predictive validity across two studies. In Study 1, participants ( N = 240) filled in the doublethink scale, the rational/intuitive inventory, and three measures of conspiratorial beliefs (conspiracy mentality, belief in specific and contradictory conspiracies). Doublethink was meaningfully related to all measured variables and was predictive of all conspiratorial beliefs over and above rational/intuitive thinking styles. In Study 2 ( N = 149), we included the need for cognition and preference for consistency in the predictor set alongside doublethink, while the criterion set remained the same. Once again, doublethink related in an expected way to other measured variables and was predictive of belief in conspiracy theories after accounting for the effects of need for cognition and preference for consistency. We discuss the properties of the scale and how it relates to other consistency measures, and offer two ways to conceptualize doublethink: as a lack of metacognitive ability to spot inconsistencies or as a thinking style that easily accommodates inconsistent beliefs.

2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (11) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Nesrin Uyanık Sağlam ◽  
Erhan Tunç

This study aims to identify the relationship between thinking styles and the need for cognition in students of the faculty of education, as well as the existence of significant differences between these two variables according to gender, department of study, class level, educational background from secondary school level, monthly incomes of families and the place where families have resided longest. The study was conducted with 820 students studying at different departments of the Faculty of Education at Gaziantep University, during the 2014-2015 academic year. In the study, data was collected using the Thinking Styles Scale and the Need for Cognition Scale, while demographic details of students were obtained through a Personal Information Form created by the researcher. Pearson’s correlation test, t-test and one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) were employed in SPSS 20 software for data analysis. According to the findings of the study, students of the education faculty use the legislative thinking style the most and the conservative thinking style the least among the others given in the Thinking Styles Scale. According to the findings regarding the relationship between thinking styles and the need for cognition; the Thinking Styles Scale shows that there are significant differences between the legislative, executive, judicial, hierarchic, oligarchic, anarchic, local, internal, liberal dimensions of thinking and the need for cognition, while there is no significant difference between the global and conservative thinking styles and the need for cognition. It is seen that legislative, executive and hierarchic dimensions of the Thinking Styles Scale differ significantly according to the gender variable. Local, conservative and oligarchic dimensions of the Thinking Style Scale also show significant differences according to the department where the students study. This differentiation is seen in favor of the classroom teaching department against the Psychological Counselling and Guidance (PCG) students in the local thinking style dimension, while it is more favorable for the mathematics teaching department against the PCG students in both conservative and oligarchic dimensions. It is also seen that the legislative and local dimensions of the Thinking Styles Scale differ significantly according to the monthly incomes of families. This differentiation is in favor of the 2000 TL and above income group in each of these thinking styles, against those with monthly incomes between 500-1000 TL. On the other hand, the place where families have resided the longest, which is often the same place where students have completed their secondary education, do not differ significantly according to class levels. The Need for Cognition Scale scores differ significantly in favor of the 4th grade students according to the class level variable. A similar significant differentiation in the Need for Cognition Scale scores is also seen in favor of urban areas (provinces) against rural areas (villages) according to the place where families have resided the longest. Finally, the Need for Cognition Scale scores do not show any significant difference in terms of the departments students study at, their secondary school majors and monthly incomes of families.


2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (11) ◽  
pp. 463
Author(s):  
Simone S. Stevenson ◽  
Richard E. Hicks

Epstein (1994; 2003) proposed that there are two cognitive information processing systems that operate in parallel: the intuitive thinking style and the rational thinking style. Decisional fit occurs when the preferred thinking style is applied to making a decision and research has shown that this fit increases the value of the outcome of a decision. Additionally, decisional fit leads to less regret, even when post hoc evaluations show the decision to be incorrect. It has not yet been determined whether decisional fit correlates with greater happiness and hence, the purpose of the current study was to investigate the difference between styles of thinking, styles of decision making and the impact of decisional fit on happiness scores. Individual differences in thinking and decision style were measured using an online interactive questionnaire (N = 100), and an ANOVA, hierarchical multiple regression, and a series of t-tests, were used to investigate the relationship between thinking style, decision style, decisional fit, and happiness, thereby addressing a gap in the existing literature. The major findings from the current study show that intuitive thinking has a strong positive correlation with happiness; that intuitive thinkers are more likely to utilize intuitive decisional style, than rational thinkers; and that when both rational and intuitive thinkers experienced decisional fit, higher ratings of happiness were reported. Explanations and recommendations for future studies are outlined in the discussion.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christie Newton ◽  
Justin Feeney ◽  
Gordon Pennycook

A common claim is that people vary not just in what they think, but how they think. In fact, there are a large number of scales that have been developed to ostensibly measure thinking styles. These measures share a lot of conceptual overlap and, in particular, most purport to index some aspect of the disposition to think more analytically and effortfully rather than relying more on intuitions and gut feelings. To address this issue, we gave a sample of 774 participants a subset of 90 items from 15 scales and narrowed the list of items down to 50 by isolating items that were meaningfully correlated with the Cognitive Reflection Test, a behavioral measure of individual differences in analytic thinking. Then, across six studies with 1149 participants, we systematically narrowed down the items and tested the underlying factor structure. This revealed that a four-factor correlated structure was best: Actively Open-minded Thinking, Close-Minded Thinking, Preference for Intuitive Thinking, and Preference for Effortful Thinking. Predictive validity for the resulting 24-item (6 items per sub-scale) Comprehensive Thinking Style Questionnaire (CTSQ) was established using a set of cognitive ability measures as well as several outcome measures (e.g., epistemically suspect beliefs, bullshit receptivity, empathy, moral judgments, among others), with some subscales having stronger predictive validity for some outcomes but not others. The CTSQ helps alleviate the jangle fallacy in thinking styles research and allows for the assessment of separate aspects thinking styles in a single comprehensive measure.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nico Pytlik ◽  
Daniel Soll ◽  
Stephanie Mehl

Background: The belief in conspiracy theories and paranoid ideation are often treated as almost synonymous. However, there is to date no research concerning shared underlying cognitive underpinnings of CTs and paranoid ideation. One potential underlying factor could be the well-known jumping to conclusion (JTC) bias, the tendency of persons with delusions to perform hasty decisions that are sometimes based on little evidence. Furthermore, a preference for a more intuitive general thinking style, as opposed to an analytical thinking style, could be an additional underlying cognitive factor of both conspiracy theories and paranoia. Thus, the aim of the present study is to investigate in a large sample of non-clinical individuals whether the JTC-bias is more pronounced in individuals who display a stronger belief in conspiracy theories and whether both are related to a more intuitive thinking preference. Methods: We assessed the data of 519 non-clinical individuals regarding their respective approval of 20 specific conspiracy theories in an online study. Further, we assessed the JTC-bias by using a computerized variant of the task (fish task). Thinking preferences were measured with the Rational-Experiential Interview.Results: Subjects who displayed the JTC-bias presented a more pronounced belief in conspiracy theories. In addition, gathering little information in the fish task before performing a decision (less draws to decision) was related to a stronger endorsement of conspiracy theories and a more intuitive thinking style (and a less analytic thinking style). Finally, a preference for intuitive thinking predicted a stronger belief in conspiracy theories in a multiple regression analysis.Conclusions: Our results demonstrate the implication of a preference for an intuitive thinking style accompanied by a propensity to faster decision-making (JTC-bias) as possible cognitive underpinnings of beliefs in conspiracy theories. Furthermore, our study is the first to confirm the notion of the JTC-bias as a reflection of the use of an intuitive thinking style.


2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 140-158
Author(s):  
Biljana Jokić ◽  
Danka Purić

The usual distinction between rational and intuitive thinking styles is still a subject of scientific debate, as there is no consensus about their nature, mutual relations and relations to other personality constructs. Cognitive-experiential self-theory (CEST) proposes rational and experiential thinking styles as original personality constructs not fully explainable by five-factor personality models. Following CEST, we aimed to examine: 1. The uniqueness of rational and experiential dimensions by relating them to other personality constructs: trait emotional intelligence (TEI) and HEXACO; 2. Thinking style profiles defined through combined rational and experiential dimensions, and the possible role of TEI in understanding them. A total of 270 undergraduate students (82% females) completed the TEIQue-SF, REI-40, and HEXACO-PI-R. Our results showed that constructs from all three paradigms were low to moderately correlated to each other. TEI had incremental validity in explaining both rational and experiential dimensions, but large amounts of their variances remained unexplained by both TEI and HEXACO. We revealed four thinking style profiles defined through combined rational and experiential dimensions. TEI was the highest when both dimensions were high and the lowest when both were low, which could be related to processes of understanding and managing emotional functioning – proposed as an essential part of TEI, while within CEST they are seen as the way in which rationality influences experientiality. This finding might be of specific significance for understanding irrationality as not exclusively related to high intuition, but to low rationality as well.


1993 ◽  
Vol 72 (3) ◽  
pp. 779-784 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alice Kienholz ◽  
Rama K. Mishra ◽  
Pat Hayes ◽  
Joyce Engel

The 1988 revised version of the Inquiry Mode Questionnaire by Harrison and Bramson was administered to 216 nursing students in the post-RN baccalaureate programs at two universities. The first purpose was to validate further this measure of relative preference in forced-choice format for five main ways of thinking, Synthesist, Idealist, Pragmatist, Analyst, and Realist. Significant differences among thinking styles on analysis of variance with repeated measures supported the tests's predictive validity. There were negative intercorrelations (≥ – 0.40) between opposing styles such as Synthesist/Pragmatist, Synthesist/Realist, Pragmatist/Analyst, and Idealist/Realist. Ninety percent (81 of 90 items) were significant in discriminating among the styles of thinking. The second purpose to ascertain whether nurses show a particular thinking-style preference was confirmed. Nurses in this study preferred the Idealist (37.5%), Realist (36.1%), and Analyst (31%) styles of thinking.


2013 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 82-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sophie von Stumm

Intelligence-as-knowledge in adulthood is influenced by individual differences in intelligence-as-process (i.e., fluid intelligence) and in personality traits that determine when, where, and how people invest their intelligence over time. Here, the relationship between two investment traits (i.e., Openness to Experience and Need for Cognition), intelligence-as-process and intelligence-as-knowledge, as assessed by a battery of crystallized intelligence tests and a new knowledge measure, was examined. The results showed that (1) both investment traits were positively associated with intelligence-as-knowledge; (2) this effect was stronger for Openness to Experience than for Need for Cognition; and (3) associations between investment and intelligence-as-knowledge reduced when adjusting for intelligence-as-process but remained mostly significant.


Author(s):  
Adrian Furnham

AbstractDo those who believe in conspiracy theories feel less happy and healthy than others? Do they believe the world is simply unjust? This study was concerned with how demographic factors, personal ratings of success, personal ideology (political and religious beliefs) and Just World Beliefs are related to Conspiracy Theories. In total, 406 participants completed two questionnaires: Just World scale (Rubin & Peplau, 1975) and Conspiracy Theories Inventory (Swami et al., 2010) and provided various personal details. The Just World Scale yielded two scores: Just and Unjust beliefs. Participants also reported on their health, happiness and success and a reliable composite measure of well-being was computed. A regression showed younger males, with Unjust World beliefs and politically right-wing views, were more likely to endorse Conspiracy Theories. The discussion revolved around explaining individual differences in accepting these theories. Implications and limitations are discussed.


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