The Discovery of Common-Sense Psychology

2008 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 125-133 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rainer Reisenzein ◽  
Udo Rudolph

This special issue of Social Psychology commemorates the 50th anniversary of Fritz Heider’s 1958 book The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations. The contributions to the special issue address the history and current state of attribution research, or illustrate contemporary research in the field. The historical articles document that Heider’s analysis of causal attribution and of common-sense psychology was significantly influenced by his academic teachers Alexius Meinong and Ernst Cassirer. We distinguish between the mainstream reception of Heider’s book, which has given rise to an extensive empirical research program, and a minority reception by authors who emphasized aspects of Heider’s thinking not well represented in mainstream psychology. Currently, there are indications of a “back to Heider” movement in social psychology. This new phase of attribution research is inspired by a fresh reading of Heider’s book, and is marked by an interdisciplinary orientation. The articles illustrating current attribution research address both classic and novel topics: the causality implicit in language, the role of causal attribution in hindsight bias, the justification of actions, and the attribution of mistakes in organizational contexts.

2008 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 141-150 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rainer Reisenzein ◽  
Irina Mchitarjan

According to Heider, some of his ideas about common-sense psychology presented in The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations ( Heider, 1958 ) originally came from his academic teacher, Alexius Meinong. However, Heider makes no reference to Meinong in his book. To clarify Meinong’s influence on Heider, we compare Heider’s explication of common-sense psychology with Meinong’s writings, in particular those on ethics. Our results confirm that Heider’s common-sense psychology is informed by Meinong’s psychological analyses in several respects: Heider adopts aspects of Meinong’s theory of emotion, his theory of value, and his theory of responsibility attribution. In addition, Heider more or less continues Meinong’s method of psychological inquiry. Thus, even without Meinong’s name attached, many aspects of Meinong’s psychology found their way into today’s social psychology via Heider. Unknowingly, some of us have been Meinongians all along.


2007 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 531-554 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALISHER FAIZULLAEV

ABSTRACTThe author argues that the international context provides an apparent environment for the individual experiencing of the state as a distinctive unitary and cohesive actor with its own intentionality and personhood, social relations and coercive resources, manifested not only by actions and force, but also through symbols, figure of speeches and other allusive forms capable of affecting human identity. As a direct personal observation, individual experiencing of states contains an inner, phenomenological plan, though it is not a solipsistic process and depends on people’s shared meanings. Conventional perception of states as anthropomorphic actors regards relations between states as social or interpersonal relations, thus causal attribution and social expectations affect individual experience of states. Being primarily a common-sense phenomenon, individual experiencing of states has a wide-ranging effect on both ‘conventional’ and ‘conceptual’ understanding of international relations. In perception and explanation of international politics, real political developments are often overshadowed by observable, experiential, common-sense causations.


2010 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 84-90
Author(s):  
Maciej Dymkowski

Afterthoughts on biases in history perception Contemporary social psychology describes various deformations of processing social information leading to distortions of knowledge about other people. What is more, a person in everyday life refers to lay convictions and ideas common in his/her cultural environment that distort his/her perceptions. Therefore it is difficult to be surprised that authors of narrations in which participants of history are presented use easily available common-sense psychology, deforming images of both the participants of history and their activities, as well as the sequence of events determined by these activities. Which cognitive biases, how often, and in what intensity they will be presented in historical narrations depend on statements of dominating common-sense psychology. The article outlines some biases made by historian-lay psychologists, such as attributional asymmetry or hindsight effects, whose occurrence in their thinking, as formed in the cultural sphere of the West, influences history perception and conducted historical interpretations.


2008 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 163-173 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bertram F. Malle

This article reviews some of the central ideas in Heider’s (1958 ) book, The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations: common-sense psychology, personal causality, causal attribution, and the social perception of mental states. Relying on Heider’s own words to introduce these topics, the review shows that post-Heiderian attribution research overlooked and misunderstood several of Heider’s contributions. For example, he has been falsely portrayed as postulating a person-situation dichotomy as the core of people’s understanding of behavior; and his analysis of dispositions as primarily mental states has been mistaken for one of dispositions as stable traits. Heider’s original ideas are, however, firmly connected to cognitive science research on the folk theory of mind and provide a foundation for recent social-psychological work on inferences of other people’s mental states.


Psychology ◽  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marion Schmidt

Fritz Heider (b. 1896–d. 1988) was an Austrian-American Gestalt and social psychologist. He is considered one of the founding fathers of interpersonal social psychology, contributing in particular his theories of attribution, balance, and motivation. (For attribution theory see the Oxford Bibliographies in Psychology article “Attribution Theory” by Bertram F. Malle and Joanna Korman) Studying in Graz and Berlin, he was influenced both by the Berlin school of Gestalt psychology under Wertheimer, Köhler, and Koffka and the Graz school under Alexius Meinong, as well as by his lifelong friendship with Kurt Lewin. He emigrated to the United States in 1930 to take a joint position at Smith College and the Clarke School for the Deaf in Northampton, Massachusetts. In 1947, he took a position as professor of psychology at the University of Kansas department of psychology, where he remained for the rest of his career. He was married to Gestalt and child psychologist Grace Moore Heider, with whom he also collaborated professionally during their time at the Clarke School. Heider’s approach was not laboratory-based, but philosophical and observational. He was a close observer of how people interact with each other and their surroundings, and also analyzed stories, aphorisms, fables, and fairy tales for generalizable narratives of human behavior. Heider believed that individuals use a kind of naïve or common-sense psychology to explain the behavior of others; this common-sense psychology thus shapes their perception of and interaction with their social world. For decades, he collected and systematized his observations in his notebooks, which were later published. While he was a meticulous and nuanced observer, he was not a prolific writer. Open to different influences, he long grappled with how to systematize human behavior into a generalizable theoretical system of social interaction. Influenced by Kurt Lewin, he sometimes tried to capture interpersonal behavior in a kind of mathematical shorthand, though he never lost sight of the essentially human dimension of his material. Apart from his autobiography, he only published four monographs: in 1927, his revised thesis, Ding und Medium; in 1940 and 1941, together with his wife, two monographs on the psychology of deafness; and in 1958 The psychology of interpersonal relations, which is considered his main work and a seminal contribution to social psychology. Beyond these works, Heider published about a dozen articles on various aspects of phenomenology, Gestalt and social psychology, and the history of psychology. He had few graduate students but nevertheless influenced younger generations through his seminars and his traveling and teaching abroad.


2006 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 57-57
Author(s):  
Bernad Batinic ◽  
Anja Goeritz

2002 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 265-274 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francisco Gil Rodríguez ◽  
Carlos María Alcover de la Hera

After a long period of scarce resources and a long delay in new scientific results suffered as a consequence of recent Spanish history, research concerning groups has experienced a rapid development over the last 15 years of the 20th century—the result of the late but then clear institutionalization of psychology into university structure. Although most research has been carried out at the very heart of social psychology and along the traditional lines of the field, a significant growth in the study of groups and work teams in organizational contexts can now be highlighted, coinciding with the tendency detected internationally during the last years. Beyond the normalization of group research in Spain, it is necessary to point out its excessive dependency in both theory and methodology on models and tools elaborated throughout North America and Europe. The present review closes with the proposal of creating a European formative curriculum for group psychologists in order to unify and promote research within this active and important field of psychology.


Author(s):  
Michael S. Moore

This book assays how the remarkable discoveries of contemporary neuroscience impact our conception of ourselves and our responsibility for our choices and our actions. Dramatic (and indeed revolutionary) changes in how we think of ourselves as agents and as persons are commonly taken to be the implications of those discoveries of neuroscience. Indeed, the very notions of responsibility and of deserved punishment are thought to be threatened by these discoveries. Such threats are collected into four groupings: (1) the threat from determinism, that neurosciences shows us that all of our choices and actions are caused by events in the brain that precede choice; (2) the threat from epiphenomenalism, that our choices are shown by experiment not to cause the actions that are the objects of such choice but are rather mere epiphenomena, co-effects of common causes in the brain; (3) the threat from reductionist mechanism, that we and everything we value is nothing but a bunch of two-valued switches going off in our brains; and (4) the threat from fallibilism, that we are not masters in our own house because we lack the privileged knowledge of our own minds needed to be such masters. The book seeks to blunt such radical challenges while nonetheless detailing how law, morality, and common-sense psychology can harness the insights of an advancing neuroscience to more accurately assign moral blame and legal punishment to the truly deserving.


2020 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 172-178
Author(s):  
Jake Harwood ◽  
Karen Tracy

This Epilogue discusses the papers in the Special Issue ( JLSP 40th Anniversary) in terms of the broader field of language and social psychology. It reflects on the key terms (“language” and “social psychology”) in terms of how they intersect and the relative emphasis on each in work published in JLSP. We also present an argument for increasing the consideration of context in language and social psychology research, and we distinguish between a desire to generalize versus universalize our knowledge about language and social psychological processes.


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