scholarly journals Review: Central Grants to Local Governments: The Political and Economic Impact of the Rate Support Grant in England and Wales, Geography and the State: An Essay in Political Geography, US Options for Energy Independence, Government and Urban Poverty: Inside the Policy-Making Process, Conflict, Politics and the Urban Scene, the Computer in Court: A Guide to Computer Evidence for Lawyers and Computing Professionals, Modern Legal Studies: Council Housing

1984 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-114
Author(s):  
A R Prest ◽  
G W Jones ◽  
T O'Riordan ◽  
P Hall ◽  
P R Dommel ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Michelle Belco ◽  
Brandon Rottinghaus

The president serves dual roles in the political system: one who “commands” by pursuing his or her agenda using unilateral orders and one who “administers” and who works to continue proper government function, often with the support of Congress. In a reassessment of the literature on unilateral power, this book considers the president’s dual roles during the stages of the policy-making process. Although presidents may appear to act “first and alone,” the reality is often much different. Presidents act in response to their own concerns, as well as assisting Congress on priorities and the need to maintain harmonic government function. The authors find support for both the model of an aggressive president who uses unilateral orders to push his or her agenda, head off unfavorable congressional legislation, and selectively implement legislation, and they find support for a unifying president who is willing to share management of government, support Congressional legislative efforts, and faithfully implement legislation. At the same time, presidents self-check their actions based on the ability of Congress to act to overturn their orders, through a shared sense of responsibility to keep government moving and out of respect for the constitutional balance. The shared nature of unilateral orders does not preclude an active president, as presidents remain strong, central actors in the political system.



1984 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 487
Author(s):  
E. M. McLeay ◽  
Joan Higgins ◽  
Nicholas Deakin ◽  
John Edwards ◽  
Malcolm Wicks


2012 ◽  
Vol 40 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 635-663 ◽  
Author(s):  
James C. Schopf

Abstract Democratisation has brought a new, riskier pattern of corruption to Korea. More groups and institutions have secured a role in a more inclusive democratic policy making process. As a result, corruption schemes now require the consent of a wide and diverse set of veto players, often including the political opposition, producing expansive democratic ‘corruption webs’. The key democratic element of competition for votes rewards opposition members in the web for blowing the whistle. Increased likelihood of exposure and punishment deter many from corruption, which has subsequently declined in Korea under democracy, as measured by perception polls, experience surveys and objective measures of elite rent exchange. The Roh Moo-hyeon NACF scandals demonstrate that democratic corruption webs also mitigate damage from scandals — forcing participants to limit rent exchange to minimise exposure to clean veto players. Democratic oversight ensures that even bribe-taking officials implement policy according to publicly-declared objectives. Finally, competition for votes encourages timely exposure of democratic corruption rackets.



2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annabelle Sophie Wittels

Participatory mechanisms are now widely used by national and local governments in developed and developing countries. While their purpose and form varies greatly, they all rely on the discretion of a professionalised bureaucracy to manage these processes and prepare their outcomes in a manner that they can feed into policy-making. Bureaucrats thus have a gate-keeping role. They can substantially influence whether and how information from participatory processes feeds into policy-making. Bureaucrats can thereby impact to what extent participatory mechanisms can deliver on their promise of giving citizens greater direct control over the policy-making process. Formal political control over the bureaucracy is limited in this case. Could informal controls make bureaucrats comply more with the demands of participatory mechanisms? This study employs a large field experiment (N=7,532) to test (1) whether citizen input filters through to bureaucrats tasked with policy design and implementation and (2) whether bureaucrats’ engagement with citizen input can be in- creased by using non-monetary rewards and value-based communication. The experiment accounts for heterogeneity by bureaucrat seniority, central versus street-level roles and involvement in the collection of citizen input. It finds no meaningful engagement at the baseline (C=0%) but that motivational interventions can significantly increase engagement (T1= 14%, T2=15%). The findings suggest that currently little input from citizens filters through to bureaucrats, but small tweaks substantially increase the democratic potential of participatory initiatives.





1973 ◽  
Vol 67 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah McCally Morehouse

This research investigated the proposition that variation in the structure of the political party can account for variation in the type of policy produced. The conditions under which legislators of the governor's party supported his legislative requests in sixteen sessions chosen for different degrees of party cohesion were investigated. The findings indicate that there is very little correlation between the legislator's district primary or election competition and his support for the governor's requests. The Democratic governor is supported by legislators from the districts in which he himself has strong party support as measured by his primary vote. The Republican governor's support cannot be geographically located in this manner. With respect to socioeconomic legislation, the pattern of support for a successful governor does not depend upon socioeconomic variables within the legislators' districts, but if the governor cannot control his legislators, socioeconomic variables provide the major basis for the factions which develop.



2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 417-450 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nikolas Sellheim

Abstract The European Union’s ban on the placing on the market of seal products stemming from commercially hunted seals has triggered much controversy due to its negative impacts on Arctic livelihoods. This article looks at the different documents and steps that constitute the crafting process which has led to the adoption of Regulation 1007/2009 on trade in seal products. It puts special emphasis on the degree of recognition of commercial sealing as a livelihood and asks if it is a tradition that may have been neglected by the political discourse in the EU. Also the role of antisealing groups is considered that may have contributed to a pre-determined stance on the commercial seal hunt during the policy-making process.



2015 ◽  
pp. 26-46 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kamil Ławniczak

“Taking ideas seriously” means not only to consider their causal and constitutive role in the study of social phenomena, but also to analyse how and why certain ideas gain or lose prominence within political institutions and discourses. One approach to these issues builds upon the notion of policy paradigms, which influence the results of policy-making process by shaping the political actors’ understanding of problems that need to be solved and limiting available policy options. This article attempts to show how the ability to modernise the EU governance within the paradigm of European integration heading towards “an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe” has been called into question by the crisis which began in 2008. Two potential new paradigms of integration are considered: first one suggests controlled disintegration and differentiation of EU structures, second one proposes a reinterpretation of federalism as a way to reconsolidate the Union.



Modern Italy ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 333-348 ◽  
Author(s):  
Franca Roncarolo ◽  
Marinella Belluati

This article analyses the experience of the second Prodi government from the standpoint of its political communication. The opening part contextualises the case by placing it within the broader framework of coalition governments generally, and briefly outlines the critical elements that, in Italy, prevent any majority from making a genuinely strategic use of communication in the policy-making process. The second part focuses on Prodi's poor communication, highlighting both its limits and the attempts at improvement made by the leader and his staff in 2007. Finally, the third part examines the journalistic coverage of the centre-left majority and considers the trend in public approval for the premier and the government, emphasising the problems that emerged on each side.



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