Natural Law and Public Reason in Kant's Political Philosophy

1996 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 389-411 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel M. Weinstock

My intention in this essay will be to explore the role that consent-based arguments perform in Kant's political and legal philosophy. I want to uncover the extent to which Kant considered that the legitimacy of the State and of its laws depends upon the outcome of intersubjective deliberation. Commentators have divided over the following question: Is Kant best viewed as a member of the social contract tradition, according to which the legitimacy of the state and of the laws it promulgates derives from the consent of those people over whom it claims authority, or should he be read as having put forward a secularized version of natural law theory, according to which the state and its laws are legitimate to the extent that they are attained by standards of sound reason and supported by an objective account of the human good?

Author(s):  
Juan Manuel Espinosa Ares

La intención del presente artículo se concreta en delimitar los fundamentos idealistas de la filosofía del derecho kantiana. Para Kant, deducir una justificación absolutamente racional de la forma de lo jurídico implica vincular esa racionalidad directamente con la idea de libertad. A su vez, esta libertad racional sólo puede resolverse legítimamente en la paz que facilita el estado mediante el vínculo que proporciona el contrato social. Así pues, el orden deductivo de la filosofía jurídica kantiana parte de la razón, para, a través de la voluntad expresada en el contrato, concluir necesariamente en el estado moderno. La finalidad última de este trabajo será examinar el desarrollo argumentativo desplegado por el filósofo de Königsberg e identificar sus posibles desajustes lógicos.The aim of the following article is to identify the idealistic foundation of Kant´s legal philosophy. For Kant, to deduce an absolutely rational statement of his legal theory implies to tie down that rationality directly to the idea of freedom. Furthermore this rational freedom can only be reached through the peace that the state provides with the net the social contract makes possible. Therefore the deductive way of Kant´s legal philosophy sets off from the idea of rationality and arrives necessarily to the modern state conducted by the will content in the social contract. The true purpose of this work is to study the development of Kant´s argument and to be able to identify, if there are any, his logical inconsistencies.


2011 ◽  
pp. 369-380
Author(s):  
Boris Milosavljevic

The paper considers Jovanovic?s view of the unity of state, law and power. State emerges from the society, by collective act of creation, not by a free individuals? contract. As the notion of law implies someone guaranteeing law implementation, i.e. coercion, law is inseparable from the state force which guarantees its mandatory feature. Without state, man would not be free because he is free only if there is state to protect him from private violence. Jovanovic emphasizes that state is force, but a well-ordained force, the only alternative of which is a disordered, chaotic force. The paper explains that understanding of the theory of state, law and power unity is essential for understanding specificities of Jovanovic?s political and legal philosophy and his criticism of the theories of natural law and social contract.


Kant Yearbook ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-71
Author(s):  
Mike L. Gregory

Abstract Kant’s Naturrecht Feyerabend has recently gained more sustained attention for its role in clarifying Kant’s published positions in political philosophy. However, too little attention has been given to the lecture’s relation to Gottfried Achenwall, whose book was the textbook for the course. In this paper, I will examine how Kant rejected and transforms Achenwall’s natural law system in the Feyerabend Lectures. Specifically, I will argue that Kant problematizes Achenwall’s foundational notion of a divine juridical state which opens up a normative gap between objective law (prohibitions, prescriptions and permissions) and subjective rights (moral capacities). In the absence of a divine sovereign, formal natural law is unable to justify subjective natural rights in the state of nature. In the Feyerabend Lectures, Kant, in order to close this gap, replaces the divine will with the “will of society”, making the state necessary for the possibility of rights.


2018 ◽  
Vol 80 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert P. Kraynak

Abstract“Social justice” is a powerful idea today, but its origins and meaning are unclear. One of the first to use the term was Antonio Rosmini, author of The Constitution under Social Justice (1848) and other works of moral philosophy. I argue that Rosmini arrived at his idea of social justice by developing Thomistic natural law theory into a novel view of the common good that balances two principles: (1) the equal rights and dignity of persons as ends-in-themselves, a version of “personalism” influenced by Kant and Christianity; and (2) unequal rewards for those who contribute most to society, a version of Aristotelian “proportionalism” based on the social nature of man. I conclude by comparing Rosmini's idea of social justice to John Rawls's “theory of justice” and Catholic social teaching.


Author(s):  
Zoe Beenstock

Coleridge wrote frequently about Rousseau throughout his varied career. His early lectures and letters draw on Rousseau’s critique of luxury and frequently allude to the general will, depicting Rousseau as a Christ-like figure. Coleridge’s subsequent disappointment with Pantisocracy led him to reject Rousseau and the social contract. Comparing Rousseau to Luther in The Friend, Coleridge argues that Rousseau’s unhappiness arises from a conflict between an age of individualism and an ongoing need for community. According to Coleridge, poetry tolerates this conflict better than philosophy. In ‘Reflections on Having Left a Place of Retirement’ Coleridge suggests that social retreat offers illusory solace from war and social crisis. He critiques the state of nature, sympathy, and even religion for failing to balance the self with its environment. Thematically and formally The Rime of the Ancient Mariner explores this crisis in cohering systems. Through the mariner’s relationship to the albatross, the wedding that frames the poem, and episodes of the supernatural that disrupt the ballad form, Coleridge defines a breaking point between the individual and general wills.


Author(s):  
Mogens Lærke

This chapter explores Spinoza’s doctrine of the social contract and his understanding of natural law and natural right. Contrasting his views with those of Hobbes, it interprets the social contract not as a logical, historical, or causal account of the state’s foundations, but as a fictive narrative, grounded entirely in the imagination, that citizens in a free republic must embrace in order to prevent mutual persecution and ensure collective security. It also argues how such a reading of the social contract can help resolve fundamental tensions between the Tractatus theologico-politicus and the later Tractatus politicus that until now have been most convincingly explained in terms of a fundamental theoretical evolution between Spinoza’s two political treatises.


2020 ◽  
pp. 20-73
Author(s):  
Raymond Wacks

This chapter discusses the relationship between the ancient classical theory of natural law and its application to contemporary moral questions. It considers the role of natural law in political philosophy, the decline of the theory of natural law, and its revival in the twentieth century. The principal focus is on John Finnis’s natural law theory based largely on the works of St Thomas Aquinas. The chapter posits a distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ natural law, examines the notion of moral realism, and examines the tension between law and morality; and the subject of the moral dilemmas facing judges in unjust societies.


Legitimacy ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 43-66
Author(s):  
Paul Weithman

John Rawls’s presentation of his famous principle of legitimacy raises a number of exegetical and philosophical questions which his texts leave unresolved. The key to their solution lies in a claim Rawls makes about the character of political power. Rawls uses language familiar from social contract theory to describe that power, saying that it is the power of the public as a corporate body. This chapter considers but ultimately rejects the suggestion that Rawls’s treatment of legitimacy is Lockean. Rather, Rawls follows Kant in thinking that talk of a contractual incorporation is best understood as a way of expressing fundamental moral claims about the object of a constitution, about citizens’ standing, and about legislators’ duties. These are the claims that do the real work in Rawls’s account of legitimacy. To show this, the chapter lays out Kant’s conception of the social contract and argues that we can draw on that conception to understand Rawls’s account of political legitimacy. It then spells out the philosophical pay-offs of the reading offered here by showing how it solves some textual puzzles and how Rawls’s account differs from others that have recently been defended in political philosophy. The chapter concludes by mentioning some lingering questions about Rawlsian legitimacy.


Author(s):  
Ruth Boeker

This introductory chapter outlines Locke’s innovative contributions to debates about persons and personal identity. His view builds, first, on moral and legal conceptions of a person, which can be found in natural law theory, second, on metaphysical debates about individuation and identity, and, third, on metaphysical and religious debates about the afterlife and the state of the soul between death and resurrection. The chapter shows that he not only builds on these debates, but also how he systematically brings the different debates together in new ways and how his distinction between the ideas of person, man, and substance makes it possible to advance the debates of his day. Moreover, this chapter presents the aims and scope of the book and offers a summary of the subsequent chapters.


2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 140-166
Author(s):  
Eric Nsuh Zuhmboshi

Abstract The relationship that exists between the state and her citizens has been described by Jean Jacques Rousseau as “a social contract.” In this contractual agreement, citizens are bound to respect state authority while the state, in turn, has the bounden duty to protect her citizens and guide them in their aspirations. In fact, any state that does not perform this duty is guilty of violating the fundamental rights of her citizens. This, however, is not the case in most postcolonial societies where the citizens see the state as an aggressive apparatus against their wellbeing because the state is not fulfilling its own part of the social contract, which requires them to protect the citizens and guide them in their aspirations. This unfortunate situation has laid the foundation for protest and anti-establishment writings in post-colonial societies – especially in Africa. Since literature, as a semiotic resource, is coterminous with its socio-political context, this attitude of the state has drawn inimical criticism from key postcolonial African writers such as Chinua Achebe, Wole Soyinka, Ngugi wa Thiong’o, Mongo Beti, and Nadine Gordimer. Using Helon Habila’s Waiting for an Angel and John Nkemngong Nkengasong’s Across the Mongolo, this essay shows the relationship between state-terrorism and the traumatic conditions of the citizens in contemporary Africa. From the perspective of trauma theory, the essay defends the premise that the postcolonial subjects/characters, in the novels under study, are traumatized and depressed because of their continuous victimization by the state. Due to this state-imposed terror and hardship, the citizens are forced to indulge in political agitation, radicalism and violence in response to their destitute and impoverished conditions.


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