Innocence and Responsibility in War

2004 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 485-506 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lionel K. McPherson

Innocence is a notion that can prove controversial. Claims of innocence typically support not imposing burdens on the innocent when their conduct is relevantly unobjectionable. This paper examines innocence in the context of violent conflict between states or groups. Many thinkers about the morality of such violence want to establish a principle that would protect innocent civilians. Yet the common view in just war theory does not affirm the moral innocence of civilians. Similarly, the common view that soldiers have an equal right to kill does not affirm their equal moral culpability.Talk of innocence usually Starts from the idea that a kind of moral appraisal makes sense. We assume that persons can be innocent or not by virtue largely of the choices they have made. I will accept this assumption and set aside metaphysical doubts about our capacity for freedom. There is, of course, no issue of moral innocence if in fact we cannot be morally responsible for our actions.

Author(s):  
Anna Stilz

Both just war theory and international law recognize the defence of one’s own state and its territory as the core example of just cause for war. Yet just war theorists have done little to explore what might give the state a territorial right of this kind. This chapter argues that a state has a right to territorial integrity when it meets three conditions: (1) its citizens have a right to occupy its territory, (2) its scheme of law is minimally just, and (3) the relationship of political cooperation that supports its institutions is reasonably and widely affirmed. This chapter then considers whether a state that satisfies these conditions may defend its territorial integrity with lethal force. This account does not support the common-sense conviction that defending one’s state against aggression is always morally permitted or even required. But it can establish a defensive privilege in a central range of cases.


2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-236 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cian O'Driscoll

AbstractBy claiming that “just war is just war,” critics suggest that just war theory both distracts from and sanitizes the horror of modern warfare by dressing it up in the language of moral principles. However, the phrase can also be taken as a reminder of why we need just war theory in the first place. It is precisely because just war is just war, with all that this implies, that we must think so carefully and so judiciously about it. Of course, one could argue that the rump of just war scholarship over the past decade has been characterized by disinterest regarding the material realities of warfare. But is this still the case? This essay examines a series of benchmark books on the ethics of war published over the past year. All three exemplify an effort to grapple with the hard facts of modern violent conflict, and they all skillfully bring diverse traditions of just war thinking into conversation with one another.


Worldview ◽  
1967 ◽  
Vol 10 (9) ◽  
pp. 8-11
Author(s):  
Edmund J. Egan

In the current wave of conscientious objection, draft refusal, pacifism, crypto-pacifism and simple concern with war and morality, it is noteworthy that informed discussion of “just war” theory has been at a minimum, Tiiis fact is worth examining within a somewhat wider philosophical dimension than is perhaps customary.The notion of “just war” represents an aspect of classical, even Hellenic ethical theory. In it the emphasis is macrocosmic, taking as its starting point the community considered as an organic whole, and seeking the “common good” of that community. This search for “common good” necessarily entails a balancing of claims, rights and needs. Historically, such a calculus has for its goal a benevolent reasonableness in the society, a quality that has generally been termed justice.


2016 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 184-203 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claire Finkelstein

Abstract:In his famous book Just and Unjust Wars, Michael Walzer articulates a thesis he calls the “Moral Equality of Soldiers,” namely, the principle that combatants have an equal right to kill other combatants in war, regardless of the justice of the cause for which they are fighting. The Moral Equality Thesis, as I shall call it, is an essential component of traditional Just War Theory, in that it provides the basis for distinguishing the jus in bello from the jus ad bellum. It also plays a crucial role in identifying the nature of the difference between combatants and civilians. The Moral Equality Thesis has recently come under attack by scholars of Just War Theory, notably philosopher Jeff McMahan, on the grounds that killing for immoral purposes cannot be justified, and so it cannot be true that combatants all have an equal right to kill, regardless of the justice of their cause. In this essay, I defend the Moral Equality Thesis in its traditional formulation. Without it, I argue, the rule of law would not apply in war. The failure to recognize the equal right of combatants to kill in war, I suggest, creates an inconsistency between the rules of war and basic concepts in the law and morality of self-defense, an inconsistency that McMahan himself would think undesirable. I argue that McMahan’s argument applies more compellingly to armed conflict in asymmetrical warfare. Arguably, the Moral Equality Thesis does not apply in an armed conflict between combatants and unlawful combatants. In that context, the divergence from the law and morality of self-defense is less of a concern.


1988 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 251-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
Virginia I. Wolfe ◽  
Suzanne D. Blocker ◽  
Norma J. Prater

Articulatory generalization of velar cognates /k/, /g/ in two phonologically disordered children was studied over time as a function of sequential word-morpheme position training. Although patterns of contextual acquisition differed, correct responses to the word-medial, inflected context (e.g., "picking," "hugging") occurred earlier and exceeded those to the word-medial, noninflected context (e.g., "bacon," "wagon"). This finding indicates that the common view of the word-medial position as a unitary concept is an oversimplification. Possible explanations for superior generalization to the word-medial, inflected position are discussed in terms of coarticulation, perceptual salience, and the representational integrity of the word.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 59-68
Author(s):  
Peter Takáč

AbstractLookism is a term used to describe discrimination based on the physical appearance of a person. We suppose that the social impact of lookism is a philosophical issue, because, from this perspective, attractive people have an advantage over others. The first line of our argumentation involves the issue of lookism as a global ethical and aesthetical phenomenon. A person’s attractiveness has a significant impact on the social and public status of this individual. The common view in society is that it is good to be more attractive and healthier. This concept generates several ethical questions about human aesthetical identity, health, authenticity, and integrity in society. It seems that this unequal treatment causes discrimination, diminishes self-confidence, and lowers the chance of a job or social enforcement for many human beings. Currently, aesthetic improvements are being made through plastic surgery. There is no place on the human body that we cannot improve with plastic surgery or aesthetic medicine. We should not forget that it may result in the problem of elitism, in dividing people into primary and secondary categories. The second line of our argumentation involves a particular case of lookism: Melanie Gaydos. A woman that is considered to be a model with a unique look.


2020 ◽  
Vol 63 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-100
Author(s):  
Arseniy D. Kumankov

The article considers the modern meaning of Kant’s doctrine of war. The author examines the context and content of the key provisions of Kant’s concept of perpetual peace. The author also reviews the ideological affinity between Kant and previous authors who proposed to build alliances of states as a means of preventing wars. It is noted that the French revolution and the wars caused by it, the peace treaty between France and Prussia served as the historical background for the conceptualization of Kant’s project. In the second half of the 20th century, there is a growing attention to Kant’s ethical and political philosophy. Theorists of a wide variety of political and ethical schools, (cosmopolitanism, internationalism, and liberalism) pay attention to Kant’s legacy and relate their own concepts to it. Kant’s idea of war is reconsidered by Michael Doyle, Jürgen Habermas, Ulrich Beck, Mary Kaldor, Brian Orend. Thus, Doyle tracks democratic peace theory back to Kant’s idea of the spread of republicanism. According to democratic peace theory, liberal democracies do not solve conflict among themselves by non-military methods. Habermas, Beck, Kaldor appreciate Kant as a key proponent of cosmopolitanism. For them, Kant’s project is important due to notion of supranational forms of cooperation. They share an understanding that peace will be promoted by an allied authority, which will be “governing without government” and will take responsibility for the functioning of the principles of pacification of international relations. Orend’s proves that Kant should be considered as a proponent of the just war theory. In addition, Orend develops a new area in just war theory – the concept of ius post bellum – and justifies regime change as the goal of just war.


EMPIRISMA ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Limas Dodi

According to Abdulaziz Sachedina, the main argument of religious pluralism in the Qur’an based on the relationship between private belief (personal) and public projection of Islam in society. By regarding to private faith, the Qur’an being noninterventionist (for example, all forms of human authority should not be disturb the inner beliefs of individuals). While the public projection of faith, the Qur’an attitude based on the principle of coexistence. There is the willingness of the dominant race provide the freedom for people of other faiths with their own rules. Rules could shape how to run their affairs and to live side by side with the Muslims. Thus, based on the principle that the people of Indonesia are Muslim majority, it should be a mirror of a societie’s recognizion, respects and execution of religious pluralism. Abdul Aziz Sachedina called for Muslims to rediscover the moral concerns of public Islam in peace. The call for peace seemed to indicate that the existence of increasingly weakened in the religious sense of the Muslims and hence need to be reaffi rmed. Sachedina also like to emphasize that the position of peace in Islam is parallel with a variety of other doctrines, such as: prayer, fasting, pilgrimage and so on. Sachedina also tried to show the argument that the common view among religious groups is only one religion and traditions of other false and worthless. “Antipluralist” argument comes amid the reality of human religious differences. Keywords: Theology, Pluralism, Abdulaziz Sachedina


2019 ◽  
pp. 338
Author(s):  
عامر سلامة القرالة ◽  
أيمن صالح البراسنة
Keyword(s):  
Just War ◽  

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