The quest for legitimacy in independent Kosovo: the unfulfilled promise of diversity and minority rights

2017 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 442-463 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dana M. Landau

When Kosovo declared its independence in 2008, it did so not as a nation-state, but as a “state of communities,” self-defining as multiethnic, diverse, and committed to extensive rights for minorities. In this paper, this choice is understood as a response to a dual legitimation problem. Kosovo experienced both an external legitimation challenge, regarding its contested statehood internationally, and an internal one, vis-à-vis its Serb minority. The focus on diversity and minority rights was expected to confer legitimacy on the state both externally and internally. International state-builders and the domestic political elite in post-conflict Kosovo both pursued this strategy. However, it inadvertently created an additional internal legitimation challenge, this time from within Kosovo's majority Albanian population. This dynamic is illustrated by the opposition movement “Lëvizja Vetëvendosje” (Self-Determination Movement), which rejects the framing of Kosovo as first and foremost a multiethnic state. The movement's counter-narrative represents an additional internal legitimation challenge to the new state. This paper thus finds that internationally endorsed “diversity management” through minority rights did not deliver as a panacea for the legitimacy dilemmas of the post-conflict polity. On the contrary, the “state of communities” continues to be contested by both majority and minority groups in Kosovo.

2001 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 431-447 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTIAN JOPPKE

This article discusses the theory and practice of multicultural citizenship in liberal states. Regarding theory, I point to the shortcomings of both ‘radical’ and ‘liberal’ approaches to justify minority rights. Regarding practice, the state-centered notion of multicultural citizenship defects from the decentered accommodation of multicultural minority claims in functionnally differentiated societies. It also runs counter to a trend toward de-ethnicization in liberal states, in which the cultural impositions of the majority on minority groups are growing thin, thus removing the case for minority rights.


2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 178-192
Author(s):  
Roberta Medda-Windischer

In international law, minority rights instruments have been traditionally conceived for, and applied to, old minority groups with the exclusion of new minority groups originating from migration. Yet, minority groups, irrespective of their being old or new minorities, can be subsumed under a common definition and have some basic common claims. This allows devising a common but differentiated set of rights and obligations for old and new minority groups alike. This paper argues that the extension of the scope of application of legal instruments of minority protection, such as the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM), is conceptually meaningful and beneficial to the integration of new minorities stemming from migration. 


Author(s):  
Christine Cheng

After war, rebuilding the state’s presence—or building it up for the first time—is both a physical and social endeavor requiring new norms of compliance and cooperation. Local authority is deeply contested and the state typically has minimal presence. These conditions are akin to those described in the state of nature. To escape these conditions, Hobbes and Locke argued for the necessity of a sovereign to impose order and impartial justice to form what I call the kernel of the state. Extralegal groups orient societies in that direction by performing a set of visible and hidden functions in contemporary post-conflict environments. But they are not intentionally state-making. Rather, extralegal groups are driven by the need to create a stable trading environment and state-making is a by-product of this imperative. In the contemporary era, the motivation that drives extralegal groups to begin state-making is trade, not war.


Author(s):  
Christine Cheng

This chapter introduces the concept of extralegal groups and a theoretical framework for analyzing them—how they emerge, develop, and become entrenched over time. It explores their dual nature as threats to the state and as local statebuilders. Formally, an extralegal group is defined as a set of individuals with a proven capacity for violence who work outside the law for profit and provide basic governance functions to sustain its business interests. This framing shows how political authority can develop as a by-product of the commercial environment, even where the state has little or no presence. In post-conflict societies, the predatory nature and historical abuses of citizens conducted in the name of the state means that government is not always more trusted or better able to look after the interests of local populations than an extralegal group. Ultimately, extralegal groups blur the lines between the formal and informal; the licit and illicit.


Author(s):  
Jim Donaghey

Punk’s resonance has been felt strongly here. Against the backdrop of the Troubles and the “post-conflict” situation in Northern Ireland, punk has provided an anti-sectarian alternative culture. The overarching conflict of the Troubles left gaps for punk to thrive in, as well as providing the impetus for visions of an “Alternative Ulster,” but the stuttering shift from conflict to post-conflict has changed what oppositional identities and cultures look like. With the advent of “peace” (or a particular version of it at least) in the late 1990s, this space is being squeezed out by “development” agendas while counterculture is co-opted and neutered—and all the while sectarianism is further engrained and perpetuated. This chapter examines punk’s positioning within (and against) the conflict-warped terrain of Belfast, especially highlighting punk’s critical counter-narrative to the sectarian, neoliberal “peace.”


2012 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 193-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dawn L. Rothe ◽  
Scott Maggard

This article provides an overview of post-conflict justice (PCJ) as well as a detailed analysis of factors that impede or facilitate the implementation of mechanisms to address the atrocities of a conflict. Grounded in an extensive new dataset, developed over the past three years, covering all conflicts in Africa between 1946 and 2009, we extend previous research by including empirical testing of previously untested assumptions and variables impacting PCJ, most notably, the role of power, politics, economics, and geo-strategic interests at the state and international political levels as well as combining previously tested variables amongst and between each other. Further, the aspects of PCJ, including conflicts where mechanisms were not deployed are included in the analysis along with those coded as symbolic in nature. We conclude by discussing the pragmatic issues associated with testing the concept of realpolitik and policy implications based on our analysis.


1998 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 943-950 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin Warbrick ◽  
Dominic McGoldrick ◽  
Geoff Gilbert

The Northern Ireland Peace Agreement1 was concluded following multi-party negotiations on Good Friday, 10 April 1998. It received 71 per cent approval in Northern Ireland and 95 per cent approval in the Republic of Ireland in the subsequent referenda held on Friday 22 May, the day after Ascension. To some, it must have seemed that the timing was singularly appropriate following 30 years of “The Troubles”, which were perceived as being between a “Catholic minority” and a “Protestant majority”. While there are some minority groups identified by their religious affiliation that do require rights relating only to their religion, such as the right to worship in community,2 to practise and profess their religion,3 to legal recognition as a church,4 to hold property5 and to determine its own membership,6 some minority groups identified by their religious affiliation are properly national or ethnic minorities–religion is merely one factor which distinguishes them from the other groups, including the majority, in the population. One example of the latter situation is to be seen in (Northern) Ireland where there is, in fact, untypically, a double minority: the Catholic-nationalist community is a minority in Northern Ireland, but the Protestant-unionist population is a minority in the island of Ireland as a whole.7 The territory of Northern Ireland is geographically separate from the rest of the United Kingdom. The recent peace agreement addresses a whole range of issues for Northern Ireland, but included are, on the one hand, rights for the populations based on their religious affiliation, their culture and their language and, on the other, rights with respect to their political participation up to the point of external self-determination. It is a holistic approach. Like any good minority rights agreement,8 it deals with both standards and their implementation and, like any good minority rights agreement, it is not a minority rights agreement but, rather, a peace settlement.


Author(s):  
Y. Romanenko

The purpose of this research is a comparative description of the visual features of the national flags of Russia and Albania as symbols of diffusion of macroidentity, which is expressed in the contradictory vectors of their foreign policy and focus on both European and Asian macroidentity. Based on color semantics, the article analyzes the state flags of Russia and Albania, which, as in state symbols, reveal the features of the geopolitical positioning of states. The connection between the axial symbol of identity – the double-headed eagle – and the bifurcation (diffuseness) of political macroidentity is shown. The features common to the two states are shown: a tendency toward geopolitical isolationism, authoritarian state power, the dependence of the institution of the church on the state and statist atheism, the prevalence of corrupt practices, the emphasis on forced modernization and extraordinary technologies for overcoming situations of foreign political challenges. It is stated that in both countries there is a corruption of power, a sign of which is a fierce struggle for power during most of Byzantine history. It was determined that this struggle was not waged by political methods, but by force – a military coup, uprising or assassination of the current head of state. In the geopolitical position of Albania, this was due to Skannerberg’s attempt to combine two in one: Islamic and Orthodox identities, as well as situational adaptation of the country’s political elite to the next occupier: from 1443, i.e. the years of struggle against Turkish rule and until 1944 the coat of arms acquired alternately Turkish, Austrian, Greek, Italian and Soviet-Russian details. The coat of arms of the Russian Federation also contains Byzantine elements, which indicates a spiritual succession with the Byzantine Empire, however, with less borrowing.


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 28
Author(s):  
Alex Costin

A half century before the New Jersey Supreme Court endorsed inclusionary zoning in Southern Burlington N.A.A.C.P. v. Mount Laurel Township, the state struggled to secure basic municipal zoning. While New Jersey’s political elite embraced zoning in the 1910s and 20s to weather a period of tremendous growth and change, a disapproving judiciary steadfastly maintained that the practice violated basic property rights. Hundreds of state court decisions in the 1920s held zoning ordinances unconstitutional. Finally, the people of New Jersey in 1927 overwhelmingly passed an amendment to the state constitution overruling those decisions and affirming zoning as a reasonable exercise of the state’s police power. This essay traces those uncertain early years of zoning in New Jersey. The amendment was not the result of a state monolithically coming to its senses. Instead, its passage documents a decade-long struggle played out not only in the courts and legislature but also in the press and the town meeting.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Finbar Benedict Kiddle

<p>The rule of law forms the bedrock for societal and institutional organisation in the Western world. International actors see its establishment in developing countries as a means to facilitate wider development work and an end in and of itself. However, development of the legitimacy of the rule of law is not well understood, especially in post-conflict environments where it is most lacking. Despite the best efforts of international interventions, the rule of law is often not in the paramount position it requires: it lacks legitimacy amongst the people. To understand why this is the case there is a need for a better understanding of how interventions develop legitimacy in the rule of law. This research develops that understanding and asks the question ‘how does the contemporary peacebuilding agenda develop the legitimacy of the rule of law in post-conflict states?’ To do this the research undertakes a case study investigation of a particular intervention: the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands. Discourse and content analyses, carried out on interview transcripts and a wealth of documentation, reveal the different forces exerted by the intervention to develop legitimacy in the rule of law. These are interpreted through a particular lens: a modified version of Luke’s three faces of power that also draws on concepts of governmentality. A four-dimensional definition of legitimacy also allows for greater analytical depth. The research shows that the contemporary peacebuilding agenda can do some things very well. It is especially effective at the initial response to crisis. It is after the establishment of this basic security/performance dimension of the rule of law that interventions begin to develop their institutional/process dimension through capacity building. Capacity building divides into three levels: the individual, the organisation, and the state. It integrates the rule of law across the state edifice and establishes it as a foundational element of the system. However, the most important aspect of building legitimacy is the development of shared beliefs, as it is these that establish what is ‘true’ amongst a society. Contemporary peacebuilding interventions portray the rule of law as intrinsically legitimate and the correct, rational way of organising society. This idea permeates through their structures, discourses, and methods. However, the rule of law is not intrinsically legitimate. It is a culturally constructed concept that in many countries is in opposition with alternative ways of organising society and resolving conflict. Developing legitimacy in the rule of law is then a struggle between competing organisational systems. Such conflict jeopardises gains made by interventions, as the rule of law is fighting an uphill battle against other internalised, and often more locally reverent, norms. If it is to establish in post-conflict environments, the rule of law and competing systems need to interact to produce a locally relevant, hybrid, conception of the rule of law. One that is recognisable to all sides, but unique to the context. This leads to peace.</p>


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