From Substages to Moral Types and Beyond: An Analysis of Core Criteria for Morally Autonomous Judgements

1999 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 899-920 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tobias Krettenauer ◽  
Wolfgang Edelstein
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Construct Validity ◽  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Type A ◽  
Longitudinal Change ◽  
Typological Approach ◽  
Moral Stage

Based on Kohlberg’s typological distinction between heteronomous versus autonomous moral types (Type A vs. B), the study proposes a refined strategy for the assessment of autonomous morality that aims at overcoming methodological ‘aws of Kohlberg’s typological approach. Theoretically, two conceptually crucial criteria of autonomous morality were distinguished: (1) prescriptiveness; and (2) universality of moral reasoning. Empirically, measures of prescriptiveness and universality of moral reasoning were examined to determine whether or not they yield important empirical findings that were associated with the concept of moral types. In a study of 348 German adolescents from grades 9 and 12, both prescriptive and universalised moral reasoning were assessed by two standard probe questions of the Moral Judgment Interview. Both aspects of moral reasoning predicted readiness to take moral responsibility in the context of sociopolitical action. In addition, both measures were moderately correlated with moral stage, largely independent of SES, and unrelated to gender. There was significant longitudinal change towards prescriptive and universalised moral reasoning over a three-year interval. The findings demonstrate that the construct validity of Kohlberg’s approach to the assessment of autonomous morality can be significantly improved by using measures of the prescriptiveness and universality of moral reasoning.

Effect of Power on Moral Judgment

1978 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 387-394
Author(s):  
Russell Hamby
Keyword(s):  
Social Psychology ◽  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Low Power ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Factorial Design ◽  
High Power ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Need For Power ◽  
Experimenter Effects

Ambiguous effects of power on attributions of moral responsibility for an accident are interpreted to result from the intervening effects of need for power, which is aroused by the anticipation of exercising power over another. 160 subjects from introductory social psychology classes participated in a questionnaire-type experiment comparing effects of high/low carelessness, severe/minor consequences, and high/low power of the attributor in a 2 × 2 × 2 factorial design. In a follow-up experiment 30 subjects were assigned to conditions of high or low power, and their needs for power and moral attributions were measured. High power seemed to arouse need for power, which was curvilinearly related to moral judgments. Those high and low in need for power attributed more moral responsibility to the perpetrator of an accident than those with moderate levels of need for power. The results suggest complicated models of both moral judgments and experimenter effects related to the level or arousal of motivations.

Autonomous Vehicles and the Attribution of Moral Responsibility

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 345-352 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan M. McManus ◽  
Abraham M. Rutchick
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Autonomous Vehicles ◽  
Moral Dilemma ◽  
Fatal Accident ◽  
Attributions Of Blame ◽  
Influence Perceptions

With the imminent advent of autonomous vehicles (AVs) comes a moral dilemma: How do people assign responsibility in the event of a fatal accident? AVs necessarily create conditions in which “drivers” yield agency to a machine. The current study examines how people make attributions of blame and praise in this context. Varying the features of AV technology affected how responsible a “driver” (who purchased the vehicle) is perceived to be following a deadly crash. The findings provide support for agency and commission as crucial bases of moral judgment. They also raise questions about how morally contradictory actions are perceived and underscore the need for research examining how moral responsibility is distributed among multiple potentially culpable agents. Pragmatically, these findings suggest that regulating (or declining to regulate) how AVs are programmed may strongly influence perceptions of moral and legal culpability.

Introduction

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Brian Leiter
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Moral Action ◽  
Philosophy Of Action ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Relationship

Moral psychology, for purposes of this volume, encompasses issues in metaethics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of action, including questions concerning the objectivity of morality, the relationship between moral judgment and emotion, the nature of the emotions, free will, and moral responsibility, and the structure of the mind as that is relevant to the possibility of moral action and judgment. Nietzsche’s “naturalism” is introduced and explained, and certain confusions about its meaning are addressed. An overview of the volume follows

Losing your footing, losing your morality

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 497-510
Author(s):  
Heng Li ◽  
Yu Cao
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Visual Experience ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Tilt Table ◽  
Conceptual Metaphors ◽  
Bodily Experience ◽  
Downstream Effects ◽  
Normal Text ◽  
Sample Experiment

Abstract What influences how people render their moral judgment? Focusing specifically on the conceptual metaphors “moral is upright” and “immoral is tilted”, we sought to investigate whether physical slant can influence people’s harsh moral judgment. Experiment 1 induced physical slant by having participants complete the questionnaire at a tilt table. We observed a significant effect with participants who experienced physical slant rendering a less severe moral judgment than did those who wrote their responses at a level table. Using a new manipulation of physical slant and a larger, more diverse sample, Experiment 2 asked participants to complete the questionnaires with rotated text or normal text. We observed a difference between the two groups: compared to participants who read the normal text, those with a visual experience of slant lessened the severity of their moral judgments. Taken together, the results showed that the consequence of tilted experience exerts downstream effects on moral reasoning, which suggests that incidental bodily experience affects how people render their decisions.

scholarly journals Unraveling Moral Reasoning in Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis: How Emotional Detachment Modifies Moral Judgment

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chiara Crespi ◽  
Gaia Chiara Santi ◽  
Alessandra Dodich ◽  
Federica Lupo ◽  
Lucia Catherine Greco ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis ◽  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Emotional Detachment ◽  
Lateral Sclerosis

scholarly journals The Limits of Emotion in Moral Judgment

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua May
Keyword(s):  
Moral Development ◽  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Cognition ◽  
Compelling Evidence ◽  
Ample Evidence ◽  
Cognitive Components

This chapter argues that our best science supports the rationalist idea that, independent of reasoning, emotions are not integral to moral judgment. There is ample evidence that ordinary moral cognition often involves conscious and unconscious reasoning about an action’s outcomes and the agent’s role in bringing them about. Emotions can aid in moral reasoning by, for example, drawing one’s attention to such information. However, there is no compelling evidence for the decidedly sentimentalist claim that mere feelings are causally necessary or sufficient for making a moral judgment or for treating norms as distinctively moral. The chapter concludes that, even if moral cognition is largely driven by automatic intuitions, these should not be mistaken for emotions or their non-cognitive components. Non-cognitive elements in our psychology may be required for normal moral development and motivation but not necessarily for mature moral judgment.

scholarly journals Id non culpam, sed poenam esse iudicabam (Confessiones VII 3, 5). Niektóre wątpliwości i refleksje św. Augustyna analizującego źródło zła

Vox Patrum ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 59 ◽  
pp. 241-250
Author(s):  
Waldemar Turek
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Saint Augustine ◽  
Spiritual Journey ◽  
Divine Judgment ◽  
Looking Back ◽  
The Way

In light of the distinction Saint Augustine makes between a committed evil, understood as the result of a mistake in choosing (culpa), and a suffered evil, des­cribed as the effect of a just divine judgment (poena) – a distinction he makes in several texts dealing with the origin of evil – I analyze Augustine’s reflections in the Confessions on his relationship with the unnamed women. He calls the rela­tionship a pactum libidinosi amoris, that is, one aimed at satisfying the passions. The negative moral judgment he passes on this stage of his life is expressed with particular poignancy by the word libido/libidinosus, indicating the passions to which man submits at times. Looking back at his affair with the unnamed woman, he considers the evil committed a culpa; hence one has the impression that he wanted to place the moral responsibility of the evil committed upon himself, thus giving greater witness to the goodness of the merciful God who revealed to him gradually the truth concerning the various phases of his spiritual journey and the pain experienced along the way.

Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua May
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Empirical Literature ◽  
Moral Cognition ◽  
Evolutionary Mechanisms ◽  
Debunking Arguments ◽  
Fertile Ground ◽  
In Virtue Of

The burgeoning science of ethics has produced a trend toward pessimism. Ordinary moral judgment and motivation, we’re told, are profoundly influenced by arbitrary factors and ultimately driven by unreasoned feelings or emotions—fertile ground for sweeping debunking arguments. This book counters the current orthodoxy on its own terms by carefully engaging with the empirical literature. The resulting view, optimistic rationalism, maintains that reason plays a pervasive role in our moral minds and that ordinary moral reasoning is not particularly flawed or in need of serious repair. The science does suggest that moral knowledge and virtue don’t come easily, as we are susceptible to some unsavory influences that lead to rationalizing bad behavior. Reason can be corrupted in ethics just as in other domains, but the science warrants cautious optimism, not a special skepticism about morality in particular. Rationality in ethics is possible not just despite, but in virtue of, the psychological and evolutionary mechanisms that shape moral cognition.

Moral Bioenhancement and the Utilitarian Catastrophe

2014 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
NICHOLAS AGAR
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Practical Interest ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Moral Value ◽  
Moral Bioenhancement

Abstract:This article challenges recent calls for moral bioenhancement—the use of biomedical means, including pharmacological and genetic methods, to increase the moral value of our actions or characters. It responds to those who take a practical interest in moral bioenhancement. I argue that moral bioenhancement is unlikely to be a good response to the extinction threats of climate change and weapons of mass destruction. Rather than alleviating those problems, it is likely to aggravate them. We should expect biomedical means to generate piecemeal enhancements of human morality. These predictably strengthen some contributors to moral judgment while leaving others comparatively unaffected. This unbalanced enhancement differs from the manner of improvement that typically results from sustained reflection. It is likely to make its subjects worse rather than better at moral reasoning.

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