scholarly journals Id non culpam, sed poenam esse iudicabam (Confessiones VII 3, 5). Niektóre wątpliwości i refleksje św. Augustyna analizującego źródło zła

Vox Patrum ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 59 ◽  
pp. 241-250
Author(s):  
Waldemar Turek

In light of the distinction Saint Augustine makes between a committed evil, understood as the result of a mistake in choosing (culpa), and a suffered evil, des­cribed as the effect of a just divine judgment (poena) – a distinction he makes in several texts dealing with the origin of evil – I analyze Augustine’s reflections in the Confessions on his relationship with the unnamed women. He calls the rela­tionship a pactum libidinosi amoris, that is, one aimed at satisfying the passions. The negative moral judgment he passes on this stage of his life is expressed with particular poignancy by the word libido/libidinosus, indicating the passions to which man submits at times. Looking back at his affair with the unnamed woman, he considers the evil committed a culpa; hence one has the impression that he wanted to place the moral responsibility of the evil committed upon himself, thus giving greater witness to the goodness of the merciful God who revealed to him gradually the truth concerning the various phases of his spiritual journey and the pain experienced along the way.

1978 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 387-394
Author(s):  
Russell Hamby

Ambiguous effects of power on attributions of moral responsibility for an accident are interpreted to result from the intervening effects of need for power, which is aroused by the anticipation of exercising power over another. 160 subjects from introductory social psychology classes participated in a questionnaire-type experiment comparing effects of high/low carelessness, severe/minor consequences, and high/low power of the attributor in a 2 × 2 × 2 factorial design. In a follow-up experiment 30 subjects were assigned to conditions of high or low power, and their needs for power and moral attributions were measured. High power seemed to arouse need for power, which was curvilinearly related to moral judgments. Those high and low in need for power attributed more moral responsibility to the perpetrator of an accident than those with moderate levels of need for power. The results suggest complicated models of both moral judgments and experimenter effects related to the level or arousal of motivations.


2021 ◽  
pp. 002216782110008
Author(s):  
Maharaj K. Raina

Greatness, a relative concept, has been historically approached in different ways. Considering greatness of character as different from greatness of talents, some cultures have conceptualized greatness as an expression of human spirit leading to transcending existing patterns and awakening inner selves to new levels of consciousness, rising above times and circumstances, and to change the direction of human tide. Individuals characterized by such greatness working with higher selves, guided by moral and ethical imperatives, and possessing noble impulses of human nature are considered to be manifesting spiritual greatness. Examining such greatness is the goal of this article. Keeping Indian tradition in focus, this article has studied how greatness has been conceptualized in that particular tradition and the way in which life and times have shaped great individuals called Mahāpuruşha who exhibited extraordinary moral responsibility relentlessly in pursuit of their visions of addressing contemporary major issues and changing the direction of human life. Four Mahāpuruşha, who possessed such enduring greatness and excelled in their thoughts and actions to give a new positive direction to human life, have been profiled in this article. Suggestions have also been made for studies on moral and spiritual excellence to help realize our true human path and purpose.


2018 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sandrine Sorlin

Abstract The aim of this paper is to evince the reasons why the viewers tend to ‘root for the bad guy’ in House of Cards in spite of his amoral undertakings. It delves into the linguistic, pragmatic and cognitive strategies employed by the protagonist, Frank Underwood, to ‘transport’ the audience in the narrative while distancing them from moral judgment. It is shown that the ‘Para-Social Relationship’ he constructs with the audience invites them to adapt to his goals and perspective, guiding their emotions and reactions, distracting them from ethical matters through generalised impersonalised aphorisms and transgressive humour. Lastly it proposes a three-level model of producing/viewing processes that are specific to House of Cards, highlighting the way the protagonist’s manipulation of audience involvement breaks apart in the last seasons, as the production crew alters the Frank-audience relationship.


2006 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 427-447 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil Levy

Whatever its implications for the other features of human agency at its best — for moral responsibility, reasons-responsiveness, self-realization, flourishing, and so on—addiction is universally recognized as impairing autonomy. But philosophers have frequently misunderstood the nature of addiction, and therefore have not adequately explained the manner in which it impairs autonomy. Once we recognize that addiction is not incompatible with choice or volition, it becomes clear that none of the Standard accounts of autonomy can satisfactorily explain the way in which it undermines fully autonomous agency. In order to understand to what extent and in what ways the addicted are autonomy-impaired, we need to understand autonomy as consisting, essentially, in the exercise of the capacity for extended agency. It is because addiction undermines extended agency, so that addicts are not able to integrate their lives and pursue a Single conception of the good, that it impairs autonomy.


2008 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 137-162
Author(s):  
Michael Allen

AbstractKarl Barth, Oliver O'Donovan, and Walter Brueggemann explicitly link their constructive political projects to extensive Scriptural exegesis. I will investigate their different readings of the Davidic monarchy within the life of Israel as a means by which to exposit and critique their respective accounts of centralized governmental authority. Along the way, three important judgments will be suggested from their theological exegesis for the task of theological politics: the analogical subordination of human government to divine judgment, an encouragement of prophetic counter-politics to ward off imperial idolatry, and affirmation of a positive creaturely witness to divine action.


2006 ◽  
Vol 19 ◽  
pp. 256-275
Author(s):  
Christian Moe

The wars that dissolved Yugoslavia – were they religious wars? Why are conflicts increasingly coded as religious, rather than as, for example, social or ethnic? What constitutes a ‘religious’ or ‘holy’ war. This article attempts an inventory of important cat­egories and hypotheses generated in the relevant literature so far, with a few critical notes along the way. The author considers the role assigned to religion in structural, cultural, and actor-oriented explanations of the Yugoslav wars. Structural and cultural explanations downplay the role of human agency and, hence, of moral responsibility; actor-oriented approaches focus on it.


2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
David Sackris

I argue that the debate concerning the nature of first-person moral judgment, namely, whether such moral judgments are inherently motivating (internalism) or whether moral judgments can be made in the absence of motivation (externalism), may be founded on a faulty assumption: that moral judgments form a distinct kind that must have some shared, essential features in regards to motivation to act. I argue that there is little reason to suppose that first-person moral judgments form a homogenous class in this respect by considering an ordinary case: student readers of Peter Singer’s “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”. Neither internalists nor externalists can provide a satisfying account as to why our students fail to act in this particular case, but are motivated to act by their moral judgments in most cases. I argue that the inability to provide a satisfying account is rooted in this shared assumption about the nature of moral judgments. Once we consider rejecting the notion that first-person moral decision- making forms a distinct kind in the way it is typically assumed, the internalist/externalist debate may be rendered moot.


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 114-122
Author(s):  
Nina A Tsyrkun

The article explores the balance of the two basic cultural constructs - individualism and collectivism - and the way it is represented in the American cinema of 2015-2016 as exemplified by a number of films set in the past, present and future. The author comes to the conclusion that in the face of a global peril the idea of individual moral responsibility inevitably leads to the role of collectivism as the essential survival condition.


2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 345-352 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan M. McManus ◽  
Abraham M. Rutchick

With the imminent advent of autonomous vehicles (AVs) comes a moral dilemma: How do people assign responsibility in the event of a fatal accident? AVs necessarily create conditions in which “drivers” yield agency to a machine. The current study examines how people make attributions of blame and praise in this context. Varying the features of AV technology affected how responsible a “driver” (who purchased the vehicle) is perceived to be following a deadly crash. The findings provide support for agency and commission as crucial bases of moral judgment. They also raise questions about how morally contradictory actions are perceived and underscore the need for research examining how moral responsibility is distributed among multiple potentially culpable agents. Pragmatically, these findings suggest that regulating (or declining to regulate) how AVs are programmed may strongly influence perceptions of moral and legal culpability.


Author(s):  
William Schweiker

This chapter explores the importance of moral responsibility in Reinhold Niebuhr’s thought, which in turn allows the reader to interpret his work within the wider compass of Christian humanism. While Niebuhr’s ethics never showcased the concept of responsibility in the way other thinkers did during his time, he nevertheless insisted that the moral capability of responsibility is basic to human dignity. Utilizing the distinction Max Weber made between two forms of ethics, the chapter suggests that moral responsibility constitutes the ‘form’, rather than the ‘norm’, of Niebuhr’s anthropological project. Niebuhr’s project can be seen as an attempt to retrieve the lost insights of the Reformation regarding sin and grace within the historical condition of modern life initiated by the Renaissance. This orientation in Niebuhr’s work bears some of the features of Christian humanism. The final section discusses how Niebuhr’s theological and ethical vision can contribute to Christian thinking in our time.


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