Autonomous Vehicles and the Attribution of Moral Responsibility

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 345-352 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan M. McManus ◽  
Abraham M. Rutchick
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Autonomous Vehicles ◽  
Moral Dilemma ◽  
Fatal Accident ◽  
Attributions Of Blame ◽  
Influence Perceptions

With the imminent advent of autonomous vehicles (AVs) comes a moral dilemma: How do people assign responsibility in the event of a fatal accident? AVs necessarily create conditions in which “drivers” yield agency to a machine. The current study examines how people make attributions of blame and praise in this context. Varying the features of AV technology affected how responsible a “driver” (who purchased the vehicle) is perceived to be following a deadly crash. The findings provide support for agency and commission as crucial bases of moral judgment. They also raise questions about how morally contradictory actions are perceived and underscore the need for research examining how moral responsibility is distributed among multiple potentially culpable agents. Pragmatically, these findings suggest that regulating (or declining to regulate) how AVs are programmed may strongly influence perceptions of moral and legal culpability.

Effect of Power on Moral Judgment

1978 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 387-394
Author(s):  
Russell Hamby
Keyword(s):  
Social Psychology ◽  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Low Power ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Factorial Design ◽  
High Power ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Need For Power ◽  
Experimenter Effects

Ambiguous effects of power on attributions of moral responsibility for an accident are interpreted to result from the intervening effects of need for power, which is aroused by the anticipation of exercising power over another. 160 subjects from introductory social psychology classes participated in a questionnaire-type experiment comparing effects of high/low carelessness, severe/minor consequences, and high/low power of the attributor in a 2 × 2 × 2 factorial design. In a follow-up experiment 30 subjects were assigned to conditions of high or low power, and their needs for power and moral attributions were measured. High power seemed to arouse need for power, which was curvilinearly related to moral judgments. Those high and low in need for power attributed more moral responsibility to the perpetrator of an accident than those with moderate levels of need for power. The results suggest complicated models of both moral judgments and experimenter effects related to the level or arousal of motivations.

Introduction

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Brian Leiter
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Moral Action ◽  
Philosophy Of Action ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Relationship

Moral psychology, for purposes of this volume, encompasses issues in metaethics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of action, including questions concerning the objectivity of morality, the relationship between moral judgment and emotion, the nature of the emotions, free will, and moral responsibility, and the structure of the mind as that is relevant to the possibility of moral action and judgment. Nietzsche’s “naturalism” is introduced and explained, and certain confusions about its meaning are addressed. An overview of the volume follows

Refusal of Killing a Stranger to Save Five Brothers: How Are Others’ Judgments Anticipated and Favored in a Moral Dilemma Situation?

2013 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 9-12
Author(s):  
Ryo Oda
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Dilemma ◽  
Surprising Result ◽  
Trolley Problem ◽  
Computational System ◽  
Rule Based System ◽  
Coordination System ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Relationship

One evolutionary theory of morality, examined here, is based on theories of kin selection while another has proposed that moral judgment is based on a Kantian rule-based system. Using the Trolley Problem, Kurzban et al. (2012) asked subjects to decide whether they would kill one person to save five others, varying the relationship of the subject with the others involved. They revealed that nearly half of the subjects reported that they would be unwilling to push one stranger to his/her death to save five brothers in a footbridge version of the Trolley Problem. In the present study, I tried to replicate this somewhat surprising result in Japanese participants, to investigate the robustness of the finding. I also examined how participants anticipated and favored the moral judgment of other people. If a Kantian decision was made according to the coordination system suggested by Kurzban et al. (2012), a Kantian decision, rather than a Hamiltonian decision, would be anticipated and favored as the decision of people generally. The results seem to support the discussion of Kurzban et al. (2012), that the computational system that delivers Kantian moral judgment functions to coordinate condemnation decisions.

Lifespan Differences in Adult Thinking about Hypothetical and Personal Moral Issues: Reflection or Regression?

1987 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 359-375 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael W. Pratt ◽  
Gail Golding ◽  
Patricia Kerig
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Age Differences ◽  
Ethical Issues ◽  
Moral Dilemma ◽  
Age Groups ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Moral Issues ◽  
Role Taking ◽  
Older Subjects

Recent work on aging and moral judgment has investigated the claim that older adults may show a regression in their average stage level of moral judgment, compared with younger groups. A second line of work has suggested that at least some elderly adults may be more reflective in their thinking regarding moral and ethical issues (e.g. Kohlberg, 1973). The present research was designed to investigate these issues with respect to hypothetical and real-life moral judgment. Subjects were 60 adults in three age groups: 18-24 years, 30-45 years, and 60-75 years. Each responded to the Kohlberg Moral Judgment Interview and to the personal moral dilemma task of Gilligan. Measures of stage level and of reported use of perspectivetaking processes, as well as analyses of the content of personal dilemmas, were obtained. Results showed no average stage level differences between the age or sex groups. Hypothetical stage scores were significantly higher than real-life scores overall. There were no age differences in reported role-taking processes on hypothetical dilemmas, though there were sex differences, with men more likely to report adopting a third-party, observer role. Finally, older subjects produced significantly more varied reflections on their personal dilemmas.

From Substages to Moral Types and Beyond: An Analysis of Core Criteria for Morally Autonomous Judgements

1999 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 899-920 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tobias Krettenauer ◽  
Wolfgang Edelstein
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Construct Validity ◽  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Type A ◽  
Longitudinal Change ◽  
Typological Approach ◽  
Moral Stage

Based on Kohlberg’s typological distinction between heteronomous versus autonomous moral types (Type A vs. B), the study proposes a refined strategy for the assessment of autonomous morality that aims at overcoming methodological ‘aws of Kohlberg’s typological approach. Theoretically, two conceptually crucial criteria of autonomous morality were distinguished: (1) prescriptiveness; and (2) universality of moral reasoning. Empirically, measures of prescriptiveness and universality of moral reasoning were examined to determine whether or not they yield important empirical findings that were associated with the concept of moral types. In a study of 348 German adolescents from grades 9 and 12, both prescriptive and universalised moral reasoning were assessed by two standard probe questions of the Moral Judgment Interview. Both aspects of moral reasoning predicted readiness to take moral responsibility in the context of sociopolitical action. In addition, both measures were moderately correlated with moral stage, largely independent of SES, and unrelated to gender. There was significant longitudinal change towards prescriptive and universalised moral reasoning over a three-year interval. The findings demonstrate that the construct validity of Kohlberg’s approach to the assessment of autonomous morality can be significantly improved by using measures of the prescriptiveness and universality of moral reasoning.

scholarly journals Id non culpam, sed poenam esse iudicabam (Confessiones VII 3, 5). Niektóre wątpliwości i refleksje św. Augustyna analizującego źródło zła

Vox Patrum ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 59 ◽  
pp. 241-250
Author(s):  
Waldemar Turek
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Saint Augustine ◽  
Spiritual Journey ◽  
Divine Judgment ◽  
Looking Back ◽  
The Way

In light of the distinction Saint Augustine makes between a committed evil, understood as the result of a mistake in choosing (culpa), and a suffered evil, des­cribed as the effect of a just divine judgment (poena) – a distinction he makes in several texts dealing with the origin of evil – I analyze Augustine’s reflections in the Confessions on his relationship with the unnamed women. He calls the rela­tionship a pactum libidinosi amoris, that is, one aimed at satisfying the passions. The negative moral judgment he passes on this stage of his life is expressed with particular poignancy by the word libido/libidinosus, indicating the passions to which man submits at times. Looking back at his affair with the unnamed woman, he considers the evil committed a culpa; hence one has the impression that he wanted to place the moral responsibility of the evil committed upon himself, thus giving greater witness to the goodness of the merciful God who revealed to him gradually the truth concerning the various phases of his spiritual journey and the pain experienced along the way.

The Influence of Emotional Closeness on Moral Judgment In Moral Dilemma Paradigm

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (8) ◽  
pp. 806-814
Author(s):  
Liu Wen ◽  
Zhan Ze ◽  
Wu Baopei
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Dilemma ◽  
Emotional Closeness

Moral Judgment in Middle and Late Adulthood: The Effects of Age-Appropriate Moral Dilemmas and Spontaneous Role Taking

1986 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 161-172 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janet Blum Chap
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Dilemma ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Cross Sectional Study ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Age Difference ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Younger Adults ◽  
Role Taking ◽  
Age Appropriate

This was a cross-sectional study of the effects of age, sex, and moral dilemma content on adult moral reasoning. Hypothetical dilemmas were presented to sixty men and women, thirty of whom were elderly and thirty in early middle age. With education controlled there were no age or sex differences in moral maturity. Dilemma content had a significant effect on moral judgment, with a tendency for each age group to use a higher level of judgment when the situation described was age-appropriate, i.e., relevant to that group's stage of life. There was a significant age difference on a measure of spontaneous role taking: old persons made more definitive moral judgments than the younger adults, who attempted to reconcile the various points of view represented in a dilemma.

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