Abstract
Scholars across international relations (IR) debate the role military experience plays in elite decision-making. I argue there are two critical problems with this debate. First, it fails to adequately consider the underlying mechanisms linking military service to elite policy preferences. Second, it narrowly focuses on the use of force and largely ignores other ways in which military experience may shape elite behavior. I employ vulnerability to the Vietnam draft lottery to disentangle the impact of two key mechanisms linking military service to elite preferences: self-selection and socialization. I compare the foreign and defense policy roll call votes of Members of Congress (MCs) in the House of Representatives across the 94th–113th Congresses who were eligible for the draft and served in the military to those who were eligible for the draft but did not serve. I find significant differences in the roll call voting behavior between these groups, particularly on issues associated with arming and defense budget restrictions, as well as broader oversight of the military. These effects are heightened for MCs who served on active duty, in the military longer, and in combat, providing strong support for socialization effects. My study carries implications for civil–military relations, elite decision-making, and the study of leaders in IR.
Schooling and the Vietnam-Era GI Bill: Evidence from the Draft Lottery