Registration Convention

Author(s):  
Anja Nakarada Pečujlić

The adoption and entering into force of the 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (also known as the Registration Convention) was another achievement in expanding and strengthening the corpus iuris spatialis. It was the fourth treaty negotiated by the member states of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UN COPUOS) and it represents a lex specialis to the Outer Space Treaty (OST), elaborating further Articles V, VIII, and XI of the OST. Article V OST deals with safe and prompt return of astronauts in case of distress or emergency landing to the state of registry of their space vehicle, which is then further defined in the Registration Convention. Article VIII OST only implied registration and provided for the consequences thereof, namely in respect of exercising jurisdiction and control over a registered space object. However, the Registration Convention specified the ensuing obligations and regulated the necessary practical steps of space objects registration. The Registration Convention also complements and strengthens Article XI OST, which stipulates an obligation of state parties to inform the secretary-general of the nature, conduct, locations, and results of their space activities in order to promote international cooperation. The prevailing purposes of the Registration Convention is the clarification of “jurisdiction and control” as a comprehensive concept mentioned in Article VIII OST. In addition to its overriding objective, the Registration Convention also contributes to the promotion and the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes. Establishing and maintaining a public register reduces the possibility of the existence of unidentified space objects and thereby lowers the risk of putting, for example, weapons of mass destruction secretly into orbit. Notwithstanding these important objectives, the negotiation history of the Convention and its lower number of ratification compared to the previous three space treaties testify to the numerous challenges that surround registration. The mandatory marking of space objects was one of the most heated points of debate between member states during the drafting of the Convention in the 1970s. Member states had conflicting views, depending on whether they were launching states or potential victims of launch failures. Additionally, questions on whether there should be one central or several registers and whether the type of information to be registered should be obligatory or optional were also pivotal in the discussion. It took five years of negotiation for member states to reach compromises and to adopt the Registration Convention, containing 12 articles. The articles covered issues ranging from registration procedure and different registries to amendments and withdrawal from the Convention. In addition, the following novelties were introduced: a new definition on “state of registry” was included; the “Moscow formula” was abandoned as the depositary was moved to the UN; and the “in five years review” clause found in Article X signified that the drafters were anticipating that technological developments could have such an impact on the Convention’s provisions that shorter time span between reviews were required than in previous space treaties. Despite the Convention’s novelties and its objective to protect the attribution of jurisdiction and control on the basis of a registry, as well as to ensure the rights provided in the Liability Convention and the Rescue and Return Agreement by offering means to identify space objects, the articles dealing with joint launch registration and registration by Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) are seen as weakening jurisdiction and control concept. Due to the fact that jurisdiction and control stay only with the state of registry, the other launching states may only conclude appropriate agreements to retain any of these rights. Thus, international responsibility and liability remain with all the launching states, but jurisdiction and control only with the state of registry. Furthermore, in the case of an IGO, the IGO does not have the sovereign authority to exercise jurisdiction and control, thereby raising the question who could do so instead of or on behalf of an IGO. In this regard, the Convention leaves important areas unregulated. In the following years, there were proposals to expand the Registration Convention to encompass other subject matters such as financial interests of assets in outer space; however, up until today, these issues remain regulated only by the UNIDROIT Space Assets Protocol.

Author(s):  
Bernhard Schmidt-Tedd ◽  
Alexander Soucek

Space objects are subject to registration in order to allocate “jurisdiction and control” over those objects in the sovereign-free environment of outer space. This approach is similar to the registration of ships on the high seas and for aircraft in international airspace. Registration is one of the basic principles of space law, starting with the first space-related UN General Assembly (GA) Resolution 1721 B (XVI) of December 20, 1961, followed by UN GA Resolution 1962 (XVIII) of December 1963 then formulated in Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, and later specified in the Registration Convention of 1975. Registration of space objects has arguably grown into a principle of customary international law, relevant for each spacefaring state. Registration occurs at the national and international level in a two-step process. To enter and object into the UN Register of Space Objects, the state establishes a national registry for its space objects and notifies the UN Secretary General of all registered objects. The UN Register is handled by the UN Office for Outer Space Affaires (UNOOSA), which has created a searchable database as an open source of information for space objects worldwide. Registration is linked to the so-called launching state of the relevant space object. There may be more than one launching state for the specific launch event, but only one state can register a specific space object. The state of registry has jurisdiction and control over the space object and therefore no double-registration is admissible. Registration practice has evolved in response to technical developments and legal challenges. After the privatization of major international satellite organizations, a number of nonregistrations had to be addressed. The result was the UN GA Registration Practice Resolution of 2007 as elaborated by the legal subcommittee of the UN Committee for the Peaceful Use of Outer Space. The complexity of space activities and concepts such as megaconstellations present new challenges for the registration system. For example, the Registration Practice Resolution recommends that in cases of joint launches each space object should be registered separately. Registration of space objects is a legal instrument relevant for state responsibility and liability, but it is not an adequate instrument for space traffic management. The orbit-related information of the registration system is useful for identification purposes but not for real-time positioning information. Orbital data to allow positioning, tracking, and collision warnings need to respond to various requirements of accuracy.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Riza Amalia

Space utilization is currently experiencing a very rapid increase. Many countries have carried out various missions by launching space objects. In launching an object into space, the state has several obligations that must be fulfilled, at least according to the author there are three basic obligations namely, registration, supervision, and responsibility when a loss occurs. For this reason, this study aims to provide information on how to carry out these obligations under international law. The method used in this study is the normative judicial approach. A normative juridical approach is a legal research conducted by examining library materials or secondary data as a basis for research by conducting a search of regulations and literature relating to the problem under study. The launch of space objects certainly has a regulation that is used as a standard worthy of launching space objects such as satellites. The launch is regulated in the 1976 Registration Convention and registered with an international institution, the International Telecommunication Union (Article iv (1) 1976 registration convention). In addition to registering space objects, the state must also supervise these space objects to find out the development of the mission they made (Article VI Outer Spece Treaty 1967), and the last is the responsibility of a country when a loss arises due to the space object. This is regulated in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (Article VII) and the 1972 Liability Convention.


Author(s):  
Anna Hurova ◽  
Maria Kirpachova

This research is aimed at detecting legal and organizational requirements for the Blockchain application in State regulation of space activity. The most precise attention is focused on considering the compliance with the space authorization requirements, ensuring the registration of space objects and the implementation of foreign trade agreements within the space sector of the economy. The research is based on results of the previous in-depth study conducted by the authors, which was dedicated to the legal nature of the DLT (distributed ledger technologies), and in particular its most popular example Blockchain, the basic elements and models of the technology, the main spheres of its application in the framework of space activity in order to guarantee realization of rights and compliance with obligations of public and private space actors in the process of conducting the outer space activities, as well as legislative innovations to regulate the utilization of the Blockchain in different countries, as well as international standards and practices and promising legal mechanisms. Thus, the authors created logical preconditions to cover in this publication the prospects of state regulation of space activities in Ukraine using the Blockchain technology. The authors consider usage of different types of Blockchain ledgers (public ledger with authorized access and with/without special validator) to implement different tasks in the process of regulating space activities, such as guaranteeing fulfillment of conditions of foreign economic agreements on the basis of smart contracts concluded between business entities and for maintaining the state register of space objects. The research proposes several scenarios that are acceptable both in terms of technical characteristics of Blochchain and legal requirements under which a number of central authorities can exercise their powers to regulate space activities using distributed ledger technologies. In addition, the study demonstrates an effective mechanism for ensuring the allocation of responsibility for the registration of space objects between the owners of the launch vehicle and payload to prevent situations when the spacecraft remains unregistered in orbit as a result of non-compliance with contractual obligations or non-inclusion of certain clauses in such agreements. The model agreements between Ukrainian and foreign space actors are proposed to be implemented by governmental institutions and used as a preventing instrument, according to which a conflict of laws can be solved and the state responsible for registering space objects in the Blockchain Network can be defined.


Author(s):  
Fabio Tronchetti

China has made remarkable achievements in the space sector and has become one of the most relevant players in the outer space domain. Highlights of this process have been the deployment in orbit of the first Chinese space station, Tiangong-1, on September 29, 2011, and the landing of the Yutu rover on the lunar surface on December 14, 2013. While technological developments have occurred at such a rapid pace, the same cannot be said of the regulatory framework governing Chinese space activities, which still lays at its infant stage. Indeed, unlike other major spacefaring countries, China lacks a comprehensive and uniform national space legislation; as of now, China has enacted two low-level administrative regulations addressing the issues of launching and registration of space objects. With the growth of the Chinese space program, such a lack of structured national space law is beginning to show its limits and to raise concerns about its negative impact on business opportunities and the ability of China to fully comply with international obligations. One should keep in mind that international space treaties (China is part to four international space law treaties) are not self-executing, thus requiring states to adopt domestic measures to ensure their effective implementation. Importantly, Chinese authorities appear to be aware of these issues; as stated by the Secretary-General of the Chinese National Space Administration (CNSA) in 2014, national space law has been listed in the national legislation plan, and the CNSA is directly engaged in such a process. However, questions remain as to how this drafting process will be conducted and what legal form and content the law will have. For example, China could either decide to proceed with a gradual approach, consisting in the adoption of laws addressing selected issues to be eventually assembled into one single law or to directly move to the adoption of one comprehensive law. In any case, if enacted, a Chinese national space law would represent an important step in the advancement of the Chinese space program and in the progress of international space law as such.


SEEU Review ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 136-142
Author(s):  
Stefani Stojchevska

Abstract The 2016 United Nations’ Resolution 2325 “Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction” manifests one of the greatest challenges for humankind in relation to preventing a global catastrophe, where it reaffirms that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security. However, regarding the continuous technological developments of terrestrial-based WMD aimed at orbiting space objects in near-Earth orbit, it is crucial to analyze whether, and if so, how 2325 prevents their proliferation and utilization. Another relevant argument addresses the terminological factuality that, while treaty and customary law do provide some guidance on the legality of weaponization, the concept of a “space weapon” is still not clearly defined. Moreover, even though the Outer Space Treaty prohibits the placement of nuclear weapons and WMD in near-Earth orbit, installing them on the Moon or any other celestial body, or to otherwise station them in outer space, it simultaneously excludes terrestrial-based anti-satellite weapons, thus creating a legal loophole. National representatives of superpowers, particularly of space-faring nations, are aware of the existing issue and often express their concerns toward comprehensive ASAT development and utilization. Nevertheless, the potential weaponization of outer space will not be actively recognized and accepted as an official occurrence within the international community until our current space systems are eventually utilized in order to destroy or damage another State’s space object.


2016 ◽  
pp. 43-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. Vinokurov

The paper appraises current progress in establishing the Customs Union and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Although the progress has slowed down after the initial rapid advancement, the Union is better viewed not as an exception from the general rules of regional economic integration but rather as one of the functioning customs unions with its successes and stumbling blocs. The paper reviews the state of Eurasian institutions, the establishment of the single market of goods and services, the situation with mutual trade and investment flows among the member states, the ongoing work on the liquidation/unification of non-tariff barriers, the problems of the efficient coordination of macroeconomic policies, progress towards establishing an EAEU network of free trade areas with partners around the world, the state of the common labor market, and the dynamics of public opinion on Eurasian integration in the five member states.


2014 ◽  
Vol 91 (4) ◽  
pp. 43-55
Author(s):  
Scott Pittman

The story of anti-communism in California schools is a tale well and often told. But few scholars have appreciated the important role played by private surveillance networks. This article examines how privately funded and run investigations shaped the state government’s pursuit of leftist educators. The previously-secret papers of Major General Ralph H. Van Deman, which were opened to researchers at the National Archives in Washington, D.C., only a few years ago, show that the general operated a private spy network out of San Diego and fed information to military, federal, and state government agencies. Moreover, he taught the state government’s chief anti-communist bureaucrat, Richard E. Combs, how to recruit informants and monitor and control subversives. The case of the suspicious death of one University of California, Los Angeles student – a student that the anti-communists claimed had been “scared to death” by the Reds – shows the extent of the collaboration between Combs and Van Deman. It further illustrates how they conspired to promote fear of communism, influence hiring and firing of University of California faculty, and punish those educators who did not support their project. Although it was rarely successful, Combs’ and Van Deman’s coordinated campaign reveals a story of public-private anticommunist collaboration in California that has been largely forgotten. Because Van Deman’s files are now finally open to researchers, Californians can gain a much more complete understanding of their state bureaucracy’s role in the Red Scare purges of California educators.


2013 ◽  
Vol 62 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Mrówczyńska

Abstract The paper attempts to determine an optimum structure of a directional measurement and control network intended for investigating horizontal displacements. For this purpose it uses the notion of entropy as a logarithmical measure of probability of the state of a particular observation system. An optimum number of observations results from the difference of the entropy of the vector of parameters ΔHX̂ (x)corresponding to one extra observation. An increment of entropy interpreted as an increment of the amount of information about the state of the system determines the adoption or rejection of another extra observation to be carried out.


Author(s):  
Oleksandra Maslii ◽  
Andrii Maksymenko ◽  
Svitlana Onyshchenko

Place of monitoring and control of risks of financial stability of the state in the system of ensuring financial security of the state was substantiated. Methods of identifying threats to Ukraine's financial security through the current and strategic analysis of financial system development indicators were considered. Tendencies of economic development of Ukraine in the context of revealing sources of threats to financial stability of the state were analyzed. Dynamic analysis of the actual values of the financial security indicators of Ukraine as a whole and its separate components had been carried out. Threats to Ukraine's financial security were identified based on comparative and trend analysis. Reasons for the critical state of debt, banking and monetary security in the financial structure and the preconditions for the emergence of systemic threats had been investigated. Systematization of risks and threats to Ukraine's financial security by its components had been carried out. Influence of systemic threats in the financial sphere on the economic security of the state was generalized. International experience of monitoring financial stability of the state was analyzed. Additional risks to the national financial system are associated with the globalization and digitization of the state financial system that are not taken into account by valid methodological recommendations for calculating the level of economic security of Ukraine were highlighted.


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