The Research on the Designs of Optimal Contract when Carrying on Technical Transactions

2007 ◽  
Vol 10-12 ◽  
pp. 6-11
Author(s):  
Y.X. Sheng ◽  
W.G. Yang
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Operation Research ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Optimal Contract ◽  
Optimal Contracts ◽  
The Game Theory

This article utilizes the game theory of the complete information condition and incomplete information condition equilibrium as well as the operation research optimization knowledge, carries on the analysis to the technical transaction of optimal contracts design question, under each kind of situation, in view of the different situation, design each kind of different optimal contracts, thus to do business, both sides both can accept them.

Game Theory and Other Modeling Approaches

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank C. Zagare ◽  
Branislav L. Slantchev
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
International Relations ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Third Wave ◽  
Extensive Form ◽  
Interactive Decision Making ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Almost All

Game theory is the science of interactive decision making. It has been used in the field of international relations (IR) for over 50 years. Almost all of the early applications of game theory in international relations drew upon the theory of zero-sum games, but the first generation of applications was also developed during the most intense period of the Cold War. The theoretical foundations for the second wave of the game theory literature in international relations were laid by a mathematician, John Nash, a co-recipient of the 1994 Nobel Prize in economics. His major achievement was to generalize the minimax solution which emerged from the first wave. The result is the now famous Nash equilibrium—the accepted measure of rational behavior in strategic form games. During the third wave, from roughly the early to mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, there was a distinct move away from static strategic form games toward dynamic games depicted in extensive form. The assumption of complete information also fell by the wayside; games of incomplete information became the norm. Technical refinements of Nash’s equilibrium concept both encouraged and facilitated these important developments. In the fourth and final wave, which can be dated, roughly, from around the middle of the 1990s, extensive form games of incomplete information appeared regularly in the strategic literature. The fourth wave is a period in which game theory was no longer considered a niche methodology, having finally emerged as a mainstream theoretical tool.

scholarly journals Refinements and higher-order beliefs: a unified survey

2019 ◽  
Vol 71 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Atsushi Kajii ◽  
Stephen Morris
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Normal Form ◽  
Econ Theory ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Economic Modelling ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Standard Normal ◽  
Payoff Uncertainty ◽  
Theory Interpretation

AbstractThis paper presents a simple framework that allows us to survey and relate some different strands of the game theory literature. We describe a “canonical” way of adding incomplete information to a complete information game. This framework allows us to give a simple “complete theory” interpretation (Kreps in Game theory and economic modelling. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990) of standard normal form refinements such as perfection, and to relate refinements both to the “higher-order beliefs literature” (Rubinstein in Am Econ Rev 79:385–391, 1989; Monderer and Samet in Games Econ Behav 1:170–190, 1989; Morris et al. in Econ J Econ Soc 63:145–157, 1995; Kajii and Morris in Econ J Econ Soc 65:1283–1309, 1997a) and the “payoff uncertainty approach” (Fudenberg et al. in J Econ Theory 44:354–380, 1988; Dekel and Fudenberg in J Econ Theory 52:243–267, 1990).

A Research on the Internal Control Information’s Disclosure of Signal Game Model of the Listed Companies

2011 ◽  
Vol 403-408 ◽  
pp. 1676-1679
Author(s):  
Qi Jie Wang ◽  
Xiao Gang Wu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Information Disclosure ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Control Information ◽  
Policy Suggestions ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Control Message

This paper studied the game theory about that the listed companies used internal control disclosure as signal under the condition of incomplete information, constructed a signal game model to analyze the internal control information disclosure problem under the condition of incomplete information. It also proposed some policy Suggestions to inspire the listed companies to disclose internal control message veritably.

Applications of operation research in Zakah administration

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shafiu Ibrahim Abdullahi
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Operation Research ◽  
Financial Viability ◽  
Economic Progress ◽  
Research Techniques ◽  
Potential Applications ◽  
Poor Management ◽  
Mathematical Applications

The significance of the Zakah institution to any Islamic economy, it links to financial viability and economic progress has made it a must to modernize the sector to go in line with modern realities. Poor management of Zakah institutions has been described as detrimental to the efforts of these institutions to collect and disburse Zakah effectively. This paper looks at applications of mathematical and quantitative techniques with the view to achieving optimality and efficiency in business of collection and disbursement of Zakah. The mathematical applications tested are the techniques of contribution maximization, programming, and game theory. The potential applications of this field of mathematics to Zakah operations are vast. It calls for concerted efforts and focuses by researchers, policymakers and Islamic scholars on finding the most efficient way of deploying operation research techniques in the management of Zakah institutions.  

Reputation and Gossip in Game Theory

2019 ◽  
pp. 213-229
Author(s):  
Charles Roddie
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Third Party ◽  
The Past ◽  
Past Behavior ◽  
Future Behavior ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Shed Light

When interacting with others, it is often important for you to know what they have done in similar situations in the past: to know their reputation. One reason is that their past behavior may be a guide to their future behavior. A second reason is that their past behavior may have qualified them for reward and cooperation, or for punishment and revenge. The fact that you respond positively or negatively to the reputation of others then generates incentives for them to maintain good reputations. This article surveys the game theory literature which analyses the mechanisms and incentives involved in reputation. It also discusses how experiments have shed light on strategic behavior involved in maintaining reputations, and the adequacy of unreliable and third party information (gossip) for maintaining incentives for cooperation.

scholarly journals The Superiority of Quantum Strategy in 3-Player Prisoner’s Dilemma

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (12) ◽  
pp. 1443
Author(s):  
Zhiyuan Dong ◽  
Ai-Guo Wu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Quantum Game ◽  
Final State ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Initial States ◽  
Quantum Strategy ◽  
Selection Of

In this paper, we extend the quantum game theory of Prisoner’s Dilemma to the N-player case. The final state of quantum game theory of N-player Prisoner’s Dilemma is derived, which can be used to investigate the payoff of each player. As demonstration, two cases (2-player and 3-player) are studied to illustrate the superiority of quantum strategy in the game theory. Specifically, the non-unique entanglement parameter is found to maximize the total payoff, which oscillates periodically. Finally, the optimal strategic set is proved to depend on the selection of initial states.

scholarly journals Multi-Robot Searching using Game-Theory Based Approach

10.5772/6232 ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 44 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yan Meng
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Dynamic Programming ◽  
Utility Function ◽  
Real Time ◽  
Dynamic Environment ◽  
Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Strategy Equilibrium ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Target Searching ◽  
Multi Robot

This paper proposes a game-theory based approach in a multi–target searching using a multi-robot system in a dynamic environment. It is assumed that a rough priori probability map of the targets' distribution within the environment is given. To consider the interaction between the robots, a dynamic-programming equation is proposed to estimate the utility function for each robot. Based on this utility function, a cooperative nonzero-sum game is generated, where both pure Nash Equilibrium and mixed-strategy Equilibrium solutions are presented to achieve an optimal overall robot behaviors. A special consideration has been taken to improve the real-time performance of the game-theory based approach. Several mechanisms, such as event-driven discretization, one-step dynamic programming, and decision buffer, have been proposed to reduce the computational complexity. The main advantage of the algorithm lies in its real-time capabilities whilst being efficient and robust to dynamic environments.

scholarly journals Spillovers and R&D Incentive under Incomplete Information

2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 50-65 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rittwik Chatterjee ◽  
Srobonti Chattopadhyay ◽  
Tarun Kabiraj
Keyword(s):  
Distribution Function ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
General Distribution ◽  
Two Stage ◽  
Stage Game ◽  
Alternative Scenarios

Spillovers of R&D outcome affect the R&D decision of a firm. The present paper discusses the R&D incentives of a firm when the extent of R&D spillover is private information to each firm. We construct a two-stage game involving two firms when the firms first decide simultaneously whether to invest in R&D or not, then they compete in quantity. Assuming general distribution function of firm types we compare R&D incentives of firms under alternative scenarios based on different informational structures. The paper shows that while R&D spillovers reduce R&D incentives under complete information unambiguously, however, it can be larger under incomplete information. JEL Classification: D43, D82, L13, O31

scholarly journals Cooperative n-person Prisoner's Dilemma on a Network

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 ◽  
pp. 122-126
Author(s):  
Aleksandra L. Grinikh ◽  
◽  
Leon A. Petrosyan ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Pairwise Interaction ◽  
Network Interaction ◽  
The Game Theory

In the paper n-person prisoner's dilemma on the network is investigated. A cooperative game with the pairwise interaction of players is constructed. The model is a modification of the classic 2-person prisoner's dilemma problem in the game theory. Network interaction provide an ability to take into account the in uence only to the adjacent players from the whole set of players. The feature of the game is found that allows to make a decision about necessity of playing dominated strategy by a few players. This solution is based on the number of the adjacent players. The work is a continuation of the paper published earlier by Grinikh A.L. and Petrosyan L.A. in 2021.

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